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Abstract  
This thesis is concerned with the problems met by the administrative 
enforcers of the Antimonopoly Law (the AML 2007) of the People‘s Republic 
of China (PRC) during its public enforcement. It provides solutions to some of 
these problems with reference to EU competition law and US antitrust law. 
Although the thesis cannot solve all the problems once for all, it does provide 
effective solutions to the three following important issues: 1. how to 
establish and improve transparency of Chinese merger control procedure; 2. 
how to allocate public enforcement power of the AML 2007 between the 
Central and Provincial enforcers; and, 3. how to improve the protection of 
right of concerned parties during the AML 2007‘s public enforcement.  
Chinese Antimonopoly Law‘s public enforcement is still immature and 
experiencing further challenges for development. In order to establish a more 
effective, transparent and fair public enforcement regime, the thesis chooses 
EU competition law and US antitrust law to compare. Not only because they 
are more advanced, but also, because the AML 2007 is heavily influenced by 
the two regimes (especially the EU competition law regime). However, it is 
noteworthy that the experience from EU and US cannot solve all problems 
met by Chinese administrative enforcers; especially those are caused by 
Chinese political and economic structure which both EU and US do/did not 
have. Nevertheless, by solving the problems met in the above three aspects, 
the thesis has contributed to a more effective, transparent and fair public 
enforcement procedure for Chinese Antimonopoly Law. 
Translations of titles, authors, and publishers from Chinese works are 
unofficial, and the laws in this thesis are up to date at December 2012. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
1. Comparative perspectives of competition 
law’s public enforcement  
Competition law1 has become more prevalent as the commercial legal 
environment has developed globally especially since World War II.2More than 
112 countries have enacted their own competition law3. As Roscoe Pound said, 
‗Since the life of law is in its application and enforcement‘,4 competition law 
will fail to realise its promise unless effectively enforced. Hence the question 
arises as to what is the most effective way to enforce competition law. The 
answer to this question may vary according to jurisdiction. State‘s 
enforcement of competition law is influenced by its economic and political 
environment, legal tradition and resources and culture. However, there are 
                                         
1
The term ‗competition law‘ is widely used in the European Union, while in the United States 
‗antitrust law‘ is more common. China‘s new comprehensive competition law is called 
‗Antimonopoly law‘. But they all have the same essential meaning: laws dealing with 
anti-competitive activities. In order to be precise, the thesis adopts ‗antitrust law‘, ‗competition 
law‘ and ‗antimonopoly law‘ respectively for competition-related laws in United States, 
European Union and China. ‗Competition law‘ is used as a general term where there is no 
need to mention the law in different legal systems.  
2
See, W. Wells, Antitrust and the Formation of the Post war World,(2002)Columbia University 
Press, at 1. 
3
See, S.Panitchpakdi, Opening Address of the Sixth UN Conference to Review All Aspects of 
the Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business 
Practices, Geneva, 8-12 November 2010, available 
at:http://www.unctad.info/en/6th-UN-Conferenceon-Competition-Policy/Conference/Opening-
Address-by-Secretary-General-of-UNCTAD/ (last visited on 25 March 2011); See also, J.M. 
Jacobson (editor in chief),Antitrust Law Developments, volume I, 6th edition, (2007)ABA 
Publishing, at 1259.  
4
 R. Pound, Jurisprudence, 5
th
 edition, volume 1, (1959) Lawbook Exchange Ltd,at 353. 
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two mainstream approaches of enforcement that may be summarised from 
these enforcement systems: the European Union‘s competition law 
(hereafter the EU competition law) regime and the United States‘ antitrust 
law (hereafter the US antitrust law) regime.5 
From a procedural perspective the main distinctive characteristic of the 
two enforcement regimes is that the EU competition law is administrative, 
agency-orientated whereas the US approach is more 
court-orientated.6Despite the differences, there are some general similarities 
between the two main approaches. For example, both the EU and US 
approach have administrative agencies and courts to enforce the law, 
although their functions are quite different.7It is these differences and 
similarities that make the two regimes comparable and which forms the basis 
                                         
5
 Similar opinion can be found in Y.J. Jung & Q. Hao, ‗The New Economic Constitution in 
China: A Third way for Competition Regime?‘(2003) 24Northwestern journal of International 
law and Business, 107-171. 
6
Ibid, at 123. 
7
The Directorate General of Competition under the European Commission, as (one of) the EU 
competition law‘s administrative enforcers, gathered in one office the authority and 
competence of investigation, prosecution and first-instance decision making with regard to 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU‘s public  enforcement. See, A. Jones & B. Suffrin, EC Competition 
Law, Text, Cases and Materials, 3rd Edition, (2008) Oxford University Press, at 1147; The 
Antitrust Division under the Department of Justice, as the administrative enforcer of the 
Sherman Act, only has the authority of investigation and prosecution. See, H. Hovenkamp, 
Federal Antitrust Policy the Law of Competition and Its Practice, 3rd Edition, (2005) West 
Group, at 593.  
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for the further discussion on how to solve the problems of public enforcement 
of China‘s new Antimonopoly Law 8(hereafter the AML 2007). 
The AML 2007 was inevitably influenced by the two regimes, not merely 
because they are advanced or influential but also, more importantly, because 
China has decided to adopt the market economy.9 As Mark Williams wrote: 
Once they have accepted the ideological case for markets, then to 
prevent state monopolies simply becoming private ones and to prevent 
market distortion caused by collusive business practices or 
over-concentration of production by merger in few hands, governments 
see the need to implement a pro-competition policy through the 
mechanism of law.10 
Such influence is illustrated by the AML 2007‘s law making process and its 
substance. During the law-making process, Chinese legislators and officials 
                                         
8
 Chinese Antimonopoly Law was promulgated by the Standing Committee of National 
People‘s Congress on August, 30, 2007 and became effective on August, 1, 2008. The official 
Chinese edition of the Anti-Monopoly Law 2008 is available at: 
http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/2007-08/30/content_732591.htm, last visited on 23/02/2012, 
22:47. An unofficial English translation will be provided as an appendix in this thesis. 
9
See, Article 15 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (adopted on December 4, 
1982):The state practises socialist market economy [‘中华人民共和国宪
法’;’zhonghuaRenminGongheguoXianfa’]. 
10
M. Williams, ‗Adoption of the EC competition law model-Is it a Trojan horse for China?‘ in 
W.D. Chen (edited by), An Exploration of China’s Legislation on Competition [中国竞争法立法
探要,zhongguojingzhengfalifatanyao] (2006) Social Sciences Academic Press, at 332-333. 
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referred to US and EU officials regularly.11The substance of the AML2007, at 
least literally, followed the basic structure and legal settings of Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU.12The AML 2007‘s public enforcement is also administrative 
agency-orientated. 
On the other hand, the influence of the planned economy, meaning ‗an 
economic system in which the state or workers' councils manage the 
economy‘13 is also deep to the AML 2007.14For instance, administrative 
monopoly15is a focal point of the AML 2007 because it may foster low 
efficiency and poor-quality service, creates income gaps, encourages 
                                         
11
 See, M. Williams, Competition Policy and Law in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan,(2005) 
University of Cambridge Press; see also, R.H. Pate, ‗What I Heard in the Great Hall of the 
People: Realistic Expectations of Chinese Antitrust‘(2008-2009) 75 Antitrust Law 
Journal,195-211.  
12
See, Y.J. Jung & Q. Hao, ‗The New Economic Constitution in China: A Third way for 
Competition Regime?‘ supra note 5, at 124.   
13
See, J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, & P. Newman, The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of 
Economics,(1987) Palgrave Macmillan,at 879-880.  
14
 There is adequate literature on the influence of the planned economy, or the economic 
model of the Soviet Union upon the current Chinese economy, market structure and 
antimonopoly law. For further reading, see for example, N.C. Hope, D.T. Yang & M.Y. Li(edited 
by),How Far Across the River?: Chinese Policy Reform at the Millennium,(2003)Stanford 
University Press; J.L. Wu, ‗China's Economic Reform: Past, Present and Future‘ (2000) 
1(5)Perspectives, available at http://www.oycf.org/Perspectives2/5_043000/china.htm, last 
visited on 14/12/2012, 16:08; R.H. Pate, ‗What I Heard in the Great Hall of the People: 
Realistic Expectations of Chinese Antitrust‘, supra note 11; Y.J. Jung &Q. Hao, ‗The New 
Economic Constitution in China: A Third way for Competition Regime?‘ supra note 5, at 110; B. 
M. Owen, S. Sun & W.T. Zhang, ‗Antitrust in China: The Problem of Incentive Compatibility‘, 
(2005) 1 Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 123-148.  
15
 The term ‗administrative monopoly‘ in China refers to monopolistic activities initiated by 
government agencies‘ at various levels abusing regulatory or administrative power, including a 
wide variety of activities such as legalised monopolies and explicitly-prohibited ultra vires 
measures. See, Y.J. Jung &Q.Hao: The New Economic Constitution in China: A Third way for 
Competition Regime? supra note 5, at 113; see also, R.H. Pate,‗What I Heard in the Great Hall 
of the People: Realistic Expectations of Chinese Antitrust‘, supra note 11.  
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corruption and prevents the formation of a unified national 
market.16However, administrative monopoly may not be regarded as a 
significant problem either under the EU or the US.17 
The AML 2007 has been implemented for several years since 1st August 
2008. The time is now right and ripe to review and evaluate the performance 
of the Law‘s public enforcers. The aim is to identify the problems met by 
them during the years of the AML 2007‘s public enforcement and to see 
whether and which of these problems can be addressed by the experiences 
from EU competition law and US antitrust law.  
2. Current public enforcement of the AML 2007  
2.1 The current position of administrative enforcers 
under the AML 2007’s public enforcement  
There are three parallel administrative enforcers of the AML 2007 at the 
central government level: the Ministry of Commerce (the MOFCOM), the 
                                         
16
 See, H.N. Su, ‗The Adjustment of High Income in Monopoly Industries‘, China Economic 
Times, (June 1, 2001).  
17
 Under the EU or US regimes where the market economy has been well developed, 
competition law is traditionally perceived as dealing with only private anticompetitive conduct 
rather than government-based monopolies. Unlike mature market economies, transitional 
economies such as China‘s, face the task of creating, not simply maintaining competitive 
markets. See, B. Song, ‗Competition Policy in a Transitional Economy: the Case of China‘, 
(1995) 31 Stanford Journal of International Law, 387-422; see also,Y.J. Jung &Q.Hao, supra 
note 5, at127.   
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National Development and Reform Committee (the NDRC) and the State 
Administration of Industry and Commerce (the SAIC).18 
2.1.1 The Ministry of Commerce 
The MOFCOM is responsible for reviewing mergers under the AML 2007.19 
Despite the MOFCOM‘s efforts in issuing a range of guidance and interim 
measures which are designed to clarify the legal standards and procedures of 
the AML 2007‘s enforcement,20in practice it may be the most active of the 
three administrative enforcers because it is responsible for the area in which 
action must be taken.21 Pursuant to Article 30 of the AML 2008, the MOFCOM 
                                         
18
No.11Announcement of the State Council, (2008), available at the official website of the 
Central Government of PRC: http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2008-04/24/content_953471.htm, last 
visited on 26/02/2012, 10:49.  
19
See, the functions of the Antimonopoly Bureau of the MOFCOM, available at the official 
website of the Antimonopoly Bureau of MOFCOM: 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/gywm/200809/20080905756026.html, last visited on 
26/02/2012,14:18. 
20
By the 30th December, 2012, the MOFCOM has issued 7 guidelines. They are: Provisions of 
the State Council on Thresholds for Prior Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings(the 
Order of the MOFCOM, No. 529, 2008); the Guidelines on calculating the turnover of financial 
institutions for merger control purpose(the Order of the MOFCOM, No.10, 2009); the 
Measures for Declaration of the concentration(the Order of the MOFCOM, No.11,2009); the 
Measures for Investigation of Concentration(the Order of the MOFCOM, No.12,2009); the 
Interim Provisions for Implementation of Asset stripping and Business Divestiture of the 
Operators in Concentration(the Order of the MOFCOM, No.41,2010); the Interim Rules on 
Evaluating Competitive Effects of Concentration of Business Operators(the Order of the 
MOFCOM,No.55, 2011); and, the Interim Measures for Investigating and Handling Failure to 
Legally Declare the Concentration of Business Operators (the Order of the MOFCOM, No.6, 
2011). 
21
 By the 30
th
September 2012 the MOFCOM had issued 474 decisions on mergers under the 
AML 2007; 458 of them were cleared. See, the MOFCOM‘s notice, available 
athttp://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/xxfb/201211/20121108436852.html?291880069=7051440
26, last visited on 17/12/2012, 14:59.    
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is obliged to publish its decisions to prohibit concentrations or to clear them 
with restrictive conditions. By December 2012 the MOFCOM had published 16 
decisions.22 Since the number of cases dealt with by the SAIC and NDRC is 
limited, the cases in MOFCOM may offer the main source from which to 
illustrate the problems met by the central public authorities during 
enforcement. 
The first published case handled by the MOFCOM in accordance with the 
AML 2007 was that of the INBEV/Anheuser-Busch merger.23 On September 
11th 2008 the MOFCOM received the application materials of concentration 
from INBEV. After examination of these, opinions from relevant governmental 
departments, beer associations, major beer producers, raw materials 
producers and retailers in China, in accordance with Article 28 of the AML 
2007,24 the MOFCOM decided to approve this concentration on the following 
conditions: 1. this concentration is not permitted to increase the 
Anheuser-Busch‘s current proportion of shareholding in Tsingtao Brewery 
Company Limited (27%); 2. if the controlling shareholders or the shareholders 
                                         
22
 In accordance with Article 30 of the AML the MOFCOM is only obliged to publish its 
decisions when the concentration is prohibited or approved with restrictive conditions.  
23
See, the Public Announcement of the MOFCOM, No.95, [2008], available at the official 
website of the Antimonopoly Bureau of MOFCOM: 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/200811/20081105899216.html, last visited on 
14/04/2011, 23:43 
24
Article 28 of the AML provides that if the concentration may eliminate or restrict competition, 
MOFCOM shall make a decision to prohibit their concentration. However, if the undertakings 
concerned can prove that the advantages of such concentration to competition obviously 
outweigh the disadvantages, or that the concentration is in the public interest, the MOFCOM 
may decide not to prohibit their concentration. 
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of controlling shareholders of INBEV has changed, INBEV is obliged to notify 
this change immediately to the MOFCOM; 3. the 28.56% shareholding ratio 
owned by the INBEV in Zhujiang brewery Group Co. Ltd should not be 
increased; 4. the new company after the concentration of 
INBEV/Anheuser-Busch) is not permitted to hold shares in China Resources 
Snow Breweries Co. Ltd nor Beijing Yanjing Brewery Co. Ltd.25 
The very first step taken by the MOFCOM was immature and simple (the 
published decision is very short, one page only). The decision is in three parts, 
each of which is a simple description without any further explanation: 1. the 
examination procedure; 2. the decision on examination; 3. restrictive 
conditions. Firstly, the MOFCOM‘s decision did not give a clear definition of 
the relevant market. In particular, there is no explanation of how the 
geographic market was defined. Given that geographic markets are very 
important for beer consumption since beer is sold to consumers in regional 
geographic markets through a special distribution system,26 the lack of 
evidence in defining geographic market in this case would fundamentally 
weaken the legal grounds, if any, of the restrictive conditions imposed on this 
concentration. Secondly, this decision did not disclose any information on the 
competitive impact assessment of the case.27 Instead it merely stated that 
                                         
25
 See, the Public Announcement of the MOFCOM, No.95, [2008] 
26
See, X.Z. Zhang & V.Y.H. Zhang, ‗Chinese merger control: patterns and implications‘, (2010) 
6 (2) Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 477-496. 
27
Ibid, at 484. 
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the decision was made after examination of the application materials and 
consultation with the relevant government departments, producers and 
retailers and it did not provide any details of the process and content of the 
consultation. There is little information on the reasons for the MOFCOM‘s 
imposing restrictive conditions on this concentration and on how these 
conditions were reached. The MOFCOM did mention the parties‘ market share 
in its decision, but failed to prove the connection between the market shares 
and the anticompetitive effects brought by this concentration through any 
substantive analysis. Given the lack of information on the definition of 
geographic market and competitive impact assessment, the restrictive 
conditions imposed on the INBEV/Anheuser-Busch have insufficient grounds.28 
Since the MOFCOM did not explain why these restrictive conditions were 
imposed in its published decision, commentators suspected the restrictive 
conditions were based on China‘s industrial policies and national 
protectionism rather than competition law principles set by the AML 2007.29 
                                         
28
At least from its published decision there was no evidence or analysis to support the 
restrictive conditions. 
29
 See for example, S.Tucker, ‗INBEV ruling sparks fears for M&A in China‘. Financial Times, 
Nov, 30, 2008; see also, D. Wei, ‗China's Anti-monopoly Law and its Merger Enforcement: 
Convergence and Flexibility‘, (2011) 14(4) Journal of International Economic Law, 807-844; 
Q.X. Bu, ‗Anheuser-Busch InBev: the legal implication under the AML 2008‘, (2010) 31(6) 
European Competition Law Review, 239-247;X.Z. Zhang & V.Y.H. Zhang, ‗Chinese merger 
control: patterns and implications‘, supra note 26; C.H. Lyons, ‗The Dragon in the Room: 
China's Anti-Monopoly Law and International Merger Review‘, (2009) 62 Vanderbilt Law 
Review, 1577-1621.    
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The second decision from the MOFCOM was even more controversial. 
Coca Cola/Huiyuan30, as the first and only merger blocked by the MOFCOM, 
drew considerable attention. The MOFCOM received the application on 
September 18th, 2008. As it did in INBEV, the MOFCOM consulted the 
government departments of, trade associations, competitors in the 
fruit-juice market, upstream suppliers, downstream distributors, Coca Cola 
and Huiyuan, and economic and agricultural experts during the investigation. 
Again, no details of the consultation process were disclosed. After a 
two-phase‘ investigation the MOFCOM listed three negative effects of this 
concentration: 1. Coca Cola would be capable of transmitting its dominant 
position in the carbonated drinks market to the fruit juice beverage market 
through this concentration. Thus it would cause anticompetitive effects 
within the fruit-juice beverage market and harm consumer welfare; 2. after 
the concentration Coca Cola‘s market power would be significantly 
strengthened in the fruit juice beverage market as controlling the two 
well-known brands; the barriers to entry into the fruit-juice beverage market 
would be significantly raised after the concentration; 3. the concentration 
would restrain the ability to enter into competition and independent 
innovation of small and/or medium size fruit-juice beverage companies in 
                                         
30
See, the Public Announcement of the MOFCOM, No.22, [2009], available at the official 
website of the Antimonopoly Bureau of MOFCOM: 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/200903/20090306108494.html, last visited on 
25/04/2011, 23:43.  
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China. Hence, under Articles 28 and 29 of the AML 2007 the MOFCOM decided 
to prohibit the concentration between Coca Cola Company and Huiyuan 
Company.31The prohibition was imposed for two reasons: firstly, the MOFCOM 
feared Coca Cola would transmit its dominant market power in the 
carbonated drinks market to the fruit-juice beverage market and harm 
competition in the fruit juice beverage market through this concentration; 
secondly, the MOFCOM was afraid that the benefit of small and medium 
fruit-juice enterprises would be jeopardised because, for example, this 
concentration might increase the barrier of entry into the fruit-juice 
market.32 
However, again the MOFCOM failed to provide sufficient evidence and 
persuasive reasoning to justify the above arguments. In particular, a clear 
examination of the definition of the relevant market, which the MOFCOM did 
not disclose, was essential in this case. The MOFCOM defined the whole fruit- 
juice beverage as the relevant market. The main reason is that different fruit 
juices are highly substitutable but they have low substitutability with 
carbonated soft drinks.33 There is no evidence of the type of analysis used 
                                         
31
Ibid. 
32
Ibid. 
33
See J. Yao, MOFCOM Spokesman, Responds to the Journalists Regarding the Antitrust 
Review of the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan Case, March 24, 2009, available at 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ae/ag/200903/20090306123715.html, last visited on 
29/02/2012, 14:04.  
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and how MOFCOM arrived at such conclusions.34 In fact there are plenty of 
literatures providing solid economic analysis on this issue available to the 
MOFCOM.35 
Another cornerstone in the MOFCOM‘s reasoning is that the Coca-Cola‘s 
dominant market position in the carbonated soft drink market in China may 
leverage its market power in the carbonated soft drink market to the fruit 
juice beverage market. Again, there was no evidence disclosed on how the 
MOFCOM reached this conclusion. Similar to the INBEV case, mainly on the 
basis of Coca-Cola‘s market power in the carbonated soft drink market, 
MOFCOM established a prima facie case for market foreclosure.36 
Lack of analysis or lack of disclosure of evidence of the MOFCOM‘s 
reasoning made this prohibition arbitrary and raised the concern of the 
                                         
34
See, X.Z. Zhang & V.Y.H. Zhang, ‗Chinese merger control: patterns and implications‘, supra 
note 26, at 487.  
35
 See for examples, J.P. Dube, ‗Product Differentiation and Mergers in the Carbonated Soft 
Drink Industry‘, (2005) 14Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 879-904; F. Gasmi, 
J.J. Laffont& Q. Vuong, ‗Econometric Analysis of Collusive Behavior in a Soft-drink Market‘, 
(1992) 1 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 277-311; R. Wayland: Coca-Cola 
versus Pepsi-Cola and the Soft Drink Industry, Harvard Business Review, 1992, available at 
http://hbr.org/product/coca-cola-vs-pepsi-cola-and-the-soft-drink-industr/an/391179-PDF-ENG, 
last visited on 16/03/2012,14:41. It is noteworthy that there is a Chinese private academic 
institution offered a solid and detailed economic analysis on the relevant market definition in 
the Coca Cola/Huiyuan. See,Xin Hong Jun Commerce and Industrial Economic Research 
Studio: Lack of Positive Analysis of China’s Relevant Market Definition: Coca-Cola/Huiyuan as 
an example[论我国相关市场界定实证分析的缺失——以汇源并购案为研究视
角,lunwoguoxiangguanshichangjiedingshizhengfenxidequeshi——yihuiyuanbinggouanweiyanj
iushijiao],(2011), available at 
http://huiguijiandan.blog.163.com/blog/static/178923061201122142052415/, last visited on 
29/02/2012, 14:50. 
 
36
X.Z. Zhang & V.Y.H. Zhang, supra note 26, at 488.  
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MOFCOM‘s lack of legal certainty. Commentators suspected that this decision 
was inspired by protectionism and national sentiment rather than 
competition law.37 Although the MOFCOM denied this claim,38it is still not 
clear that this decision indicated MOFCOM‘s protectionism of trade until 
more detail of analysis and definition of the relevant market had been added 
in the decision. Increasing the transparency of the MOFCOM‘s decision and 
decision-making process will benefit companies and investors in China 
because the legal certainty of merger control would be increased.  
In Mitsubishi/Lucite39 the MOFCOM approved the merger with restrictive 
conditions. The process of investigation was similar. It is noteworthy that, 
firstly, in this case the MOFCOM clearly defined MMA (a polymer necessary to 
make acrylic glass) as the relevant market. However, there was no analysis 
explaining how and why the MOFCOM defined the relevant market. Secondly, 
the MOFCOM classified the competition effects brought by this concentration 
                                         
37
 See for example, C.H. Lyons, ‗The Dragon in the Room: China's Anti-Monopoly Law and 
International Merger Review‘, supra note 29;X.Z. Zhang & V.Y.H Zhang, supra note 26; Q.X. 
Bu,‗Coca-Cola v. Huiyuan-Market-economy Driven or Protectionism?‘ (2010) 41(2) 
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 202-210;F. Deng, A. Emch 
& G. K. Leonard,‗A Hard Landing in the Soft Drink Market-MOFCOM‘s Veto of the Coca Cola 
&Hui Yuan Deal‘, Global Competition Policy, April 2009, Release 2; J. Sun & M. Zhai, 
‗Thinking Over the Antimonopoly Law on China‘s Foreign Investors‘ Merger and Acquisitions: 
Taking Coca Cola/Huiyuan as an Example‘, (2009) 37(3) Journal of Xinjiang University, 45-51; 
G.P. Ying, ‗Some Thoughts about the Proposed Acquisition of Huiyuan by Coca Cola from the 
Perspective of Antimonopoly Law‘, (2010) 12(6) Journal of Southwest University of Political 
Science& Law, 42-48. 
 
38
See,J. Yao, supra note 33. 
39
The Public Announcement of the MOFCOM, No.28, [2009], available at 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/200904/20090406198805.html?2560677784=70514402
6, last visited on 28/04/2011, 16:19.  
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as horizontal and vertical effects. In relation to the horizontal effect, 
depending on the high market share after the concentration (64%), the 
MOFCOM presumed that Mitsubishi/Lucite post-merger company would have 
market power to exclude or restrict its rivals in the Chinese MMA market. In 
relation to the vertical effect the Mitsubishi/Lucite might leverage its market 
power in the MMA market to eliminate and restrict competition in 
downstream markets.40 Again, there was no analysis to support these 
conclusions. The only basis of the MOFCOM ruling was market share. There 
may be problems with the remedies too. For example, the third condition 
imposed on Mitsubishi/Lucite was that the merged company be disallowed / 
forbidden to initiate any new acquisition or build additional industry for five 
years after this merger. This condition was designed to promote competition 
by protecting rivals, but may itself be anticompetitive.41 
In GM/Delphi42the MOFCOM failed to define a geographic market and a 
relevant product market clearly again. The MOFCOM said it assessed this 
concentration comprehensively but did not reveal any details of the 
assessment. It mentioned that GM had a ‗leading position in the auto market 
                                         
40
Ibid. 
41
X.Z. Zhang & V.Y.H. Zhang, ‗Chinese merger control: patterns and implications‘, supra note 
26.  
42
The Public Announcement of the MOFCOM, No.76, [2009], available at 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/200909/20090906540211.html?1906497432=70514402
6, last visited on 28/04/2011, 16:38. 
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in China and in the world‘43 but did not provide any statistic, such as the 
market share of GM in Chinese auto market, to support this claim although 
this was one of the cornerstones of the decision to impose restrictive 
conditions on this concentration. 
In the later published merger cases44 the problem is generally the same: 
the MOFCOM did not provide clear and sufficient evidence to support its 
conclusion on defining the relevant market and competitive impact 
assessment.45 
2.1.2 The National Development and Reform Committee 
The NDRC, a government agency with broad responsibilities that include 
ensuring price stability in key areas of China‘s economy, is responsible for 
action against price-related violations of the AML 2007.46 In December 2012 
the NDRC issued two guidelines on anti-price-related monopoly enforcement: 
                                         
43
Ibid. 
44
 By December 2012 there were13 additional cases published by the MOFCOM. They are: 
Savio/Penelope; GE/Shenhua; Seagate/Samsung;Henkel HK/Tian De; Western Digital/Viviti 
Technologies; Google / Motorola Mobility; Google / Motorola Mobility; 
Walmart/Yihaodian;ARM, Giesecke/ Devrient. Available officially online at 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/static/ztxx/ztxx.html/1?3176597381=705144026, last visited on 
03/12/2012, 21:52.      
45
 Nevertheless, it is noteworthy thatthe economic analysis in MOFCOM‘s Seagate/Samsung 
decision is significantly more detailed than that of earlier decisions. 
46
 See,No.11 Announcement of the State Council, (2008), supra note 18.  
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the Provision against Price Monopoly47 and the Provision of Procedure against 
Price Monopoly.48 
The NDRC has gained a little experience in dealing with anti-price-fixing 
agreements. In TravelSky, 49 China TravelSky Holding Company (hereafter, 
TravelSky) was a national enterprise under State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission of the State Council (hereafter, the SASAC). 
It owned the only tickets agency and sale system in China and the market 
share in (year) reached 97% in the domestic civil aviation ticket computer 
booking market.Between March and May 2009 TravelSky decided to adopt a 
new formula to calculate the discount of air tickets. It was suspected of 
violating the AML by fixing the price of civil aviation tickets and the NDRC has 
initiated investigation. However, the case is still pending. The NDRC was 
reported to have faced great difficulty in collecting evidence.50 In addition, 
                                         
47
See, Order of NDRC, No.7 (2010), Available on the official website of the Central 
Government of thePRC: http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2011-01/04/content_1777969.htm, last visited 
on12/05/2011, 10:11. The official English version is currently unavailable. An unofficial one 
can be found at: 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/NetLaw/display.aspx?db=law&sen=rLdDdW4drhdDdWEdrhd6d
W4d/DdDdW4d9DdydWhd/ddDdWud9ddwdWfd9ddGdWud/ddTdWud9Dd+&Id=8440&, last 
visited on 12/05/2011, 10:11.  
48
See, Order of NDRC, No.8 (2010), Available at the official website of the Central 
Government of PRC: http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2011-01/04/content_1777998.htm, last visited on 
12/05/2011, 10:31.  
49
This case was handled by the NDRC in May, 2009. However, the ruling has not been 
published on the official journal or website of the NDRC. The process of this case can be found 
onhttp://caac.people.com.cn/GB/114103/9315281.html, last visited on 15/05/2011, 12:20.  
50
 B.Q. Wang& W.X.Liu,‗NDRC investigated Travelsky for manipulating ticket price‘, The 
Economic Observer, 15th, May, 2009. Available at 
http://www.eeo.com.cn/eeo/jjgcb/2009/05/18/137787.shtml, last visited on 15/05/2011, 11:04. 
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TravelSky is a SOE under the direct supervision of the SASAC, which is in the 
same administrative hierarchy as the NDRC. Since the process of investigation 
has not been published, the detail of the difficulty met by the NDRC in this 
case cannot be identified.  
It is noteworthy that the NDRC has completed its first antitrust action in 
the pharmaceutical sector under the AML 2007. On 14 November 2011 the 
NDRC published a decision to sanction the anti-competitive conduct of 
Shandong Weifang Shuntong Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. (hereafter, the 
Shuntong) and Weifang Huaxin Medicine Trading Co.Ltd. (hereafter, the 
Huaxin).51The NDRC found that the two companies had entered into exclusive 
sales agreements with the only two manufacturers of the ingredient, thereby 
gaining full control of the domestic supply of promethazine hydrochloride. 
Shuntong and Huaxinthen raised the sales price of promethazine 
hydrochloride.The NDRC decided to impose fines of close to RMB 7 million 
upon Shuntong and around RMB 150,000 on Huaxin.52 The announcement 
published by the NDRC did not identify which AML provision had been 
infringed. It merely held that Shuntong and Huaxin had unlawfully gained 
control over the supply of promethazine hydrochloride and stated that the 
                                         
51
 J. Liu,‗Drug firms face monopoly fines‘, China Daily, (15, November, 2011), available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/business/2011-11/15/content_14095767.htm, last visited on 
01/03/2012, 20:51.  
52
 See, N. Susan, L. Ding, J. Liu & Y.M. Sun,‗NDRC Fined TwoPharmaceutical Companies for 
Abusive Conducts‘, China Law Insight,  King & Wood, 12 December, 2011, available at 
http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2011/12/articles/corporate/antitrust-competition/ndrc-fined-tw
o-pharmaceutical-companies-for-abusive-conducts/, last visited on 01/03/2012, 21:10.   
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AML and Price Law prohibited such actions constituting ‗abuse of a monopoly 
position and the implementation of price monopoly conduct in order to 
eliminate or restrict competition, hike prices and reap excessive profits to 
the detriment of consumer interests.‘53Several points may be concluded from 
this case. Firstly, the fine imposed on Shuntong far exceeds the previously 
highest fine for an antitrust infringement.54 This indicates the NDRC‘s 
tendency to increase the level of fines for antitrust violations. Secondly, at 
least from this case, that the two companies fined by the NDRC are domestic 
capital firms indicates that the nationality of the capital firms under 
investigation may not be a decisive factor for the NDRC.55 Thirdly, the NDRC's 
action against Shuntong and Huaxin in the pharmaceutical sector shows, at 
least to some extent, its determination to enforce competition law in 
industries dominated by sector regulation.56 
More importantly, in November 2011 the NDRC‘s officials told the domestic 
press that they were investigating a potential abuse of dominance by China 
                                         
53
For the original news release on the NDRC's website (in Chinese), please refer to: 
http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/t20111115_444599.htm, last visited on 01/03/2012, 21:17.  
54
 Before this case, the highest fine imposed by the NDRC was on Unilever, around RMB 2 
million. See, Q.F. Ding &Y. Wang,‗Unilever's price rise 'a corporate decision'‘, China Daily, 27, 
May, 2011.  
55
 P. Cheng, A. Emch, S. Q. Fu, A. McGinty, W. Jun, H. Wheare, D. Wong,‗Strong Medicine 
for Law Breakers - NDRC's First Antitrust Action in the Pharmaceutical Sector under the 
Anti-Monopoly Law‘,Hogan Lovells, 29 November 2011, available 
athttp://www.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication/a029e38d-a052-4bb5-82c4-8bc1bef386b5/Pr
esentation/PublicationAttachment/ec637564-1b54-4cb6-ad66-7a56b4145ff2/Strong%20Medic
ine%20for%20Law%20Breakers.pdf,  last visited on 01/03/2012, 22:05; 
56
In fact, the NDRC itself is a major sector regulator of pharmaceutical sector.  The NDRC 
itself plays a major role in setting the prices of many essential drugs.  
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Telecom and China Unicom.57 Again, without an official decision or 
announcement, the exact facts, process and result of investigation are not 
clear. However, the NDRC started tackling SOEs. The ongoing China Telecom 
and China Unicom case could be important as it will answer the question 
whether and to what extent the AML 2007 applies to SOEs in law and in 
practice.58 
2.1.3 State Administration of Industry and Commerce  
The SAIC is responsible for action against non-price related violations of 
the AML 2007.59Since December 2012 the SAIC has issued five guidelines on 
non-price anticompetitive agreements, non-price abuse of dominant position 
and administrative monopoly, respectively.60These guidelines are largely 
                                         
57
 See,L. Pang, ‗NDRC: China Unicom and China Telecom under Investigation‘, the Economic 
Observer, 9 November, 2011. English version is available at 
http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/2011/1109/215349.shtml, last visited on 01/03/2012, 22:48.    
58
 See, N. Petit, ‗Chinese Antitrust Law – The Year of the Rabbit in Review (1) & (2)‘, Chillin' 
Competition, (23 January, 2012), available at 
http://chillingcompetition.com/2012/01/23/chinese-antitrust-law-the-year-of-the-rabbit-in-revie
w-1/, last visited on 01/03/2012, 22:54.  
59
See, the internal institutions‘ responsibility and settings of the SAIC, available at 
http://www.saic.gov.cn/zzjg/zyzz/, last visited on 02/03/2012, 16:16. 
60
 See Procedural Rules for the Industry and Commerce Administration Authorities of 
Investigating and Treating Administrative Monopoly related Cases(Order of SAIC, 2009, 
No.41);Procedural Rules for the Industry and Commerce Administration Authorities of 
Investigating and Treating Monopolistic Agreement and Abuse of Dominant Position 
Cases(Order of SAIC, 2009, No.42); Rules Concerning Prohibition of Monopolistic 
Agreements(Order of SAIC, 2010, No.53); Rules Concerning Prohibition of Abuse Market 
Dominance(Order of SAIC, 2010, No.54) and Rules Concerning Administrative 
Monopoly(Order of SAIC, 2010, No.55). All these rules are available (in Chinese only) on the 
official website of the SAIC:http://www.saic.gov.cn/fldyfbzdjz/zcfg/zcfg/index.html, last visited 
on 02/03/2012, 10:25.     
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repetition of the content of AML 2007. Despite this, the actual casework of 
the SAIC was limited. The first published enforcement decision by the SAIC 
was Lian Yun Gang’s Concrete Association.61 In this case the Industry and 
Commercial Administration of Jiang Su province (hereafter the ICJS), which is 
under the leadership of SAIC, received a complaint that the Concrete 
Association of Lian Yun Gang (hereafter, the CA) organised the premixed 
concrete companies in the association to reach agreements of Market 
Segmentation and price-fixing. The ICJS conducted preliminary investigation 
of the case and applied the authority of enforcing the AML 2007 to the SAIC 
since this jurisdiction is in the hands of the central government. The SAIC 
authorised the ICJS to investigate the case. At first the investigation was 
effective because the CA did not realise that they might have violated the 
AML. When the CA realised that it might have violated the AML, it did not 
want to continue to cooperate with the ICJS but it was too late. The crucial 
evidence had been collected by the ICJS.62 Then the ICJS organised a hearing 
to hear the opinions of the CA. The main claim of the CA was that the 
‗premixed concrete company‘s self-discipline terms‘ and ‗punishment rules‘ 
were a kind of self-rescue measure to overcome overcapacity in the current 
sluggish economic circumstance. The ICJS denied this claim. The ICJS held 
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 See, F. Yao,‗The first AML case enforced by the SAIC has been sealed: the market 
segmentation agreement of LianYungang‘s association‘, Legal Daily, 02/03/2011.  
62
Ibid. 
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that this agreement violated Article 13 of the AML 200863 and imposedan 
injunction against the Association to cease the illegal conduct, as well as a 
fine of RMB 200,000 on 5 of the 16 defendants. 
As the first completed public enforcement case of AML 2007dealt with by 
the SAIC, there are several notable points. Firstly, the relationship between 
the SAIC and the ICJS indicates the allocation of the AML‘s public 
enforcement authority between the central government and the local 
government. After a preliminary investigation the ICJS applied for leave to 
enforce the AML to the SAIC. This clearly indicated that the ICJS‘s authority 
to enforce the AML comes from the SAIC of the central government. Secondly, 
the defendant‘s knowledge of antitrust violation was limited. During the 
investigation the CA did not realise its investigated dealing might breach the 
AML until the ICJS obtained the decisive evidence. Thirdly, the rights of the 
concerned parties in this case were not sufficiently protected. For example, 
the evidence was collected from the defendant when it was unaware of the 
violation. The concern of right against self-incrimination might be raised. Nor 
did the defendant have the right of access to the Commission‘s file or legal 
professional privilege. However, the ICJS did respect the defendant‘s right to 
be heard by holding an oral hearing for the CA. Lastly, the ICJS did not 
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Article 13 of the AML 2008 states that fixing or changing prices of commodities shall be 
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explain how the penalty was calculated, nor did it explain why only 5 of the 
16 business operators were fined. 
2.2 Current practice of the courts under the AML 
2007’s public enforcement  
Under the AML 2007‘s public enforcement regime,64the courts have the 
legal duty to conduct judicial review of the administrative enforcers‘ 
decisions taken under the AML 2007.65In relation to the MOFCOM‘s merger 
assessment decision the dissatisfied party must firstly apply for 
administrative reconsideration. If it is still dissatisfied with the result of 
administrative reconsideration, it then may file for administrative litigation 
before the court.66 In cases of monopolistic agreement and alleged abuse of 
dominant market position the plaintiff may challenge the SAIC or the NDRC‘s 
decision freely either by applying for administrative reconsideration or by 
filing for administrative litigation in the court.67 However, at the time of 
writing there has been no judicial review under the AML 2007. One may be 
curious about the reason why there is zero judicial review judgement. This 
                                         
64
Article 50 of the AML 2007 states: ―Where the monopolistic conduct of an undertaking has 
caused losses to another person, it shall bear civil liabilities.‖ Hence the courts are also 
responsible for dealing with civil cases brought by private parties related to Antimonopoly Law 
in relation to the private enforcement of the Law. However, this is out of the scope of this thesis. 
For the details of the civil private antitrust enforcement conducted by the courts, please refer to: 
Report on Competition Law and Policy of China 2010, (2010)edited by Competition law and 
policy Committee of China WTO Research Institution, at 188-189.  
65
See, Article 53 of the AML 2007. 
66
 See, para.1, ibid.  
67
Paragraph 2 of Article 53 of the AML. 
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fact raises concerns about whether the courts are capable of conducting 
judicial review under the AML 2007.68 
3. Structural and technical problems in the 
public enforcement of the AML 2007 
A brief examination of the current position of the public enforcement of 
the AML 2007 from August 2008 to December 2012 shows that there are 
problems with the performance of both the administrative enforcers and the 
courts. These problems may be roughly divided into two categories: 
structural problems and technical problems. This classification is based on 
the several causes of the problems.69 
The structural problems include: 1. lack of independent judiciary; 2. the 
close relationship between the administrative enforcers of the AML 2007, the 
                                         
68
 See for example, Report on Competition Law and Policy of China 2010, supra note 64;See 
also,D.B. Yuan, ‗Why there is little case before the courts in relation to the Antimonopoly Law‘s 
enforcement: an Explanation from the Supreme Court‘,  Legal Daily,  1
st
, September, 2008. 
69
 This classification is used in the research on the sector and economic reforms of China and 
other transitional countries to illustrate different tasks faced by the reformers of the sector 
industries and economy. For instance, J.Sachs and W.T.Woo provided some targets of 
structural reform:enterprise (SOEs) reform,trade liberalization and price reform. J.Sachs 
&W.T.Woo, ‗Structural factors in the economic reforms of China, Eastern Europe, and the 
Former Soviet Union‘, (1994) 9(18) Economic Policy, 101-145, at 103; See also, S.F. Xu& W.Y. 
Chen, ‗The reform of electricity power sector in the PR of China‘, (2006) 34 Energy Policy, 
2455-2465,at 2460. However, there are relatively less literatures in the field of Chinese 
antitrust laws using the classification to examine its public enforcement problems. In theReport 
on Competition Law and Policy of China 2010,the authors mentioned that Chinese AML 
2007‘s public enforcement is facing ‗dual structural and technical challenges‘, but there is no 
further explanation about the meaning of the terms. See, Report on Competition Law and 
Policy of China 2010, supra note 64, at 145.  
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sector regulators and the SOEs. A structural problem is usually caused by the 
Chinese current economic and political system, and the situation of the 
transactional economy period. It cannot be totally solved merely by a 
technical improvement. For example, lack of judicial independence is a 
structural problem rooted in the Chinese political system.70 Many 
commentators doubted that China‘s ill-suited judicial review system would 
be capable of protecting the right of defence and guarantee legal certainty in 
the AML 2007‘s enforcement.71 
A technical problem in this thesis refers to which has little relevance to 
Chinese political structure and industrial policy; it is the specific procedural 
problem under the AML 2007‘s public enforcement. It can be solved, or at 
least improved under the current Chinese political structure. For example, 
antitrust enforcement authority‘s allocation between administrative 
enforcers at the central governmental level and the local level is unclear. 
This relationship can be clarified by issuing guidelines or rules.   
3.1 Structural problems  
                                         
70
This issue will be discussed in more detail in the following section.  
71
 See for examples, M. Williams, Competition Policy and Law in China, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan,supra note 11, at 219-220; Y.J. Jung &Q.Hao,‗The New Economic Constitution in 
China: A Third way for Competition Regime?‘supra note 5, at 161; B. Song,‗Competition Policy 
in a Transitional Economy: the Case of China‘, supra note 17; B. M. Owen, S. Sun & W.T. 
Zhang,‗Antitrust in China: The Problem of Incentive Compatibility‘,supra note 14, at 137.  
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There are two major structural problems in enforcement of the AML 2007: 
lack of independent judicial review and administrative enforcers‘ close and 
the ambiguous relationship of sector regulators and SOEs.72 
3.1.1 Lack of independent judiciary73 
Although some scholars have argued that the AML 2007 may still be 
effectively enforced even without an independent judiciary,74 lack of 
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For  discussions on these two issues, see, for general examples, M. Williams, Competition 
Policy and Law in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, supra note 11; H. S. Harris Jr.,‗The Making 
of an Antitrust Law: The Pending Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China‘, (2006) 
7(1) Chicago Journal of International Law, 169-229; T. Brooks, ‗China‘s Antimonopoly Law: 
History, Application and Enforcement‘, (2011) 16 Appeal, 31-48; R.H. Pate,‗What I Heard in 
the Great Hall of the People: Realistic Expectations of Chinese Antitrust‘, supra note 11;S.K. 
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problem faced by the AML 2007‘s public enforcers.);A.H.Y. Zhang, ‗The enforcement of the 
Anti-Monopoly Law in China: An institutional design perspective‘,(2011) 36(3) Antitrust Bulletin, 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1783037, last visited on 04/03/2012, 21:46; B. 
Song,‗Competition Policy in a Transitional Economy: the Case of China‘, supra note 17; Y.J. 
Jung &Q.Hao, ‗The New Economic Constitution in China: A Third Way for Competition 
Regime‘, supra note 5. 
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 Article126 of Chinese Constitution (hereafter, the Constitution, passed and enacted on 4
th
, 
December, 1982, by the fifth National People‘s Congress) provides that Chinese courts shall 
be independent of government, non-governmental organisations and individuals. This can be 
seen as a basic definition of judicial independence in China in the view of legislators. At the 
least it refers to the ability of judges to decide disputes impartially despite real, potential, or 
proffers of favour. See, M. GurArie& R. Wheeler, ‗Judicial Independence in the United States: 
Current Issues and Relevant Background Information‘, Guidance for Promoting Judicial 
Independence and Impartiality, revised edition, (United States, 2002), 133-147. Judiciary in 
this thesis is limited to the system of courts, excluding the Procuratorate (the special form of 
prosecutors with a broad supervisory mandate in China). For further discussion of 
procuratorate, please refer to G. Ginsburgs& A. Stahnke, ‗The Cenesis of the People's 
Procuratorate in Communist China 1949-1951‘, (1964) 20 The China Quarterly, 1-83. 
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judicial independence has already caused problems with regard to the Law‘s 
enforcement. Courts are responsible for reviewing the first instance decisions 
made by the administrative enforcers.75 However, as noted, since December 
2012 there has been no judicial review case. One might attribute this fact to 
the courts‘ lack of experience of dealing with judicial review under the new 
AML 2007.76 This is undeniable; however, in fact judicial review is based on 
the Administrative Procedural Law77(hereafter, the APL 1999) rather than the 
AML 2007. The APL 1999 has been in force for 13 years.78 And, at least 
procedurally, there is no significant difference between judicial review of an 
antitrust case and other ordinary specific administrative Acts?79Judges at 
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See, Article 53 of the AML 2007. 
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Meng,‗Research on China‘s judicial review system of antitrust law [我国反垄断法司法审查制度
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Legal Daily, 1st, September, 2008;D.J. Gerber, ‗Constructing competition law in China: the 
potential value of European and US experience‘, (2004) 3Washington University Global 
Studies Law Review,315-331.  
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The Order of President of People‘s Republic of China, No.16, [1999], came into force on 1
st
, 
October, 1999. Official version is available at 
http://www.zjgxzsp.gov.cn/public/LawsItem.aspx?id=2702, last visited on07/03/2012, 11:40. 
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A detailed discussion of Chinese Administrative Law and Administrative Procedural Law is 
out of the scope of this thesis. For who is interested, please refer to: M.A. Jiang,Administrative 
Law and Administrative Litigation Law[行政法与行政诉讼法, 
xingzhengfayuxingzhengsusongfa],5
th
 edition,(2011)Beijing University Press.  
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According to Article 11 of the APL 1999, courts shall accept appeals towards 8 specific 
administrative acts:  1. an administrative sanction, such as detention, fine, rescission of a 
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least should not be unfamiliar with the procedure of the judicial review under 
the AML 2007.  
There may be other reasons why the number of antitrust judicial review 
cases before the courts is zero.  A deeper reason might be that China‘s lack 
of judicial independence has fundamentally weakened the effectiveness and 
credibility of the courts. Under Chinese Constitution, the judiciary is merely 
an organ of the government, and probably the weakest.80Judges are often 
affected by the will of governmental officials and orders from the Politics and 
Law Committees (hereafter, the PLC), which are responsible for supervising 
the work of courts according to the China Communist Party‘s will (hereafter 
the CCP).81 Besides, the courts‘ budget is mainly determined by the 
                                                                                                                     
infringement upon one's managerial decision-making powers, which is considered to have 
been perpetrated by an administrative organ;4. refusal by an administrative organ to issue a 
permit or license, which one considers oneself legally qualified to apply for, or its failure to 
respond to the application;5. refusal by an administrative organ to perform its statutory duty of 
protecting one's rights of the person and of property, as one has applied for, or its failure to 
respond to the application;6. cases where an administrative organ is considered to have failed 
to issue a pension according to law;7. cases where an administrative organ is considered to 
have illegally demanded the performance of duties; and 8. cases where an administrative 
organ is considered to have infringed upon other rights of the person and of property. Apart 
from the provisions set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the people's courts shall accept 
other administrative suits which may be brought in accordance with the provisions of relevant 
laws and regulations.  
80
See, M.U.Killion, ‗Post-WTO China and independent judicial review‘, (2003-2004) 26Houston 
Journal of International Law,507-559; see also, Y.W. Li, ‗Court reform in China: Problems, 
Progress and Prospects‘, in J.F. Chen, Y.W. Li and J.M.Otto (edited by), Implementation of 
Law in the People’s Republic of China, (2002) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, at pp.55-83. 
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 For details of the functions of the PLCs, please refer to the official websites of PLCs in 
central and local governments. See also, Y.W. Li,ibid, at 59.   
Chapter 1 Introduction 
28 
 
government where the court located.82 The independence of Chinese 
judiciary is thus affected. This is a structural problem which deeply rooted in 
Chinese political structure.  
3.1.2 The relationship between administrative enforcers, 
sector regulators and the SOEs 
As noted above, since December 2012allmerger cases reported by the 
MOFCOM concern foreign or Hong Kong companies,83 while the NDRC and the 
SAIC have only heard one case on Chinese private enterprises. This raises the 
suspicion that the targets of the AML 2007 are limited to foreign companies 
and domestic private companies.84 The ability and incentive of 
administrative enforcers are also believed to be ‗too weak to fight against 
monopolistic activities of SOEs in the Chinese domestic market‘.85 The Law is 
called ‗a tiger without teeth‘ when it concerns SOEs.86The combination of 
sector regulator and AML 2007‘s enforcer may fundamentally weaken the 
incentive and effectiveness of the AML 2007‘s enforcement because the 
power of enforcement is in the hand of Chinese sector regulators who may 
                                         
82
Y.X. Wang, ‗The Cost and Efficiency of Judiciary: Financial Security and Incentive 
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In Henkel HK/Tian De, the two parties‘ headquarters are in Hong Kong.  
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N. Petit, ‗Chinese Antitrust Law – The Year of the Rabbit in Review‘, supra note 58.  
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, April, 2009. 
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benefit from the maintenance of SOE‘s monopoly. If maintaining a monopoly 
benefits the SOEs and thus increase the profit and performance of the 
MOFCOM, the NDRC or the SAIC, the incentive and effectiveness of the AML 
2007‘s public enforcement would be seriously doubted.  
3.1.3 Limited comparability between China’s structural 
problems and EU competition law/US antitrust law’s public 
enforcement 
EU competition law and US antitrust law‘s public enforcement can provide 
limited experience with regard to the structural problems faced by Chinese 
AML 2007. The immediate reason is that such problems are caused by China‘s 
political and law implementation structure which were seldom faced by the 
EU or the US.  
In relation to the first structural problem, with regard to the EU Courts, as 
early as the Court of Justice was established on April 18, 1951, it was based 
on democratic and constitutional principles and the rule of law.87 
Particularly, an independent and effective judicial review system is essential 
for the EU competition law.88 Such independence is guaranteed by the EU‘s 
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 See, L.N. Brown & T. Kennedy, The Court of Justice of the European Communities, 5th 
edition, (2000) Sweet & Maxwell Limited, at1.   
88
 See,D. Geradin& N. Petit, ‗Judicial Review in European Union Competition Law: A 
Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment‘, TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2011-008; Tilburg Law 
School Research Paper No. 01/2011, 2010, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1698342, last visit at 09/03/2012; 13:11. 
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institution, personnel and budget system.89Judicial independence has also 
been a core political value in the United States since the founding of the 
republic.90 
As regards the second structural problem, in order to find whether it can 
be addressed by the experience from the EU or the US, we shall first of all 
find the reason(s) for the relationship.The relationship is rooted in China‘s 
political and economic structure in current transitional period91 as well as 
the history of planned economy from 1949 to 1978.92 Following the Soviet 
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 From institutional perspective, the Court of Justice was born independently from a High 
Authority, a Common Assembly and a Special Council of Ministers when the Treaty 
established the European Coal and Steel Community signed in Paris on 18, April 1951. See, A. 
Arnull, ibid, at 3. From personnel perspective, Article 252 and 253 TFEU provided that the 
judges and Advocate-General of the EU Courts shall be chosen from persons whose 
independence is beyond doubt. The Court of Justice (and the General Court) also has 
independent budget from other institutions under the EU, for detail, please refer to the official 
website of the EU‘s budget, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/www/index-en.htm, 
last visit on 09/03/2012, 21:00. 
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In fact, there are some literatures suggesting China to import American independent judicial 
review system because the system is advanced. See for example, T.V. Lee,‗Exporting Judicial 
Review from the United States to China‘, (2005) 19 Columbia Journal of Asia Law,152-184. 
For further reading about US judicial independence, please refer to S.G. Breyer,‗Judicial 
Independence in the United States‘, (1995-1996) 40 Saint Louis University Law Journal, 
989-996; for the history and originality of the US judicial independence, please refer to J.H. 
Smith,‗An Independent Judiciary: The Colonial Background‘, (1975-1976) 124 University of 
Pennsylvania Review, 1104-1156.       
91
The term ‗transitional economy‘ or ‗transitional period‘ in this thesis refers to ‗an economy in 
transition from a socialist planned systemmodelled from Soviet Union to a market-driven 
economic structure.‘ See, B. Song,‗Competition Policy in aTransitional Economy: TheCase of 
China‘, supra note 17, at 388.   
92
For China‘s economic history from 1949 to 1978 generally, please refer toB.Naughton,The 
Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth, (2007)Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Press;see also, J.L. Wu,‗China's Economic Reform: Past, Present and Future‘,(2000) 1(5) 
Perspectives, athttp://www.oycf.org/Perspectives2/5_043000/china.htm, last visited on 
10/03/2012, 11:24; Y.J. Jung &Q.Hao, ‗The New Economic Constitution in China: A Third way 
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Union economic model, China established the planned economy under which 
the state (or the Party) controlled the nation‘s economy and the SOEs 
through state plans and administrative orders. There was no private 
enterprise nor free market competition.93 After 1978, the planned economy 
was abandoned and Chinese government began the transition towards 
market-oriented economy.94 This is an on-going process from 1978 now and 
the formulation of AML 2007 may be seen as part of efforts in this transition. 
The sector regulators under the State Council still control the SOEs and 
enforce the state‘s plans as they did in the planned-economic period.95Some 
of these sector regulators have become antitrust law public enforcers as we 
                                                                                                                     
for Competition Regime?‘supra note 5, at 110-112;B.M. Owen, S. Sun & W.T. Zhang,‗Antitrust 
in China: The Problem of Incentive Compatibility‘,supra note 14, at 126-128.    
93
 See, H.H. Wu, W. Zhou&X.Y. Zhang, ‗Past, present and future of China‘s competition policy 
[中国竞争政策的过去、现在和未来,zhongguojingzhengzhengcedeguoqu,xianzai he 
weilai]‘,(2008) 11 Finance & Trade Economics, 102-110.  
94
See, J.L. Wu, ‗China's Economy: 60 Years of Progress‘, (2009) 20CaijingMagazine,available 
at http://english.caijing.com.cn/2009-09-30/110269580.html, last visited on 10/03/2012, 17:22.  
95
 For example, the SASAC is the supervisor and main shareholder of 120 SOEs which has 
strong market power in various relevant markets and industries. These 120 SOEs reached the 
following industries: nuclear , aviation, aerospace, ship, weapons, electronic technology, 
petroleum, electricity and grid, telecommunication, automobile, heavy machinery, electric 
manufacturing, steel and, aluminum, Maritime transport, Air transportation, food, mining 
industry, construction industry, investment, tourism, consultant, engineering industry, coal and 
energy, metallurgy, chemical industry, salt industry, light industry, building materials, 
nonferrous metal, railway, information industry, agriculture, spinning, forestry, medicine and 
pharmacy, gold, cotton, war industry, printing, CRT, photo film, foreign trade, and video 
products. For details of these SOEs, please refer to the official website of SASAC, available at:  
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/index.html, last visited on 11/03/2012, 12:00.The 
NDRC has the authority to examine and approve projects and fix the price of thousands of 
products and services related nearly all industries in China via administrative orders.For 
example, from 2010 to 2011, the NDRC fixed the price of products and services by 
administrative orders from various fields and industries, The NDRC published these orders on 
the official website (in Chinese): http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zfdj/default.htm, last visited on 
11/03/2012, 17:56. 
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know them today (the MOFCOM, the NDRC and the SAIC). As T.Varady pointed 
out, ‗The single most important differentiating factor influencing 
competition policies in 'Western' and in former socialist countries 
respectively, is their economic heritage‘96 For China, one most significant 
inheritance or rather a sequel of the planned economy is that the close 
relationship between the AML administrative enforcers, sector regulators and 
the SOEs. Nothing in the EU and US antitrust law regimes was adopted from 
Soviet history.97Hence, they do not have to face the problem caused by this 
heritage 
3.2 Technical problems and comparability with EU 
Competition Law and US Antitrust Law’s public 
enforcement 
Unlike the structural problems which are unique to transitional 
economies, technical problems have a more comprehensive background for 
comparative study because they mainly concern the procedure of the AML 
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 See, T. Varady, ‗The Emergence of Competition Law in (Former) Socialist Countries‘, (1999) 
47(2) American Journal of Comparative Law, 229-275.    
97
Indeed, there are some EU Member States which belong to the former Soviet Union, for 
example, Poland, Romania and Slovenia. However, the research on competition law regimes 
in Member States is beyond the scope of this thesis. In fact, these transitional countries‘ 
competition law might be able to provide more useful reference to Chinese structural problems 
met during transitional period with regard to public enforcement of AML 2007. For example, 
Bing Song has compared competition law in Poland with China‘s competition law regime and 
argued that ‗Poland is a prime example of a state that needs to break up large state 
monopolies‘. See, B. Song, ‗Competition Policy in a Transitional Economy: the Case of China‘, 
supra note 17, at 393; see also, B.L. McCormick & J. Unger (edited by), China after Socialism 
(1996)M.E. Sharpe Inc. 
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2007‘s public enforcement regardless of Chinese political structure. 
Technical problems, have been faced, or are being faced by developed 
antitrust law regimes. Hence they can be effectively addressed by experience 
from developed antitrust law regimes such the EU and the US. 
3.2.1 Lack of transparency in merger enforcement procedure  
Lack of transparency98 is a significant if not the greatest concern, as can 
be seen from the examination of the AML 2007‘s merger enforcement. The 
MOFCOM‘s lack of transparency takes two forms: firstly, the procedure of 
merger enforcement lacks transparency; secondly, the information released 
in reported decisions is insufficient. 
Lack of transparency left many worried about the uncertainties of future 
enforcement of the AML 2007; lack of effective judicial review sharpened the 
worries. Especially in the merger field (due to the lack of cases before the 
SAIC and the NDRC), companies, lawyers and commentators suspected the 
MOFCOM‘s enforcement was influenced significantly by political 
considerations or other non-competition factors rather than on the basis of 
sound and professional competition analysis.99 For example, in Coca 
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 Transparency in this thesis is only for the general public but not for the involved parties and 
interested third parties.  
99
See, X.Z. Zhang & V.Y.H. Zhang,‗Chinese merger control: patterns and implications‘, supra 
note26, at 495; see also, A. Emch& G. K. Leonard,‗A Hard Landing in the Soft Drink 
Market-MOFCOM‘s Veto of the Coca Cola &Hui Yuan Deal‘,supra note 37.  
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Cola/Huiyuan, observers criticised that the proposed merger was blocked 
due largely to China‘s nationalism.100 But the MOFCOM claimed that the case 
was decided mainly on a neutral assessment of competition effects101. For the 
MOFCOM, if transparency is improved in the decision-making process and the 
decision, legal certainty and credibility of merger control enforcement were 
increased, and controversy would be reduced. Practitioners and the business 
community believe transparency is badly needed to provide guidance and 
predictability.102 And most importantly, as some scholars have 
argued,information disclosure or improvement of transparency is one aspect 
that China‘s administrative enforcers can improve in the short term.103 
3.2.2 Enforcement authority’s allocation between the central 
and local levels: centralised or decentralised?   
Another technical problem is the vagueness of the Law‘s public enforcement 
authority‘s allocation between the central and local government. The only 
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See, A. Emch& G. K. Leonard,ibid; see also, C.H. Lyons,‗The Dragon in the Room: China's 
Anti-Monopoly Law and International Merger Review‘, supra note 29, at 1601; S. Tucker and J. 
Anderlini,‗China's Block on Coke Bid Raises Alarm over M&A‘, Financial Times, March 19, 
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Street Journal, March 21, 2009; ‗Coca- Cola in China: Squeezed Out‘, The Economist, March 
18, 2009; ‗Coca-Cola and China:Hard to Swallow‘, The Economist, March 19, 2009.  
101
 See, J. Yao,‗Responds to the Journalists Regarding the Antitrust Review of the 
Coca-Cola/Huiyuan Case‘, supra note 33. 
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 See, A.H.Y. Zhang,‗Problems in Following E.U. Competition Law: A Case Study of 
Coca-Cola/Huiyuan‘,(2011) 3Peking University Journal of Legal Studies, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1569836, last visited on 12/03/2012, 10:48. 
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 See for example, X.Z. Zhang & V.Y.H. Zhang,‗Chinese merger control: patterns and 
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reported case,Lian Yun Gang’s Concrete Association, handled by the SAIC and 
the ICJS indicated that the Industry and Commercial Administration of Jiang 
Su province could not enforce the Law directly without the SAIC‘s 
authorisation. The enforcement authority allocation is an immediate problem 
that would be faced by the administrative enforcers of the AML 
2007.However, there is no clear rule or guidance on the authority allocation 
between the central and local government to address this problem. The 
literature and comments from scholars are limited.104 This problem draws 
little attention in China, due to the limited caseload especially before the 
SAIC and the NDRC. However, with the development of the AML 2007‘s 
enforcement and the accumulation of cases, how to allocate the Law‘s public 
enforcement power between the central governmental level and the local 
governmental level will become more and more significant.105 
3.2.3 Rights of the concerned parties under the public 
enforcement of the AML 2007 are insufficiently protected  
                                         
104
 There is some literature on the institutional design of the AML 2007‘s administrative 
enforcers. In this literature, authors designed the relationship between central governmental 
and localenforcers and the local ones. However, these literatures generally lack analysis on 
the advantages and disadvantages of the designed relationship. See for general examples, 
G.H. Li, The Research on Enforcement of Antimonopoly Law [‘反垄断法实施机制研
究’fanlongduanfashishijizhiyanjiu] (2006)Chinese Founder Press; B.S. Zhang, ‗A Comment of 
the Institutional Design of Current Administrative Enforcers of the AML 2007 [论我国反垄断执
法机构的设置, lunwoguofanlongduanfazhifajigoudeshezhi]‘, (2005) 2 Science of Law, 113-121, 
at 119; X.L. Wang, ‗An Approach to Antimonopoly Law Enforcement Authority and its 
Responsibilities[关于中国反垄断执法机构的设置与职责问题的
探,guanyuzhongguofanlongduanzhifajigou de shezhiyuzhizewentidetantao]‘, (2000) 8 Chinese 
Public Administration, 60-64.  
105
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Concerns for the rights of parties during investigation are raised bythe cases 
dealt with by the SAIC and the NDRC. Some clues might be found in the Lian 
Yun Gang’s Concrete Association case. Here officials of ICJS did not inform 
the investigated party that the purpose of the investigation was to collect 
evidence of the suspected AML 2007 violation. They conducted the 
investigation and collected the evidence successfully when the concerned 
concrete association did not realise that the ICJS was collecting evidence of 
AML 2007 violation; they thought it was a routine check.106 
Nor is there any legal basis for the right of concerned parties to have access 
to the administrative enforcers‘ file and obtaining legal privilege which exist 
under EU competition law‘s public enforcement procedure. 
3.2.4 Comparability of China’s technical problems and EU 
competition law/US antitrust law’s public enforcement 
Technical problems can be effectively solved or alleviated by application 
of experience from the EU and the US, because these two regimes have faced, 
or are facing similar problems. Lack of transparency under the AML 2007‘s 
public enforcement can be improved by the experience from the EU 
competition law and the US antitrust law. Transparency is particularly 
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emphasized during merger enforcement in both the EU and the US.107  
Chinese administrative enforcers could increase transparency through this 
comparison with developed economies‘ experience. As a significant concern 
of the merger enforcement under the AML 2007, improving the procedure and 
the decision‘s transparency might provide a starting point for further reforms 
on the Law‘s public enforcement.  
In relation to how to allocate enforcement jurisdiction and duty between 
the public enforcers of the AML 2007, both EU and the US experience can 
provide useful guidance. Under EU competition law, in 2002 the EU 
Commission decentralised its enforcement authority of Article 101(3) TFEU to 
the National Competition Authorities (hereafter the NCAs) and the national 
courts of the Member States. This ‗modernisation‘108  provided us a good 
chance to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of the centralised and 
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There are plenty of literatures discussing this issue in the EU and the US. See for example, 
K.R. Fisher,‗Transparency in Global Merger Review: A Limited Role for the WTO?‘(2006) 
11(327) Stanford Journal of Law, Business, and Finance,available at SSRN: 
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decentralised enforcement mechanisms. Under US antitrust law, there are 
plenty of literature evaluating the United States‘ traditional federalism 
between the Congress and the states,109 which can also help China to decide 
how to allocate the authority at central and the local levels.    
In relation to the third technical problem, the EU and the US also may 
provide plenty of experience. In these developed antitrust law enforcement 
regimes, there are various rights of defence against the public enforcers‘ 
investigation. With this experience, we shall be able to argue which rights of 
defence can be, and should be protected, and how can they be effectively 
protected under the public enforcement of the AML 2007.  
4. Research questions, scope and structure of 
the thesis 
This thesis will examine the public enforcement of the AML 2007 with a 
comparative study of EU competition law and US antitrust law. The main 
reason for choosing these two developed regimes is that both are influential 
to the AML 2007.  
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This thesis adopts a comparative methodology. This has some limitations. 
First, the thesis chooses two regimes to compare with Chinese antimonopoly 
law, i.e. the EU competition law and US antitrust law. Other jurisdictions are 
not considered. Second, the comparative study only applies to the 
competition laws‘ public enforcement. Private enforcement and substantive 
issues are not dealt with here. When considering EU competition law, 
reference is made only to the application of Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU 
by the EU Commission, and not to the role of Member States or the European 
Competition Network (‗ECN‘). A similar position is adopted in relation to the 
United States, in respect of which only the federal law enforced by the 
Department of Justice, Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission 
is considered. Third, the EU competition law and US antitrust law 
enforcement only refers to their current enforcement activities. One may 
argue that it is necessary to compare the AML 2007 public enforcement 
regime (which is in its initial stage) with the EU competition law and US 
antitrust law public enforcement regimes at their early years to fulfil the 
timing condition of comparative equivalence. However, the comparative 
study in this thesis does not include the temporal enforcement of the EU and 
US at their respective initial stage because the purpose of this research is to 
examine whether the experience from current EU and US enforcement can 
solve the problems faced by the Chinese AML regime. 
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This thesis aims to suggest a series of procedural reforms to improve 
Chinese Antimonopoly Law‘s public enforcement. As discussed, the AML 
2007‘s public enforcement has been problematic. We divided these problems 
into two categories, structural and technical.   
The experience of EU competition law and US antitrust law may not be 
able to solve all the problems met by China‘s AML 2007.The structural 
problems which rooted in Chinese political structure and transitional period 
cannot be effectively addressed by EU and US experience. On the other hand, 
technical problems which are solely related to the AML 2007‘s enforcement 
procedure comparable to the EU and US experience because in the EU or the 
US, such problems has been solved, or are being faced by these two regimes. 
This thesis will focus on the technical problems faced by AML 2007‘s public 
enforcement. On examination of the AML 2007‘s public enforcement from 
2008 to 2012 the author found three significant technical problems: 1. lack of 
transparency in the administrative enforcers‘ decisions and decision making 
progress; 2. the enforcement authority‘s allocation of the AML 2007 at 
central and local governmental levels is not clear; 3. the rights of the 
concerned parties under the AML 2007‘s administrative enforcement. In these 
three areas both the EU competition law and the US antitrust law‘s public 
enforcement regimes can help China to improve. 
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This thesis focuses on the technical problems in China‘s AML 2007‘s public 
enforcement. By ‗China‘, we mean the People‘s Republic of China, excluding 
Hong Kong, Tai Wan and Macao. By ‗technical problems‘, we mean those 
which have little relevance to China‘s general political structure, legal 
environment and industrial policies, namely, the problems which  mainly 
concern the procedure of the AML 2007‘s public enforcement. By ‗public 
enforcement‘, we mean the way in which the Law is enforced by public 
authorities in order to bring anticompetitive behaviour to an end or for 
protection of competition.110  Hence antitrust lawsuits brought by 
individuals or private parities lies outside of the scope of the thesis. In 
addition, by ‗enforcement’ we generally mean civil enforcement rather than 
criminal enforcement.111 Civil enforcement means it follows the civil 
procedure, civil burden and standard of proof and sanction methods. 
This thesis consists of five chapters, including an Introduction and 
Conclusion. This introductory chapter identifies research questions and the 
scope of this thesis. Chapter 1 examines the status quo of the AML 2007‘s 
public enforcement between August 2008 and December 2012, and revealed 
the problems raised in public enforcement. We divided these into structural 
and technical problems claimed that the structural problems have little 
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 See, J. Basedow (edited by),Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law, (2007)Kluwer 
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association of undertakings during the investigation, the thesis may reach criminal 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
42 
 
comparability with the EU competition law and the US antitrust law public 
enforcement regimes. Hence, this thesis chooses technical problems for 
comparison.  
Chapter 2 analyses possible ways of improving the transparency of the AML 
2007‘s enforcement. Lack of transparency makes the Law‘s enforcement in 
future hard for practitioners to predict. Transparency in this thesis has two 
aspects: that of the investigation process and reporting of the case and 
administrative enforcers‘ decisions. Increasing transparency is both 
beneficial for the administrative enforcers and practitioners in China. For 
administrative enforcers of the Law, their credibility in the enforcement will 
be improved; for practitioners, a consistent, predictable and transparent 
antitrust enforcement would be established. A comparative study of EU 
competition law and the US antitrust law‘s public enforcement will be 
conducted. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the issue of antitrust enforcement authority‘s allocation 
between the central administrative enforcers at central and at local 
government levels. This chapter demonstrates the necessity and importance 
of addressing this question and how to allocate the AML 2007‘s enforcement 
authority between central and local government. As a reference, it examines 
the decentralisation process under EU competition law and the federalism, 
the relationship between the federal government and state under the US 
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antitrust law.  We then discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the 
centralised and decentralised mechanisms under the EU and the US 
respectively, in order to see which would be more appropriate for China‘s 
antitrust public enforcement authority allocation.  
Chapter 4 discusses the rights of concerned parties under the AML 2007. As 
revealed by the cases mentioned above, the concerned parties‘ rights during 
the investigation are not sufficiently protected. In this regard EU competition 
law and the US antitrust law regimes may provide plenty of experience on 
how to protect the rights of the concerned parties. This chapter 
demonstrates which rights need to be protected during the investigation 
under the EU competition law and US antitrust law, and how they are 
protected. It then examines whether these rights can be effectively 
protected under the AML 2007 investigation.  
Chapter 5 concludes this part of the thesis. Adopting findings in Chapters 2, 3 
and 4, this chapter makes a series of suggestions on the procedure of the AML 
2007‘s public enforcement. Comparison of EU competition law and the US 
antitrust law the suggestions of reforms are focused on the three technical 
problems stated above.       
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As a developing antitrust regime without an adequate legal infrastructure and 
often facing obstacles from industrial policies during the enforcement,112the 
AML 2007 has a long way to go. However, at least some technical problems 
can be solved with the experience of developed antitrust law enforcement 
regimes such as those of the EU and the US. The three technical problems 
addressed in this thesis may not be able to cover all the technical problems 
met by China‘s public enforcers;113 however, they provide a clue for further 
research on China‘s AML 2007 or future competition law procedure and public 
enforcement.   
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Chapter 2 Improving Transparency in China’s 
Antimonopoly Law’s Public Enforcement 
Procedure   
1. Introduction 
As identified in the introduction of this thesis, lack of transparency is a 
significant concern in the AML 2007‘s merger enforcement procedure.1  This 
chapter aims to examine this problem in more detail and propose ways in 
which to improve transparency in AML 2007 merger enforcement.  
The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (the ESCAP) provides a complete and detailed definition of 
transparency: firstly, decisions taken and their enforcement are conducted in 
a manner that follows rules and regulations; secondly, information is freely 
available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by such 
decisions and their enforcement; and thirdly, enough information is provided 
and that it is provided in easily understandable forms and media.2 
Accordingly, in antitrust law, a transparent enforcement procedure  
requires, firstly that  decisions and/or judgments made by  administrative 
enforcers and  courts must be based on antitrust law and regulations; 
secondly, the enforcement of the law must follow the procedural rules; 
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 See, ‗3.2.1 Lack of transparency in merger enforcement procedure‘, in Chapter 1 of this 
thesis.   
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 See, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 
What is Good Governance (2007), available at 
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Chapter 2 Improving Transparency in China‘s Antimonopoly Law‘s Public Enforcement Procedure 
46 
 
thirdly, information related on   enforcement 3 should be freely available 
and directly accessible to the parties concerned  and  third parties whose 
interests stand to be affected by  enforcement; finally, enough information 
on  enforcement of the law should be provided in easily understandable 
forms and media to the public. This definition includes openness of the 
decision-making and enforcement processes as well as access to and 
distribution of information.4  
The scope of transparency will be discussed here and is determined by the 
research question of this chapter, i.e. how to improve transparency in AML 
2007 merger enforcement. As briefly examined in Chapter 1, there are two 
main problems: firstly, the procedure of merger enforcement lacks of 
transparency; secondly, the published decisions of the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) have generally been very brief and notable for lack of information. 
5  The transparency to be discussed here concerns only that related to 
merger enforcement procedure. In order to fulfil the requirement of 
comparative equivalence, transparency examined under EU competition and 
US antitrust law will also be limited in their respective merger enforcement 
procedures. Secondly, the problems raised only concern the procedure of 
China‘s merger enforcement. Thus the transparency discussed in this chapter 
relates only to procedural issues. Indeed, there is serious concern at the 
                                         
3
 Antitrust law enforcement may have different content in r different jurisdictions. In the EU 
enforcement under EU competition law may include (but is not limited to): the process of 
investigation, the process of decision- making and the process of judicial review. In US 
antitrust laws, such enforcement may include (but is not limited to): the process of investigation, 
the consent decree related procedure, the litigation, the FTC‘s adjudicative process and the 
appeal process and/or the judicial review process. China‘s AML 2007‘s public enforcement 
process is similar to that of the EU: it may include (but is not limited to): the investigation 
process, the decision making process and the judicial review process.  
4
 See, F. Weiss, ‗Transparency as an Element of Good Governance in the Practice of the EU 
and the WTO: Overview and Comparison‘, (2006-2007) 30 Fordham International Law Journal, 
1545-1586, at 1553.  
5
 See, supra note 1.  
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MOFCOM‘s published decisions and remedies on substantive issues.6 However, 
this is a topic of the substantive test of merger assessment, not of the AML 
2007‘s enforcement procedure.7 Finally, transparency discussed in this 
chapter mainly means the disclosure of information to the public at large. 
The disclosure of information to concerned parties and any interested third 
parties will be excluded.8 
Transparency is regarded as an important part for an open, fair, 
accountable and democratic government.9 As Justice Brandeis states: 
‗Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most 
efficient policeman.‘10  Transparency may contribute to good governance in 
the following ways: by1. improving pre-decision process and results; 2. 
fostering agency accountability after a decision is reached; 3. enhancing 
knowledge of and promoting compliance with the law; 4. fostering fairness of 
and public confidence in the institutions of government; and, 5. avoiding 
unfair arbitrage  in the stock market.11 In antitrust law, transparency is 
                                         
6
 For example, in Coca-Coca/Huiyuan, the MOFCOM revealed little economic analysis in its 
decision. See, A.H.Y. Zhang, ‗Problems in Following E.U. Competition Law: A Case Study of 
Coca-Cola/Huiyuan‘, (2011) 3 Peking University Journal of Legal Studies, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1569836, last visited on 12/03/2012, 10:48.  
7
 Normally, the topic of transparency related to merger control may also relate to the 
substantive issues. For example, it is argued that the EU merger control regime‘s adoption of a 
‗more economic approach‘ on substantive test may improve the transparency in the EU 
Commission‘s decisions. However, as mentioned above, this chapter will only discuss 
transparency related to procedural issues, merger control procedure is just selected as an 
example, the substantive issues of the merger control is thus irrelevant to the discussions in 
this chapter.     
8
 For the examination of the disclosure of information to the concerned parties, please refer to 
Chapter 4 of this thesis.   
9
 See, W.S. Grimes, ‗Transparency in Federal Antitrust Enforcement‘, (2003) 51 (4) Buffalo 
Law Review, 937-993, at 939; see also, K.C. Davis, Discretionary Justice, A Preliminary 
Inquiry, (1969) Louisiana State University Press.  
10
 L.D. Brandeis, Other People's Money, (1933) Washington, National Home Library 
Foundation, at 62.  
11
 See, W.S. Grimes, ‗Transparency in Federal Antitrust Enforcement‘, supra note 9, at 
942-944; for a  detailed discussion of the value of transparency and openness in 
Chapter 2 Improving Transparency in China‘s Antimonopoly Law‘s Public Enforcement Procedure 
48 
 
especially needed where investigation and decision- making is conducted by a 
single administrative agency and lack of system of law reporting. As law 
enforcement decisions become common-law markers that guide future 
decisions, the need for disclosure grows.12  Transparency is important to 
merger enforcement under the AML 2007 where administrative enforcers 
have the authority to conduct investigation and make decisions and judicial 
review is scarce.13 In fact, as will be examined later, lack of transparency is a 
significant concern, if not the greatest that can be seen from examination of 
merger enforcement under the AML 2007.14    
In order to provide solutions to lack of transparency of the merger 
enforcement procedure under the AML 2007, this chapter will firstly examine 
experience in the EU and US merger enforcement regimes.  
2. Transparency and concerns in EU merger 
control enforcement 
2.1 Transparency in EU merger control enforcement 
EU merger control discussed in this section only refers to the mergers in an 
EU dimension.15 Concentrations at the Member States‘ level will not be 
                                                                                                                     
administrative law, please refer to B. Bugaric, ‗Openness and Transparency in Public 
Administration: Challenges for Public Law‘, (2004) 22(3) Wisconsin International Law Journal, 
483-521; A. Frost, ‗Restoring Faith in Government: Transparency Reform in the United States 
and the European Union‘, (2003) 9(1) European Public Law, 87-104; F. Weiss, ‗Transparency 
as an Element of Good Governance in the Practice of the EU and the WTO: Overview and 
Comparison‘, supra note 4.    
12
 W.S. Grimes, ibid, at 944.  
13
 For discussion of judicial review under the AML 2007, please refer to ‗3.1.1 Lack of 
independent judiciary‘ of Chapter 1.  
14
 ‗3.2.1 Lack of transparency in merger enforcement procedure‘ of Chapter 1 of the thesis.  
15
 For the definition of ―European dimension‖, see Article 1 of Council Regulation (EU) No. 
139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, adopted on 20 January 2004 
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considered. Merger control in the EU is supervised by the European 
Commission (hereafter, the Commission). The Commission was invested with 
a tri-partite 'investigator, prosecutor and judge' role in reviewing 
concentrations with a European dimension.16 Since China‘s merger control 
system has similar institutional design to that in the EU,17  experience of the 
Commission may provide valuable guidance.  
2.1.1 The importance of transparency to EU merger control 
procedure  
For the purpose of merger control, the concept of transparency refers to 
the ability of the public to see and understand the workings of the merger 
review process; in other words, transparency refers to the fair and responsive 
explanations of the antitrust enforcers' action and inaction.18 In relation to 
EU merger control, transparency first of all contributes to achieving 
consistency, predictability and fairness in applying merger norms, thereby 
enhancing credibility and effectiveness of merger enforcement; secondly, 
transparency requires the Commission to ensure that their decisions are 
based on accurate facts and sound economic principles; thirdly, transparency 
would help the concentrating parties and practitioners under EU merger 
control regime  better to understand the likely outcome of their prospective 
case and the time and costs  review may entail; finally, transparency may 
                                                                                                                     
(the EUMR), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:024:0001:0022:en:PDF, 
last visited on 21/10/2012, 17:32.    
16
 C.Ş. Rusu, ‗A few Considerations Regarding to Transparency and Legal Certainty in 
European Merger Control‘, (2007) 2 SUBB Jurisprudentia, 180-196, at 190.  
17
 Similar to the Commission under the EU merger control system, the MOFCOM in China 
concentrates the functions of investigation, prosecution, decision-making and policy-making 
when dealing with merger assessment under the AML 2007.  
18
 See, R. Pitofsky, ‗Comments on Warren Grimes: Transparency in Federal Antitrust 
Enforcement‘, (2003) 51 Buffalo Law Review 995-999; at 995.  
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promote discussion and understanding as well as enhancing the possibility of 
harmonisation of legal policies among different national competition 
authorities of  Member States.19  
2.1.2 Transparency in the EU merger control procedure 
In 2004 the EU adopted the so called ‗Merger Review Package‘20 to 
strengthen the objectivity and soundness of the Commission's decisions in 
merger cases and to increase the transparency of the merger control 
system.21 It is not the task of this section to evaluate all advantages and 
disadvantages of the 2004 Merger Review Package;22 nevertheless the author 
will focus on the content of procedural transparency in these regulations and 
guidelines.  
From notification to Phase I decision  
                                         
19
 See, C.Ş. Rusu, ‗A few Considerations Regarding to Transparency and Legal Certainty in 
European Merger Control‘, supra note 16; at 181.  
20
 This Merger Review Package includes a revised merger regulation, a cross- border merger 
directive to implement the merger regulation (Commission Regulation No 802/2004 of 7 April 
2004), guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers, a set of best practice guidelines 
for merger investigations and a number of measures of changes with regard to institution and 
DG Competition‘s staffing and resources.   
21
 See, M. Monti, ‗Merger Control in the European Union: A Radical Reform‘, Speech at the 
European Commission/IBA Conference on EU Merger Control, Brussels, 7 November 2002, 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-02-545_en.htm?locale=en, last 
visited on 24/10/2012, 22:36.  
22
 For a detailed evaluation of the 2004 Merger Review Package, please refer to A. 
Christiansen, ‗The Reform of EU Merger Control - Fundamental Reversal or Mere 
Refinement?‘ (April 25, 2006), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=898845, last visited 
on 21/10/2012, 13:45; N. Levy, ‗EU Merger Control: From Birth to Adolescence‘, (2003) 26(2) 
World Competition, 195-218; B.R. Lyons, ‗Reform of European Merger Policy‘, (2004) 12(2) 
Review of International Economics,246-261;    
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Before the parties notified the concentration, the parties may contact the 
Commission voluntarily23 to discuss jurisdictional and other legal issues 
including a brief description of the background of the transaction, the 
relevant market or sector involved and the likely competitive impact of the 
transaction.24 The pre-notification discussions are held in strict confidence;25 
therefore, the pre-notification discussion would not be disclosed to the 
public. 
All the notifications are published in the Commission‘s Official Journal and 
are accessible on its website in the form of a summary.26 This summary 
indicates the names of the interested parties (including the notifying parties 
and the groups to which they belong or the undertakings that control them), 
their countries of origin, the nature of the concentration and the economic 
sectors affected.27 The Commission shall take account of the protection of 
business secrets of the undertakings.28 The disclosure of notifications may be 
benefit merger control enforcement in at least three ways. Firstly, the 
potential notifying parties who propose a concentration and their attorneys 
may learn the requirement of the Commission from the disclosed summary 
and thus improve their preparation for notification. This is important for the 
potential notifying parties because where the information is deemed by the 
Commission to be incomplete, the notification will not be considered to have 
                                         
23
 See, para. 8 of the DG Competition Best Practices on the Conduct of EC merger 
proceedings (hereafter, the Best Practice), adopted on January 20, 2004, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/proceedings.pdf, last visited on 26 October, 
2012, 16:18.   
24
 See, M. Furse, The Law of Merger Control in the EC and the UK, (2007) Hart Publishing, at 
99.  
25
 Para. 8 of the Best Practice.  
26
  See, E.N. Varona, A.F. Galarza, J.F. Crespo & J.B. Alonso, Merger Control in the EU: Law, 
Economics and Practice, second edition, (2005) Oxford University Press, at 370.  
27
 See, Article 4(3) EUMR.  
28
 Article 4(3) EUMR.  
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taken place until the complete documentation is received.29 Notification is 
also considered invalid where information provided is incorrect or 
misleading.30  The Commission warns that failure to comply with this 
obligation may significantly delay the investigation and may lead to a 
declaration of incompleteness.31 Secondly, such disclosure may provide 
statistics by which to evaluate the Commission‘s enforcement activities. For 
example, the percentage of the number of notifications filed before the 
Commission and the number of phase I decisions made by the Commission 
may provide important guiding information on the Commission‘s attitude to 
concentration to the practitioners in the relevant market.  
After the process of investigation and internal consultation, there are 
three possible phase I decisions: 1. the Commission may declare lacks 
jurisdiction; 2. the Commission may authorise the operation because of its 
insignificant doubts about its compatibility with the common market; 3. an 
initiation of phase II proceeding where the concentration does fall within the 
Commission‘s jurisdiction and may significantly impede effective competition 
in the common market.32 The last decision may be modified by Article 6(2), 
which allows the Commission to declare the concentration compatible with 
the common market when the parties provide satisfactory commitments. In 
accordance with Article 8(1) and Article 20 ECHR, transactions that are 
cleared summarily under Article 6(1) (b) EUMR are the subject of a 
Commission statement that identifies the parties, the nature of the 
transaction, the relevant product and geographic markets, the degree of 
                                         
29
 See, Article 5(2) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 
of 7 April 2004, implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (hereafter, the Implementation Regulation), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:133:0001:0039:EN:PDF, 
last visited on 28/10/2012, 16:02.  
30
 Ibid, Article 5(4).  
31
 Para. 20 of Best Practice.  
32
 Article 6 (1), supra note 29.  
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overlap of the participating firms, and other salient facts that led the 
Commission to conclude that no challenge was necessary.33 In addition, the 
commitment decisions based on Article 6(2) are also required to be 
published.34  
However, there is no legal obligation on the Commission to publish the 
decisions of declaration of lack jurisdiction and the initiation of second phase 
proceeding.35 The Commission has developed a practice whereby it 
announces in the Official Journal decisions authorising a concentration during 
the first phase and publishes a short note of its decisions in a press release.36 
In addition, anybody interested in reading the decision may request the 
non-confidential version from the Commission itself or read the decision 
on-line.37 In the meantime, undertaking‘s business secret should be kept 
from disclosure. The Commission will ask the parties to indicate those parts 
of the decision that they consider should not be published because of 
business secrets after the first-phase decision is adopted. The parties must 
justify such request.38  
Phase II proceeding  
If the notified transaction falls within the scope of the EUMR and gives rise 
to serious doubts about its compatibility with the common market, the 
                                         
33
 See for example, Case COMP/M.2048, Alcatel/Thomson Multimedia JV (Oct. 26, 2000) 
(citing a Commission statement that explains its decision not to challenge the joint venture at 
issue), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/index/m40.html#m_2048, 
last visited on 30/10/2012, 10:17.  
34
 See, Article 8(2) and Article 20 EUMR.  
35
 Instead, such decisions have only to be notified to the parties to the concentration and to 
the Member States. See, Article 6(5) EUMR. 
36
 E.N. Varona, A.F. Galarza, J.F. Crespo & J.B. Alonso, Merger Control in the EU: Law, 
Economics and Practice, supra note 26, at 376.  
37
 Ibid.  
38
 Ibid, at 373.  
Chapter 2 Improving Transparency in China‘s Antimonopoly Law‘s Public Enforcement Procedure 
54 
 
transaction will be subject to a more detailed examination in the second 
phase proceeding. The Commission has 90 working days to conduct its 
investigation.39 After the investigation, if the Commission continues to hold 
that the merger is likely  significantly to impede effective competition in 
the common market or in a substantial part of it, it is required to issue a 
Statement of Objection(hereafter, the SO) to set out the objections to the 
notified operation.40  
After the formal hearing and consultation with the Advisory Committee41 
the Commission adopts a decision on the concentration which is required to 
be published.42 The publication states the names of the parties and the main 
content of the decision; it also considers the legitimate interest of 
undertakings in the protection of their business secrets.43 For such 
transactions involved in a second- phase investigation, the Commission‘s 
decisions are much more detailed.44 For example, many published decisions 
are more than one-hundred-pages long with detailed analysis on relevant 
market, impact on consumers, market shares, the market after the 
concentration, the competitive impact on potential market and proposed 
remedies and so on.45 The Commission publishes a non-confidential version 
of the decision free of business secrets in the Official Journal, L series.46 
                                         
39
 Article 10(3) EUMR.  
40
 Article 18(3), ibid.  
41
 Article 19 EUMR.  
42
 See, Article 20 EUMR.  
43
 Article 20(2), ibid.  
44
 W.S. Grimes, ‗Transparency in Federal Antitrust Enforcement‘, supra note 5, at 958.  
45
 See for example, Case No IV/M.877, Boeing/McDonnell Douglas (30 July, 1997), available 
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31997D0816:EN:HTML, 
last visited on 30/10/2012, 11:53; Case No COMP/M.2220, General Electric/Honeywell (3 July, 
2001), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2220_en.pdf, 
last visited on 30/10/2012, 11:57; Case No COMP/M.5421, Panasonic/Sanyo (29 September, 
2009), available at 
Chapter 2 Improving Transparency in China‘s Antimonopoly Law‘s Public Enforcement Procedure 
55 
 
Several points may be summarised from the above observations. Firstly, 
transparency in the EU merger control is respected at every stage of the 
procedure from notification regardless of whether the Commission 
determines to prohibit the merger, to allow it to proceed with conditions, or 
to clear it unconditionally: 1. all notifications are  disclosed in the form of 
brief summary; 2. phase I decisions are disclosed by the Commission in 
practice in the Official Journal and on the website; 3. the Commission is 
obliged to publish its phase II decisions in detail. Secondly, the undertaking‘s 
business secrets are kept from disclosure at the same time. Before every 
stage of disclosure in the procedure, the Commission will ask the notifying 
and third parties to submit a non-confidential version and justify their 
opinion.  
2.2 Institutional concerns of transparency of EU 
merger control procedure  
Although the Commission managed to achieve in the past a more or less fair 
degree of transparency,47 the procedure is still criticised for concerns of 
transparency brought by institutional design.48 It has been argued that a 
                                                                                                                     
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5421_20090929_20212_en.pdf, 
last visited on 30/10/2012, 12:00.      
46
 E.N. Varona, A.F. Galarza, J.F. Crespo & J.B. Alonso, Merger Control in the EU: Law, 
Economics and Practice, supra note 26, at 392.    
47
 C.S. Rusu, European Merger Control: The Challenges Raised by Twenty Years of 
Enforcement Experience, (2010) Kluwer Law International, at 52. In addition, as stated by T.O. 
Barnett, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division of the DOJ,  
‗regarding the goal of increased transparency, the European Commission and others have 
been ahead of the U.S. when it comes to explaining the reasons behind decisions not to bring 
challenges.‘ See, T.O. Barnett, ‗Antitrust Enforcement Priorities: A Year in Review‘ (November 
19, 2004) Department of Justice, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/206455.htm, last visited on 30/10/2012, 16:30.   
48
 In the EU merger control system institutional design refers to a system in which  
investigation, prosecution and decision- making are entrusted to the same institution: the 
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substantial lack of transparency in a merger control system may stem from 
the very institutional design that a particular system is built upon.49 Having 
the solid status where no separation of functions existed under the EU merger 
control regime, the Commission‘s functions have been criticised as lacking 
transparency and prone to political influence.50 In addition, for a long time it 
has been commonly noted that the Commission‘s decisions on mergers have, 
for many reasons, not been fully subjected to substantive judicial review.51 
This institutional design has consequently been thought to constitute ‗the 
main weakness‘52 of EU merger control in that it inherently incorporates a 
substantial lack of transparency.53 Since sufficient criticism and proposals for 
reform have been made on this topic,54 this section is not intended to discuss 
                                                                                                                     
Commission; parties can appeal the Commission‘s decision before an independent judge. See, 
Article 21(2) EUMR.  
49
 See, P.D. Camesasca, European Merger Control: Getting the Efficiencies Right, (2000) 
Intersentia Publishers, at 246.  
50
 Ibid, at 190.  
51
 F. Todorov & A. Valcke, ‗Judicial review of merger control decisions in the European Union‘, 
(2006) 51(2) Antitrust Bulletin, 339-381, at 339. A detailed discussion on the effectiveness of 
judicial review under the EU merger control system lies out of the scope of this section. For 
more detailed research on this issue, please refer to M. Clough, ‗The Role of Judicial Review 
in Merger Control‘, (2003-2004) 24 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, 
729-754; R. Brandeburger & T. Janssens, ‗European Merger Control: Do the Checks and 
Balances Need to Be Re-set?‘ (2001) Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 177-225; J. Schwarze, 
‗Judicial review of European administrative procedure‘, (2004) 68 Law and Contemporary 
Problems, 85-105.  
52
 D.G. Goyder, EC Competition Law, third edition, (1998) Oxford University Press, at 596.  
53
 P.D. Camesasca, European Merger Control: Getting the Efficiencies Right, supra note 49, 
at 245.  
54
 For example, E. Bannerman, The Future of EU Competition Policy, (2002) Centre for 
European Reform, at 29-31; D.J. Neven, R. Nuttall & P. Seabright, Merger in Daylight: The 
Economics and Politics of European Merger Control, (1993) Centre for Economic Policy 
Research, at 231-236; P.D. Camesasca, ibid, at 245-257; C.S. Rusu, European Merger 
Control: The Challenges Raised by Twenty Years of Enforcement Experience, supra note 47, 
at 48-60; H.C.H. Hofmann, ‗Good Governance in European Merger Control: Due Process and 
Checks and Balances under Review‘, (2003) 24(3) European Competition Law 
Review,114-131; N. Levy, ‗EU Merger Control: From Birth to Adolescence‘, supra note 22, at 
195-218. A. Christiansen, ‗The Reform of EU Merger Control - Fundamental Reversal or Mere 
Refinement?‘ supra note 22;     
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appropriate institutional design but to only examine the connection between 
lack of procedural transparency and the institutional design of the EU merger 
control system; and any additional efforts that have be made to improve 
transparency of the EU merger control system. 
The institutional design of the EU merger control system raises two main 
problems of procedural transparency: 1. the decisions are not taken by 
competent judges but by political Commission members under an 
administrative agency; 2.being a political body, the Commission is prone to 
be surrounded by political lobbyists seeking to influence opinions expressed 
by the Merger Task Force members on a concentration‘s being cleared or 
blocked.55 The first problem leads to the system‘s lacking judicial disclosure, 
for example, cross examination between the Commission and the notifying 
parties. Although the EU merger control system publishes notifications, phase 
I and phase II decisions, the decision- making process, the Commission‘s 
reasoning and its internal files are generally unavailable to the public.56 As 
regards the second problem, the EU merger control system seems to fit the 
description of a system in which the inevitable political element operates 
mostly behind closed doors.57 If the competition and political stages are not 
kept separated and outside each other‘s reach, any decision clearing (or 
                                         
55
 See, I. Schmidt, ‗Jurisdictional Problems of Merger Control, an international comparison‘, in 
C.D. Mueller, A. Haid & J. Weigand(edited by), Competition, Efficiency and Welfare, (1999) 
Kluwer  Academic Publishers, at 193.      
56
 As argued by E.H. Pijnacker Hordijk, ‗For an outsider, who has to rely on the published 
version of the Commission‘s decision in a given case, it is often very difficult if not impossible 
to access the substantive soundness of the reasoning of the Commission and the 
appropriateness of the remedies, if any‘. See E.H. Pijnacker Hordijk, ‗Towards the tenth 
anniversary of the EC merger regulation; an interim report‘, (1999) 47 S.E.W. at 120.   
57
 See, C.S. Rusu, European Merger Control: The Challenges Raised by Twenty Years of 
Enforcement Experience, supra note 47, at 50.   
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block) a concentration transaction may be susceptible of being based on 
political grounds.58  
In order to provide more transparency and soundness in the Commission‘s 
decision- making process and the decision itself, the Commission, under the 
current institutional design,59 has provided some procedural solutions in 
addition to disclosure requirements in the merger control procedure 
mentioned above. Firstly, the role of Hearing Officer (hereafter the HO) has 
been enhanced. The HO is to supervise and safeguard the procedural rights of 
the parties to due process.60 Although its role is still limited to providing 
internal checks and balances in the EU merger control system,61 the 
publication of the HO‘s independent report on whether procedural rights 
have been respected during the process may improve the transparency of the 
merger control procedure.62 The public may at least have a chance to 
observe and evaluate merger enforcement. Secondly, a Consumer Liaison 
function has been created in the DG Comp to encourage and facilitate the 
involvement of consumer associations which are often poorly resourced 
bodies since consumers rarely express their views to the Commission about 
the likely impact of specific mergers.63 Thirdly, the Commission has issued a 
                                         
58
 Ibid, at 50.  
59
 The Commission has strongly resisted adopting a judicial-based system and any radical 
institutional changes in EU merger control. It argues that due to its legal culture heritage and 
the legal hurdles that need to be overcome for a radical institutional change to take place, the 
Commission is not ready to adopt a model where the investigation, prosecution and 
decision-making steps are separated and entrusted to different independent bodies. See, C.S. 
Rusu, ibid, at 60.   
60
 C.S. Rusu, European Merger Control: The Challenges Raised by Twenty Years of 
Enforcement Experience, supra note 47, at 56.  
61
 See, N. Levy, ‗EU Merger Control: From Birth to Adolescence‘, supra note 22.   
62
 For a more detailed discussion on the role of HO in the EU competition law enforcement 
procedure, please refer to chapter 4 of this thesis (2.3.1 Right to a fair hearing under EU 
competition law).  
63
 See, M. Monti, ‗Merger Control in the European Union: A Radical Reform‘, Speech at the 
European Commission/IBA Conference on EU Merger Control, Brussels, 7 November 2002, 
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series of notices and guidelines to explain the Commission‘s activities in 
merger assessment.64 As argued by P.D. Camesasca: 
Rather than changing the core of an in the meantime well-established 
and appreciate body of law, the real investment should be one in 
enhancing transparency. Offering technical guidance as on how to 
apply merger control by issuing Merger Guidelines has served US 
agencies well in carrying out their appointed task…65  
Under the current institutional design increasing the transparency of the 
merger assessment process may be the most feasible and effective, if not the 
only way, to overcome the two problems stated above. A more transparent 
procedure may require the Commission to disclose its process of decision- 
making, for example, the internal files, to certain extent.66 Thus cross 
examination in a quasi-judicial procedure is possible.67 In addition, the more 
                                                                                                                     
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-02-545_en.htm?locale=en, last 
visited on 24/10/2012, 22:36.  
64
 See for example, the Best Practice; the Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal 
mergers(Official Journal C 31 of 05.02.2004) and the Guidelines on the assessment of 
non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:265:0006:0025:en:PDF, 
last visited on 10/12/2012, 15:08.     
65
 See, P.D. Camesasca, European Merger Control: Getting the Efficiencies Right, supra note 
49, at 257.  
66
 In fact, some commentators have argued, in the context of Article 101 and 102 TFEU‘s 
enforcement, that the decision- maker should make its internal files available and conduct 
cross-examination during the formal oral hearing with the parties concerned. See for example, 
N. Zingales, ‗The Hearing Officer in EU Competition Law Proceedings: Ensuring Full Respect 
for the Right to Be Heard?‘ (2010) 7(1) Competition Law Review, 129-156, at 148; ECLF 
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transparent the procedure is, the less likely political capture and influence. 
All in all, the goal of enhancing transparency is to ensure that the 
Commission‘s activities are better known, understood and accepted by 
governments, undertakings, professional practitioners and the public.68  
3. Transparency and Concerns in US merger 
control enforcement 
3.1 An overview of the procedure of US merger control 
enforcement 
The Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission (hereafter the 
FTC) share the authority of enforcing US merger control policies on behalf of 
the Federal government under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.69 Since October 
1978, most significant mergers and acquisitions must be reported to the 
Division and the FTC before they occur.70 The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust 
Improvements Act of 1976(hereafter, the HSR Act)71 requires enterprises 
exceeding certain thresholds to notify the Antitrust Division and the FTC of 
the proposed transaction, submit documents and other information to  
agencies concerned  in the transaction, and refrain from closing the 
transaction until a specific waiting period has expired.72  The Antitrust 
                                                                                                                     
decision on objections about which the undertakings have had an opportunity to make their 
views known); See also, L.O. Blanco, European Community Competition Procedure, (1996) 
University of Oxford Press, at chapters 7-11.    
68
 See, K. Van Miert, ‗Competition Policy and the Commission's Information Strategy‘, (1994) 
1(1) EC Competition Policy Newsletter, 1.  
69
 See, J.M. Jacobson (editor in chief), Antitrust Law Developments, volume I, 6th edition, 
(2007) ABA Publishing, at 333.  
70
 See, R.L. Johnson & D.D. Smith, ‗Antitrust Division Merger Procedures and Policy, 
1968-1984‘, (1987) 32 Antitrust Bulletin, 967-988, at 969.   
71
 Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1390 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1994)). 
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Division and the FTC have a clearance procedure to allocate the case to one 
of them. 
If the information received from the HSR file is insufficient to determine 
that a proposed merger will not harm competition, the Antitrust Division or 
the FTC will generally will open a preliminary investigation. The preliminary 
investigation will be mainly focused on fact-finding and economic analysis 
and is limited in 30 days. After conducting the preliminary investigation, the 
Antitrust Division or the FTC may decide whether the investigation should be 
continue or closed.  The agency may issue a Request for Additional 
information which is known as Second Request when it deems necessary.73 
The waiting period extends up to twenty days after the parties substantially 
comply with the request.74 During those 20 days the staffs attempt to 
complete their investigation so that the Antitrust Division or the FTC can 
make a decision.  The statistics of the numbers of notifications, preliminary 
investigations and the second request are available to the public on the 
Antitrust Division and the FTC‘s official website.75  
At the decision- making stage the investigation may have three results: 1. 
it may be dropped unconditionally before litigation; 2. may result in a 
settlement, reached either before or after litigation is commenced; or 3. may 
result in litigation.76  
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3.2 Arguments related to the transparency of US 
merger control procedure  
3.2.1 Concerns of transparency under the US merger control 
procedure 
Because of the relative openness of judicial or administrative litigation and 
the likelihood that a tribunal decision will be accompanied by an explanatory 
opinion, transparency has not been a major issue for cases resolved by a court 
or administrative tribunal.77  
The Antitrust Division  
If the Antitrust Division and the concerned parties reached a settlement via 
a consent decree, some transparency is provided. In relation to the consent 
decree between the Antitrust Division and the merging parties the Tunney 
Act78 requires that a proposed settlement should be published in the Federal 
Register, together with a Competitive Impact Statement (the CIS)79 that 
describes the underlying proceeding and other information, including a 
description and evaluation of alternatives to the consent proposal actually 
considered by the United States.80 The Tunney Act also requires publication 
of a list of documents upon which the Antitrust Division relied and disclosure 
by the defendant of all relevant contacts between the defendant and officers 
                                                                                                                     
Administrative Efficiency and the Rule of Law‘, (1997) 49 Administrative Law Review, 889-914, 
at 895.  
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 See, S. Calkins, ‗In Praise of Antitrust Litigation: The Second Annual Bernstein Lecture‘, 
(1998) 72(1) St. John's Law Review, 1-42; at 15-21.  
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 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2000). 
79
 For a more detailed description about the content of a CIS please refer to Chapter 4 of this 
thesis, at ‗3.1 Introductory remarks and an overview of US antitrust laws‘ enforcement 
procedures‘. 
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 15 U.S.C. § 16(b). 
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or employees of the United States (other than contacts between the Antitrust 
Division and counsel of record).81 The proposed decree is then required to be 
disclosed for public comment for a sixty-day period. At the end of the period 
the comments and the Antitrust Division's reply to the comments must also be 
published in the Federal Register.82 In addition, summaries of this material 
must also be published in newspapers of general circulation for seven days 
over a two- week period.83 
However, the Tunney Act only requires the disclosure of the analysis that is 
addressed in the consent decree by the Antitrust Division. The Antitrust 
Division fails to provide meaningful analysis of the alternative remedies that 
were considered.84 A competitive impact analysis provided by the Antitrust 
Division is incomplete if it addresses only competition issues for which the 
Antitrust Division was able to negotiate relief in the consent order. As argued 
by W.S. Grimes, if the Antitrust Division were free to ignore genuine 
competition issues not addressed in the order, even the most egregious 
sweetheart settlement could be packaged in a manner that reduced public 
scrutiny of critical issues.85 In addition, the disclosure of the competitive 
problems which are not addressed in the consent decree may equally 
contribute to reasoned decision-making, consistency, predictability, and 
fairness of the procedure. Incomplete disclosure will decrease the value of 
such information to the practitioners in the market. 
Another more serious concern is that there appears to be little or no 
disclosure when: 1. the Antitrust Division drops a merger investigation; 2. the 
parties to a proposed acquisition abandon or restructure the transaction, 
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 15 U.S.C. §§ 16(b), (g). 
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 15 U.S.C. § 16(d). 
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often in the face of expressed opposition from the Antitrust Division; and, 3. 
when the Antitrust Division resolves competition issues through a fix-it-first 
settlement86 that requires the merging parties to restructure before 
proceeding with the merger. For example, in Bell Atlantic/NYNEX, the 
Antitrust Division investigated the proposed acquisition of NYNEX by Bell 
Atlantic in 1997-98.87 The Antitrust Division, after investigating this 
acquisition for almost a year, issued a two sentence statement announcing 
that the investigation had been dropped because the merger did not violate 
antitrust laws.88 
According to statistics89 provided by the Antitrust Division, in the fiscal 
year of 2011 the Antitrust Division initiated 72 merger investigations based on 
the HSR Act; at least 31 of them are regarded as having involved substantial 
antitrust issues for which an explanation of the agency decision could have 
provided significant guidance.90 Of the 31 cases the Antitrust Division 
challenged 20. In 13 of these challenges the Antitrust Division filed a 
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 In accordance with the ‗fix-it-first‘ solution, in some cases the parties may agree to a 
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complaint in the US District Court. The other 7 cases were settled by consent 
decree.91 This means there were 11 cases (35.5% of the total second request 
cases) which might have raised significant competitive concerns dropped by 
the Antitrust Division or the merging parties without any meaningful 
disclosure. In addition, 7 cases were resolved by the parties‘ either 
abandoning or restructuring their proposed transaction or changing their 
conduct to avoid competitive problems (22.6% of the total second request 
cases). Thus   in relation to the Antitrust Division, in the fiscal year of 2011, 
there were  58.1% cases among which might  have raised significant 
competitive concerns, which lacked  disclosure. The situation is not better 
in the fiscal years from 2002-2011. From 2002-2011 there was a total of 220 
second request investigations conducted by the Antitrust Division. 133 of 
them were challenged by the Antitrust Division and 56 cases were dropped or 
restructured by the merging parties. Thus the average percentage of cases 
which might have raised significant competitive concerns but lacked 
disclosure is 65.0%.92 
The Federal Trade Commission 
When cases are settled by the consent decree between the FTC and the 
concerned parties, the decrees, once initially approved by the FTC, will be 
placed on the public record for thirty days to allow for comments.93  The 
FTC will also publish an explanation of the proposed consent decree.94  
However, the FTC is not required to disclose its replies to the comments, nor 
is there any requirement of publication of the proposed consent agreement in 
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newspapers. It seems that these rules governing consent orders issued by the 
FTC are less rigorous than the Tunney Act procedures. Similarly, even if the 
disclosure of the consent decree is sufficient, the FTC would still be 
suspected, as is the Antitrust Division, of a tendency to disclose only those 
issues addressed in the settlement, leaving the public uninformed as to its 
thinking on other genuine competition issues raised by the investigation. 
However, this problem may be alleviated when the Commissioners of the FTC 
have different opinions on a merger. Any one of the five Commissioners can 
respond by filing a dissenting statement that will bring the matter to the 
attention of the public.95  
Similar to the Antitrust Division, the FTC offers little or inadequate 
disclosure when the FTC drops a merger investigation that was subject to a 
second request; or, when the parties to a proposed acquisition abandon the 
transaction in the face of agency opposition. When investigations are 
dropped because the parties abandon the proposed merger in the face of FTC 
opposition, there is typically no meaningful disclosure. However, when the 
agency has decided to drop an investigation because it determines that there 
would be no Section 7 violation, the FTC has increasingly offered some 
disclosure96 although still not adequate.  
In accordance with the methods evaluated the Antitrust Division, the FTC 
in the fiscal year of 2011 initiated 24 second request investigations of 
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 For example, in the Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd/P&O Princess Cruises plc & Carnival 
Corporation/P&O Princess Cruises,(hereafter, the Cruises mergers) when the FTC dropped 
the cruise mergers investigation in October of 2002, the Commission issued a statement 
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mergers which might have had significant competitive impact. It challenged 
17 transactions of them, leading to 9 consent orders, 3 administrative 
complaints before district court and 5 transactions that were abandoned or 
restructured after the parties learned of the FTC‘s concerns.97 Therefore, 
there were 7 cases that had been dropped by the FTC and 5 cases that were 
abandoned or restructured by the merging parties. i.e., there are 12 cases 
lack of disclosure, which accounts for 50% of the total number of the cases 
containing second request. The average percentage from 2002 to 2011 is 
46.5%. The statistics show that transparency of the FTC is slightly better than 
in the Antitrust Division in terms of the number of disclosed cases which may 
have significant competitive impact. 
In practice the FTC also tends to provide more information to the public 
than the Antitrust Division. A notable case is the Cruises mergers. When the 
FTC closed its investigation of two proposed acquisitions involving the three 
largest firms in the ocean cruise industry in October 2002, it took the unusual 
step of issuing a statement explaining its decision which offers unique and 
welcome insights into the bases for an important merger enforcement 
decision,98although the FTC pointed out that its decision not to pursue either 
of the proposed cruise line acquisitions was based on specific and complex 
circumstances of this particular industry and should not be read as indicating 
that large mergers in highly concentrated industries would be permitted in 
another case.99 The FTC‘s statement explained the proposed transactions, 
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analysed the relevant market and an alternative market definition considered 
and rejected by the FTC, and assessed some of the possible anticompetitive 
consequences that might occur in that market.100 One reason for disclosing 
this dropped investigation may be that the authorities of the EU and UK were 
conducting a parallel investigation on the same merger and issued detailed 
reports explaining the facts of this case and grounds of their decisions 
although both agencies decided not to challenge this merger.101 However, 
the disclosure was still inadequate in some aspects. In particularly, the FTC 
failed to explain why the presumption that concentration enhancing mergers 
in an already concentrated market is likely to create anticompetitive effects, 
which has venerable roots in economic theory and in antitrust 
enforcement,102 did not apply in this case.103 Nor did the FTC explain on the 
three possible effects that the acquisition would bring: 1. the unilateral 
effects; 2. the coordinative effects; 3. the possible strategic behaviour.104 
Nevertheless, at least some of these issues were addressed in the statement 
of the dissenting Commissioners.105  
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From the above observations, it may be concluded that there are two 
significant concerns with regard to US merger enforcement procedure. Firstly, 
the disclosure provided in the cases resolved by consent decrees between the 
Antitrust Division/ the FTC and the concerned parties is incomplete. Secondly, 
in relation to the merger cases which may have significant competitive 
impact on the market (the cases containing second request) investigated 
substantially but cleared or dropped by the merging parties, there is little 
disclosure. The number of such cases is significant in both the Antitrust 
Division and the FTC. Nevertheless, especially the FTC has attempted to 
adopt a more transparent approach in mergers that raise competitive issues 
but are cleared without challenge or settlement.106 As argued by W.S. 
Grimes and J.E. Kwoka: ‗when an agency devotes substantial resources to 
investigating a proposed acquisition an explanation of the agency‘s decision 
should be provided, regardless of the final disposition.‘107   
3.2.2 Arguments against the concerns for transparency under 
US merger control procedure 
Although there is almost universal agreement that transparency in merger 
review is a commendable goal, there is disagreement about how great a 
burden should be placed on the agencies to explain their decisions.108 The 
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cost of transparency is significant and includes 1. the burden of preparing for 
a public disclosure; 2. confidentiality risk; 3. creation of precedent that 
would undermine future cases; and, 4. awkwardness or difficulty of 
explaining decisions that are based on administrative or ‗mixed‘ reasons.109 
The burden of preparing for a public disclosure would be substantial if the 
Antitrust Division and the FTC began to disclose the cleared merger or 
dropped investigations. For example, the Antitrust Division would have to 
issue more than one statement a week to explain its decision to drop an 
investigation, abandon mergers and fix-it-first resolutions.110 A previous 
Commissioner of the FTC also mentioned that the primary reason an absolute 
requirement of explanations of all decisions is inappropriate is that it would 
be a substantial and rarely worthwhile resource commitment.111 
The second issue is the worry of disclosing confidential information of the 
businesses. Confidentiality protection is an obligation under US merger 
enforcement.112 Companies do not have to worry about disclosure of 
confidential business information when they respond to a second request.113 
Concerned parties and third parties would not be willing to cooperate with an 
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enforcement agency if they feared information submitted would be released 
to the public. Third parties may value confidentiality more than the merging 
parties. Customers, suppliers, or small competitors may fear retaliation. 
They may accept that their information may be disclosed if the agency 
decides to challenge a merger, but if they believe that their information may 
be disclosed even if the agency does not challenge the transaction, it may 
discourage them from coming forward in the first place.114 
As regards the third point, a former Antitrust Division chief has expressed 
the concern that disclosure of the reasons an agency did not pursue a case 
might directly or indirectly reveal evidentiary difficulties which might make 
the agency vulnerable to counsel‘s planning transactions that are designed to 
frustrate the ability successfully to enjoin them.115 It seems undeniable that, 
if the Antitrust Division issued explanation on non-enforcement decisions, the 
defendants in litigated merger cases would be very likely to seek to use those 
statements against the agencies. 
Finally, there are cases in which the agencies decided not to pursue, not 
because they are lawful or harmless but or other reasons such as limited 
resources. In fact many decisions to drop an investigation may be a ‗mix‘: the 
case is not very strong; the agency is overcommitted; the case may make bad 
law; one commissioner thinks the efficiency defence is strong; the discovery 
did not produce strong evidence; etc.116 In these cases the agencies may not 
need to disclose their decision not to pursue. The disclosure of such cases 
would have little value for the consistency and predictability of merger 
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enforcement for there are no significant competition factors in the decision. 
However, the public may want to know whether or not investigated conduct 
was determined to be lawful, or merely not a proper focus for enforcement 
at the time the agency reached its decision.117    
4. How to improve transparency of Chinese 
merger control procedure  
4.1 The importance of transparency to Chinese merger 
control procedure   
As is evident from both EU and US merger enforcement regimes, 
transparency is an essential requirement of an effective, responsive and fair 
merger control procedure. It enables companies to understand better the 
possible risks associated with proposed transactions. It allows all 
practitioners and the public at large (not just those with inside knowledge of 
recent deals) to predict with greater certainty how the agencies will analyse 
a relevant market. It also forces the agencies to ensure that their decisions 
are based on accurate facts and sound economic principles and reasoning. 
The public also benefits from a better understanding of this important area of 
government regulation.118 
Transparency can be fairly important to Chinese merger control procedure.  
Chinese merger control is in its initial stage and the MOFCOM has not 
developed ample case law and guidelines to give practitioners adequate legal 
certainty. From August 2008 to December 2012, the MOFCOM published 17 
decisions on the mergers which are prohibited or cleared with conditions. 
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Although the MOFCOM has published a list of the parties‘ names in the cases 
which were cleared, there is no information in this list except the names of 
the merging parties.119 Nor has the MOFCOM issued any horizontal or 
non-horizontal merger guidelines. (until the thesis is written). Secondly, the 
MOFCOM‘s decisions are often suspected of being influenced by political 
powers. For example, in the case of Coca-cola/Huiyuan, the MOFOM‘s 
prohibition decision was suspected of being influenced by the government 
and protectionism.120 It is argued that the MOFCOM‘s short, vague decisions 
encourage speculation about protectionism.121 
Transparency may not only provide necessary legal certainty of AML 2007‘s 
enforcement and contribute to a more effective, responsive and fair 
procedure, but also help the MOFCOM to clarify the rumours and speculation 
on the political or other non-competitive influence on the decisions. Hence 
transparency is in MOFCOM's own interests.122 In addition, it is relatively easy 
to establish a transparent enforcement system at this early stage where the 
caseload is not unacceptable. As C.Ş. Rusu states: ‗the most practical method 
to ensure transparency in an antitrust system is to provide appropriate rules 
in this respect from the very inception of the institutional system, or in any 
case when it is still young and malleable.‘123    
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See, the official website of the MOFCOM, available at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/index.shtml, 
last visited on 03/12/2012, 12:09.   
120
 See for example, R. Evans, ‗Transparency is in Mofcom's Interests‘, (2008-2010) 28 
International Financial Law Review, 19-20; C.H. Lyons, ‗The Dragon in the Room: China's 
Anti-Monopoly Law and International Merger Review‘, (2009) 62 Vanderbilt Law 
Review,1577-1621; S. Tucker & J. Anderlini, Coke's Rejection is to Chinese Public's Taste, 
Financial Times, March 18, 2009, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9df57384-13d1-11de-9e32-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz2Dzw4RDb4, 
last visited on 03/12/2012, 14:12.     
121
 R. Evans, ibid, at 20.  
122
 Ibid.  
123
 C.Ş. Rusu, ‗A few Considerations Regarding to Transparency and Legal Certainty in 
European Merger Control‘, supra note 16; at 182.  
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4.2 Current position of transparency of Chinese 
merger enforcement procedure 
As identified in chapter 1 of this thesis, there are two concerns with regard 
to the transparency of Chinese merger enforcement procedure: 1. the 
procedure of merger investigation lacks transparency; 2. the content of the 
decision made by the MOFCOM lacks transparency, no matter for the 
approved cases, prohibit cases or cases cleared with remedies.124  
Similar to their EU and US counterparts, the Chinese merger investigation 
process may also be divided into two phases.125 Article 25 of the AML 2007 
provides that the phase I investigation may last for as long as 30 days once 
the merging parties notified successfully. Article 26 further stipulates:  
Where the Antimonopoly Authority under the State Council decides 
to conduct further review, they shall, within 90 days from the date of 
decision complete the review, make a decision on whether to prohibit 
the concentration, and notify the business operators concerned of the 
decision in written form. 
However, neither phase I nor phase II investigation processes are disclosed 
to the public. From notification to phase I decision, there is no legal 
requirement for the MOFCOM to inform the public when merging parities 
notified a case before it. Nor is the MOFCOM obliged to disclose the 
information on the cases which have been cleared or terminated during phase 
I investigation. The MOFCOM will not disclose the information on cases being 
brought to a phase II investigation either, which are deemed to be important 
                                         
124
 See, ‗3.2.1 Lack of transparency in merger enforcement procedure‘ of chapter 1 of this 
thesis.   
125
 Article 25 and 26 of the AML 2007.  
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and may have significant competitive impact in the market.  From 
notification to the end of phase I investigation, there are three possible 
situations: 1. if a merger is cleared after the phase I investigation, the only 
disclosure would be the name of the merging parties; 2. if the case proceeds 
to phase II investigation, there is no information disclosed at this stage; 3. if 
the phase I investigation is dropped by the MOFCOM, there would be no 
information disclosed to the public. As to decisions made after phase II 
investigation process, it will be discussed below.  
In relation to the second problem, as mentioned above, if a merger is 
cleared by the MOFCOM, only the names of merging parties will be disclosed 
in a list. When the MOFCOM‘s decision blocks a merger or clears it with 
remedies, it generally contains insufficient information to justify the decision 
and the remedies.126 With the development of case law, the MOFCOM seems 
to have gradually adopted established concepts of merger remedies and 
analytical framework from more developed jurisdictions but at the same time 
the decisions lack clear reasoning and analytical standards.127  
4.3 Improving transparency of Chinese merger 
enforcement procedure  
4.3.1 Comparison of the transparency of merger enforcement 
procedure in the EU and US  
                                         
126
 For a detailed case study on the MOFCOM‘s cases, please refer to Chapter 1 of this thesis: 
‗2.1 The current position of administrative enforcers under the AML 2007‘s public 
enforcement‘.    
127
 See, Q. Hao, ‗Merger Remedies in China: Developments and Issues‘, (2010) 6(2) 
Competition Law International, 13-21; at 13.    
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The EU seems to have established greater transparency than the US. The 
Commission discloses nearly every step of the investigation to the public. 
Firstly, the Commission l publishes all notifications in the Official Journal and 
the website of the Commission in the form of a summary. Secondly, the 
decisions made after the phase I investigation conducted by the Commission 
are also disclosed to the public. Thirdly, any merger accessed to the phase II 
investigation, no matter whether cleared or not, will be disclosed to the 
public by the Commission.128 The Commission's website systematically lists 
all notified transactions, disclosing the lines of business in which 
participating firms are active, and reports the Commission's dispositions of 
each of the notified transactions.129The US merger enforcement regime only 
publishes the statistics of its investigative procedure to provide some 
transparency to the public. The statistics include: the number of notifications 
received by the Antitrust Division and the FTC; the total number of 
investigations conducted by the agencies; the total number of mergers 
challenged by the agencies; the number of second request investigation 
conducted by the agencies; the number of cases settled by consent decrees; 
the number of cases dropped by the merging parties; the number of cases 
settled by fix-it-first resolution; and, the number of cases filed before federal 
court.130 Such statistics under the EU merger regime are also available.131 In 
addition, the HSR Annual Reports to Congress discloses some (but not all of) 
cases challenged by the Antitrust Division and the FTC. The disclosed 
information includes the merging parties‘ name, the competition related 
                                         
128
 See, ‗2.1.2 Transparency in the EU merger control enforcement procedure‘ of this chapter.   
129
 W.S. Grimes, ‗Transparency in Federal Antitrust Enforcement‘, supra note 9, at 958.  
130
 These statistics are available in the Ten Year Workload Statistics Report of the Antitrust 
Division and the HSR Annual Reports to Congress, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/merger-enforcement.html, last visited on 04/12/2012, 11:32.      
131
 The statistics of EU merger investigation are available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf, last visited on 04/12/2012, 14:34.  
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concerns held by the agencies and the possible remedies provided by the 
agencies.  
In relation to disclosure of the decisions, it seems the EU merger regime 
provides more transparency than does the US. Firstly, the Commission 
regularly publishes a summary statement on the cleared mergers while US 
agencies do not routinely disclose the cleared cases. The summary statement 
at least includes the following information: the parties; the nature of the 
transaction; the relevant product and geographic markets; the degree of 
overlap of the participating firms and other salient facts that led the 
Commission to conclude that no challenge was necessary.132 As is the case 
with U.S. merger enforcement, there is no regular disclosure of cases which 
are not challenged by the Antitrust Division or the FTC after the investigation. 
As mentioned above,133 the FTC occasionally discloses some information 
about its clearance decision. A notable example is the Cruises mergers case. 
The EU Commission cleared the same merger and issued a fifty-seven page 
statement containing extensive discussion and references to economic 
analyses and other materials submitted by the parties and clear explanation 
and reasoning of the clearance decision.134 This information could be useful 
in fostering a clear understanding of the law and in providing a platform for 
overview of the EU Commission's decisions.135 Although the FTC has made 
substantial efforts to disclose the relevant information of this case, the 
                                         
132
 For an example of clearance summarily statement issued by the Commission, see Case 
No COMP/M.6381 Google/Motorola Mobile (13/02/2012), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6381_20120213_20310_2277480
_EN.pdf, last visited on 04/12/2012, 14:52.   
133
 See, ‘3.2.1 Concerns of transparency under the US merger control procedure‘ of this 
chapter.  
134
 See, Case COMP/M.2706, Carnival Corp. /P&O Princess, (July 24, 2002), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2706_en.pdf, last visited on 
04/12/2012, 15:12.   
135
 W.S. Grimes, ‗Transparency in Federal Antitrust Enforcement‘, supra note 9, at 959. 
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deficiencies were still significant especially in relation to its economic 
analysis.136 
The Commission‘s decision prohibiting a merger or clearing it with 
commitment usually contains comprehensive and detailed analysis on the 
possible competition impact of the merger and the possible remedies that 
may address the impacts.137 Under the US merger regime, if a merger case is 
settled by a consent decree, the Antitrust Division and the FTC are required 
to provide the public a statement containing analysis on the competitive 
impact of the proposed merger. However, it is argued that the enforcement 
agencies often disclose the analysis only of competitive issues that are 
addressed in the consent decree but fail to provide meaningful analysis of 
alternative remedies that were considered.138 If a merger is prohibited, this 
decision will be made by the federal court and subject to judicial disclosure 
requirements.139 
It may be concluded that the EU merger regime paid more attention to the 
transparency of its enforcement procedure. However, the EU and US regimes 
have the following similarities. Firstly, both provide statistics on their 
enforcement activities during the investigation process. From these statistics, 
the public can at least evaluate the effectiveness of the merger policy‘s 
enforcement. The potential merging parties will also learn the possibility of 
being successfully cleared by the agencies. The agencies themselves will also 
                                         
136
 See, ‗3.2.1 Concerns of transparency under the US merger control procedure‘ of this 
chapter.  
137
 See, supra note 45.  
138
 See, ‗3.2.1 Concerns of transparency under the US merger control procedure‘ of this 
chapter.  
139
 The Antitrust Division has no authority to make a decision to block a merger. If it regards 
the merger as a high risk to the market and thus be blocked, it has to file the case and 
challenge the merging parties before federal court. The FTC may prohibit the merger by a 
preliminary injunction, which is obtained before the Federal court, based on an administrative 
complaint filed before the court.        
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have to pay attention to the consistency of their enforcement. Legal 
certainty and predictability will be generated even if only the statistics in the 
investigation process are disclosed. Secondly, both the EU and US disclose the 
prohibition decisions and decisions with remedies, although in different ways 
and to different extent. On the other hand, the main difference between the 
EU and US merger enforcement regimes is that the EU Commission provides a 
consistent and sufficient disclosure of its clearance decision in the form of a 
summary statement published in the Official Journal and the official website; 
while the US Antitrust Division and the FTC have not developed a consistent 
practice for disclosing merger cases which are cleared or dropped. The 
different attitude towards the cleared mergers in the two regimes may partly 
be due to their different caseload and administrative burdens. From fiscal 
years 2002 to 2011 there were in total 2995 mergers notified to the EU 
Commission, that is, 299.5 merger cases a year on average.140 In the same 
period there was a total of 14,331 merger transactions reported under the 
HSR Act to the Antitrust Division and the FTC. Every year the two US merger 
control agencies deal with 1433.1 cases.141         
4.3.2  What can be learned to improve the transparency of 
Chinese merger enforcement procedure  
Improving transparency during the merger investigative process 
The first problem in Chinese merger control‘s transparency is that there is 
little disclosure of information during the MOFCOM‘s investigative process. As 
noted above, both EU and US merger enforcement regimes shows that at 
least the statistics of investigative procedure are disclosed, providing a basis 
                                         
140
 See, EU Merger Statistics, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf, last visited on 11/12/2012, 21:31.  
141
 See, supra note 130 and 131.  
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for the public evaluation of the effectiveness of the merger policy‘s 
enforcement and also for practitioners in the market to obtain necessary 
legal certainty and predictability. To this end the MOFCOM might consider 
disclosing these statistics as the first step towards a transparent procedure. 
The disclosure might be made in its annual report. The statistics should at 
least include: 1. the number of notifications received; 2. the number of 
phase I investigations conducted; 3. the number of cases proceeds to the 
second phase investigation; 4. the number of cases cleared after the phase I 
investigation. If these statistics were disclosed, the public would be able to 
see the MOFCOM‘s merger enforcement activities. Potential merging parties 
and lawyers would also be able to predict the possibility of clearance. 
However, disclosure of these statistics is not enough. Firstly, disclosure is not 
prompt if annual reports are issued at the end of a year. Secondly, neither 
the public nor practitioners can see the investigative process merely from 
statistics. Without disclosure of the basic contain of investigated cases, they 
will not know which cases are more likely to be cleared and which are more 
likely to be challenged. 
In order to provide transparency to Chinese merger investigation procedure 
at this early stage, the MOFCOM should offer: 1. prompt and regular 
disclosure of every merger case notified before the MOFCOM in a summarily 
way in the official journal142 and/or website;143 2. a prompt and regular 
publication of  explanations of the decisions to clear or drop a merger after 
phase I investigation; 3. a prompt and regular disclosure of the information of 
cases‘ referral to the second phase investigation.                     
                                         
142
 It shall be noted that the MOFCOM currently do not have an official journal to publish its 
decisions, notices and guidelines. The current practice of the MOFCOM is that it mainly 
publishes such information on its official website.   
143
 Based on the experience from the EU, such statement should contain: 1. the name of the 
merging parties; 2. the names of the interested parties; 3. the nature of the concentration; 4. 
the economic sectors affected.     
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Improving transparency in the MOFCOM’s decisions 
The other problem is that the content of the decision made by the MOFCOM 
lacks necessary information. In relation to cleared mergers, the MOFCOM 
discloses the names of the parties (in Chinese) in a list on its official website. 
Although this is progress because the MOFCOM refused to disclose any 
information about its clearance decision before 16 November, 2012,144 this 
name list can provide little meaningful information to the public and the 
potential merging parties about why and how these cases were cleared. No 
explanation of the clearance is provided, nor does any information about the 
merging party either. 
The EU provides an example in disclosing such cleared mergers.145 If the 
merger case is cleared after the second phase investigation, the Commission 
will publish a more detailed decision to explain why this merger should not be 
challenged. For example, in KLM/Martinair,146 after the second phase 
investigation, the Commission issued a ninety-eight page decision to explain 
why it considered that this concentration would not significantly impede 
effective competition in the common market or in a substantial part of it and 
thus should be approved. Although the US does not disclose cleared mergers 
regularly, it sometimes explains clearance decisions especially when the 
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 See, the MOFCOM‘s notice on 16 November 2012, available at 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/zcfb/201211/20121108437868.html?2551843205=70514402
6, last visited on 05/12/2012, 15:12.  
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 If the merger case is cleared after phase I investigation, as examined in the EU section of 
this chapter, the Commission will publish a short statement containing the following 
information: 1. the name of the merging parties; 2. the nature of the transaction; 3. the relevant 
product and geographic markets; 4. the degree of overlap of the participating firms; and, 5. 
other salient facts that led the Commission to conclude that no challenge was necessary. For 
example, Case No. COMP/M.6381, Google/Motorola Mobility, supra note 132.   
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 Case No COMP/M.5141, KLM/Martinair, (December 17, 2008), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5141_20081217_20682_en.pdf, 
last visited on 05/12/2012, 17:15.   
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investigation contains a second request. As do both the EU and US the 
MOFCOM should not only disclose the names of the parties toe cleared 
mergers, but also provide meaningful information about cleared mergers 
especially where a second phase investigation is involved. If the level of 
disclosure under the EU merger regime is too high for China,   at least the 
MOFCOM should be able to offer routine disclosure of the cleared cases 
involving second phase investigation,147 details to include the nature of the 
transaction, a brief statement of the transaction‘s competitive impact, and 
the main reason for offering clearance. 
Decisions made by the MOFCOM which prohibits a merger or clear it with 
conditions; the MOFCOM is obliged to publish timely.148 However, as 
examined above, the decisions generally lack information about the 
definition of relevant market and competitive impact assessment. The 
MOFCOM cleared the merger between Panasonic and Sanyo with conditions on 
30 October 2009.149 This case was also cleared with conditions by the EU 
Commission on 29 September 2009150  and the FTC on 24 November 2009151 
respectively.  Panasonic/Sanyo may provide an example to compare for the 
purpose of illustrating the deficiencies in the MOFCOM‘s decision with regard 
to information disclosure. It should be noted that the purpose of this 
comparison is not to discuss whether the MOFCOM had made the right 
decision or whether the remedies provided were appropriate; rather, it is to 
                                         
147
 In fact, due to lack of disclosure of cleared cases under the Chinese merger enforcement 
regime, the author does not know if there is any merger been cleared after the MOFCOM‘s 
second phase investigation.  
148
 Article 30 of the AML 2007.  
149
The Public Announcement of the MOFCOM, No.82, [2009], available at 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/200910/20091006593175.html?2711934872=70514402
6, last visited on 05/12/2012, 23:41.   
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 Case No COMP/M.5421, Panasonic/Sanyo, supra note 45.  
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 FTC Order Sets Conditions for Panasonic‘s Acquisition of Sanyo, released on 24 
November, 2009, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/11/sanyo.shtm, last visited on 
05/12/2012, 23:47.  
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see what information should be published (but failed to be disclosed) to 
justify the MOFCOM‘s decision and to provide necessary legal certainty and 
predictability to practitioners in China. 
The EU Commission‘s decision in Panasonic/Sanyo is seventy-eight-pages‘ 
long. It can be divided into four parts. The first includes basic information of 
the case: the date of the notification received, the merging parties, the 
proposed operation between the merging parties and whether the 
Commission has jurisdiction. 
The second part is the competitive assessment, which constitutes the main 
content of the decision. When examining the transaction‘s competitive 
impact, the Commission first of all defined ―battery‖ and gave a detailed 
classification of different batteries. This classification provided a basic 
structure for the Commission‘s reasoning. There are seven main types of 
battery related to this transaction;152 the Commission analysed the relevant 
product and geographic markets, and the competitive impact in each of them. 
When defining the relevant product market, the Commission considered the 
following elements: 1. supply substitutability between the different 
sub-chemistries; 2. demand substitutability between the different 
sub-chemistries. When examining the relevant geographic market, the 
Commission firstly disclosed the parties‘ opinion and then give its own 
opinion based on its market investigation. The elements considered by the 
Commission when defining a geographic market include: 1. the place of the 
product produced; 2. customers' requirements in different regions; 3. 
whether the producer has a global pricing strategy; 4.the regions of 
customers‘ source; and, 5. the price difference between the different regions. 
                                         
152
 The classification is based on whether it is rechargeable, different chemistries and shape 
of the batteries. The seven main types are: Alkaline primary batteries, Zinc carbon primary 
batteries, Lithium primary batteries, NiCd rechargeable batteries, NiMH rechargeable batteries, 
Li-ion rechargeable batteries, and, Lithium rechargeable batteries.    
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When assessing the competitive impact of the transaction the Commission 
provided the following information based on its investigation: 1. market 
shares of the concerned parties; 2. whether Panasonic and Sanyo are close 
competitors in the relevant market; 3. other close competitors in the 
relevant markets; 4. the situation of the relevant market, e.g. whether the 
market is growing or not; and, 5. market entry barriers. The Commission also 
analysed the competitive impact of this transaction on other consumer 
electronic goods produced by Panasonic and Sanyo.153In light of the above 
examinations, the Commission reached the conclusions on whether the 
proposed transaction would have significant competitive impact on each 
types of battery relevant market and what possible competitive impact might 
be brought. 
Thirdly, the Commission published the commitments proposed by the 
merging parties and its assessment of the commitments on whether they are 
able to remedy the serious doubt identified. When assessing the proposed 
remedies the Commission indicated that it firstly considers the type, scale 
and scope of the remedies by reference to the structure and the particular 
characteristics of the market in which these serious doubts arise; secondly, 
the most effective way to maintain effective competition is to create the 
conditions for the emergence of a new competitive entity or for the 
strengthening of existing competitors via divestiture by the merging 
parties.154 The final part is the conclusive decision of the Commission on 
whether to oppose notified operation based on all the above observations. 
The FTC and the merging parties reached a consent decree. The FTC 
disclosed a series of information about its complaint and decision on its 
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 The consumer electronic goods include: digital still cameras, voice recorders, DVD 
player-recorders, home audio systems, flat-panel televisions, digital projectors, microwave 
ovens, air conditioners and camcorders.  
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 See, paras.213-214 of Panasonic/Sanyo, supra note 45.   
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website, including the FTC‘s complaint, the decision and order, and the 
analysis of the consent decree to aid public comment. 
In the complaint the FTC firstly disclosed the name and addresses of the 
merging parties and stated its jurisdiction on this case. Then the FTC defined 
the relevant product market and geographic market without any explanations 
in this complaint. Next the FTC provided a brief but clear examination of the 
relevant markets‘ structure and entry conditions. It is noteworthy that the 
FTC used the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (the HHI) to evaluate the 
concentration rate of the relevant market and concluded that the market 
concentration level far exceeded the thresholds set out in the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines155 and thus raised a presumption that the proposed 
acquisition would create or enhance market power. Finally the FTC 
concluded that competition might be significantly lessened by this 
transaction in three  respects: 1. by eliminating actual, direct, and 
substantial competition between Respondents in the worldwide portable 
NiMH battery market; 2. by increasing the likelihood that Respondents would 
unilaterally exercise market power in the worldwide portable NiMH battery 
market; and, 3. by increasing the likelihood that US consumers would be 
forced to pay higher prices for portable NiMH batteries.156 The FTC‘s 
complaint is a brief statement of its attitude to the case. It can tell the public 
the basic information of the merging parties, the relevant market and the 
FTC‘s opinions on the merger. 
The FTC‘s decision and order contained detailed information on the 
remedies. It at first defined a series of terms mentioned in this decision.  
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 The latest version is available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf, 
last visited on 11/12/2012. 
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 See, The FTC‘s complaint, Docket No. C-4274, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0910050/091124panasanyocmpt.pdf, last visited on 07/12/2012, 
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The FTC then regulated in detail the rights and obligations of the respondents, 
the divestiture party, the acquirer, the interim monitor and the trustees. It 
should be noted that this order contained no competitive impact analysis. 
Analysis of this transaction‘s competitive impact lay mainly in the ‗analysis 
of the agreement containing consent orders to aid public comment‘ 
(hereafter the analysis). The analysis was in three parts: 1. introduction of 
the transaction; 2. the relevant market and the competitive impact of the 
transaction; 3. the consent agreement. In the first part the analysis disclosed 
basic information about the transaction and the parties. The second part 
explained the relevant product market, the relevant product market and the 
competitive impact. The FTC defined the relevant product market as 
portable NiMH batteries and provided two reasons: 1. customers cannot 
switch to another type of rechargeable battery because the products were 
designed specifically to accommodate portable NiMH batteries; 2. even 
among customers who use NiMH batteries but are not locked into purchasing 
them, there is a strong preference for portable NiMH batteries for 
performance and cost reasons.157 The FTC defined the geographic market as 
worldwide, providing that manufacturing of portable NiMH batteries is 
concentrated in Asia, and orders are shipped to customers throughout the 
world.158 When analysing the competitive impact of the transaction the FTC 
cited three points: firstly, Panasonic and Sanyo are close competitors in the 
market of portable NiMH batteries; secondly, the merger would allow 
Panasonic to exercise market power unilaterally; and thirdly, the new 
competitors in the portable NiMH batteries are unlikely to bring sufficient 
competition to deter or counteract the anticompetitive effects of the 
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 See, Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Orders to Aid Public Comment In the 
Matter of Panasonic Corporation and Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0910050/091124panasanyoanal.pdf, last visited on 08/12/2012, 
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proposed acquisition. The final part is the consent agreement which required 
Sanyo to divest its assets relating to the manufacture and sale of portable 
NiMH batteries to FDK Corporation. 
The information disclosed by the FTC is much less than that by the EU 
Commission. It only provided a basic analysis of the relevant markets and 
competitive impact of this transaction. Although it did not explain the 
reasons based on which the decision was made, it gave a detailed explanation 
on the remedies.159 Although varying in length and level of detail, the 
decisions in Panasonic/Sanyo made by the EU Commission and the FTC have 
the following similarities. Firstly, they defined the relevant product market 
in their decisions with explanations. Secondly, both agencies evaluated the 
competitive impact of this transaction from the following aspects: market 
shares of the merging parties; whether Panasonic and Sanyo are close 
competitors in the relevant market; the other major r competitors in the 
relevant market; whether the relevant market was growing or not; and 
whether there were new competitors in the relevant market. Thirdly, both 
the EU Commission and the FTC disclosed detailed information on the 
remedies. The information included: 1. the original remedies provided by 
Panasonic and Sanyo; 2. the agencies‘ assessment of the remedies proposed 
by the merging parties; 3. a series of definitions of the terms used in the 
remedies;160 4. the reasons why the remedies could effectively address the 
competitive impact of this transaction; and, 5. detailed rights and obligations 
of the Divestment Business (the ‗Respondents‘ in the context of the FTC‘s 
decision), the Purchaser(the ‗Acquirer‘ in the context of the FTC‘s decision), 
                                         
159
 As mentioned above, the FTC spent 26 page so explaining the proposed consent order. It 
defined 37 terms used in this order, set time-limits to the divestiture and provided detailed 
guidance on how to divest, the interim monitor, the trustee, the obligation of keeping 
confidentiality and the duty of notifying the FTC.   
160
 For example, Affiliated Undertakings, Trustee, Divestment Businesses and Monitoring 
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the Divestiture Trustee and the Monitoring Trustee(the Interim Monitor in the 
context of the FTC‘s decision). 
The MOFCOM‘s decision on Panasonic/Sanyo is three pages long and can 
also be divided into three parts. Part one provided summary information 
about the notification procedure, the content of the MOFCOM‘s investigation 
and how the MOFCOM conducted the investigation. There are two notable 
points in this part. Firstly, the MOFCOM indicated that the content of the 
investigation included: 1. the market shares of Panasonic and Sanyo in the 
relevant markets; 2. the degree of market concentration in the relevant 
market; 3. the influence of the concentration of business operators on  
market access and technological progress; 4. the influence of the 
concentration of business operators on the consumers and other business 
operators; and, 5. the influence of the concentration of business operators on 
the national economic development.161 However, the decision failed to cover 
every element in its competitive impact part. Secondly, the MOFCOM 
indicated that it investigated the opinions of the government, business and 
industrial associations and 39 competitors. The MOFCOM did to consult the 
consumers who might be directly affected by this merger and it failed to 
disclose any details and content of all these investigations. 
In the second part the MOFCOM analysed the competitive impact of this 
transaction. It firstly classified the relevant product markets, without any 
explanation, as to: 1. rechargeable lithium coin batteries; 2. Ni-MH batteries 
for civil use; and, 3. automotive Ni-MH batteries. It then defined the relevant 
geographic market as worldwide, again without any explanation nor evidence. 
The MOFCOM briefly analysed the competitive impact of this transaction on 
each relevant product market. There are five elements used by the MOFCOM: 
                                         
161
 See, The Public Announcement of the MOFCOM, No.82, [2009], supra note 149; see also, 
Article 27 of the AML 2007.  
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1. market share; 2. the number of effective competitors after the transaction; 
3. buyers‘ power; 4. market entry; and, 5. the degree of market 
concentration. All explanations were brief (in one or two sentences) and 
lacked statistics and reasoning.162 Moreover, the MOFCOM did not provide 
any analysis on other competitors except e Panasonic and Sanyo.163 
The last part was on the remedies.  Again, the MOFCOM did not explain 
why these remedies would be effective to address the competitive concerns 
brought by the transaction in the decision. It can be seen that unlike the 
decisions of the EU and US, the MOFCOM‘s decision in Panasonic/Sanyo the 
MOFCOM failed to explain how the relevant markets were defined, which is 
the basis of the reasoning. The EU Commission provided a detailed 
classification of the different types of battery and gave a comprehensive 
description on each of the markets. The FTC although did not provide a 
detailed classification of batteries. It explained why the FTC regarded the 
portable NiMH batteries as the relevant product market.164  The MOFCOM 
should in the first place provide sufficient evidence and reasoning to explain 
its definition of relevant product and geographic market. If the MOFCOM is 
incapable of providing a comprehensive classification of relevant products,165 
it at least should give basic but clear reasons to support its definition of the 
                                         
162
 It seems that the only statistics the MOFCOM relied on were on the market share. For 
example, the MOFCOM did not give any quantitative analysis on the degree of market 
concentration, although it claimed all three relevant markets were highly concentrated. 
Another example is that in the decision the MOFCOM indicated that the buyer power in the 
market of rechargeable lithium coin batteries cannot eliminate the negative effect brought by 
this merger. However, there is no further explanation of how the MOFCOM reached this 
conclusion.              
163
 In this decision the MOFCOM‘s competitive concerns on the three relevant markets were 
partly based on the lack of effective competition between the merged company and other 
competitors in the relevant market. However, the MOFCOM provided no information on any 
competitors other than Panasonic and Sanyo.    
164
 See, The FTC‘s complaint, supra note 156.  
165
 Such incapability may be due to lack of experience, personnel and professionalism of the 
MOFCOM.  
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relevant market. For example, in Panasonic/Sanyo, the MOFCOM might have 
provided analysis on the supply substitutability and demand substitutability 
of the rechargeable lithium coin batteries when it defined it as the relevant 
product market. Secondly, when assessing the competitive impact the 
MOFCOM should provide more information to justify its conclusion. As clear 
from both the EU and US experience, the MOFCOM needs to disclose 
information and analyses on the following aspects instead of just relying on 
the merging parties‘ market share: 1. the market shares and ability of other 
major competitors; 2. whether the merging parties are close competitors and 
the reasons; 3. whether the market is growing and the evidence; 4. whether 
the relevant market is highly concentrated and the reasons;166 and, 5. 
whether new competitors will enter the market and the reasons. Thirdly, it is 
insufficient for the MOFCOM to only publishing the remedies; it needs to 
explain why these remedies can effectively eliminate the anticompetitive 
effects brought by the transaction. Following both EU and US practice the 
MOFCOM might improve  transparency in this regard in the following ways: 1. 
it should disclose the original remedies proposed by the merging parties; 2. it 
should provide assessment of and opinion on the original proposed remedies; 
3. it  should define the terms used in the remedies clearly, for example, the 
Divestment Business and the Purchaser; 4. it needs to explain why the 
remedies provided can effectively eliminate the harm  to competition  
brought by the proposed merger; and, 5. although the MOFCOM has regulated 
the rights and obligations of Panasonic and Sanyo in a fairly detailed way, it 
failed to mention the rights and obligations of the Purchaser, the Divestiture 
Trustee and the Monitoring Trustee. 
                                         
166
 When evaluating the degree of the market concentration the MOFCOM may use the HHI 
and the market shares of other competitors as evidence to support its conclusion instead of 
bringing the conclusion directly without any supportive statements.   
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Mergers which are prohibited or cleared with remedies by the MOFCOM are 
deemed important to competition and thus have significant guiding value to 
the public and the practitioners in the market. If the disclosure of such 
decisions is insufficient, the public and merging parties would be unaware of 
the MOFCOM‘s analytical framework and thus face the risk of legal 
uncertainty and unpredictability of the merger enforcement. On the other 
hand, the credibility of the MOFCOM‘s enforcement activity may also be 
affected.167 If the MOFCOM can improve the quality of such decisions in the 
ways identified above, transparency might be significantly increased. This 
improvement would be both beneficial to practitioners in the market and the 
MOFCOM itself.                  
Further concerns at lack of transparency in Chinese merger enforcement 
procedure  
The experience of the EU and US also illustrates some concerns of 
transparency under both regimes. In relation to the EU merger regime, the 
main concern is that the Commission‘s tripartite role under merger 
enforcement brings significant concerns at the transparency of EU merger 
enforcement.168 Such concern is raised equally in China. Similar to the 
Commission, the MOFCOM also has exclusive authority of investigation, 
prosecution and decision-making. Ineffective judicial review in China worsens 
the situation.169 In order to reduce political influence on the decisions the 
MOFCOM might consider increasing internal balance under current structure 
by establishing a hearing department to supervise the procedure of merger 
                                         
167
As stated by R. Evans: ‗Short, vague decisions encourage speculation about protectionism.‘ 
See, R. Evans, ‗Transparency is in Mofcom's Interests‘, supra note 120, at 20.  
168
 See, ‗2.2 Institutional concerns of transparency of EU merger control procedure‘ of this 
chapter.  
169
 For discussion on the ineffectiveness of judicial review under the AML 2007, please refer to 
‗3.1.1 Lack of independent judiciary‘ of Chapter 1 of the thesis.  
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enforcement independently.170 In addition, it is advisable for the MOFCOM to 
issue a series of notices and guidelines to explain its enforcement and general 
analytical framework in its merger assessment.171 
The main concern of transparency faced by the US agencies is its cost. 172 
The first two sources of cost may also be faced by the MOFCOM, i.e. the 
administrative burden and the protection of confidentiality. In relation to the 
administrative burden of transparency, it is not significant under the Chinese 
merger enforcement regime. As examined above, the Commission annually 
dealt with an average of 299.5 notifications  from 2002 to 2011, the two 
agencies under US merger enforcement regime received 1433.1 notifications 
(on average) annually in the same period. In China, from 1 August, 2008 to 30 
September, 2012, the MOFCOM dealt with 474 merger cases in these four 
years and that is average of 118.5 cases a year.173 This number amounts to 40% 
of the EU caseload and only 8% of the US.  The cost of transparency in the 
Chinese current merger enforcement regime is insignificant due to the 
                                         
170
 A detailed discussion of the role of the Hearing Department under the AML 2007‘s 
enforcement will be provided in Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
171
 This experience is also proved effective under the US merger enforcement regime. 
Although the Antitrust Division and the FTC fail to disclose as much information of the 
decisions as the EU Commission does, the two agencies have issued written guidelines that 
remain a good statement of the analytical framework used to review mergers. See, J.M. 
Nannes, ‗Transparency in Federal Antitrust Enforcement Decisions: A Reaction to Professor 
Grimes‘, supra note 110, at 1018.  
172
 See, ‗3.2.2 Arguments against the concerns for transparency under US merger control 
procedure‘ of this chapter. The four points against transparency in US merger enforcement are: 
1. the administrative burden; 2. the protection of confidentiality; 3. evidentiary difficulties which 
might make the Antitrust Division vulnerable to counsel‘s planning transactions that are 
designed to frustrate their successfully enjoining them; 4. there are cases where the agencies 
decided not to pursue not because they are lawful or harmless but for other reasons such as 
lack of resources. The third reason will not be met by the MOFCOM because of different 
institutional design and enforcement mechanisms. The fourth concern is caused by 
administrative overload and scare resources. Thus in essence it is the concern of the cost of 
transparency.  
173
 The statistics are available at the official website of the MOFCOM‘s Antimonopoly Bureau: 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/, last visited on 09/12/2012, 23:55.  
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relatively low caseload. In relation to the concern for the protection of 
confidentiality, it is undeniable that an increase in transparency in Chinese 
merger would threaten business confidentiality. For example, if more 
information were disclosed to the public in the MOFCOM‘s decision, the 
merging parties and the relevant third parties would not be willing to 
cooperate with the MOFCOM for fear that the information submitted would 
be released. However, this concern can be allayed by the approach provided 
by the EU: the Commission only provides the public a non-confidential version 
of the decision. As examined above, before every stage of disclosure in the 
procedure the Commission will ask the notifying parties and third parties to 
submit a non-confidential version and justify their opinion.174 Thus the 
MOFCOM might avoid the risk of disclosing confidential information by 
adopting an approach similar to that of the EU.     
                                         
174
 See, ‗2.1.2 Transparency in the EU merger control enforcement procedure‘ of this chapter.  
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Chapter 3 Allocation of Public Enforcement 
Powers in China’s Antimonopoly Law between 
the Central and Provincial Administrative 
Enforcers 
1. Introduction 
This chapter seeks to answer the question of how to allocate the public 
enforcement power of the AML 2007 between the central governmental 
administrative enforcers (hereafter the CAEs) and provincial governmental1 
administrative enforcers (hereafter the PAEs).2 The CAEs include MOFCOM, 
SAIC and the NDRC, while the PAEs are the branches of MOFCOM, SAIC and the 
NDRC at the provincial level.3 Article 10 of the AML 2007 stipulates that:  
                                         
1
 The ‗provincial governments‘ discussed in this chapter include the governments of Provinces, 
Autonomous Regions and Municipalities directly under the Central Government. They occupy 
the  same position in the political hierarchy under China‘s political system. See, Chinese 
Regional Administrative System, available (in Chinese) at Xin Hua Net, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-08/22/content_1039416_5.htm, last visited on 
28/03/2012, 16:36 ; For a detailed and comprehensive examination of the Chinese political 
structure and system, please refer to: N. Wei & A.M. Wu, ‗Modern Chinese Government and 
Administration[当代中国政府与行政,dangdai zhongguozhengfu yu xingzheng]’ (2008) Renmin 
University of China Press.  
2
 Because the implementation of the prohibition of the anticompetitive agreement and abuse 
of dominant position is separated from merger assessment under EU competition law and the 
US antitrust law regimes, discussion of the enforcement powers allocation between  CAEs 
and the PAEs in this chapter will be in line with this separation. The AML 2007 enforcement 
power‘s allocation among the CAEs and the PAEs refers to the implementation of the 
prohibition of the anticompetitive agreement and abuse of dominant position. Merger 
assessment will be discussed separately.   
3
 In China, the branches of the CAEs at the provincial level are under direct leadership of the 
MOFCOM the SAIC and the NDRC respectively. The branches of the CAEs are at the same 
time subject to the provincial government. See, Article 66 of Organic Law of the Local People's 
Congress and Local People's Governments of the People‘s Republic of China, passed by the 
5
th
 NPC, the second Conference on 1st July, 1979, latest amended on 27
th
 October, 2004. See 
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The MOFOM, the SAIC and the NDRC may, when needed, authorise 
their branches at provincial governmental level to enforce the Law.  
This article ensures that the public enforcement authorities of the AML 
2007 can be devolved from the CAEs to the PAEs. However, this broad 
statement is insufficient to determine how to allocate the enforcement 
powers between the CAEs and the PAEs; it merely raises a question: there is 
no further explanation of the words ‗when needed‘. 
Article 10 leaves huge discretion to MOFCOM, SAIC and the NDRC in 
determining whether PAEs will have powers of enforcement under the AML 
2007. The absence of clear guidelines, cases and procedure to address this 
problem not only increases the Law‘s uncertainty, inconsistency and 
unpredictability during enforcement but also causes inefficient case 
allocation between CAEs and PAEs. 
The concerns of uncertainty, inconsistency and unpredictability are 
immediate for practitioners in China.4 They may have doubts about whether 
the AML 2007 can be enforced consistently by both CAEs and PAEs. For 
instance, if an undertaking‘s anticompetitive conduct has been addressed by 
the SAIC, it could not predict whether the same conduct would be 
                                                                                                                     
also, more specifically for the SAIC, Article 8 of the Interim Provisions of Industrial and 
Commercial Administration, issued by the Order of the SAIC, No.45, on 19 December, 1995, 
amended by the Order of the SAIC, No. 63, on 17, December, 1996. There are also branches 
of the CAEs at the city and county levels which are below the provincial level. However, since 
it is unclear whether the branches on the city and county levels have authority to enforce the 
AML 2007, this chapter will only focus on the relationship between the CAEs and their 
branches at the provincial level. For details of the Chinese administrative system and 
hierarchy please refer to N. Wei & A.M. Wu, ibid.   
4
 As Thomas Jones (a partner in Allen & Overy) states ‗(foreign) investors seek consistency 
and guidance in the AML 2007‘s implementation. In addition, national security review policies 
must be specific and authorities should establish detailed implementation plans in the near 
future.‘ See, Z.X. Huo, ‗A Tiger without Teeth, The Antitrust Law of the People‘s Republic of 
China‘, (2008) 10 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal, 32-60, at 57.    
Chapter 3  
Allocation of Public Enforcement Powers in China‘s Antimonopoly Law between the Central and 
Provincial Administrative Enforcers 
96 
 
investigated and addressed again by the PAEs, because there is no 
explanation as to the conditions in which the SAIC will not give the provincial 
government the power of enforcing AML 2007. Or, in the field of merger, a 
business may be uncertain whether the merger will be re-examined by a PAE 
after it reached consent with MOFCOM.5 The concern of inefficient case 
allocation is also significant. With multiple antitrust enforcers under the 
regime, an inevitable question to be faced is how to allocate cases in the 
most efficient way between the multiple enforcers. The Commission regards 
the efficient way as the case is allocated to a single ‗well placed authority‘ 
according to the link between the geographical market in question and the 
territory of the competition authority involved.6 Since the AML 2007 enables 
both CAEs and PAEs to enforce it, the question of how to determine the most 
efficient or well-placed authority in individual case should be answered. 
To this end, the aim of this chapter is to provide a discussion of the AML 
2007‘s allocation of public enforcement powers between CAEs and PAEs. In 
particular it seeks answers to the following three questions: 1.whether the 
AML 2007 should be directly applicable by the PAEs; 2. under what conditions 
PAEs may enforce the AML 2007, i.e. how to define the word ‗when needed‘ 
in Article 10 of the AML 2007; 3. how to guarantee a consistent, predicable 
and harmonious public enforcement of the AML 2007 between the CAEs and 
the PAEs. 
In order to answer these questions we shall examine the experience of the 
public enforcement of EU competition law and US antitrust law. The EU 
                                         
5
 In fact this concern is real in practice in the US. See, California v. American Stores Co., 495 
U.S. 271 (1990). In this case the State Attorney General of California filed a suit under Section 
7 of the Clayton Act, Section 1 of the Sherman Act and California‘s state competition Act, upon 
the approved merger between America Stores and Luck Stores Inc., by the FTC.  
6
 See, The Commission Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, 
[2004], OJ C101/43, para.5-15.  
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competition law‘s modernisation process from a centralised to the 
decentralised enforcement mechanism might provide a chance to evaluate 
both the centralised and the decentralised mechanisms between the 
Commission and the NCAs and national courts. Such an evaluation could 
provide useful experience for discussing the relationship between the CAEs 
and the PAEs under the AML 2007. In addition, the European Competition 
Network (hereafter, the ECN) may provide an approach for China through 
which effective case allocation and cooperation between the CAEs and the 
PAEs can be established. On the other hand, US antitrust law, with its long 
tradition of federalism,7 may provide plenty of experience on the questions 
such as where the boundary lies between the enforcement of the federal 
antitrust Acts and the states‘ antitrust Acts, how to enforce the federal 
antitrust law consistently and harmoniously through the offices of the FTC, 
the DOJ and the State Attorneys General.8 
This chapter is divided into three parts. First of all we shall examine the 
decentralisation9 and multi-level governance10 of Articles 101 and 102 
                                         
7
 For discussion of the history of the United States‘ antitrust federalism see T.M. Wilson 
(edited by), Antitrust Federalism: the Role of State Law, (1988) American Bar Association; for 
a more general introduction to federalism, please refer to: L.N. Gerston, American federalism: 
a concise introduction, (2007) M.E. Sharpe Inc; see also, A. Stepan, ‗Federalism and 
Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model‘, (1999) 10(4) Journal of Democracy, 19-34.    
8
 The states proclaimed their roles as the ‗de facto third national antitrust enforcement agency.‘ 
See, D.L. Flexner & M.A. Racanelli, ‗State and Federal Antitrust Enforcement in the United 
States: Collision or Harmony?‘ (1993-1994) 9 Connecticut Journal of International Law, 
501-534.  
9
 The term ‗decentralisation‘ in this chapter refers to the devolution of powers concerning the 
enforcement of Article 101 TFEU to the national competition authorities and the national 
courts.  
10
 The term ‗multi-level governance‘ in this chapter strictly refers to the relationship between 
the Commission and the national competition authorities and the national courts in Member 
States under the public enforcement of Article 101, Article 102 TFEU and Council Regulation 
No.139/2004(Official Journal L 24, 29.01.2004, p.1-22). For a more comprehensive and 
detailed explanation of EU‘s multi-level governance, please refer to L. Hooghe and G. Marks, 
Multi-Level Governance and European Integration, (2001) Rowman & Littlefield Publishers; 
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TFEU‘s enforcement. This examination will exclude competition law in the 
different Member States. The aim is to find what can be learned from the 
experience of EU competition law‘s decentralisation and its case allocation, 
cooperation and coordination mechanisms. The second part will examine the 
state and federal antitrust enforcement in the United States. Again, this 
examination will exclude states‘ competition Acts but will focus on the public 
enforcement of federal antitrust Acts. The aim is to find what can be learned 
by AML 2007‘s public enforcers from the relationship between the federal and 
state government under the public enforcement of federal antitrust Acts. The 
last part of this chapter will discuss whether the experience found in the EU 
and US in the above two parts is applicable and effective to address the 
question posed at the beginning: how to allocate public enforcement 
authorities between CAEs and PAEs under Chinese AML 2007. 
2. Decentralisation and multi-level governance 
under EU competition law’s public Enforcement  
2.1 From centralisation to decentralisation  
2.1.1 An overview 
On December 16th 2002 the Council abandoned the 40 year old Regulation 
17/6211 and adopted Regulation 1/2003 (hereafter, Reg. 1/2003),12 which 
establishes a new European competition enforcement regime based on the 
                                                                                                                     
see also, N. Nugent (edited by), At the Heart of the Union: Studies of the European 
Commission, 2nd edition, (2000) Macmillian Press Ltd. 
11
 EEC Council: Regulation 17/62, Official Journal 013, 21/02/1962 P.0204–0211.  
12
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2003 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, available 
at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l001/10012003010 4en 00010025.pdf, last 
visited on 29/03/2012, 15:36. 
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joint enforcement of the EU competition rules by the Commission and 
national authorities.13 In order for this new enforcement regime to function 
efficiently the Commission decided to complement Reg. 1/2003 with a 
package of six accompanying notices and a Commission implementing 
regulation, the so-called ‗Modernisation Package.‘14 Two significant reforms 
were applied by the modernisation: the abolition of the pre-notification 
system established by Regulation 17/6215 and the decentralisation of Article 
101(3) TFEU (Article 85(3))‘s direct enforcement authority to NCAs and 
national courts which had previously been centralised in the hands of the 
Commission under Regulation 17/62.16  
As a result of broad interpretation of Article 101(1) TFEU a large number of 
agreements between undertakings have in the past been deemed to fall 
within the prohibition of Article 101(1) TFEU and have therefore been 
                                         
13
 P. Lowe, ‗Current Issues of E.U. Competition Law: The New Competition Enforcement 
Regime‘, (2004) 24 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, 567-584.  
14
 The six notices are: Commission Regulation on proceedings by the Commission pursuant 
to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, 2003 O.J. (C 243) 3; Commission Notice on 
cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, 2003 O.J. (C 243) 11; Commission 
Notice on the co-operation between the Commission and the courts of the EU Member States 
in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, 2003 O.J. (C 243) 20; Commission Notice on the 
handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, 2003 
O.J. (C 243) 30; Commission Notice on informal guidance relating to novel questions 
concerning Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty that arise in individual cases, 2003 O.J. (C 243) 
42; Commission Notice Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 
82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. (C 243) 45; Notice - Communication from the Commission 
Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. (C 243) 62. 
15
 In accordance with Article 4 of Regulation 17 agreements, decisions and concerted 
practices of the kind described in Article 85 (1) of the Treaty (i.e. Article 101(1) TFEU) which 
come into existence after the entry into force of this Regulation and in respect of which the 
parties seek application of Article 85 (3) (i.e. Article 101(3) TFEU) must be notified to the 
Commission. Until they have been notified no decision on application of Article 85 (3) may be 
taken.  
16
 See, para.12 of the White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 
and 86 of the EC Treaty, European Commission, COM (99) 101 Final (Apr. 1999); O.J. C 
132/1 (1999) (hereinafter White Paper). 
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automatically ruled null and void.17 In seeking exemption the agreements 
were subject to block exemption regulation18, or they had to be notified to 
the Commission under Article 101(3) TFEU.19 The Commission‘s resources 
were absorbed by examination of notifications and requests for exemption 
instead of being devoted to the investigation of complaints and the launching 
and pursuit of ex officio procedures.20 The White Paper also claimed that the 
notification system and the Commission‘s monopoly of exemption under 
Article 101(3) TFEU resulted in undertakings‘ systematically notifying their 
restrictive practices to the Commission which, with limited administrative 
resources, was very soon faced with the impossibility of dealing by formal 
decision with the thousands of cases submitted.21 Thus there were two aims 
of the modernisation: firstly, to maintain and, where possible, improve the 
effectiveness of the enforcement of the EU competition rules in an enlarged 
European Union;22 secondly, to enable the Commission to focus on the most 
serious anticompetitive infringements.23  
The concerns that the reform would possibly bring or have brought and 
whether the modernisation can achieve the proposed goals have been widely 
                                         
17
See, J.S. Venit, ‗Brave New World: The Modernisation and Decentralisation of Enforcement 
under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty‘, (2003) 40 Common Market Law Review, 545-580. 
18
 On 2 March, 1965, in order to relieve the Commission from the large number of notifications 
pursuant to Regulation 17/62, the Council approved Regulation No. 19/65(OJ 36, 6.3.1965, p. 
533–535) enabling the Commission to declare by way of regulation that Article 101(1) TFEU 
does not apply to certain categories of agreements. Agreements which met the criteria of 
established by the Commission‘s block exemption are automatically exempted from Article 
101(1) TFEU without a notification‘s  being required. 
19
 See, Article 4 of the Regulation 17/62.  
20
 See, C. D. Ehlermann, ‗The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy, a Legal and Cultural 
Revolution‘, (2000) 37(3) Common Market Law Review, 537-590.  
21
 Para. 24, The White Paper.  
22
 See, P. Lowe, ‗Current Issues of E.U. Competition Law: The New Competition Enforcement 
Regime‘, supra note 13, at 568.  
23
 See, para 13, the White Paper; see also, the Third Recital of Reg. 1/2003.  
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discussed.24 This section does not seek to repeat the discussion. Rather it will 
only focus on the advantages and disadvantages of the centralised and 
decentralised enforcement mechanisms under EU competition law.  
2.1.2 The reasons for and concerns of the EU’s centralised 
enforcement mechanism 
A centralised enforcement mechanism of EU competition law in this 
chapter specifically refers to the system established by Regulation 17/62 
under which the Commission monopolised the authority of issuing individual 
exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU. There are two cornerstones of the 
centralised mechanism: the notification system and the Commission‘s 
exclusive authority to enforce exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU. The 
White Paper claimed that the centralised mechanism which existed for 40 
years proved necessary and effective for the establishment of a culture of 
competition' in Europe.25 In this section we shall examine the reasons for and 
concerns at the centralised mechanism from the economic and legal 
perspectives, in order to see whether the White Paper‘s claim is justified and 
what can be learned from this centralised mechanism by China‘s AML 2007. 
                                         
24
 Some commentators and officials are confident about the modernisation reform. See for 
example, P. Lowe, ‗Current Issues of E.U. Competition Law: The New Competition 
Enforcement Regime‘, supra note 13; M. Monti, ‗The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy‘, 
Opening Speech at the Annual EU Competition Law and Policy Workshops (2000); J.S. Venit, 
‗Brave New World: The Modernisation and Decentralisation of Enforcement under Articles 81 
and 82 of the EC Treaty‘, supra note 17. However, other commentators pointed out various 
concerns that may be brought by the modernisation. For example, A. Riley argued that the 
decentralisation in the modernisation process would strengthen the Commission‘s position in 
the EU and have a de facto centralised effect. See, A. Riley, ‗EC Antitrust Modernisation: The 
Commission Does Very Nicely—Thank You! Part One: Regulation 1 and the Notification 
Burden‘, (2003) 24(11) European Competition Law Review, 604-615; A. Riley, ‗EC Antitrust 
Modernisation: The Commission Does Very Nicely—Thank You! Part Two: Between the Idea 
and the Reality: Decentralisation under Regulation 1‘, (2003) 24(12) European Competition 
Law Review, 657-672.   
25
 See, para. 4 of the White Paper.  
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The reasons for applying the centralised mechanism  
The main reasons for applying the centralised mechanism in the EU were 
firstly to prevent trade protectionism between Member States; secondly to 
guarantee the consistent implementation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in 
Member States.26 The notification system and the Commission‘s exclusive 
authority to grant exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU provided the 
Commission with a large amount of information and allowed it to develop a 
coherent implementation strategy for Article 101(3) TFEU. It also provided 
undertakings with legal certainty. This was particularly important in the 
period immediately following the adoption of EU competition law as the 
precise contours of the rules were not completely clear.27 The reasons can be 
                                         
26
 See, C.D. Ehlermann, ‗The Contribution of EC Competition Policy to the Single Market‘ 
(1992) 29(2) Common Market Law Review, 257-282; see also, G. Tesauro, ‗Some Reflections 
on the Commission‘s White Paper on the Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy‘, in C. D. 
Ehlermann and I. Atanasiu (edited by), European Competition Law Annual 2000, (2001) Hart 
Publishing; at 259-270. 
27
 D. Geradin, ‗Competition between Rules and Rules of Competition: A legal and economic 
analysis of the proposed modernisation of the enforcement of EC competition law‘, (2002) 9 
Columbia Journal of European Law, 1-28.  
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explained from an economic point of view:28 the prevention of externalities, 
transaction cost savings and, perhaps, prevention of a race to the bottom.29 
Externalities can be typically illustrated by differing environmental law in 
different nations. It also occurs in competition law.30 A typical example is 
that under the EU merger regime the costs of market power to foreign 
customers will be given less weight than the rents of market power to 
domestic interests. An excessively national focus in the control of such 
mergers may thus lead to distorted judgments.31 Such externalities may be 
inspired by a Member State‘s national interests. Unlike the Commission, 
national enforcement bodies will systematically focus on the local effects of 
a given transaction, instead of looking at the broader, EU-wide picture.32 
Hence transactions with externalities should be supervised by supranational 
antitrust authorities to prevent a bias in favour of national interests. To this 
                                         
28
 The foundation of the following economic views is the concept of regulatory competition, 
which can be traced to Tiebout's 1956 article arguing that a decentralised governmental 
system, with horizontally arrayed jurisdictions competing to attract residents on the basis of 
differing tax and benefit structures, produces efficient outcomes. Laws and regulations are 
regarded as ‗goods‘ or ‗services‘ in the market, i.e. goods and services produced by public 
authorities for which people are willing to pay taxes. Governments are suppliers of legal 
structures and products and therefore these actors could and should be disciplined by market 
forces and competition rules. So competition pressure would force governments to produce 
their regulatory products at competitive ‗prices‘. See, C. M. Tiebout, ‗A Pure Theory of Local 
Expenditures‘, (1956) 64(5) Journal of Political Economy, 416-424; see also, F.H. Easterbrook, 
‗Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism‘ (1983) 26(1) Journal of Law and Economics, 
23-50.  
29
 See, D. Geradin, ‗Competition between Rules and Rules of Competition‘, supra note 27, at 
12; R. Van den Bergh, ‗Economic Criteria for Applying the Subsidiarity Principle in the 
European Community: The Case of Competition Policy‘, (1996) 16 International Review of Law 
and Economics, 363-383; E.M. Fox, ‗Antitrust Law on a Global Scale: Races Up, Down, and 
Sideways‘, in D.C. Esty & D. Geradin(edited by), Regulatory Competition and Economic 
Integration-Comparative Perspectives, (2001) Oxford University Press, at 348-363;  
30
 R. Van den Bergh, ibid.  
31
 See, D.J. Neven, R. Nuttall & P. Seabright, Merger in Daylight: The Economics and Politics 
of European Merger Control, (1993) Centre for Economic Policy Research, at 196.  
32
 See, P.C. Mavroidis & D.J. Neven, ‗The White Paper: A Whiter Shade of Pale of Interest 
and Interests‘, European Competition Law Annual 2000, 207-222, at 214.  
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end centralised supervision will mitigate judgments biased in favour of 
national interests33 and prevent trade protectionism between nations.  
Transaction cost savings is another result brought by consistent 
enforcement of EU law.34 In technically complicated or analysis-intensive 
regulatory fields such as the EU competition law enforcement regime, 
economies of scale can be realised by entrusting regulatory duties to a 
centralised authority35. In practice economies of scale may bring transaction 
cost savings which may benefit practitioners in the market by the increase in 
legal certainty. Firstly, as the White Paper recalls, the notification system set 
out by Regulation 17/62 sought to establish the conditions for providing 
business with adequate legal certainty.36 All the undertakings seeking 
exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU must bring the agreement before the 
Commission, the only body which is able to apply exemption. In fact most of 
the undertakings were not seeking exemption, but to obtain legal certainty 
for their agreements before they implemented them.37 The abolition of this 
ex ante safeguard for undertakings would decrease legal certainty.38 
Secondly, the Commission‘s exclusive role in applying Article 101(3) TFEU 
                                         
33
See, R. Van den Bergh, ‗Economic Criteria for Applying the Subsidiarity Principle in the 
European Community: The Case of Competition Policy‘, supra note 29, at 372, 373.  
34
 Ibid, at 374.  
35
 See, D. Geradin, ‗Competition between Rules and Rules of Competition: A legal and 
economic analysis of the proposed modernisation of the enforcement of EC competition law‘, 
supra note 27, at 6.  
36
 See, White Paper, paras. 16-17. 
37
 See, M. Siragusa, ‗A Critical Review of the White Paper on the Reform of the EC 
Competition Law Enforcement Rules‘, (1999) 23(4) Fordham International Law Journal, 
1089-1127, at 1096.  
38
 However, on the contrary, some commentators argue that the abolishment of notification 
system will increase legal certainty because it would be no longer possible to use the nullity 
sanction of Article 101(2) TFEU as a tactical weapon for competition law litigation. See for 
example, S. Bishop, ‗Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Article 81 and 82‘, European 
Competition Law Annual 2000, at 57-69. This argument will be discussed in more detail in the 
next section.  
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(rather than being applied by the Commission plus 27 Member States‘ NCAs 
and national courts) may maintain the consistency and predictability of 
enforcement and reduce the search costs for firms and consumers. Although 
EU competition law is the same in the literal sense, Member States may have 
different interpretations and procedures to enforce it.39 For example, 
inconsistency generates information costs as firms and their advisers have to 
keep track of a variety of guidelines to enforcing EU competition law.40 
These transaction cost savings may be very important for firms that are 
active in interstate commerce.41 The centralised enforcement mechanism 
can provide a more stable and predictable jurisprudence42 and thus save on 
transaction costs. 
The third positive effect under the centralised mechanism is prevention of 
the race to the bottom.43 To avoid perceived competitive harm, states may 
                                         
39
 This raises the issue of whether national procedural rules should be harmonized on an 
EU-wide basis. On this issue see S. Kon, ‗The Commission's White Paper on Modernization: 
The Need for Procedural Harmonization‘, in B.E. Hawk(edited by): Annual Proceedings of the 
Fordham Corporate Law Institute on International Antitrust Law and Policy, (2000) Juris 
Publishing, Inc., at 233. 
40
 See, D. Geradin, ‗Competition between Rules and Rules of Competition: A legal and 
economic analysis of the proposed modernisation of the enforcement of EC competition law‘, 
supra note 27, at 23.  
41
 See, R. Van den Bergh, ‗Economic Criteria for Applying the Subsidiarity Principle in the 
European Community: The Case of Competition Policy‘, supra note 29, at 374.  
42
 See, S.R. Ackerman, Rethinking the Progressive Agenda, (1992) Free Press; see also, M. 
Siragusa, ‗A Critical Review of the White Paper on the Reform of the EC Competition Law 
Enforcement Rules‘, supra note 37. However, under the EU competition law regime, whether 
the centralised mechanism can provide more legal certainty or predictability than the 
decentralised mechanism is still uncertain. See, G. Amato & C.D. Ehlermann (edited by), EC 
Competition Law-A Critical Assessment, (2007) Hart Publishing, at 645-646. This issue will be 
discussed in the following section.  
43
 The ‗race to the bottom‘ theory, which was initially developed in the context of US 
federalism, builds on the logic of a prisoner's dilemma. For general reference, see, W.L. Caryt, 
‗Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware‘, (1974) 83(4) Yale Law Journal, 
663-705; R. L. Revesz, ‘Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race to the 
Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation‘, (1992) 67 New York University Law 
Review, 1210-1255, at 1217-1218.  
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engage in strategic behaviour and adopt lower standards than they would 
have chosen in the absence of economic competition.44 However, this 
behaviour may not fit the EU competition law regime if all EU Member States 
applying the same Article 101 and 102 TFEU, which is the situation discussed 
here. With the same substantive law Member States are not able to introduce 
controversial standards or regulations which are more attractive to 
practitioners in the market.45 However, races to the bottom can take place 
at the enforcement level: weak enforcement of Article 101 and 102 TFEU in 
some Member States could, at least in theory, incline enforcement agencies 
in other Member States to relax their own enforcement. This concern does 
not arise where the Commission is the sole enforcer of Article 101 and 102 
TFEU. For example, since agreements caught by Article 101(1) TFEU can only 
be exempted by the Commission, Member States would have no authority to 
enforce the exemption and thus there is no chance for ‗race to the bottom‘. 
However, when the Commission proposed harmonisation of enforcement of 
Article 101 and 102 TFEU in a decentralised mechanism, it referred to the 
need to prevent inequality of competitive conditions across Member States46  
Concerns of the EU centralised mechanism 
The main concern of the EU centralised mechanism is quite practical. As 
claimed in the White Paper and Reg.1/2003 this centralised mechanism 
created an immense administrative overload.47 The Commission received 
hundreds of notifications every year but it only granted a formal decision on a 
                                         
44
 Ibid.  
45
 However, it should be noted that in the absence of centralised decision- making and clarity 
in the application of the law, there can be substantial scope for differing interpretations as to 
the obligations imposed by the substantive provisions.  
46
 See, The White Paper, para. 101. This issue will be discussed in the later section.  
47
 See, para. 24, Ibid; see also, the Third Recital of Regulation 1/2003. 
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very small percentage of the notifications that it received.48 Especially in an 
enlarged EU49 the Commission‘s limited resources proved increasingly 
inadequate to the task. Although the Commission adopted a number of 
measures to reduce notifications and to process notifications more quickly, 
the effect was limited.50 With the help of the measures aiming to reduce 
notifications such as block exemption and informal comfort letters51 formal 
exemption decisions remained extremely rare. In the years preceding 2000, 
the average number of such decisions did not exceed five per year.52The 
Commission also left many cases unsettled.53 DG Comp was never able to 
eliminate the backlog that built up since the first wave of notifications.54 
The immediate result of the Commission‘s lack of response or delay was that 
a large number of agreements, decisions or concerted practices, regardless 
of their legality, remained pending and waiting for exemption from the 
Commission. 
                                         
48
 For example, in 2002, the Commission closed 363 cases, only 33 cases of which were dealt 
with by formal decisions (about 9%). The statistics are available in the XXXIInd Report on 
Competition Policy 2002, SEC (2003) 467 FINAL.  
49
 The number of the Member States of the EU has grown from 6 Founding Members in 1951 
to 27 Member States in 2007.  
50
 See, The White Paper, paras. 26-33; see also, I. Forrester, ‗Modernization of EC 
Competition Law‘, (1999) 23(4) Fordham International Law Journal, 1028-1088.   
51
 The comfort letters, are signed by a director of DG Comp, inform undertakings that, 
according to the information in the Commission's possession, the notified agreement either did 
not meet the conditions for application of Article 101(1) TFEU (negative clearance letter) or 
qualified for exemption (exemption letter) under Article 101(3) TFEU. See, para. 34, ibid.  
52
 See, C.D. Ehlermann, ‗The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy, a Legal and Cultural 
Revolution‘, supra note 20, at 544. I. Forrester also concluded that from the adoption of 
Regulation 17/62 in 1962 to 1999, the total number of formal decisions based on notification is 
just 222. See, I. Forrester, ‗Modernization of EC Competition Law‘, supra note 50, at 1032.  
53
 In accordance with the Commission’s Annual Report on Competition Policy 1998-2002, 
during the period the number of pending cases reached an average of 959.4 each year, while 
the number of closed cases was only 460.8 each year averagely. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/index.html, last visited on 
06/04/2012, 16:38.  
54
 See, C. D. Ehlermann, ‗Modernization of EC Competition Law‘, supra note 51, at 544.  
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The other consequence of the centralised mechanism is that the 
undertakings concerned could bring proceedings on the national level to a 
halt by lodging a notification with the Commission.55 When undertakings 
initiated national proceedings defendants were still able to notify their 
restrictive practices to the Commission in order to thwart the actions of the 
body to which the matter had been referred.56 As soon as the Commission 
initiated procedures the competition authorities automatically lost their 
jurisdiction. The national courts of Member States could continue their 
proceedings but often stayed them until the Commission made a decision.57 
The Commission‘s role under the centralised mechanism proved a bottleneck 
rather than a promoter of the implementation of EU competition law at the 
national level.  
2.1.3 The reasons for and concerns regarding the EU’s 
decentralised enforcement mechanism 
The ―EU decentralised mechanism‖  means the enforcement system 
established by Reg.1/2003 and the six affiliated guidelines under which the 
ex ante notification system is abolished and exemption under Article 101(3) 
TFEU can be directly applicable by the NCAs and national courts of the 
Member States. Without the notification system undertakings no longer need 
ex ante to log the agreements before the Commission. Nor does the 
Commission‘s monopoly of granting exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU 
persist. Undertakings may seek exemption before NCAs or national courts in 
27 Member States. Decentralisation may be able to overcome the concerns of 
                                         
55
 See, M. Todino, ‗Modernisation from the perspective of national competition authorities: 
impact of the reform on decentralised application of EC competition law‘, (2000) 21(8) 
European Competition Law Review, 348-358.  
56
 See, The White Paper, para. 39 
57
 Ibid.  
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the previous centralised mechanism; however, it may also reduce consistency 
and legal certainty of EU competition law enforcement. 
The reasons for applying the decentralised mechanism  
The application of the decentralised mechanism is to overcome the 
concerns brought by the centralised mechanism. The first concern is the 
Commission‘s inability to deal with the caseload created by the centralised 
mechanism. The second is that the notification system blocked EU 
competition law enforcement before NCAs and courts in Member States. 
According to the official statistics of the Commission the administrative 
overload is significantly reduced: the number of new antitrust cases received 
by the Commission was 509 in 1998; the number had dropped to 262 in 2003; 
the number of cases pending also dropped from 1204 in 1998 to 760 in 2003.58 
Hence, the decentralisation of the application of the EU competition law and 
the abolition of the notification system will certainly enable the Commission 
to focus on detecting and punishing the most serious infringements.59 
Some commentators argue that the decentralised mechanism may increase 
legal certainty for companies.60 The abolition of the ex ante notification 
system and the Commission‘s exemption monopoly  make it impossible for 
undertakings to use the nullity sanction of Article 101(2) TFEU as a tactical 
weapon to suspend competition law litigation in national courts.61 Under the 
new decentralised system the NCAs and national courts obtained authority to 
enforce Article 101 TFEU towards agreements so that firms are no longer held 
                                         
58
 See, XXXIIIrd Report on Competition Policy 2003, (Brussels, Luxembourg, 2004), at 62; 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2003/en.pdf, last 
visited on 08/04/2012, 16:49.  
59
 See, G. Amato & C.D. Ehlermann (edited by), EC Competition Law-A Critical Assessment, 
supra note 42, at 644.  
60
 See, S.R. Ackerman, Rethinking the Progressive Agenda, supra note 43.  
61
 See, S. Bishop, Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Article 81 and 82, supra note 39.  
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hostage to the split between Article 101(1) and Article 101(3) TFEU.62 The 
other reason for the centralised system‘s resulting in reduced legal certainty 
concerns the Commission‘s inability to deal with administrative workload. 
Agreements with no or little effect on competition  which would almost 
certainly be eligible for exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU were illegal and 
thus automatically null or void, unless and until they were notified and 
declared legal by the Commission, which was unable to do so in a reasonable 
period of time.63 The effect was to ‗alter the content of agreements, upset 
the bargain struck by agreements and undermine the incentives to enter 
arrangements in the first place.‘64 
Apart from the above, the economic view again provides general grounds in 
favour of decentralisation.65 Firstly, a decentralised mechanism may 
increase regulatory competition; secondly, decentralisation may prevent or 
improve informational asymmetries; thirdly, decentralisation may provide a 
chance for experimentation. 
As mentioned above,66 if we regard the Commission and NCAs as the 
suppliers of EU competition law, the practitioners in the market are 
consumers. According to competition theory, if there are more competitors 
in the market, governments are forced to produce their regulatory products 
at ‗competitive prices‘ (e.g. since benefits of governmental intervention 
exceed the costs) on pain of losing their customers, the practitioners in the 
                                         
62
 See, G. Amato & C.D. Ehlermann (edited by), EC Competition Law-A Critical Assessment, 
supra note 42, at 646.  
63
 See, The White Paper, para.40.  
64
 See, B.E. Hawk, ‗System Failure: Vertical Restraints and EC Competition Law‘, (1995) 32 
Common Market Law Review, 973-989, at 983.   
 
 
65
 See, D. Geradin, ‗Competition between Rules and Rules of Competition‘, supra note 27, at 
12; R. Van den Bergh, ‗Economic Criteria for Applying the Subsidiarity Principle in the 
European Community: The Case of Competition Policy‘, supra note 29; E.M. Fox, ‗Antitrust 
Law on a Global Scale: Races Up, Down, and Sideways‘, supra note 29, at 348-363.   
66
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market.67 Given this, centralised systems of standard setting should be seen 
as regulatory cartels or monopoly (such as the Commission‘s monopoly of 
exemption) that, like any other form of collusion between competitors, 
would raise prices to the public and reduce economic efficiency.68 At least in 
theory the decentralisation of EU competition law‘s full enforcement 
authority from the single Commission to 27 Member States‘ NCAs and courts is 
progress. However, in reality, the narrow set of assumptions of regulatory 
competition is rarely met.69 There is neither a sufficiently large number of 
legislators to choose between nor perfect mobility.70 Regulatory competition 
seems unlikely to happen under the EU‘s decentralised system. Firstly, in 
relation to EU merger control, the principle of the one stop shop excluded the 
NCAs when dealing with mergers with an EU dimension;71 while in relation to 
agreements or abuses of a dominant position, EU competition law would be 
applied if the agreement or abuse had effect between Member States.72 
Secondly, because of the broad interpretation of ‗effect between Member 
States‘ by the Court of Justice,73 EU competition law can in many situations 
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 F.H. Easterbrook, ‗Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism‘, supra note 28.  
68
 See, D. Geradin, ‗Competition between Rules and Rules of Competition: A legal and 
economic analysis of the proposed modernisation of the enforcement of EC competition law‘, 
supra note 27, at 4.  
69
 See, R. P. Inman & D. L. Rubinfeld, ‗Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine: 
Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism‘, (1997) 
75(6) Taxes Law Review, 1203-1300, at 1219.  
70
 See, R. Van den Bergh, ‗Economic Criteria for Applying the Subsidiarity Principle in the 
European Community: The Case of Competition Policy‘, supra note 29, at 365.  
71
 See, Article 1 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004, (Official Journal 
L 24, 29.01.2004, p. 1-22).   
72
 See, Article 3 of Reg.1/2003.  
73
 The Court of Justice has consistently held that in order for an agreement to affect trade 
between 
Member States: ‗... [it must, in order to come within the field of application of Article 85(Article 
101TFEU), on the basis of all the objective elements of law and of fact, be such as to give rise 
to a reasonable expectation that it might directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, influence 
the flow of trade between Member States that is likely to hamper the realization of a single 
market between those States.‘ See, Socidtd Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, 
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be applied to agreements or abuses of dominance prior to Member States‘ 
competition law. Thirdly, decentralisation has in fact strengthened the 
application of EU competition law in different Member States to replace 
national competition law.74 For fear that EU competition law might be 
enforced inconsistently the Commission provided some procedural 
mechanisms which might strengthen the application of EU competition law 
and give power to the Commission to intervene in the enforcement by the 
NCAs and national courts. For example, the Commission may not only require 
copies of draft decisions before they are adopted: it will also be able under 
Art.11 (6) of Reg. 1/2003 to take over cases from NCAs or national courts. 
Informational asymmetries may provide a stronger argument in favour of 
decentralisation. The basic assumption is that firms will often fail to reveal 
the full range of information needed by regulators to make decisions.75 Thus 
there is an ‗asymmetry of information‘ between regulators who need this 
information and regulated firms, which, deliberately or not, fail to provide it 
or provide it only partially. Decentralisation may help to mitigate this 
problem as decentralised agencies may be in a better position to collect 
information from local companies.76 Local authorities might be ideally 
placed to gather information, such as the market shares or existence of 
contacts between competitors, as they generally have  good knowledge of 
local markets and of the local business culture. For example, the 
                                                                                                                     
Case 56/65, 1966 E.C.R. 235, 249 [1961-66 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 7685, 
at 7697. 
74
 See, A. Riley, ‗EC Antitrust Modernisation: The Commission Does Very Nicely—Thank You! 
Part Two‘, supra note 24. A. Riley concluded that at the core of the decentralised mechanism 
is a refusal of the Commission to accept a real partnership with the NCAs (because of the 
Commission‘s supervisal role under the system), which would involve real sharing of the 
caseload and the development of the law, and thus the proposed modernisation is a process 
of centralisation rather than a decentralisation.  
75
 See, M. Armstrong, S. Cowan & J. Vickers, Regulatory Reform - Economic Analysis and 
British Experience, (1994) Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, at 11-12.  
76
 See, The White Paper, para.46.  
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Bundeskartellamt of Germany may have a better understanding of the 
German market than the Commission in Brussels.  
Decentralisation allows for a useful degree of experimentation because 
different regulatory regimes may enforce different (or the same) antitrust 
laws in different approaches and thus some novel questions may be solved by 
experiment in different regulatory regimes. It has been proved as a 
significant benefit brought by decentralisation under US federal system.77 
However, this benefit may be less significant in the EU where competition 
laws in Member States are identical with or similar to EU competition law.78 
This similarity reduces the possibility of experimentation with the content of 
substantive law because all Member States‘ competition law follow EU 
competition law. In addition, in relation to EU competition law‘s 
implementation, convergence and consistency are emphasised. Firstly, 
Article 3 of Reg.1/2003 requires that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU should be 
applied by NCAs to all agreements that could fall within their scope (applied 
in practice to agreements which fulfil the test of having an effect on 
interstate trade); secondly, Reg. 1/2003 sets up a system of supervision and 
control by requiring that all decisions by NCAs be vetted by DG Competition, 
which can displace the national authorities and substitute its own 
proceedings.79  
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 As Justice Brandeis pointed, ‗It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a 
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social 
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Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting). 
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European Community: The Case of Competition Policy‘, supra note 29, at 374; I. Forrester, 
‗Modernization of EC Competition Law‘, supra note 50, at 1031. However, A. Riley expressed 
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from EC law‘. See, A. Riley, ‗EC Antitrust Modernisation: The Commission Does Very 
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The concern of decentralisation  
The main concern of decentralisation is that it may reduce the consistency 
and legal certainty of Article 101 and 102 TFEU‘s enforcement.80 There exists 
inconsistency between the Commission and the Member States because the 
NCAs and national courts have complete enforcement authority of Article 101 
and 102 TFEU. In addition, inconsistency between Member States is also likely 
to happen.81 
With regard to inconsistency between the Commission and the Member 
States, the White Paper identified two potential conflicts: where an NCA or 
national court takes a favourable view of an agreement that is prohibited by 
the Commission; and where the Commission takes a favourable view of an 
agreement but a national court or NCA prohibits it.82 Inconsistency between 
Member States may also appear because NCAs are not currently bound by the 
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 This concern is much discussed in the literature. For examples, D.J. Gerber & P. Cassinis, 
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Annual 2000, at 323-333. 
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 See, M. Siragusa, ‗A Critical Review of the White Paper on the Reform of the EC 
Competition Law Enforcement Rules‘, supra note 37, at 1100, 1101.  
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legal determinations of other NCAs. Accordingly, inconsistency may arise 
where NCAs in different Member States investigate the same (type of) 
agreement or practice and apply different legal interpretations of Article 101 
TFEU.83 NCAs are part of the state machinery of the Member States and are 
likely to be influenced to some degree by the policies and interests of their 
states.84 The legislators and the NCA in Member State A are not expected or 
competent to solve the competition problem of Member State B, as has been 
discussed in the issue of externalities. In addition, it is only since 1990 that 
all Member States have had national systems of competition law.85 The NCAs 
in Member States have different levels of resources, professionalism, 
experience and enforcement level.86 Hence Articles 101 and 102 TFEU will be 
enforced inconsistently in different Member States.  
A qualify degree of consistency in EU competition law‘s application is 
critical to the success of the new decentralised system.87 Inconsistent 
requirements on e.g. vertical restrictions could force an undertaking to build 
or maintain different distribution schemes only to comply with national 
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 See, M. Siragusa, ‗A Critical Review of the White Paper on the Reform of the EC 
Competition Law Enforcement Rules‘, supra note 37, at 1101.  
84
 See, A. Riley, ‗EC Antitrust Modernisation: The Commission Does Very Nicely—Thank You! 
Part Two: Between the Idea and the Reality: Decentralisation under Regulation 1‘, supra note 
24, at 660.   
85
See, A. Dreher, ‗The Harmonisation of National Competition Laws in the European 
Community‘, paper delivered at Florence Conference at EUI, Implementation of Antitrust Rules 
in a Federal Context (1996), 2. 
86
 For example, the NCAs in Germany, the UK, France and Italy may be better established 
and have more experience than the NCAs in Eastern European countries. For examination of 
the NCAs‘ capability of enforcing EU competition law, refer to A. Riley, ‗EC Antitrust 
Modernisation: The Commission Does Very Nicely—Thank You! Part Two: Between the Idea 
and the Reality: Decentralisation under Regulation 1‘, supra note 24; see also, P. Nicolaides, 
‗Development of a System for Decentralised Enforcement of EC Competition Policy‘, (2002) 37 
Intereconomics, 41-51.  
87
 See, D.J. Gerber & P. Cassinis, ‗The Modernisation of European Community Competition 
Law: Achieving Consistency in Enforcement-Part I‘, supra note 80, at 10.  
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competition law requirements.88 Legal certainty would also be reduced if EU 
competition law could not be enforced consistently and harmoniously in the 
27 Member States. In order to guarantee consistency the Commission provides 
a series of convergent regulations and a cooperation and coordination 
mechanism between the Commission, NCAs and national courts, which will be 
discussed in the next section. 
The Commission‘s argument that decentralised enforcement will result in a 
better application of competition rules is doubtful. Although the notification 
system has been abolished and the Commission is relieved from the heavy 
caseload brought by the centralised mechanism, it is unclear whether the 
NCAs and national courts will require more resources to enforce the law than 
the Commission. One may argue that the NCAs and national courts are more 
competent to enforce competition rules than the single Commission because 
of their knowledge of local markets and businesses. Fewer resources would 
thus be needed to achieve a given level of enforcement. In addition, the 
resources of 27 Member States altogether would be more than the scarce 
resources in the Commission. On the other hand, one may also argue that 
there is less knowledge and experience of EU competition rules in the NCAs 
and national courts than in the Commission. Shifting enforcement of such 
rules to the national level would thus require more resources than the 
centralised mechanism requires. In addition, the cost of keeping the 
consistency of the law‘s enforcement at the Commission‘s level and among 
the 27 Member States should also be counted.   
2.2 European Competition Network: case allocation 
and consistency  
                                         
88
See, D. Geradin, ‗Competition between Rules and Rules of Competition: A legal and 
economic analysis of the proposed modernisation of the enforcement of EC competition law‘, 
supra note 27, at 23.  
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2.2.1 An overview 
The European Competition Network (hereafter the ECN) is a part of the 
Modernisation Programme designed to promote consistency of policy and to 
regulate relations between the competition authorities of Europe in the era 
of decentralisation89 Reg. 1/2003 indicates that ‗the Commission and the 
competition authorities of the Member States should form together a network 
of public authorities applying the Community competition rules in close 
cooperation.‘90 The principles of this network are provided in the 
Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition 
Authorities.91 In order to guarantee the consistency of EU competition law 
enforcement in the Commission and 27 Member States the ECN mainly deals 
with three areas: case allocation within the network, cooperation within the 
network and convergence mechanisms.  
Case allocation  
An effective case allocation mechanism is essential in a network under 
which the authorities have parallel enforcement powers. The Network Notice 
states that a case is ‗well placed‘ if it is allocated to a single authority which 
stands closest to the centre of gravity of the violation in question and is 
therefore able to collect strategic information and bring the violation 
                                         
89
 See, F. Cengiz, ‗The European Competition Network: Structure, Management and Initial 
Experiences of Policy Enforcement‘, Max Weber Programme Working Paper No. 2009/05, 
April 01, 2009, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1462223, or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1462223, last visited on 15/04/2012, 17:35.  
90
 See, Recital 15 of Reg. 1/2003.  
91
 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities(hereafter 
the Network Notice) (OJ C 101/43, 27 April 2004).This Notice replaces the Commission Notice 
on cooperation between national competition authorities and the Commission in handling 
cases falling within the scope of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, 15 October 1997. 
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effectively to an end.92 Thus there are three conditions: 1. the actions of the 
parties have substantial effects for the territory in which the authority is 
based; 2. the authority can effectively bring to an end the entire 
infringement; 3. the authority can effectively gather the evidence required 
to prove the infringement.93 Thus the Network Notice provides a practical 
mechanism to allocate cases. Firstly, a single NCA is usually well placed to 
deal with violations if the agreements or practices substantially affect 
competition mainly within its territory, or where, although more than one 
NCA can be regarded as well placed, the action of a single NCA is sufficient to 
bring the entire infringement to an end. Secondly, parallel action by two or 
three NCAs may be appropriate where a violation has substantial effects on 
competition mainly in their respective territories and the action of only one 
NCA would not be sufficient to bring the entire infringement to an end and/or 
to sanction it adequately. Thirdly, the Commission is particularly well placed 
in three circumstances: 1.where the violation has effects on competition in 
more than three Member States; 2. where the case is closely linked to other 
EU provisions which may be exclusively or more effectively applied by the 
Commission; 3. where the EU interest requires the adoption of a Commission 
decision to develop EU competition policy when a new competition issue 
arises or to ensure effective enforcement.94 
Cooperation mechanism  
                                         
92
See, para.8 and 16 of the Network Notice.  
93
 M. Kekelekis, ‗The European Competition Network (ECN): It Does Actually Work Well‘, 
(2009) 1 EIPAScope, 35-39.  
94
 See, paras. 10-15 of the Network Notice.  
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Mutual resource interdependencies play the key role in the formation of 
networks95 and it requires close and active cooperation within the network. 
This cooperation may be divided into three parts: cooperation between the 
Commission and the competition authorities of the Member States; 
cooperation between the Commission and national courts; cooperation 
between the Member States. 
Article 11(1) of Reg.1/2003 requires the Commission and the competition 
authorities of the Member States to apply EU competition rules in close 
cooperation. Such obligation includes firstly that any NCA acting under 
Articles 101 or 102 TFEU must inform the Commission before or just after 
commencing its first formal investigative measure;96 secondly, the 
Commission has also accepted an equivalent obligation to inform NCAs in the 
form of transmitting copies of most important documents to the NCAs;97 
thirdly, NCAs mustinform the Commission before taking a positive decision in 
enforcement of Article 101 and 102 TFEU and communicate their summary 
decisions to the Commission on which the Commission may express written or 
oral observations.98 The competition authorities may consult the Commission 
on any case involving application of EU competition law. Finally, in cases 
where the Commission needs information or evidence from the territory of a 
particular NCA in the course of their investigations, they may approach and 
ask the NCA in question to collect evidence in its territory and to 
communicate such evidence to the requesting authority.99 
                                         
95
 See, W.W. Powell: Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Market Types of Organisation, in G. 
Thompson, J. Frances, and R. Levačić(edited by): Markets, Hierarchies and Networks: The 
Coordination of Social Life, (1994) Sage Publications Ltd., at 272.  
96
 See, Article 11(3) of Reg.1/2003.  
97
 See, Article11(2), ibid.  
98
 Article 11(4), ibid.  
99
 Article 12, Article 22(1), ibid.  
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In relation to the cooperation between the Commission and the national 
courts, it is noteworthy that the national courts‘ position is very different 
from that of NCA‘s in the network because of their independence from the 
executive branch.100 National courts, under the EU competition law‘s public 
enforcement, are subject only to the European Court of Justice rather than 
the Commission.101 However, national courts have the right to seek the 
Commission‘s assistance: firstly, it may ask for documents in the 
Commission‘s possession; secondly, it may ask for information on 
procedure.102 The Commission must respond to such a request within one 
month.103 In addition there is an information exchange between the 
Commission and the national courts.104 Finally, the Commission may be 
present as amicus curiae in national proceedings when a national court 
enforces Article 101 and 102 TFEU.105  
As regards cooperation and coordination between Member States, 
Reg.1/2003 provides that the competition authorities of Member States shall 
apply  EU competition rules in close cooperation. Firstly, the competition 
authorities of the Member States may, when acting under Article 101 and 102 
TFEU, inform other Member States.106 Secondly, where two or more Member 
States have received a complaint or are acting on their own initiative under 
Article101 or 102 TFEU against the same violation, that one authority is 
dealing with the case shall be sufficient grounds for the others to suspend the 
                                         
100
 See, K. Lenaerts & D. Gerard, ‗Decentralisation of EC Competition Law Enforcement: 
Judges in the Frontline‘, (2004) 27 World Competition, 313-349; see also, D. Broomhall & J. 
Goyder, ‗European Union in Modernisation in Europe 2005‘, in Global Competition Review 
Special Report (London, 2005), at 7.  
101
 G. Amato & C.D. Ehlermann (edited by), EC Competition Law-A Critical Assessment, 
supra note 42, at 669.  
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 See, Article 15(1) of Reg.1/2003.  
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 Para.22, the Network Notice.  
104
 See, Article 15(1) of Reg.1/2003.  
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 Article 15(3), ibid.  
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 Article 11(3), ibid.  
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proceeding or to reject the complaint.107 Thirdly, a NCA may ask another 
NCA for assistance in order to collect information on its behalf.108 Finally, 
the Advisory Committee which is composed of representatives of the 
competition authorities of the Member States109 provides a forum in which to 
discuss competition matters between the Member States and deliver opinion. 
Besides, the Commission shall consult an Advisory Committee on restrictive 
practices and dominant position prior to the taking of any decision110 and 
take the utmost account of the opinion delivered by the Advisory 
Committee.111 
The superior role of the Commission 
The Commission‘s superior role under the ECN leads some commentators to 
characterise the ECN as a ‗centralised interactive model‘.112 The 
Commission‘s special role is explained by its responsibility for the 
development of EU competition policy and the necessity to establish 
coherence within the network of competition.113 Firstly, the national 
authorities have the duty to inform the Commission before or just after 
commencing its first formal investigative measure, and, before they taking a 
positive decision in enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Secondly, the 
Commission has the power to relieve the national authorities of their 
competencies by initiating proceedings for the adoption of a decision even if 
                                         
107
 Article 13(1), ibid.  
108
 Para.29, the Network Notice.  
109
 Article 14(2) of Reg.1/2003. 
110
 Article 14(1), ibid. 
111
 Article 14(5), ibid.  
112
 See, D.J. Gerber, ‗The Evolution of a European Competition Law Network‘, in C.D. 
Ehlermann and I. Atanasiu (edited by), European Competition Law Annual 2002: Constructing 
the EU Network of Competition Authorities, (2005) Hart Publishing, 43-64, at 53.  
113
 See, U. Böge, ‗The Commission‘s Position within the Network, the Perspective of the 
NCAs‘, in European Competition Law Annual 2002, ibid, at 247-254; On the Commission‘s 
central role, see, Case C-344/98 Masterfoods Ltd v HB Ice Cream Ltd [2000] ECR I-11369.  
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a national authority is already acting on the case.114 Thirdly, the national 
authorities cannot take decisions which would run counter to those adopted 
by the Commission when ruling on agreements, decisions and practices under 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.115 Fourthly, the Commission may intervene as 
amicus curiae in national judicial review proceedings.116  
2.2.2 A brief evaluation of the initial experience of the ECN 
Initial experience of management of the ECN has been largely positive.117 
The worries raised at the time of inception of the ECN have not been realised. 
For example,it was feared that the Commission‘s power of relieving the NCAs 
of their authority of investigation would diminish legal certainty, consistency 
and effective enforcement within the ECN.118 However, the ECN‘s practice 
shows that the Commission has not yet used its power of relieving NCAs of 
their authority to investigate. The statistics also show that Member States are 
generally very active in enforcing Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The total 
number of official proceedings opened by NCAs collectively far exceeds those 
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 Article 11(6) of Reg.1/2003.  
115
 See, para. 43 of the Network Notice.  
116
 G. Amato & C.D. Ehlermann (edited by), EC Competition Law-A Critical Assessment, 
supra note 42, at 663.  
117
 See, F. Cengiz, ‗The European Competition Network: Structure, Management and Initial 
Experiences of Policy Enforcement‘, supra note 89, at 19; M. Kekelekis, ‗The European 
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(2000) Hart Publishing, at 197; Böge argues that the precondition for effective enforcement is 
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European Competition Law Annual 2002, at 111-118.   
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of the Commission.119 As a result it can be argued that the communication 
channels between the NCAs and the Commission have been working 
effectively and, contrary to original predictions, the Commission‘s superior 
role in this network has not prevented the emergence of mutual trust and 
cooperation between the Commission and the NCAs. Nor has there been any 
instance of conflict between the network members on case allocation during 
the last four years.120 
However, there are several concerns about this network. Firstly, the 
statistics show there is a gap between the number of formal investigations 
opened and final positive decisions taken by the NCAs.121 There are two 
possible explanations: 1. generally, the NCAs may be under a heavy burden of 
enforcement which has been decentralised from the Commission; 2. the 
practices targeted by  NCA investigation are actually benign and do not 
constitute breaches of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU so that most cases are 
closed without taking any  action.122 Both these explanations can be 
worrisome. The first may cast serious doubt on the effectiveness of 
decentralisation. The caseload relieved from the Commission is imposed 
again on the NCAs, and neither the Commission nor the NCAs enjoy the 
resources required for effective enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
The second may suggest that the network members lack an understanding 
sufficient to proper enforcement of EU competition law. If this is the case, 
additional funds, time and resources would need to be allocated to correct 
                                         
119
 For example, in 2008, the NCAs investigated 149 cases in total, while the Commission only 
investigated 10. The data are available on the ECN‘s official website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/ecn/statistics.html, last visited on 22/04/2012, 10:32.  
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 See, F. Cengiz, ‗The European Competition Network: Structure, Management and Initial 
Experiences of Policy Enforcement‘, supra note 89.  
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 F. Cengiz, ‗The European Competition Network: Structure, Management and Initial 
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mistakes, and thus the effectiveness of the whole network would be affected. 
Secondly, the information exchange mechanism may raise concerns of 
confidentiality protection. Article 12(1) of Reg.1/2003 provides that for the 
purpose of applying Articles 101 and 102 TFEU the Commission and the NCAs 
shall have the power to provide one another with and use in evidence any 
matter of fact or of law, including confidential information. Theoretically the 
Network is very much an intergovernmental system that will transmit large 
amounts of highly confidential information.123 Thirdly, instances of 
cooperation in which the NCAs jointly investigated the same violation or 
provided each other with evidence in practice have been extremely rare.124 
Finally, the FIDE Report 2008 shows that the Commission and the NCAs prefer 
informal channels of communication such as email and telephone.125 
Moreover, the written responses of the Commission to the envisaged NCA 
decisions and any other communication between the members are not open 
to the parties under investigation.126 Lack of transparency raises the concern 
of accountability as it is difficult to observe the roles of Member States in 
investigation and their contributions to the final decision.  
                                         
123
 See, S. Wilks, ‗Agency Escape: Decentralization or Dominance of the European 
Commission in the Modernization of Competition Policy?‘ (2005) 18(3) Governance: An 
International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 431–452, at 442.  
124
Until 2009 only the Danish, Spanish and UK authorities had collected information on behalf 
of and communicated information to other NCAs. See, H. Franz Koeck & M.M. Karollus (edited 
by): The Modernisation of European Competition Law: Initial Experiences with Regulation 
1/2003 (hereafter, the FIDE Report 2008), volume 2, (2008) FIDE XXIII Congress Linz, 
Congress Publications, at 50, 303.  
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 Ibid.  
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with Regulation 1/2003‘, ibid, at 446.  
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3. The relationship between federal and state 
antitrust enforcers under US federal antitrust 
law’s public enforcement  
3.1 An overview of the federal and state’s antitrust 
enforcers under U.S. antitrust law  
Before 1890 when the Sherman Act127 (the first federal antitrust statute) 
was enacted, restraints of trade were largely regulated by state law.128 The 
legislative history of the federal antitrust law indicates that Congress 
intended to leave state antitrust enforcement more or less intact but to 
provide an additional federal forum to deal with restraints of trade which 
exceeded the jurisdiction of the courts of any particular state129. The result is 
that antitrust enforcement has theoretically existed at two levels, federal 
and state.130 Similar to the multi-governance system under the EU 
competition law regime, US antitrust law public enforcement also includes 
                                         
127
 Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7, enacted on July 2, 1890.  
128
 See, A.M. Eaton, ‗On Contracts in Restraint of Trade‘, (1890) 4(3) Harvard Law Review, 
128-137; F.D. Jones, ‗Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition‘, (1926) 
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‗Historic Origins of Anti-Trust Legislation‘, (1953) 18(3) Missouri Law Review, 215-248.  
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 See, R.E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 37 Cal. App. 3d 653, 600, 112 Cal. Rptr. 585, 
589 (1974); see also generally, J.J. Flynn, Federalism and State antitrust regulation, (1964) 
University of Michigan Law School; S. Rubin, ‗Rethinking State Antitrust Enforcement‘, (1974) 
26(4) Florida Law Review, 653-757.      
130
 See, H. Hovenkamp, ‗State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme‘, (1983) 58(3) Indiana Law 
Journal, 375-432, at 376.  
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two levels which are based on the federal model of the United States, the 
federal and state levels.131 
At the federal level enforcement is largely in the hands of the Antitrust 
Division of the DOJ and the FTC. The Antitrust Division has exclusive federal 
authority to enforce the Sherman Act and shares with the FTC and other 
agencies the federal authority to enforce the Clayton Act.132 In addition, the 
Antitrust Division has exclusive criminal authority under Sections 1, 2 and 3 of 
the Sherman Act, section 4 of the Robinson-Patman Act and section 14 of the 
Clayton Act.133 The FTC has broad enforcement power under the FTC Act and 
Clayton Act.134 The Antitrust Division and the FTC shares concurrent 
jurisdiction to investigate many types of conduct. To be sure that only one of 
the two agencies investigates a particular matter they have developed a 
clearance procedure135 which governs assignment of investigation to one 
agency or the other.136 
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 This section mainly focuses on the State Attorneys General‘s enforcement of federal 
antitrust laws rather than their own state antitrust statutes. State courts‘ judicial activities are 
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Some states had been legislating and enforcing antitrust provisions even 
before the Sherman Act was enacted.137 In the years immediately following 
the passage of the Sherman Act, more antitrust suits were filed by the states, 
under their own statutes, than by federal enforcers.138 However, federal 
enforcement soon began to grow and peaked in the 1960s.139 And as federal 
enforcement grew, state antitrust enforcement was virtually non-existent 
from the 1960s to the 1980s.140 At the beginning of the 1980s the states 
declared their determination, collectively or individually, aggressively to 
enforce both federal and state antitrust laws.141 Explanations of the revival 
of the state enforcement142 include firstly that in 1976 Congress passed the 
Crime Control Act which provided the ‗seed money‘ for states to fund their 
own antitrust enforcement.143 Secondly, in the same year the 
Hart–Scott–Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act (hereafter the HSR Act) was 
passed which enables states to bring civil actions on behalf of natural persons 
residing in the state, as parens patriae, in any district court in the United 
                                                                                                                     
W.E. Kovacic, ‗Downsizing Antitrust: is it time to end dual federal enforcement‘, (1996) 41(3) 
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States and claim treble damages.144 Thirdly, in the 1980s the states believed 
that the federal enforcers had abandoned their primary role in antitrust 
enforcement and were challenging fewer and fewer antitrust violations.145 
Fourthly, the states found themselves increasingly in disagreement with the 
federal government in the 1980s.146 In short the states have become a ‗de 
facto third national antitrust enforcement agency‘147 which have the 
authority to enforce both federal and state antitrust law. 
It is also noteworthy that under the US antitrust public enforcement regime, 
jurisdiction to adjudicate alleged violations of the federal antitrust laws is 
vested in the federal district courts148 and been interpreted as exclusive.149 
The Antitrust Division, the FTC and the State Attorneys General (hereafter, 
the SAG) have the authority of investigation and prosecution. 
At the federal level both the Antitrust Division and the FTC may bring 
proceedings before a federal district court after investigation.150 Or, more 
commonly, if the Antitrust Division found antitrust concerns after 
investigation, before filing a complaint in a federal district court it will 
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propose a consent decree on the respondent to settle the concern. The 
Antitrust Division must submit each proposed consent decree for approval by 
the court in which the complaint has been filed.151 In addition, a violation of 
the decree is punishable by the court if the Antitrust Division can prove the 
violation according to the civil procedural standard. On the other hand, under 
Section 5(b) of the FTC Act, the FTC may challenge putative unfair or 
deceptive act(s) or practice(s) (or violations of other consumer protection 
statutes) through administrative adjudication. 
At the state level the SAGs have two main ways of enforcing federal 
antitrust law. Firstly, they may bring a civil action on behalf of natural 
persons residing in the state, as parens patriae, in any federal district court 
in the United States.152 A parens patriae suit in the antitrust context was 
brought by the SAG in Georgia v.Pennsylvania Railroad Co.153 The State of 
Georgia alleged that the defendants violated the antitrust laws by conspiring 
to fix railroad rates, thus injuring commercial activity in the State. The 
Supreme Court upheld Georgia's parens patriae authority, acknowledging 
that: 
Georgia as a representative of the public is complaining of a wrong 
which, if proven, limits the opportunities of her people, shackles her 
industries, retards her development and relegates her to an inferior 
economic position among her sister States. These are matters of grave 
public concern in which Georgia has an interest apart from that of 
particular individuals who may be affected.154 
                                         
151
 J.M. Jacobson (editor in chief), Antitrust Law Developments, supra note 132, at 705.  
152
 See, 15, U.S.C. § 15c (a) 1 & 2(1988).See also, Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. 324 
U.S. 439 (1945).    
153
 Ibid.  
154
 Ibid. at 451.  
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Georgia established the States' authority to sue as parens patriae for 
injunctive relief under Section 16 of the Clayton Act,155 based on injury to 
state consumers or commerce.156 Congress enacted the HSR Act in 1976 and 
conferred on the states parens patriae authority to seek treble damages on 
behalf of natural persons injured by federal antitrust violations under Section 
4C of the Clayton Act.157   
Secondly, since states are considered ‗persons‘ under the Clayton Act,158 
they may sue for damages under Section 4 if they are direct purchasers of 
goods affected by an antitrust violation.159 If the state is an indirect 
purchaser, it is limited to the remedy of injunctive relief.160  
Under state sovereignty under the US Constitution,161 states have 
considerable freedom in enforcing federal and state antitrust laws.162 States 
                                         
155
 Section 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26, provides in the pertinent part that: Any person, firm, 
corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of 
the United States having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a 
violation of the antitrust laws.., when and under the same conditions and principles as 
injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts 
of equity under the rules governing such proceedings, and upon the execution of proper bond 
against damages for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing that the danger of 
irreparable loss or damage is immediate, a preliminary injunction may issue . 
156
 See, e.g., California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 977, 979 (C.D. Cal. 1971); Hawaii v. 
Standard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 982, 984 (D. Haw. 1969).   
157
See, 15 U.S.C. § 15c (l), which provides that in pertinent part that: Any attorney general of a 
State may bring a civil action in the name of such State as parens patriae on behalf of natural 
persons residing in such State in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of 
the defendant, to secure monetary relief as provided in this section for injury sustained by such 
natural persons to their property by reason of any violation of sections I to 7 of this title. 
158
 See, Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396(1906).  
159
 15, U.S.C. § 15 (1993). 
160
 15, U.S.C. § 26 (1993); see also, Cargill v. Monfort, 479 U.S. 104, 122(1986).  
161
 See Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. For a comprehensive discussion 
of the general power and role of states under U.S. federalism, please refer to K.R. Thomas: 
Federalism, State Sovereignty and the Constitution: Basis and Limits of Congressional Power, 
CRS Report for Congress, September 5, 2003, available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30315.pdf, last visited on 02/05/2012, 21:19.   
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enforcement differs from federal enforcement in certain respects.  For 
example, states have generally adopted a more aggressive attitude towards 
merger control and vertical restraint cases than federal antitrust 
enforcers.163 Moreover, states retain the power to reopen and challenge a 
federally approved merger case.164 The American Bar Association concluded 
that the states do not agree to be bound or constrained by the decision of the 
federal enforcement agencies.165 
3.2 Whether states should be empowered to enforce 
federal antitrust law 
The relationship between the SAGs and federal agencies raises the 
following question which could also be faced by Chinese AML 2007‘s 
administrative enforcers at the central governmental level and at the local 
level: whether the state should be empowered to enforce federal antitrust 
laws.  
3.2.1 Concerns of state enforcement of federal antitrust laws 
Conflict between the State and Federal Antitrust Enforcement 
                                                                                                                     
162
 However, U.S. Constitution imposed some limitations on the states‘ sovereignty, for 
example, the limitation of the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court also indicated that 
federal law prevails over state law due to the operation of the Supremacy Clause, and that 
federal law can neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislators or state executive or 
judicial officers nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes. See, Cooper v. Aaron, 
358 U.S.1 (1958).   
163
 See, D.L. Flexner & M.A. Racanelli, ‗State and Federal Antitrust Enforcement in the United 
States: Collision or Harmony?‘ supra note 8, at 513-519.  
164
 See for example, California v. American Stores Co. 495 U.S. 271 (1990).  
165
 See, ABA Section of Antitrust Law, State Antitrust Practice and Statutes, supra note 131.  
Chapter 3  
Allocation of Public Enforcement Powers in China‘s Antimonopoly Law between the Central and 
Provincial Administrative Enforcers 
132 
 
Conflict between the state and federal antitrust enforcement of federal 
antitrust laws was especially significant during the 1980s.166 The states, 
through coordinated multistate litigation, became increasingly active in 
antitrust litigation in areas where the federal authorities chose not to 
pursue.167 During the Reagan Administration, because of a relatively lax 
enforcement of federal antitrust law especially on vertical restraints and 
mergers,168 states became the chief enforcers of federal antitrust law in 
these two areas.169 Contrary to the federal antitrust enforcers‘ attitude 
towards vertical restraints, some states held that ‗vertical pricing restraints 
actually led to higher retail prices in the real-world marketplace.‘170 Some 
states also rejected federal acceptance of a merger‘s impact on total welfare, 
including that of shareholders; instead they generally insisted on a single 
focus on consumer welfare.171 As increasingly mergers and price-fixing 
litigation took place in a number of states, the SAGs began organising 
collective, multistate investigations and litigation. The National Association 
                                         
166
 See 3.1 an overview of federal and state antitrust enforcers under U.S. antitrust law‘ is 
offered in this section.    
167
 See, J. Ratner, ‗Conflicting Federal and State Enforcement of Federal Antitrust Law: 
Statutory Crisis or Celebration of Diversity?‘ Multistate Litigation Seminar Paper, February 2, 
2001, available at 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/center_program/ag/resources/Library?exclusive=filemgr.downlo
ad&file_id=94724&rtcontentdisposition=filename%3DRatner,%20J-%20Conflicting%20Federa
l%20and%20State%20Enforcement%20of%20Federal%20Antitrust%20Law.pdf, last visited 
on 15/05/2012, 14:33. Reagan Administration adopted the Chicago School‘s view that ‗virtually 
all vertical restraints, pricing or otherwise, are either neutral or beneficial to consumers‘; see, 
J.W. Burns, ‗Embracing both Faces of Antitrust Federalism: Parker and ARC America Corp.,‘ 
(2000) 68(1) Antitrust Law Journal, 29-44, at 32. 
168
 See, J.W. Burns, ibid.  
169
 See, J. Ratner, ‗Conflicting Federal and State Enforcement of Federal Antitrust Law: 
Statutory Crisis or Celebration of Diversity?‘ supra note 167. 
170
See, J.W. Burns, ‗Embracing both Faces of Antitrust Federalism: Parker and ARC America 
Corp.,‘ supra note 167, at 33.   
171
 See, J.I. Klein, K.J. O‘Connor, R. Pitofsky, E. M. Fox, J.L. McDavid, and R. Schmalensee, 
‗Roundtable Conference with Enforcement Officials‘, (1997) 65 Antitrust Law Journal, 929-971; 
at 951.   
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of State Attorneys General (hereafter the NAAG) created a Task Force to 
coordinate multistate antitrust investigations. Thus states expanded the 
antitrust enforcement from a local172 or state level to the interstate level. 
In the 1990s cooperation between federal and state enforcers became 
active and the divergence between the federal and SAG approach to 
enforcement diminished. One scholar noted that the heads of antitrust 
authorities at the DOJ and the FTC ‗have sent a clear message to their staffs 
that cooperation with the states is now the rule.‘173 Nevertheless, multistate 
antitrust enforcement actions (during the 1990s) illustrate a continuing 
difference in view as to what types of activity are properly actionable under 
the federal antitrust laws.174 For example, in Kodak 1992175 the states filed 
                                         
172
 In this chapter, the author uses the phrase ‗local‘ under U.S. antitrust public enforcement 
regime to mean intrastate or statewide as opposed to purely national effects. 
173
 See, J. Ratner, ‗Conflicting Federal and State Enforcement of Federal Antitrust Law: 
Statutory Crisis or Celebration of Diversity?‘ supra note 167.The antitrust cases during the 
period also illustrated the cooperation between the SAGs, the DOJ and the FTC. For example, 
In Browning-Ferris Industries/Attwoods, Florida, Maryland and the DOJ investigated a 
proposed merger of Browning-Fernis and Attwoods in 1994, two of the nation's largest waste 
disposal companies; see, United States v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 1995-2 Trade Cas. 
(CCH) 71,186 (D.D.C.1995); in Chevron/Texaco, 12 States and the FTC investigated the 
proposed merger of Chevron and Texaco in 2000 and 2001; see, California v. Chevron Corp., 
Case No. 01-07746 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2001); In re Chevron Corp., Docket No. C-4023, 2001 
FTC LEXIS 135 (FTC 2001); in Exxon/Mobil: New York and nine other northeastern States, 
along with Texas, California and the Pacific northwest States, filed suit in conjunction with an 
FTC administrative complaint, challenging the merger of Exxon and Mobil in 1999, two of the 
world's largest integrated petroleum products companies; see, New Jersey v. Exxon Corp., 99 
CV 03183 (RMU) (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 1999); In re Exxon Corp., No. C-3907, 2001 FTC LEXIS 16 
(FTC 2001); in Health Care, the FTC and the State of Missouri pursued a preliminary 
injunction against a hospital merger in southeast Missouri in 1999; see, FTC v. Tenet Health 
Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999); in Legal Publishing: seven States and the DOJ 
brought a joint action in the District of the District of Columbia in 1997, challenging the 
proposed merger of Thomson and West Publishing, two of the nation's leading publishers of 
legal research; see, United States v. Thomson Corp., 1997-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,754 
(D.D.C. 1997). 
174
 See, S.P. Mahinka & K.M. Sanzo, ‗Multistate Antitrust and Consumer Protection 
Investigations: Practical Concerns‘, (1994) 63(1) Antitrust Law Journal, 213-238.   
175
 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Service, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992). 
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two amici briefs in opposition to positions taken by the DOJ. In fact most of 
the antitrust cases undertaken by the states have not been supported by 
federal agencies.176  More recently Microsoft 177 brought the conflict 
between federal antitrust enforcers and SAGs in enforcement into sharp 
focus.178 
Arguments brought by Microsoft case 
Microsoft illustrated the tension and divergence between federal and state 
enforcement. The Microsoft litigation began in May 1998 when the Justice 
Department and a score of states filed separate complaints alleging that 
Microsoft had illegally monopolised the Internet browser market.179 The 
District Court of Columbia found various violations of federal antitrust law 
and thus ordered a splitting up of the company.180 The Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded for reassignment to a different trial judge.181 The DOJ and nine 
states agreed to a new consent order, which the new district judge modified. 
However, the rest of the states refused this consent order and filed a new 
suit with different remedies based on the same facts of Microsoft‘s conduct. 
Microsoft dismissed the new remedies proposed by the rest of the states and 
                                         
176
 See for example, State of New York by Vacco v. Reebok Intern. Ltd., 96 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 
1996); State of Texas ex rel. Atty. Gen. Morales v. Zeneca, Inc., 1997 WL 570975 (N.D.Tex. 
1997); State of Missouri, et al. v. American Cyanamid Co., Dkt. No. 97-4024-CV-C-SOW (W.D. 
Mo. Jan. 30, 1997). 
177
 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
178
 This debate brought by Microsoft case will be examined in the following part.  
179
 See, J.L. Himes, ‗Exploring the Antitrust Operating System: State Enforcement of Federal 
Antitrust Law in Remedies Phase of the Microsoft Case‘, (2002) 11 George Mason Law 
Review, 37-109; S. Calkins, ‗Perspectives on State and Federal Antitrust Enforcement‘, (2003) 
53 Duke Law Journal, 673-735; for more details of the Microsoft case, please refer to K. 
Auletta, World War 3.0: Microsoft and Its Enemies, (2001) Random House.  
180
 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35–56 (D.D.C. 2000); United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp.2d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 2000). 
181
 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 118–19 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 
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argued that first of all the litigating states could not demonstrate a 
"state-specific" injury different from the nationwide injury arising from 
Microsoft's antitrust violations; in addition, the litigating states were usurping 
the enforcement role of the DOJ on behalf of the United States; and finally 
the proposed consent decree in the United States' action would, upon its 
entry, have a res judicata effect, thus precluding any remedy in the litigating 
states' case.182 However, The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit denied Microsoft's dismissal motion183 and upheld the litigating states' 
standing to sue in deciding the liability phase of the case.184 Thus Microsoft 
raised the possibility that significantly different remedies could emerge to 
redress the same adjudicated Microsoft liability for monopoly 
maintenance.185 
Justice Posner reached a somewhat stern conclusion: nothing in the theory 
of federalism lends support to authorising SAGs to bring parens patriae suits 
under federal antitrust law186 and thus the states‘ parens patriae authority 
should be denied. There are three main supportive opinions for this 
conclusion.187 Firstly, states can do no more than free ride on federal 
                                         
182
 See, J.L. Himes, ‗Exploring the Antitrust Operating System: State Enforcement of Federal 
Antitrust Law in Remedies Phase of the Microsoft Case‘, supra note 179, at 38.  
183
 Civil Action No. 98-1233, 209 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D.D.C. 2002) (filed June 12, 2002).  
184
 Ibid, at 141-145.  
185
 See, Stipulation, United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1232 (CKK) (D.D.C. 
Jan. 11, 2003) (filed Nov. 6, 2001).  
186
 See, R.A. Posner, ‗Federalism and the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by State Attorneys 
General‘, (2004) 2 Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy, 5-15.  
187
 Apart from the three concerns listed in this section, the concern of the diversity of the state 
enforcement is particularly significant in the merger area. See for example, J. Rose, ‗State 
Antitrust Enforcement, Mergers, and Politics‘, (1994) 41 Wayne Law Review,71-134; at 
115–26 (lamenting differences in federal and state antitrust standards in merger regulations); 
D. A. Zimmerman, ‗Why State Attorneys General Should Have a Limited Role in Enforcing the 
Federal Antitrust Law of Mergers‘, (1999) 48 Emory Law Journal, 337-366. However, merger 
has been excluded in this chapter. Nevertheless, the concern of diversity brought by state 
enforcement on agreements and abuse of dominant positions will be discussed in the following 
section.      
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antitrust litigation.188 In the Microsoft case, if the DOJ brings an antitrust suit, 
the SAGs may be able to take a free ride on the Department's investment in 
the litigation, by bringing parallel suits that are then consolidated with the 
DOJ‘s suit.189 Secondly, state enforcement might be easily influenced by a 
state‘s interest groups,190 particularly when a state is too subjective191 to 
protect the interests of the competitors in its territory using the government 
antitrust enforcement to put at disadvantage a competitor out of its territory. 
As Justice Posner argued, ‗the federal government, having a larger and more 
diverse constituency, is less subject to takeover by a faction.‘192 In fact some 
in the United States were concerned that the EU was trying to aid European 
businesses in some international mergers by opposing mergers of US firms 
that compete in Europe.193 This concern also exists with regard to the EU 
decentralised competition law regime, which is interpreted as protectionism, 
or in the economic term, ‗externalities‘.194 One way overcome externalities 
is to establish a centralised supervision which has a focus beyond Member 
                                         
188
 See, R.A. Posner, ‗Antitrust in the New Economy‘, (2001) 68 Antitrust Law Journal, 
925-943, at 940.  
189
 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2001); quoted from R.A. 
Posner, ‗Federalism and the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by State Attorneys General‘, supra 
note 186, at 9. 
190
 See, R.A. Posner, ibid; see also, R.A. Posner, ‗Antitrust in the New Economy‘, supra note 
188.  
191
 See, supra note 188.  
192
 Ibid, at 941.  
193
 See for example, W.E. Kovacic, ‗Transnational Turbulence: The Boeing McDonnell 
Douglas Merger and International Competition Policy‘, (2001) 68(3) Antitrust Law Journal, 
805-874; at 839-852.  
194
 For an examination of externalities, please refer to ‗2.1.2 the reasons for and concerns of 
EU‘s centralised enforcement mechanism‘ of this chapter. In fact U.S. commentators also use 
the term ‗federalism externality‘ under U.S. antitrust law enforcement regime, which means 
one state acting on complaint from an in-state busines, might sue an out-of-state business, 
thereby helping local business by imposing an unnecessary cost on the out-of-state concern. 
See, H. First, ‗Delivering Remedies: The Role of the States in Antitrust Enforcement‘, 
(2000-2001) 69 George Washington Law Review, 1004-1041; at 1030-1031.  
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States‘ interest,195 in this case the states‘ interest. Thirdly, States do not 
have the resources to enforce federal antitrust laws. As Justice Posner argued, 
they cannot afford large staff and so they cannot reap the benefits of 
specialisation. Nor can they afford to hire top-quality lawyers. These 
resource-related handicaps are particularly serious in a highly technical, 
expert-witness intensive, specialised field of law such as federal antitrust 
law.196 
Some commentators argue that Posner‘s concerns and conclusions lack 
supportive evidence.197 Firstly, the claim that states can do ‗no more‘ than 
free ride on federal antitrust litigation is not borne out by the facts.198 It is 
undeniable that the SAGs may come after and makes some use of the efforts 
of the federal antitrust enforcement agencies. In fact this type of follow-on 
litigation has a long history.199 However, such litigation brought by states is 
not a free ride because they can raise substantial issues relating to 
substantive antitrust liability200 or relating to damages.201 In Microsoft 
                                         
195
 See, R. Van den Bergh, ‗Economic Criteria for Applying the Subsidiarity Principle in the 
European Community: The Case of Competition Policy‘, supra note 29, at 372, 373. 
196
 See, R.A. Posner, ‗Federalism and the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by State Attorneys 
General‘, supra note 186, at 9. It is noteworthy that the concern at some Member States‘ 
possible lack of resources and incapability with regard to the enforcement of Article 101 and 
102 TFEU also exists under EU competition law‘s decentralised approach. See for example, A. 
Riley, ‗EC Antitrust Modernisation: The Commission Does Very Nicely—Thank You! Part Two: 
Between the Idea and the Reality: Decentralisation under Regulation 1‘, supra note 24, at 658.  
197
 See for example, H. First, ‗Delivering Remedies: The Role of the States in Antitrust 
Enforcement‘, supra note 194; J.L. Himes, ‗Exploring the Antitrust Operating System: State 
Enforcement of Federal Antitrust Law in Remedies Phase of the Microsoft Case‘, supra note 
179; S. Calkins, ‗Perspectives on State and Federal Antitrust Enforcement‘, supra note 179. 
198
 See, H. First, ibid, at 1028.  
199
 The first case brought by a governmental entity for antitrust damages is Addyston Pipe in 
1906. See, Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 395 (1906).  
200
 For example, Cf. 7-UP Bottling Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 191 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 
1999) 
(insufficient evidence of participation in price-fixing agreement to which ADM had previously 
pleaded guilty.) 
Chapter 3  
Allocation of Public Enforcement Powers in China‘s Antimonopoly Law between the Central and 
Provincial Administrative Enforcers 
138 
 
Justice Posner specifically expressed the concern of free ride when a 
state/states act(s) cooperatively with the DOJ or the FTC. However, 
cooperation between state and federal agencies is so frequent that 
sometimes such cooperation is deemed necessary.202 And for most of the 
time, cooperation is harmonious and effective.203 Hence one may ask, if 
states were simply free riding on the federal litigation effort, why this 
cooperation is a relatively recent development and why would the federal 
government permits it?204 It is true that state enforcement of federal law 
would complicate the result; however, the complication comes from the fact 
that the states have jurisdiction under federal law and are capable of 
exercising it instead of simple ‗free riding‘.205  
The second concern is known as federal externality or state protectionism. 
As mentioned in the EU section this claim is certainly theoretically possible. 
However, there is little supportive evidence under US antitrust enforcement 
regime.206 This is at least partly because of the existence of the Multistate 
Antitrust Task Force of the National Association of State Attorneys General 
(hereafter, the Task Force). The Task Force is composed of antitrust contacts 
from all states and territories that are members of NAAG.207 It was to 
                                                                                                                     
201
 See, H. First, ‗The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of International 
Competition Law‘, (2001) 68 Antitrust Law Journal, 711-804; at714-716.  
202
 There are some examples from case law; see, the footnote 173. For more comprehensive 
and detailed information, please refer to ABA Section of Antitrust Law: State Antitrust Practice 
and Statutes, supra note 131.  
203
 ABA Section of Antitrust Law: State Antitrust Practice and Statutes, ibid, at 827-829. 
204
 H. First, ‗Delivering Remedies: The Role of the States in Antitrust Enforcement‘, supra note 
194; at 1029. 
205
 Ibid, at 1029.  
206
 Ibid, at 1031.  
207
 See, the official website of the NAAG, available at 
http://www.naag.org/who_are_naags_members_and_how_is_it_organized.php, last visited on 
10/05/2-12, 21:54.  
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improve, enhance and coordinate state antitrust enforcement.208 The 
concern that states might use enforcement as a protective device cannot 
arise in the case of one single state since litigation against anticompetitive 
behaviour that has multistate effects will likely be brought on a multistate 
basis.  It thus seems highly unlikely that all states in a multistate group will 
be subject to such a trade-off analysis. This means that such cases will have 
to appeal to most of the states on their merits, not because of competitor 
influence.209 As argued in the EU section, externalities can be avoided by 
establishing an enforcement agency which goes beyond one state‘s interest. 
The Task Force may be viewed as an enforcement agency.  
As regards the third concern about the states‘ ability to enforce federal 
antitrust law, again the claim of the states' relative lack of resources for 
antitrust enforcement holds good. However, both the FTC and the DOJ may 
also face this problem.210 Interestingly, statistics show that state enforcers 
might not be so incapable. For example, the SAG of New York from March 
1999 to February 2001 on its own initiative opened 9 antitrust cases on 
restraints of trade and monopolisation respectively. SAG completed all the 9 
cases in time.211  Moreover, cooperation between states and federal 
agencies may reduce this concern. The Task Force‘s most important function 
is to coordinate multi-state investigation and litigation. In this regard the 
Task Force functions as an antitrust enforcement unit. 212 If the Task Force 
                                         
208
 See, M.F. Brockmeyer, ‗Report on the NAAG Multi-State Task Force‘, supra note 146, at 
216.     
209
 See, H. First, ‗Delivering Remedies: The Role of the States in Antitrust Enforcement‘, supra 
note 194, at 1031.  
210
 See, S. Calkins, ‗Perspectives on State and Federal Antitrust Enforcement‘, supra note 
179, at 721-722.  
211
 See, H. First, ‗Delivering Remedies: The Role of the States in Antitrust Enforcement‘, supra 
note 194, at 1017. Indeed, the New York SAG cannot represent all States and District of 
Columbia in the U.S., the capability and resources vary in different States.  
212
 See, M.F. Brockmeyer, ‗Report on the NAAG Multi-State Task Force‘, supra note 146, at 
216.  
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decides to pursue an investigation, one or two states will typically take the 
lead and other interested states will share the responsibility and allocation of 
resources.213 In addition, the fact of active state enforcement through the 
NAAG and the Task Force especially after the 1980s also indicates that the 
concern over the states‘ inability to enforce federal antitrust law may be 
exaggerated.214    
Other critics of state enforcement of federal antitrust laws 
The first and major concern other than Posner‘s argument is that the 
divergent federal and state requirements place undue burdens on businesses. 
Because of the SAGs‘ ignorance of the federal approach on matters like 
vertical restraints and mergers and pursue federal antitrust cases based on 
theories rejected by the federal agencies,215 businesses have to bear 
uncertainty, delay, and unpredictability with regard to business planning.216 
Such inconsistency brings additional costs to businesses and thus decreases 
the efficiency of the federal antitrust law‘s enforcement.217 
Some critics have argued that collective multistate activity creates an 
alternative multistate regulation of antitrust law.218 Therefore such 
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 Ibid. 
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 See, ibid, at 217-218; see also, ABA Section of Antitrust Law, State Antitrust Practice and 
Statutes, supra note 131.  
215
See, J.W. Burns, ‗Embracing both Faces of Antitrust Federalism: Parker and ARC America 
Corp.,‘ supra note 167, at 39-40.  
216
See, J. Rose, ‗State Antitrust Enforcement, Mergers, and Politics‘, supra note 187, at 117.   
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 See, J. Rose, ibid, at 117-118; see also, D. P. Majoras, Antitrust and Federalism, Remarks 
Before the New York State Bar Association, (Jan. 23, 2003), published by the Department of 
Justice, at 3-6; available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/200683.htm, last visited 
on 10/05/2012, 16:49.  
218
 As former Alabama Attorney General Bill Pryor stated, multistate antitrust lawsuits ‗have 
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multistate enforcement violates the intention of the HSR Act and Congress. 
Firstly, the HSR Act recognised that the federal government ‗has been 
particularly effective in cases involving large purchasers‘, whereas the 
federal government has not been active in pressing violations ‗of relatively 
small size.‘219 Secondly, granted the above fact, through this Act Congress 
encouraged states to supplement federal antitrust efforts by tackling 
anticompetitive practices in areas in which the federal government had 
neither the resources nor the expertise to investigate, 220 especially on 
mergers or price-fixing with local concerns.221 Thirdly, the HSR Act clearly 
set forth that ‗the goal of this Act is to promote the cooperation in antitrust 
enforcement between the States and the federal government‘.222  Thus 
critics held that the multistate antitrust enforcement which is divergent from 
federal agencies had gone beyond the scope of state authority and ran 
contrary to this spirit of cooperation and mutual assistance.  
3.2.2 The states’ comparative advantages when enforcing 
federal antitrust law 
State enforcement has its unique advantages that make it irreplaceable 
within the US antitrust enforcement regime. These are the most compelling 
comparative advantages: 1. familiarity with local markets; 2. familiarity with 
                                                                                                                     
Abuses and Reforms of Class Actions and Multi government Lawsuits‘, (2000) 74Tulane Law 
Review, 1885-1900; at 1898.    
219
 See, The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, at 3 (reprinted at 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572) (1977). 
220
 Ibid. 
221
 In fact, Congress placed several constraints on parens patriae suits, including the Section 
15c(c) limitations on the power of states to settle and the Section 15c(b)(1-2) obligation of 
states to provide notice to constituents of their right to exclusion election, thereby indicating 
Congressional intent to limit the scope of state antitrust enforcement. See, 15 U.S.C.§15c(c) 
(2000); 15 U.S.C.§15c(b)(1-2) (2000). 
222
 See, supra note 219.  
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and representation of state and local institutions; and, 3. ability to provide 
monetary relief to injured individuals.223 
State Attorneys General have a clear advantage in understanding local 
markets.224 Similar to the ‗information asymmetry‘ claim in favour of 
decentralisation under EU competition law, 225 a SAG may have a better 
understanding of the local market than enforcers from Washington D.C. For 
example, the SAG of California may be considered to be in a better position 
than the FTC to investigate and sue for injunction relief in a merger involving 
a local shop because the SAG is more likely to be familiar with the history and 
current market dynamics of that area. In fact the Antitrust Division of the 
DOJ has also recognised that it may be sensible for states to take the lead in 
challenging conspiracies in localised markets.226 
Secondly, SAGs are more likely than federal enforcers to know and be 
known and be trusted by state and local government officials.227  When the 
state or local governments act as purchasers,228 they are notoriously 
                                         
223
 See, S. Calkins, ‗Perspectives on State and Federal Antitrust Enforcement‘, supra note 
179, at 679. There are certainly other advantages but the listed three are most compelling. For 
example, L. Constantine argued that state enforcement can maximise citizen participation. 
See, L. Constantine, ‗Antitrust Federalism‘, (1990) 29 Washburn Law Journal, 163-184; at 
182-183.   
224
 See, R.B. Bell, ‗Counterpoint: States Should Stay out of National Mergers‘, (1989) Antitrust, 
at 37.   
225
 See, ‗2.1.2 The reasons for and concerns of EU‘s centralised enforcement mechanism‘ of 
this chapter.  
226
 See, Protocol for Increased State Prosecution of Criminal Antitrust Offenses, 70 Antitrust & 
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 362, 362 (1996) (announcing that the Division may transfer to state 
attorneys general the criminal prosecutorial responsibility ―for offenses including, but not 
limited to, bid rigging and/or price fixing in localized markets‖).  
227
 See, S. Calkins, ‗Perspectives on State and Federal Antitrust Enforcement‘, supra note 
179, at 681. 
228
 For example, schools can be overcharged for milk, roofs, carpets and fuel; local 
governments can be overcharged for fuel, waste disposal, flooring and ambulance services; 
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susceptible to anticompetitive manipulation.229 States have worked 
effectively with purchasing authorities to deter and prosecute such illegality, 
returning money to the taxpayers and the victims of conspiracy.230 In such 
circumstances, ‗no Washington-based voice is likely to be listened to as 
carefully as the voice of the State Attorney General‘.231 
Thirdly, the SAGs can compensate injured individuals. There are two ways. 
Firstly, states may represent the taxpayers by recovering overcharges 
exacted from state purchasing operations;232 in addition, SAGs are the only 
governmental officials specifically authorised by federal statute to recover 
monetary relief in treble damages for natural persons injured by Sherman Act 
violations.233 The federal agencies, on the other hand, almost always choose 
between two remedies: a criminal penalty which is within the DOJ‘s exclusive 
authority, and a prospective-only injunction of limited duration.234 In 
                                                                                                                     
and state agencies can be overcharged for road building, infant formula, travel, and health 
care services, and so on.  
229
 For discussion of the issue of governmental purchasers and related antitrust problems, 
please refer to R.D. Blair & D.L. Kaserman, Antitrust Economic, (1985) Oxford University 
Press, at 144; R.H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, (1978) Free Press, at 347; J.S. Wiley, Jr., ‗A 
Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism‘, (1986) 99(4) Harvard Law Review, 713-789, at 728.      
230
 For example, in the Florida Milk (the first school milk cases), an action filed in February 
1988 by the Attorney General of the State of Florida triggered many other state investigations 
and complaints, and  more than $32 million recovered by Florida against milk companies 
accused of price fixing in schools. See, Cf. Florida v. Southland Corporation, et, al., Case No. 
8S-O273-Civ-Scott (SD. Fla., Miami Div). See also, R.F. Lanzillotti, ‗The Great School Milk 
Conspiracies of the 1980s‘, (1996) 11(4) Review of Industrial Organization, 413-458; at 423.   
231
 See, M. Crane, J.R. Loftis III, A.H. Silberman & S.H. Walbolt, ‗60 Minutes with Robert M. 
Langer, Assistant Attorney General-State of Connecticut, and Chair, NAAG Multistate Antitrust 
Task Force‘, supra note 147. 
232
See, K.J. O‘Connor, ‗Federalist Lessons for International Antitrust Convergence‘, (2002) 70 
Antitrust Law Journal, 413-441; at 442.   
233
 15 U.S.C. § 15c (2000). Parens patriae authority was established by Title III of the Hart- 
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 301, 90 Stat. 1383, 
1394 
(1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15c (2000)). 
234
 See, E. Gellhorn & W.E. Kovacic, Antitrust Law and Economics in a Nutshell, 4
th
 edition, 
(1994) West Publishing Co., at 450-452.    
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practice consumers have been the beneficiaries of the SAGs‘ efforts. For 
example, in Compact Discs,235 about 3.5 million people received almost $13 
each as their share of a settlement.236 In another case, Bristol 
Myers-Squibb,237 although the FTC had issued an injunction against a 
pharmaceutical firm that allegedly abused the patent system to block 
competition,238 states expected to recover over $150 million to their 
consumers.239 The DOJ has no such power, while the FTC lacks the 
experience and resources to distribute the recoveries efficiently to 
consumers in various states.240 
3.3 Consistent enforcement of federal antitrust laws 
between federal agencies and the State Attorneys 
General241  
                                         
235
See, In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., No. 2:01-CV-125-P-H, 
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12663 (D. Me. July 9, 2003). 
236
See, In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., 2003-1 Trade Cas.(CCH) 
¶ 74,060, at 96,591 (D. Me. 2003).  
237
See, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., FTC File Nos. 0010221 (Taxol), 0110046 (BuSpar), 
0210181 (Cisplatin) (Mar. 7, 2003).  
238
 See, Press Release, FTC, FTC Charges Bristol-Myers Squibb with Pattern of Abusing 
Government 
Processes to Stifle Generic Drug Competition (Mar. 7, 2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/03/bms.htm, last visited on 12/05/2012, 21:00.  
239
 See, Press Release, Florida Attorney General, States Reach Tentative Agreement with 
Bristol Myers-Squibb in Antitrust Drug Cases (Jan. 7, 2003), available at 
http://myfloridalegal.com/newsrel.nsf/newsreleases/9E2439956993A54285256CA70075AB79, 
last visited on 12/05/2012, 21:09.   
240
 The FTC has itself recognised  and admitted that it has used this authority ‗cautiously‘ and 
‗sparingly‘, employing it in only a handful of cases. See, Cf. FTC, Policy Statement on 
Monetary Equitable Remedies in Competition Cases, (July 25, 2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/disgorgementfrn.htm, last visited on 12/05/2012, 21:17.  
241
 Undoubtedly, federal courts and Supreme Court are also playing significant roles in 
keeping consistency of federal antitrust law‘s public enforcement. However, this section is 
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3.3.1 Case allocation between state and federal enforcers: a 
general principle  
As the third de facto federal antitrust law enforcer242 the SAGs have the 
freedom to choose to sue as parens patriae or direct/indirect purchaser 
under federal antitrust law or the antitrust statutes of their states. Hence, 
unlike in the EU where Articles 101 and 102 TFEU must be applied to ‗trade 
between Member States‘,243 the SAGs are not obliged to apply federal 
antitrust law to interstate commerce.244 The concept of ‗case allocation‘ and 
‗well placed‘ between the Commission and the Member States under the EU 
competition law regime245 might not exist under its US counterpart, because 
theoretically all the federal antitrust cases are placed in the federal district 
courts. 
However, as a general principle Congress intended a limited, localised 
scope of state enforcement of federal antitrust law.246 Section 15F (a) of HSR 
Act states: 
                                                                                                                     
more information on the functions of federal courts and Supreme Court in relation to antitrust 
law enforcement, please refer to M.A. Duggan: Antitrust and the U.S. Supreme Court, 
1829-1980 2
nd
 edition, Federal Legal Pubns, (United States, 1981); R.H. Bork: The Antitrust 
Paradox, supra note 229;  
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 M. Crane, J.R. Loftis III, A.H. Silberman & S.H. Walbolt, ‗60 Minutes with Robert M. Langer, 
Assistant Attorney General-State of Connecticut, and Chair, NAAG Multistate Antitrust Task 
Force‘, supra note 147.  
243
 See, Article 3 of Reg.1/2003.  
244
 In fact, state antitrust laws can extend to transactions involving interstate commerce. For 
example, Coca-Cola Co.v. Harmar Bottling Co., 2006-2 Trade Cas.(CCH) ¶ 75, 464 (Tex., Oct. 
20, 2006); R.E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 112 Cal. Rptr. 585, 587-594 & n.4(Ct. App. 
1974); Oliver v. All-States Freight, 156 N.E.2d 190, 195-196(Ohio Ct. App. 1957).     
245
 See, ‘2.2 European Competition Network: case allocation and consistency‘ of this chapter    
246
 Generally refer to ‗3.2.1 Concerns of state enforcement on federal antitrust laws‘ in this 
chapter.  
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Whenever the Attorney General of the United States has brought an 
action under the antitrust laws, and he has reason to believe that any 
State Attorney General would be entitled to bring an action under this 
Act based substantially on the same alleged violation of the antitrust 
laws, he shall promptly give written notification thereof to such State 
Attorney General.247 
That the federal antitrust enforcer is required to notify SAGs of additional 
parens patriae claims when it files suit suggests that federal antitrust 
enforcement might not be able to cover the entire range of antitrust 
violations. Congress anticipated that because some areas of local concern 
would be left out of federal investigations states should be empowered to 
bring additional antitrust suits. As one commentator said, ‗it would make 
little sense for Washington-based enforcers trying to craft divestitures to 
remedy a grocery store merger, or debating about the viability of stores on 
different sides of some small town, not to consult with or involve a state 
enforcer who is more likely to be familiar with the history and current market 
dynamics of that area.‘248 In this way the SAGs would ensure consumer and 
business protection in situations currently left unprotected due to gaps in 
federal enforcement249 
3.3.2 Coordination and cooperation between state and federal 
enforcers 
                                         
247
 15 U.S.C.§15f(a)(2000). 
248
 See, S. Calkins, ‗Perspectives on State and Federal Antitrust Enforcement‘, supra note 
179, at 680.  
249
 See, J. Ratner, ‗Conflicting Federal and State Enforcement of Federal Antitrust Law: 
Statutory Crisis or Celebration of Diversity?‘ supra note 167.  
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As mentioned above especially in the 1990s cooperation between states 
and federal antitrust enforcers was active.250 Both the SAGs and federal 
agencies developed mechanisms to coordinate federal antitrust law 
enforcement between states and federal agencies. 
First of all the NAAG, founded in 1907, is the key organisational vehicle for 
cooperation among the states. It ‗facilitates interaction among Attorneys 
General as peers, thereby enhancing the performance of Attorneys General 
and their staffs to respond effectively to emerging state and federal legal 
issues‘.251 The NAAG represents all states, including the United States 
territories and the District of Columbia. Its central office has helped 
coordinate the states' efforts in investigation, litigation, lobbying and 
training.252 The NAAG also provides a continuing legal education program for 
state lawyers, organises seminars, conferences, summits and publishes 
written reports, monographs and newsletters on substantial issues of 
antitrust laws. The Association also serves as liaison agency to the federal 
government in federal antitrust law enforcement.253 In the NAAG the 
coordination between the states is entirely voluntary. There is no 
hierarchical control of these joint efforts. Each state, and the federal 
government when it is involved, is sovereign.254 When conducting an 
antitrust investigation involving more than one state normally one state will 
take the lead. The NAAG‘s general principle is that the state (or states) most 
                                         
250
 See, ‗Conflict between the State and Federal Antitrust Enforcement‘ in the section of ‗3.2.1 
Concerns of state enforcement on federal antitrust laws‘.  
251
 See, the official website of the NAAG, supra note 207; 
252
 For a description of NAAG's administrative structure, see R. Abrams & L. Constantine, 
‗Dual Antitrust Enforcement in the 1990s‘, in H. First, E.M. Fox & R. Pitofsky(edited by): 
Revitalizing Antitrust in its Second Century: Essays on Legal, Economic, and Political Policy, 
(1991) Greenwood Publishing Group, at  484-515.  
253
 See, the official website of the NAAG, supra note 207.  
254
 See, H. First, ‗Delivering Remedies: The Role of the States in Antitrust Enforcement‘, supra 
note 194, at 1014.  
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committed to organising and managing an investigation or litigation will 
become the lead (or co-lead) state, but there is no formal way to compel this 
result or to choose a lead. When a federal enforcement agency is involved, 
that agency leads the investigation, again by virtue of superior resources and 
interest rather than any legal requirement.255 In addition, the NAAG created 
the Task Force in1983 to coordinate the investigation by different SAGs and 
encourage cooperation during such investigation.256 As the activities of the 
Task Force grew, more states wished to participate actively. Over the years 
membership grew to the point that now the Task Force became, in essence, a 
committee of the whole.257 
Secondly, the Executive Working Group for Antitrust (hereafter, the EWGA), 
formed in October 1989, created an opportunity for the DOJ, FTC, the NAAG, 
and individual SAG to gather and discuss antitrust policy and enforcement. 
The EWGA includes the FTC Chairman, the Assistant Attorney General in 
charge of the DOJ Antitrust Division, and representatives of the states‘ 
Attorneys General. They meet to discuss issues of common interest. 
Extending those discussions to the staff level, and scheduling more frequent 
meetings, might further facilitate coordination. Staff-level meetings would 
enable state and federal personnel to assess candidly what is (or is not) 
working as well as it could.258 Thanks to the EWGA overlapping federal and 
                                         
255
 See, H. First, ibid; at 1015; see also, M.F. Brockmeyer, ‗Report on the NAAG Multi-State 
Task Force‘, supra note 146, at 216.  
256
 See, M.F. Brockmeyer, ibid.  
257
 See, M.F. Brockmeyer, ‗Report on the NAAG Multi-State Task Force‘, supra note 146, at 
216; see also, M. Crane, J.R. Loftis III, A.H. Silberman & S.H. Walbolt, ‗60 Minutes with Robert 
M. Langer, Assistant Attorney General - State of Connecticut, and Chair, NAAG Multistate 
Antitrust Task Force‘, supra note 147, at 200.  
258
See, P.J. Harbour, ‗Cooperative Federalism in the Enforcement of Antitrust and Consumer 
Protection Laws‘, in Federal Trade Commission 90th Anniversary Symposium, on September 
23, 2004, available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/harbour/040923coopfed.pdf, last visited on 
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state enforcement can be coordinated and the duplication of effort can also 
be prevented.259 
Thirdly, both the federal and state antitrust authorities have issued a series 
of guidelines to coordinate their civil investigation and prosecution.260 For 
example, the NAAG has redrafted its Horizontal Merger and Vertical 
Restraints Guidelines to make them more consistent with the Federal 
Guidelines. In addition, federal and state antitrust authorities developed the 
1998 Protocol for Coordination in Merger Investigations between the Federal 
Enforcement Agencies and State Attorneys General,261 which has greatly 
increased cooperation between states and the federal government during 
merger investigations. 
As the result of the effort of coordination and cooperation made by both 
federal and state antitrust enforcers there were numerous examples of 
multistate federal cooperation in antitrust investigation and prosecution 
especially during the 1990s.262  
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 See, J.S. Rill & C.S. Chambers, ‗Federalism in Antitrust Enforcement: The United States 
Experience with a Dual Enforcement Regime‘, in C.D. Ehlermann & L. Laudati(edited by), 
Robert Schuman Centre Annual on European Competition Law 1996, (1997) Kluwer Law 
International.  
260
 There are other guidelines to coordinate federal and state criminal enforcement which are 
beyond the scope of this chapter. For example, in March, 1996 the DOJ has issued the 
Protocol for Increased State Prosecution of Criminal Antitrust Offenses. See, Department of 
Justice Press Release, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0618.htm, last 
visited on 20/05/2012, 15:39.  
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 See, 4 Trade Reg. Rep.(CHH),¶¶ 13, 211-13, (Oct. 26, 1995); see also, Antitrust Division,  
FTC Announce Program to Assist States with Merger Enforcement, 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. 
Rep. (BNA), 331, 338-339 (Mar. 12, 1992). 
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4. The Relationship between the Central and 
Provincial Administrative Enforcers under 
China’s Antimonopoly Law   
4.1 Factors to be considered under the AML 2007 
regarding public enforcement  
The examination above makes clear that both EU competition law and US 
antitrust law enforcement regimes are two-level. The EU has the 
Commission‘s and national enforcers‘ levels; the US antitrust regime has the 
federal and states levels. Similarly, Chinese AML 2007‘s public enforcement is 
at the central and the provincial governmental levels.263 As mentioned in the 
introduction to this chapter, this section seeks to answer the following three 
questions: 1. whether the AML 2007 should be directly applicable by the PAEs; 
2. How to allocate antitrust cases between the CAEs and the PAEs; 3. How to 
guarantee a consistent, predictable and harmonious public enforcement of 
the AML 2007 between the CAEs and the PAEs. There are three facts that 
need to be considered when discussing the three questions : 1. the PAEs are 
able to enforce the AML 2007 but need pre-authorisation from the CAEs; 2. 
PAEs generally lack resources and ability to enforce the AML 2007; and 3. 
protectionism is a serious problem in China. 
According to Article 10 of the AML 2007, PAEs are able to enforce the law 
on authorisation devolved by the CAEs. In Concrete Association the provincial 
enforcer of Jiang Su province investigated the case after it obtained 
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authorisation from the SAIC.264 This shows that the enforcement authority of 
the AML 2007 is not exclusive to MOFCOM, the NDRC and the SAIC, and the 
provincial agencies need authorisation from central government to enforce 
the law. The following sections will discuss whether the AML 2007‘s 
enforcement authority should be devolved to the PAEs; if it should, then the 
question is how to ensure consistency between the CAEs and the PAEs.  
China has 31 provincial governments.265 They generally lack capacity and 
resources to enforce the AML 2007. Firstly, many PAEs do not have a specific 
institution to enforce the law. None of provincial branches of the MOFCOM 
has a specific department to assess mergers among the 31 provincial 
governments. There are only 7 provincial branches of the NDRC clearly 
provided in its internal regulations that they are responsible for enforcing the 
law against price monopoly.266 However, there is no specific agency to take 
charge of regulating price-related monopoly. There are more provincial 
branches of the SAIC which are specifically responsible for governing 
non-price related monopoly. Of the 31 PAEs 24 provincial governments report 
that they have established specific agencies to fight against non-price related 
monopolies. However, most of them failed to provide further explanation on 
how to enforce the AML 2007.267 Moreover, in practice the PAEs issued no 
guideline in relation to the enforcement of the AML 2007. The number of 
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 See, Y. Fan, The first AML case enforced by the SAIC has been sealed: the market 
segmentation agreement of Lian Yungang‘s association, Legal Daily, 02/03/2011.  
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 In fact China has 22 provinces (Taiwan is excluded), 5 autonomous region and 4 
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 The seven provincial branches are: Beijing, Tianjin, Neimenggu(inner Mongolia ), Henan, 
Gansu, Shanghai and Xinjiang.  
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cases is also very limited.268 These facts suggest that the PAEs generally lack 
institutional capacity and resources to enforce the AML 2007. 
Protectionism between provinces is significant. It can be illustrated 
directly from economic analysis. Data show that the tariff between domestic 
provinces amounted to 46% in 1997. And these data, from 1986-1996 are on 
average, 35%.269 In 1997 consumers residing in a province purchased goods 
produced in their own province 21 times more than from other provinces, 
while this number is 11 times in 1987.270 In practice, under the name of 
assistance to the local economy, local(provincial) governments used their 
heightened administrative powers (in terms of trade, investment, budget, 
and price fixing) to implement a multiform protection of workers and 
enterprises under their authority.271 Other provincial barriers include: 
approved import bans, discriminatory product and health certification 
standards, tariffs and dumping charges, confiscations of profits earned on 
marketing interprovincial goods, as well as subsidies to local commercial 
units for buying locally produced products aimed at curtailing competition 
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Until December, 2012, the author cannot find a single guideline issued by the 31 PAEs in 
relation to the AML 2007‘s enforcement. The published cases are also limited.  However, 
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Market Disintegration‘, (2005) 13(3) Review of International Economics, 409-430; see also, 
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Review‘, 
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Incentives in China‘, Paper presented at the Workshop on National Integration, organised by 
the World Bank and China‘s Development Research Centre, State Council (2003). 
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with home-province products and sustaining employment and the survival of 
uncompetitive local enterprises.272 A questionnaire survey also shows that 
undertakings in 31 provinces generally feel that the provincial protectionism 
is a significant problem in China‘s domestic market.273  
4.2 Whether a centralised or a decentralised 
enforcement mechanism is appropriate for the 
AML 2007      
Although Article 10 of the AML 2007 empowers the provincial governments 
to enforce the law, the question of ‗whether these provincial governments 
should be empowered to enforce the AML 2007‘ still remains.  
4.2.1 Whether a centralised enforcement mechanism is 
appropriate under the AML 2007?   
Possible advantages of a centralised mechanism274 under the AML 2007 
As examined in the EU section, the centralised enforcement mechanism 
under Regulation 17 brought the following two advantages: firstly, consistent 
and predictable implementation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in Member 
States could be guaranteed; secondly, it could prevent trade protectionism 
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between Member States.275 Although during the examination of US antitrust 
law the author did not find much discussion on the advantages of a 
centralised enforcement system,  critics of state enforcement of federal 
antitrust laws reveal that, if federal antitrust law were to be enforced 
directly by different states, it would cause problems of inconsistency and 
protectionism between states.276  Hence, based on both the EU and US 
experience, it could be concluded that a centralised enforcement mechanism 
might bring two major advantages: 1. keeping consistent and predictable 
enforcement of the antitrust law; 2. preventing trade protectionism between 
Member States (or states).  
If China were to adopt a centralised enforcement mechanism for the AML 
2007 the two advantages might be gained. If only the CAEs can enforce the 
Law directly, one immediate effect is that the AML 2007 would be uniformly 
enforced in China‘s provinces.  As the core enforcer(s), CAEs need not worry 
about contradictory decisions from PAEs and can guarantee consistency of 
interpretation of the Law, the standard of enforcement as the result of 
similar violations. CAEs may establish principles of enforcement, precedent 
and case law and binding/nonbinding guidelines. Such consistency is 
important to undertakings not only because it can save transaction costs but, 
more importantly, because it can provide considerable predictability which is 
crucial especially during such an early stage of the AML 2007‘s 
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 See, ‗The reasons for applying the centralised mechanism‘ in ‗2.1.2 The reasons for and 
concerns of EU‘s centralised enforcement mechanism‘ of this chapter.  
276
 See, generally, ‗3.2.1 Concerns of state enforcement on federal antitrust laws‘. Justice 
Posner argued that state enforcement of federal antitrust law would be ‗too subject‘ to protect 
the competitors in its territory using the government antitrust enforcement to disadvantage a 
competitor out of its territory. See, R.A. Posner, ‗Antitrust in the New Economy‘, supra note 
188, at 940; H. First also argued that one state, acting on complaint from an in-state business, 
might sue an out-of-state business, thereby helping local business by imposing an 
unnecessary cost on the out-of-state concern. See, H. First, ‗Delivering Remedies: The Role of 
the States in Antitrust Enforcement‘, supra note 194, at 1030-1031.    
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enforcement.277 Experience from EU competition law also indicates that at 
the early stage a centralised enforcement mechanism is more effective than 
the decentralised mechanism due to the need to establish consistent EU 
competition law enforcement and predictability for undertakings in the 
market.278 China is also in its early years of enforcement of the AML 2007 and 
competition policy was not widely known in many provinces of China before. 
In addition, as identified above, the PAEs generally lack resources, 
experience and capacity to enforce the Law. The benefit of consistent and 
predictable enforcement of the AML 2007 brought by the centralised 
mechanism could be crucial to consumers, undertakings as well as enforcers 
of the Law. 
The second advantage of a centralised mechanism is that it can prevent, or 
at least relieve, inter-province protectionism. This will also be crucial for 
China‘s AML enforcement. As identified above, China faces significant local 
protectionism between provinces. If PAEs are empowered to enforce the AML 
2007, Justice Posner‘s concern under the US antitrust law regime could be 
realised in China. For instance, Chinese PAEs in different provinces may 
protect competitors in their own territory using the government antitrust 
enforcement to disadvantage a competitor out of its territory,279 which runs 
contrary to the goal of the AML 2007 which aims to establish an integrated 
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 Similar opinion can be seen in A.H.Y. Zhang, ‗Problems in Following E.U. Competition Law: 
A Case Study of Coca-Cola/Huiyuan‘, (2011) 3 Peking University Journal of Legal Studies, 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1569836, last visited on 27/05/2012, 16:48.  
278
 The White Paper states that the centralised authorisation system was necessary and 
proved very effective for the establishment of ‗a culture of competition' in Europe. It enabled 
the Commission to establish the uniform application of Article 101 TFEU throughout the EU 
when competition policy was not widely known in many parts of the Community in the early 
years. See, § 4 of the White Paper. 
279
 Chinese commentators also expressed this concern. See for example, B.S. Zhang, ‗A 
Comment of the Institutional Design of Current Administrative Enforcers of the AML 2007‘; 
supra note 269, at 117.  
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domestic market.280 This is a realistic risk in China. Take the tobacco 
industry for example.281 Economic analysis shows that the tobacco industry in 
China faces serious provincial protectionism.282 The barrier is established by 
provincial governments in the form of an administrative monopoly283 because 
the tax on tobacco leaf is mainly for local government revenue.284 Hence it is 
likely that the PAEs would have used the AML 2007 to protect the 
undertakings within their territories if they were empowered to enforce the 
law.  
To prevent such situation, a centralised and national level enforcer(s) 
would be needed to overcome local protectionism. As illustrated both by EU 
and US experience, a centralised, super-provincial-interest supervision will 
mitigate judgments biased in favour of provincial interests and prevent trade 
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 See, Article 4 of the AML 2007.  
281
 For a more comprehensive analysis on the monopoly and local protectionism of China‘s 
tobacco industry, please refer to J.F. Zhu, Research on the Development of China’s Tobacco 
Industry[中国烟草工业发展研究，zhongguoyancaogongye fazhanyanjiu], PhD Thesis, (2008) 
Jilin Agricultural University, China P.R.; M. Tao, Chinese Tobacco Industry under Monopolistic 
Control[专卖管制下的中国烟草业 zhuanmaiguanzhixia de zhongguoyancaoye], PhD Thesis, 
(2005) Fudan University, China P.R.      
282
 See, C.E. Bai, Y.J. Du, Z.G. Tao & S.Y. Tong, ‗Local Protectionism and Regional 
Specialization: 
Evidence from China‘s Industries‘, (2004) 63 Journal of International Economics, 397-417, at 
408; see also, Z.L. Huang & J.Y. Wang, ‗Local Protectionism and Market Fragmentation: An 
Experience Study in China [地方保护与市场分割:来自中国的经验数据, difangbaohu yu 
shichangfenge:laizi zhongguo de jingyanshuju]‘, (2006) 2 China Industrial Economics, 60-67.  
283
 In essence, in China, local protectionism is a kind of administrative monopoly. See, Y. Guo 
& A.G. Hu, ‗The Administrative Monopoly in China‘s Economic Transition‘, (2004) 37 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 265-280.  
284
 See, T.W. Hu, Z. Mao, M. Ong, E. Tong, M. Tao, H. Jiang, K. Hammond, K.R. Smith, J.de 
Beyer & A. Yurekli, ‗China at the Crossroads: the Economics of Tobacco and Health‘, (2006) 
15 Tobacco Control, 37-41, at 38.   
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protectionism between provinces,285 which is one of the goals of the AML 
2007.   
Concerns of the centralised mechanism under the AML 2007 
A centralised enforcement mechanism would also bring some concerns. 
Such concerns faced by EU competition law enforcer(s) include:286 1. the 
Commission faced an immense administrative overload created by the 
centralised mechanism; 2. the undertakings concerned could bring 
proceedings at the national level to a halt by lodging a notification with the 
Commission.287 However, it is doubtful that the concerns faced by EU 
centralised mechanism would apply equally to China. 
Firstly, the CAEs of China have not faced an immense administrative 
caseload. On the contrary, by December 2012, the CAEs, especially the NDRC 
and the SAIC, did not deal with many cases in the 4 years‘ enforcement. Take 
the NDRC for example; it did not complete a single case from August 2008 to 
April 2010.288 From August 2010 to April 2012,289 the NDRC has investigated 5 
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 See respectively, ‗The reasons for applying the centralised mechanism‘ in ‗2.1.2 The 
reasons for and concerns of EU‘s centralised enforcement mechanism‘ of this chapter; 
‗Arguments brought by Microsoft case‘ in 3.2.1 ‗Concerns of state enforcement on federal 
antitrust laws‘ of this chapter.  
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 In the US there is little discussion of the concerns at centralised mechanism for a 
centralised enforcement mechanism never existed under U.S. antitrust law enforcement.  
287
 See, ‗The concerns of the EU centralised mechanism‘ in ‗2.1.2 The reasons for and 
concerns of EU‘s centralised enforcement mechanism‘ of this chapter. However, examination 
of the US antitrust enforcement regime did not show much information on the discussion of 
concerns over a centralised enforcement mechanism.  
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 See, Report on Competition Law and Policy of China 2010, edited by Competition law and 
policy Committee of China WTO Research Institution, (2010) Law Press, at 135.  
289
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cases and completed 4 of them.290 Compared with the workload faced by the 
EU Commission in its centralisation period,291 the NDRC‘s burden is quite 
light.   
The second concern faced by the EU is based on the notification system on 
exemption. This concern could be raised when an undertaking is facing 
investigation by a NCA, and it may use the Commission‘s superior power to 
thwart the NCA‘s investigation. Hence if the PAEs in China are entirely 
excluded from the AML 2007‘s enforcement, this concern will not arise 
because the undertaking could deny the PAE directly. Or, if the PAEs may 
enforce the AML 2007 on the authorisation by the CAEs and there is a 
centralised notification system for exemption (Article 15 of the AML 2007), an 
undertaking could similarly thwart the PAE‘s investigation by notifying its 
conduct before the CAEs. In this case the CAEs must react timely to the 
notification to prevent such a block.292 Nevertheless, this concern is not 
currently relevant since China still does not have such notification system for 
exemption.  
4.2.2 Whether a decentralised enforcement mechanism is 
appropriate under the AML 2007   
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 See, A. Fels, X.Y. Wang & J. Su (edited by), China Competition Bulletin, available at 
http://www.anzsog.edu.au/research/publications/the-china-competition-bulletin, last visited on 
28/05/2012, 11:23.  
291
 According to data from the Annual Report of the Commission, from 1998 to 2002 the 
number of pending cases before the Commission reached anaverage of 959.4 each year. See, 
Report on Competition Policy 1998-2002, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/index.html, last visited on 
28/05/2012, 11:34.      
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 This concern has been discussed under EU competition law regime. For example, M. 
Siragusa suggested that ‗the Commission must decide on notified agreements within certain 
time limits.‘ See, M. Siragusa, ‗A Critical Review of the White Paper on the Reform of the EC 
Competition Law Enforcement Rules‘, supra note 37; at 1103.  
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Possible advantages of a decentralised mechanism under the AML 2007 
The so-called decentralised enforcement mechanism under China‘s AML 
2007 means that under which the AML 2007 is directly enforceable by the 
PAEs without any authorisation from the CAEs.  
From the examination of EU practice, EU competition law‘s decentralised 
enforcement mechanism may have the following advantages: 1. it may create 
competition of rules; 2. local agencies are in a better position to collect 
information from local companies; 3. decentralisation allows for a useful 
degree of experimentation.293 As examined in the US section of this chapter, 
the advantages of state enforcement include: 1. they may have a better 
understanding of the local market than enforcers at the federal level; 2. they 
are more likely than federal enforcers to know and be known and be trusted 
by state and local government officials; 3. they can compensate injured 
individuals while the federal enforcers cannot.294 The first advantage of the 
state enforcement under US antitrust law, namely the familiarity with local 
markets, is similar to the claim of informational asymmetries under EU 
competition law‘s regime.295 The last two advantages of US antitrust law296 
do not exist under China‘s antimonopoly law regime. As to the second 
advantage, i.e.  familiarity with and representation of state and local 
institutions, a PAE is not independent in China as it belongs to the provincial 
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 See, ‗The reasons for applying the decentralised mechanism‘ in ‗2.1.3 The reasons for and 
concerns regarding the EU‘s decentralised enforcement mechanism‘ of this chapter.  
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 See, ‗3.2.2 The states‘ comparative advantages when enforcing federal antitrust law‘ of 
this chapter.  
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 See, ‗The reasons for applying the decentralised mechanism‘ of ‗2.1.3 The reasons for and 
concerns of EU‘s decentralised enforcement mechanism‘ in this chapter.  
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 Namely, the familiarity with and representation of state and local institutions; and, the 
ability to send money to injured individuals. See, ‗3.2.2 The states‘ comparative advantages 
when enforcing federal antitrust laws‘ of this chapter.  
Chapter 3  
Allocation of Public Enforcement Powers in China‘s Antimonopoly Law between the Central and 
Provincial Administrative Enforcers 
160 
 
government.297 Hence, theoretically, when the provincial government claims 
to be the victim of an antitrust violation, the PAE of this province could not 
make a decision on this violation because it is at the same time the plaintiff 
in this case. As to the third advantage, there is no legal ground in China for 
the PAEs, as parens patriae, to compensate their residents and individual 
consumers. Thus there are three main comparative advantages of a 
decentralised enforcement mechanism summarised both from EU 
competition and US antitrust law regimes that might be applied in China: 1. 
competition of rules; 2. local agencies‘ better position to collect information 
from local companies; 3. experimentation.    
Competition of rules could be very limited during the AML 2007‘s 
enforcement even if a decentralised enforcement mechanism were 
introduced. Firstly, as mentioned above, Chinese provinces currently do not 
have their own antitrust statutes. The AML 2007 was enacted to be applied to 
all 22 provinces, 5 autonomous regions and 4 municipalities directly under 
the Central Government298. As the first comprehensive and uniﬁed antitrust 
statute of China299 the AML 2007 is followed as an example of legislation by 
the provincial governments subsequently if the province intends to make its 
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 The provincial administrative enforcers in China are branches of the Central Administrative 
Enforcers in local governments. They are under dual leadership control: the leadership of the 
local government and the leadership of the CAEs. For general relationship between Chinese 
central and local government, please refer to J.G. Zhang, Introduction to the Relationship 
among Governments in Contemporary China[当代中国政府间关系导论,dangdai 
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 See, Article 2 of the AML 2007.  
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 See, H.W. Hittinger & J.D. Huh, ‗The People‘s Republic of China Enacts its First 
Comprehensive Antitrust Law: Trying to Predict the Unpredictable‘, (2008) 4 New York 
University Journal of Law and Business, 245-283.   
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own provincial antitrust statute. Moreover, although the AML 2007 did not 
stipulate the relationship between the Law and provincial antitrust statutes, 
the Law of the People's Republic of China on Legislation (hereafter the 
Legislation Law 2000)300 provides that the legislators at the provincial level 
are able to ‗formulate local regulations in accordance with the specific 
conditions and actual needs of their respective administrative areas‘.301 
However, such local regulations are ‗not allowed to be in contradiction with 
Chinese Constitution, laws and administrative regulations‘.302 In other words 
the AML 2007 will be applied in all provinces, autonomous regions and 
municipalities prior to provincial and local antitrust statutes, if they have any. 
Nor should any provincial and local antitrust statutes conflict with the AML 
2007. However, different PAEs may have different procedures to enforce the 
same AML 2007 and thus regulatory competition may happen to some extent.  
The second advantage may be a stronger reason for decentralisation. As 
illustrated both by EU and US experience a local authority will be better 
placed than the central authority to deal with local antitrust violation. The 
Commission in Brussels may not be able to detect a price-fixing agreement 
between local shops in a UK town; the state Attorney General of California 
may have a better understanding of the local market than the enforcers from 
Washington D.C. Similarly, the provincial government in Xinjiang autonomous 
region (which is 2410 km from Beijing) may be considered a better antitrust 
enforcer than officials in Beijing when dealing with local antitrust concerns. 
Although PAEs may lack capacity and experience to enforce the AML 2007, 
the PAEs do have this comparative advantage that the CAEs do not have.  
                                         
300
 The Law of the People's Republic of China on Legislation was adopted by the 3rd Session 
of the Ninth National People's Congress on March 15, 2000, and effective from July 1, 2000. 
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 See, Article 63 of the Legislation Law 2000.  
302
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Thirdly, the advantage of experimentation would also be limited if China 
were to adopt a decentralised enforcement mechanism for the AML 2007. 
Firstly, as mentioned above, the obligation to enforce the same AML 2007 in a 
similar and convergent way would greatly weaken the effect of 
experimentation. Secondly, the lack of capacity of the PAEs would also limit 
experimentation. Hence it might be too early to consider the benefit of 
experimentation in China.        
Concerns regarding the decentralised mechanism under the AML 2007  
   The main concern with the decentralisation of EU competition is that it 
may reduce the consistency and legal certainty of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU.303 Examination of the US antitrust law regime also illustrates a similar 
concern of inconsistency.304 There are three additional concerns regarding 
the US state enforcement of federal antitrust laws. Firstly, state enforcers 
can do no more than free ride on federal antitrust litigation; secondly, state 
enforcement might be easily influenced by the state‘s interest groups; and, 
thirdly, state enforcers do not have the resources to enforce federal antitrust 
law.305  
If the PAEs may directly enforce the AML 2007, enforcers of the Law may 
face inconsistency of two kinds: firstly, that between PAEs and CAEs; 
secondly, between PAEs. The inconsistency between the PAEs and the CAEs 
could appear because, although PAEs cannot make contradictory antitrust 
statutes, there is no specific law or regulation stipulating that the PAEs 
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 See, ‗the concern of decentralisation‘ in ‗2.1.3 The reasons for and concerns regarding the 
EU‘s decentralised enforcement mechanism‘ of this chapter.  
304
 See, ‗Other critics of state enforcement of federal antitrust laws‘ in ‗3.2.1 Concerns of state 
enforcement of federal antitrust laws‘ in this chapter.  
305
 See, ‗Arguments brought by Microsoft case‘ in ‗3.2.1 Concerns of state enforcement on 
federal antitrust laws‘ of this chapter. 
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cannot take different decisions from those of CAEs in relation to antitrust 
enforcement.  PAEs may either take a more restrictive, less rigorous or lax 
enforcement approach than the CAEs. There are two possible sources of 
inconsistency in PAE practice. Firstly, a PAE is not currently bound by the 
legal determinations of another PAE. Inconsistency may arise where PAEs in 
different provinces investigate the same (type of) agreement or practice and 
apply different legal interpretations of the AML 2007. Secondly, different 
PAEs may have different levels of resources, professionalism, experience, 
and enforcement levels. For example, the government of Shanghai may have 
more resources, expertise and experience than the government of Xinjiang 
autonomous region.306 If PAEs are empowered to enforce the AML 2007 
directly, different PAEs would enforce the AML 2007 inconsistently. A 
consistent enforcement of the AML 2007 is vital especially at this early stage. 
It is necessary for legal certainty and predictability for both undertakings and 
consumers; it can help to build a stable enforcement system for the AML 2007; 
it may also contribute to the establishment of an integrated domestic market 
in China.  
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 Because there is no report on the AML 2007‘s enforcement by Shanghai or Xinjiang 
provincial government, there is no direct evidence to prove that Shanghai PAE is more 
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All the concerns of decentralisation encountered under US antitrust regime 
may also arise in China. Firstly, it is very likely that the PAEs can do no more 
than free ride on CAEs‘ enforcement.307 Posner‘s argument concerning the 
US antitrust law regime may not reflect the fact,308 however, that in China 
the free ride can be a real concern. Without sufficient competence and 
resources, if the PAEs were granted direct enforcement authority at such an 
early stage, it is very likely that they would only come after and make use of 
the efforts of the CAEs and raise no substantial issues relating to the Law‘s 
enforcement. The second concern raised regarding the US antitrust regime 
would be even more significant in China. As mentioned above, China‘s 
provincial policy of protectionism is a serious.309  Even before the enactment 
of the AML 2007 provincial governments used various tools to protect local 
businesses and discriminate against competitors in other provinces.310 The 
AML 2007 could be another tool. Provincial government A may protect the 
local shoe making factory A from its competitor (shoe making factory B) in 
province B by enforcing the AML 2007 more rigorously in respect of the 
branch of factory B in province A. The temptation would be particularly 
strong if the provincial enforcer of the AML 2007 is not independent of the 
provincial government, which is the case in China. Thirdly, lack of 
competence of the PAEs in China has been discussed above311 .   
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4.3 Some proposals for the AML 2007’s centralised 
enforcement mechanism  
4.3.1 A centralised enforcement mechanism is more 
appropriate for China at this time 
Discussion of advantages and concerns of centralised and decentralised 
enforcement mechanism in Chinese circumstances now completed, we may 
conclude that a centralised enforcement mechanism is more appropriate 
than a decentralised mechanism at this time. 
Firstly, the advantages brought by the centralised mechanism are more 
significant than the advantages brought by the decentralised mechanism. 
Maintaining consistent and predictable enforcement of antitrust law and 
preventing trade protectionism between provinces in China may be the 
primary task for AML 2007 enforcers. The advantages brought by 
decentralisation would be diminished in current Chinese circumstances. 
Regulatory competition is not likely to occur even if decentralisation is 
introduced because all PAEs enforce the same AML 2007 or their local 
antitrust statutes modelled on the AML 2007 with similar enforcement 
procedures and standards. Experimentation would also be insignificant for 
the same reason and the lack of experience of the PAEs. PAEs do have an 
advantage because they are more familiar with local markets. However, this 
advantage will be weakened if the PAEs do not have enough resources, 
experience and expertise to enforce the Law directly. 
Secondly, the concerns arising in respect of decentralisation are more 
significant than those under a centralised mechanism. As mentioned 
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above,312  it is too early to consider the concerns of centralisation: the 
current administrative workload of CAEs is acceptable; and the notification 
system does not exist under China‘s AML 2007 enforcement regime. However, 
the possible concerns can be immediate and serious. Firstly, at such an early 
stage, public enforcement of the AML 2007 should remain consistent and 
stable to establish both general principles as well as detailed procedural rules 
for subsequent enforcement and legal certainty and predictability for 
practitioners and consumers in the domestic market. The main concern is 
inconsistency. Secondly, the three concerns regarding state (direct) 
enforcement of federal antitrust laws under US antitrust law may be 
particularly significant in China313 due to the two features of China‘s 
antitrust enforcement: PAEs generally lack resources, experience and 
competence to enforce the AML 2007; and, provincial or local protectionism.  
4.3.2 A specific design of a centralised enforcement 
mechanism for China’s AML 2007 
There are two possible centralised mechanisms for China to choose 
between: 1. in which all enforcement powers are in the hands of the central 
government and PAEs are excluded from AML 2007 enforcement; 2. in which 
PAEs can enforce the AML 2007 on the authorisation from the CAEs. The 
author prefers the second option for two reasons. Firstly, if the first option 
were to be adopted, CAEs might face immense and unacceptable 
administrative workload after years of development and decentralisation 
could be the only choice at that stage. At that time, however, PAEs would 
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still have no experience to enforce the AML 2007 because they were excluded 
previously. Secondly, the advantage of PAEs that they are more familiar with 
local markets and local antitrust violation than are PAEs is undeniable. PAEs 
should make use of this advantage to improve the effectiveness of the Law‘s 
public enforcement. 
Under the centralised authorisation, PAEs cannot enforce the AML 2007 
without the authorisation from CAEs. Firstly, PAEs‘ enforcement actions are 
supervised by CAEs. Such supervision may include: 1. the obligation of the 
PAEs to obtain authorisation before its first formal antitrust investigation; 2. 
the obligation to inform  CAEs before taking a decision in enforcement of 
Articles 13, 14, 15 and 17 of the AML 2007; 3. the obligation of the PAEs to 
respect and follow  precedent ns made by the CAEs to maintain consistent 
enforcement of the AML 2007; 4. if the CAEs think that a PAE is not enforcing 
the AML 2007 properly, they may issue a guidance letter to help it enforce the 
Law. Secondly, during the PAE‘s enforcement, a CAE may withdraw 
authorisation and therefore relieve the PAE(s) from enforcing the Law. A CAE 
may consider withdrawal when the PAE‘s enforcement action and/or decision 
would run counter to previous decisions and procedural rules set up by the 
CAEs. However, the CAEs should initiate such proceeding cautiously and after 
consulting with that PAE and giving reasons.       
4.3.3 Establishing a notification system for exemption under 
Article 15 of the AML 2007 
Another question is whether undertakings should notify agreements, 
decisions or concerted practices before the AML 2007 administrative 
enforcers for exemption. Establishing a notification system in China would at 
least bring three benefits. Firstly, anticompetitive agreements, decisions or 
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concerted practice may be examined by the administrative enforcers before 
they are enforced; secondly, undertakings or association of undertakings 
would be relived of self-examination of their possibly anticompetitive 
conduct; thirdly, this notification process might spread the sense of antitrust 
and make the AML 2007 become known by the undertakings or association of 
undertakings and lawyers within China.314 More importantly, the main reason 
for the EU‘s abandoning its notification system was the heavy administrative 
burden,315 which does not exist currently in China.316 Finally, the AML 2007 
has a very short history compared with that of the EU and US; secondly, the 
public enforcement of antitrust law is immature; thirdly, Chinese 
undertakings generally lack knowledge of the AML 2007 and it would be hard 
or even unrealistic to require them to conduct self-examination of their 
anticompetitive agreements, decisions or concerted practices.317 China 
should establish the ex ante notification system which is similar to the 
previous EU notification system under Regulation 17 under which  
undertakings seeking  exemption should notify the CAE of agreements, 
decisions or concerted practices  before they come into force.   
4.4 Case allocation between the CAEs and PAEs: a 
basic principle 
                                         
314
 In fact this is what had happened in the EU at its early years. The abolished notification 
system under EU competition law had spread Article 101 and 102 TFEU and made them 
become known by the undertakings or association of undertakings and lawyers within the EU 
and establishment of ‗a culture of competition' in Europe. See, para. 4 of the White Paper; see 
also, W.P.J. Wils, Principles of European Antitrust Enforcement, (2005) Hart Publishing, at 6. 
315
 See, para. 4 of the White Paper; see also, the Third Recital of Regulation 1/2003, supra 
note 13.   
316
 See, ‗Concerns of the centralised mechanism under the AML 2007‘ in ‗4.2.1 Whether a 
centralised enforcement mechanism is appropriate under the AML 2007?‘ of this chapter.  
317
 See, G.Y. Xu & C. Wang, ‗Modernisation of EU Competition Law and the Establishment of 
Chinese Antimonopoly Law‘s Enforcement mechanism, [欧共体竞争法实施机制的现代化，兼论
我国反垄断法实施机制的确立，ougongti jingzhengfa shishijizhi de xiandaihua, jianlun 
woguofanlongduanfashishijizhi de queli]‘, supra note 274, at 149.  
Chapter 3  
Allocation of Public Enforcement Powers in China‘s Antimonopoly Law between the Central and 
Provincial Administrative Enforcers 
169 
 
Article 10 of the AML 2007 grants PAEs power to enforce the law. Case 
allocation between the CAEs and PAEs needs to be decided. Under EU 
competition law NCAs and national courts in Member States are obliged to 
enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU when the suspected violation has ‗effect 
between Member States‘,318 which is interpreted broadly by the Court of 
Justice.319  EU competition law  provides a general principle of case 
allocation which states a case is ‗well placed‘ if it is allocated to a single 
authority which stands closest to the centre of gravity of the violation in 
question and therefore has the ability to collect strategic information and 
bring the violation effectively to an end.320 Moreover, the ECN also provides 
a practical approach to allocation of cases between the Commission and 
national enforcers of Member States.321 The general principle under the US 
regime of allocating antitrust cases between federal enforcers and state 
Attorneys General, although not voluntarily applied, is that state 
enforcement of federal antitrust law should be focused on local matters, 
while federal antitrust enforcers should deal with antitrust violations which 
have an effect between states or on the national level.322 
In sum both EU and US practice adopts a general principle for case 
allocation between the two-tier enforcers:  where local enforcers are better 
placed to deal with local antitrust matters and US federal enforcers or the EU 
Commission focus on  concerns at US federal or the EU level. In fact this 
measure of antitrust case allocation finds a parallel in China‘s patent law. 
                                         
318
 See, Article 3 of Reg.1/2003.  
319
 See, footnote 73.  
320
 See, para.8 and 16 of the Network Notice. 
321
 See, ‗2.2.1 An overview‘ of this chapter.  
322
 See, ‗3.3.1 Case allocation between state and federal enforcers: a general principle‘ in this 
chapter.  
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Article 3 of Patent Law of the People's Republic of China (hereafter, Patent 
Law 2000)323 states: 
The Patent Administrative Organ under the State Council is 
responsible for the patent work nationwide…The authorities for patent 
work under the governments of provinces, autonomous regions and 
municipalities directly under the Central Government are responsible 
for the patent administration work of their own administrative areas. 
This principle can also be applied under China‘s two-tier antitrust 
enforcement. To this end the general words ‗when needed‘ in Article 10 of 
the AML 2007 can be interpreted as: 1. the MOFOM, the SAIC and the NDRC 
should authorise their provincial administrative enforcer which stands closest 
to the centre of gravity of the violation in question to enforce the Law when 
the suspected violation only has an effect within its territory; 2. if a violation 
of the Law has a nationwide effect, CAEs should take the case and/or 
cooperate with  PAEs; 3. If the violation in question is between two or 
several provinces but does not have a national effect, the PAEs in these 
provinces should be authorised to enforce the Law in a cooperative and 
coordinative manner.324 
However, there is no official explanation of the words ‗nationwide effect‘ 
under Chinese antitrust or anti-unfair competition law regime. Similar words 
can be found in Civil Procedural Law of People‘s Republic of China 
                                         
323
 Adopted at the 4th Session of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People‘s 
Congress on March 12, 1984; amended twice in 1992 and 2000 respectively. 
324
 The cooperation and coordination will be discussed in the following section.  
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325(hereafter, Civil Procedural Law 2007). Article 21(1) of the Civil Procedural 
Law 2007 states: 
The Supreme People‘s Court shall have jurisdiction as the court of 
first instance over the cases that have nationwide effect. 
Although there is no explanation or definition of  ‗nationwide effect‘, in 
the Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Some Issues Concerning the 
Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of 
China326(hereafter, the Opinions on Civil Procedural Law), there appear some 
factors that need to be considered when the Higher Courts327 determine the 
province-wide impact and their jurisdiction: the complexity of the case, the 
related amount of the case and the impact in the territory.328 These factors 
may also be considered in defining a ‗nationwide effect‘ in antitrust cases. 
Additionally, China might consider a more formulaic but more feasible policy 
adopted by the EU competition law regime: when the violation in question 
involves three or more provinces and this violation has a nationwide effect it 
shall be dealt with by CAEs.329 
                                         
325
 Adopted on April 9, 1991 at the Fourth Session of the Seventh National People‘s 
Congress.   
326
 Discussed and adopted at the 528th meeting of the Judicial Committee of the Supreme 
People's Court, and promulgated by Judicial Interpretation No.22 [1992] of the Supreme 
People's Court on July 14, 1992. 
327
  China‘s hierarchy of courts can be divided into four levels: Basic People‘s Courts (or the 
Grass-root Courts) deal with cases in a city or county; the Intermediate People‘s Courts are set 
up within provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central 
government. Intermediate Courts sit in the central city of a province or autonomous regions; 
The Higher People‘s Courts are established at the provincial level and deal with cases with 
province-wide impact; the Supreme People‘s Court is the highest court in China and deals with 
cases with nationwide impact. For detailed structure and jurisdiction of Chinese courts, see, 
Organic Law of the Peoples Courts of the People‘s Republic of China, adopted on July 1, 1979 
at the Second Session of the Fifth National People‘s Congress.  
328
 See, Article 1(3) of the Opinions on Civil Procedural Law. 
329
 See, Para. 14 of the Network Notice.  
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When determining which PAE (or PAEs) is better placed to deal with a local 
matter we may refer to the three conditions under EU competition law as 
well: 1. the actions of the parties have substantial effects for the territory in 
which the authority is based; 2. the authority can effectively bring to an end 
the entire infringement; 3. the authority can effectively gather the evidence 
required to prove the infringement.330  
4.5 Cooperation and coordination under the 
enforcement of the AML 2007 between CAEs and PAEs 
Both the EU and US encourage cooperation and coordination between 
antitrust enforcers. Under the decentralised enforcement mechanism of EU 
competition law, Article 11(1) of Reg.1/2003 imposes a legal duty of 
cooperation on the Commission and national enforcers in Member States.331 
The national enforcers in Member States are also obliged to cooperate with 
and inform each other.332 In addition, the ECN was created to enhance 
cooperation and coordination between the Commission and national 
enforcers of Member States and its initial experience is generally positive.333 
                                         
330
 See, M. Kekelekis, ‗The European Competition Network (ECN): It Does Actually Work 
Well‘, supra note 93.  
331
 Article 11 and Article 12 of Reg.1/2003 stipulates five kinds of obligation: firstly, any NCA 
acting under Articles 101 or 102 TFEU must inform the Commission before or just after 
commencing its first formal investigative measure;  secondly, the Commission has also 
accepted an equivalent obligation to inform NCAs in the form of transmitting copies of most 
important documents to the NCAs;  thirdly, e NCAs are under an obligation to inform the 
Commission before taking a positive decision in enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
and communicate their summary decisions to the Commission on which the Commission may 
express written or oral observations;  fourthly, the competition authorities may consult the 
Commission on any case involving application of EU competition law; finally, in cases where 
the Commission needs information or evidence from the territory of a particular NCA in the 
course of their investigations they may approach and ask the NCA  to collect evidence in its 
territory and to communicate such evidence to the requesting authority. 
332
 See, Article 11(3) and Article 13(1) of Reg. 1/2003; para.29 of the Network Notice.   
333
 See, ‗2.2 European Competition Network: case allocation and consistency‘ in this chapter.  
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State enforcers under the US antitrust law regime have more freedom than 
the national enforcers in EU Member States because the cooperation between 
state and federal enforcers is voluntary.334 However, there has also been 
developed a series of networks to enhance cooperation and coordination, for 
example the NAAG and its Task Force.335   
EU and US experience show that cooperation and coordination mechanisms 
between antitrust enforcers may bring at least two benefits: firstly, they may 
reduce the possibility of inconsistent enforcement of EU competition or US 
federal antitrust law; secondly, through such cooperation, inexperienced 
individual local enforcers may gather their resources and enforce the law 
jointly as a unit and thus the concern of local enforcers‘ incapability can be 
reduced.336 These two benefits could be very important for the AML 2007 
because China may face problems of inconsistent enforcement of the Law 
and lack of capacity of PAEs. Even if a centralised enforcement mechanism is 
adopted under which the PAEs are excluded from enforcing the AML 2007, 
cooperation between the CAEs and PAEs is still necessary to overcome 
informational asymmetries when the CAEs need information on local markets 
from the PAEs.337  
In order to establish and enhance cooperation and coordination in AML 
2007 enforcement at least two things can be done: firstly, imposing a legal 
obligation of cooperation and coordination between CAEs and PAEs and 
different PAEs by adopting a regulation governing AML 2007 public 
                                         
334
 See, See, H. First, ‗Delivering Remedies: The Role of the States in Antitrust Enforcement‘, 
supra note 194, at 1014. 
335
 See, ‗3.3.2 Coordination and cooperation between state and federal enforcers‘ in this 
chapter.  
336
 See, M.F. Brockmeyer, ‗Report on the NAAG Multi-State Task Force‘, supra note 146; ABA 
Section of Antitrust Law, State Antitrust Practice and Statutes, supra note 131.  
337
 Please refer to ‗2.1.3 The reasons for and concerns regarding the EU‘s decentralised 
enforcement mechanism‘ in this chapter.  
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enforcement procedure; secondly, establishing a network under which all 
CAEs and PAEs can cooperate during investigation, exchanger information and 
allocate the case efficiently.  
The obligation of cooperation and coordination might include, but not 
belimited to: 1. The CAEs and PAEs ‗informing each others before or just 
after commencing the first formal investigative measure of anticompetitive 
conducts; The information might also be shared with other PAEs;338 2. PAEs 
might be placed under an obligation to inform CAEs before taking a decision 
in enforcement of Articles 13, 14, 15 and 17 of the AML 2007;339 3. If CAEs 
were to initiate  proceedings for adoption of a decision under Articles 13, 14, 
15 and 17 of the AML 2007, it should relieve the PAEs of their competence to 
apply these articles. If a PAE were already acting on a case, CAEs should 
consult this PAE before initiating proceedings. In addition, PAEs might consult 
CAEs on any case involving the application of AML 2007.  
The network constituted by CAEs and PAEs could be called ‗The Chinese 
Antimonopoly Network‘ (hereafter the CAN). The aim of the CAN would be to 
enhance, improve and coordinate e CAE and PAE antitrust enforcement. It 
should at least have three functions: 1. to allocate antitrust cases within the 
network; 2.to exchange information between CAEs and PAEs efficiently; 3. to 
help PAEs to enforce the AML 2007 effectively. For example, if a violation in 
question involves two or more PAEs while having no nationwide effect, these 
PAEs might take action collectively as one authority in order to overcome 
                                         
338
 In fact, according to Article 10 of the AML, PAEs are under an obligation to inform CAEs 
before the first formal investigation because they need authorisation from CAEs to enforce the 
law. However, neither the AML 2007 nor other related regulations imposed an obligation on 
CAEs to inform PAEs.    
339
 These Articles concern the prohibition of monopolistic agreements and abuse of dominant 
position under the AML 2007.  
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their individual incapacity. One PAE should take the lead and the other PAEs 
should share information and resources to help the PAE which leads the case.  
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Chapter 4 Protection of Rights of Concerned 
Parties during the Administrative Procedure 
under the AML 2007 
1. Introduction 
Rights of the concerned parties in China are normally regulated under civil, 
criminal or administrative procedures1. Public enforcement of the AML 2007 
conducted by Chinese administrative enforcers follows the administrative 
procedure under which the enforcers have the authority both to investigate 
and to take decisions.2 However, there is no uniform or specific law or 
regulation stipulating the procedure of neither administrative investigation 
nor the right of defence during investigation in China.3The only related 
content in the AML 2007 is Article 43, which provides that: 
                                         
1
To date China has enacted three major procedural laws: Civil Procedural Law of People‘s 
Republic of China(adopted on April 9th, 1991 at the Forth Session of the Seventh National 
People‘s Congress, and revised at the 30th Session of the Standing Committee of the 10th 
National People‘s Congress in 2007); Criminal Procedural Law of People‘s Republic of 
China(adopted on July 1st, 1979 at the Second Session of the Fifth National People‘s 
Congress, and revised at the Forth Session of the Standing Committee of the 8th National 
People‘s Congress in 1996); and,  Administrative Procedural Law of People‘s Republic of 
China(adopted on April 4, 1989, at the Second Session of the Seventh National People's 
Congress, and revised by Order No. 16 of the President of the People's Republic of China on 
April 4, 1989),(hereafter, the APL). The rights of defence protected by these laws are in the 
procedure in court. However, as will be illustrated below, there is no specific legislation on the 
protection of the rights of defence during the administrative investigation process in China.  
2
Article 44 of the AML 2007 provides that after investigating and verifying the suspected 
anticompetitive conduct, if the enforcer of the Law believes the conduct has constituted a 
violation of the Law, it shall take decisions according to law and it may publish it.  
3
See, L.J. Tang,‗Categorisation of China‘s Administrative Investigation [论行政调查的类型
化,lunxingzhengdiaocha de leixinghua]‘, (2010) 1 Western Law Review, 119-124; see also, 
Z.H. Kang,‗The Protection of the Rights of the Investigated party during the Administrative 
Investigation [论行政调查中被调查人的权利保
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The undertaking(s) concerned and third interested parties being 
investigated have the right to express their opinions to the 
administrative enforcer(s) of the AML 2007. The administrative 
enforcer(s) shall verify the facts, reasons and proofs being given by 
undertakings concerned and/or third interested parties being 
investigated. 
In addition, the MOFCOM, the SAIC and the NDRC have issued their own 
procedural rules and regulations.4These did not introduce any new kind of 
right of the concerned parties other than that set out in the AML 2007.5 In 
fact, in the Chinese general administrative law regime protection of rights of 
concerned parties during administrative procedures is insufficient.6In 
                                                                                                                     
护,lunxingzhengdiaochazhongbeidiaocharendequanlibaohu]‘, (2012) 1 Hubei Social Science, 
159-162; 
4
See, the Measures for the Undertaking Concentration Examination (No. 12 Decree [2009] of 
the MOFCOM);the Provision of Procedure against Price Monopoly(No.7 Decree [2010] of the 
NDRC); Procedural Rules for the Industry and Commerce Administration Authorities of 
Investigating and Treating Administrative Monopoly related Cases(No.41 Decree[2009] of the 
SAIC); Procedural Rules for the Industry and Commerce Administration Authorities of 
Investigating and Treating Monopolistic Agreement and Abuse of Dominant Position 
Cases(No.42 Decree[2009] of the SAIC).  
5
However, the Measures for the Undertaking Concentration Examination provides a detailed 
procedure on oral hearing. See, Article 8 of the for the Undertaking Concentration Examination. 
This oral hearing procedure is also regulated in the Administrative Punishment Law of the 
People's Republic of China (adopted at the fourth session of the Eighth National People's 
Congress on March 17, 1996; hereafter, the Administrative Punishment Law), which should be 
followed also by the SAIC and the NDRC when they are organising oral hearing under the 
AML 2007.  
6
See, S.N. Ying & H. Zhuang, ‗The Status Quo and Future Development of Chinese 
Administrative Investigation [行政调查的现状与未来发展方向,xingzhengdiaocha de 
xianzhuangyuweilaifazhanfangxiang]‘, (2008) 5 Jiangsu Social Science,114-116. For the 
analysis on the protection of rights of defence in general administrative investigative procedure 
under Chinese administrative laws, please refer to C.Y. Zhang,Guarantee of Rights of Private 
Party in Administrative Investigation [行政调查中相对人权利保障问题研
究,xingzhengdiaochazhongxiangduirenquanlibaozhangwentiyanjiu],(2011)Thesis of master 
degree of law, Zhengzhou University. 
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practice, in Concrete Association7, the rights of the investigated undertakings 
were not sufficiently protected during the investigation by the Industry and 
Commercial Administration of Jiang Su province (hereafter the ICJS).8Thus 
during the administrative proceeding under the AML 2007 protection of rights 
of concerned parties is a significant concern that requires examination. 
This chapter examines the rights of concerned parties during the 
administrative procedure under the AML 2007‘s public enforcement. 
Particularly, there are three questions: 1. what protection of rights of 
concerned parties is there during the administrative enforcement procedure 
of the AML 2007? 2. What is the experience of the enforcement regimes of EU 
competition law and US antitrust law? and, 3. What can be learned to protect 
concerned parties‘ rights under the AML 2007 from the experience of the EU 
and US? 
The scope of rights of concerned parties discussed in this chapter is 
defined as follows: firstly, it includes those enjoyed by the undertaking 
concerned and investigated by the administrative enforcer(s).9Thus the rights 
of the complainants and other third parties are not considered. Secondly, the 
rights of the concerned parties are those which arise or which should arise 
under the AML 2007‘s administrative investigative procedure. There is no 
express definition of the ‗administrative investigative procedure of the AML 
2007‘s public enforcement‘ in China.10In this chapter it refers to the 
                                         
7
 See, F. Yao,‗The first AML case enforced by the SAIC has been sealed: the market 
segmentation agreement of LianYungang‘s association‘, Legal Daily, 02/03/2011. 
8
For details, please refer to ‗3.2.3 Rights of the concerned undertaking (or association of 
undertakings) during antitrust investigation are insufficiently protected‘ in Chapter 1 of this 
thesis.  
9
Similar classification can be found in M. Kekelekis,EC Merger Control Regulation: Rights of 
Defence, (2006)Kluwer Law International, at 91-92. 
10
Indeed, Chinese commentators have discussed the definition of ‗administrative investigative 
procedure‘ in China which is more general than the ‗administrative investigative procedure 
under the AML 2007‘. Although there has been no consensus on this definition reached so far, 
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proceeding from the beginning of an antitrust investigation initiated by the 
public enforcer(s) of the AML 2007, based on a complaint or an act of the 
administrative enforcer‘s own initiation, to the issuance of the first instance 
decision. Hence the rights in any subsequent judicial review proceeding shall 
be excluded here. Thirdly, this chapter will mainly focus on the rights of 
concerned parties in relation to monopolistic agreements and abuse of 
dominant position; the rights of concerned parties during merger assessment 
will be excluded.11 
                                                                                                                     
one view is well accepted: an administrative investigative procedure is initiated by the 
administrative authorities, aiming to collect evidence in order to realise the administrative 
purpose. See for example, Y.C. Mo, Administrative Law and Administrative Procedural Law[行
政法与行政诉讼法,xingzhengfayuxingzhengsusongfa],(2008)Science Press, at 187; S.N. Ying, 
Administrative Law in Contemporary China[当代中国行政
法,dangdaizhongguoxingzhengfa],(1998)China Founder Press, at 822;S.Z. Sun & B. Cai, ‗On 
the Connotation, Confines and Legal Regulation of Administrative Investigation [行政调查的内
涵, 边界及法律规制, xingzhengdiaochadeneihan, bianjiejifalvguizhi]‘, (2011) 39(6) Journal of 
Lanzhou University (Social Science), 125-131;J. Zhang, ‗Research about the Basic Concept of 
Administrative Inquiry [行政调查基本概念初探, xingzhengdiaochajibengainianchutan]‘, (2009) 
10 Law Science Magazine,111-113.  Administrative investigative procedure of the AML 
2007‘s public enforcement means the procedure under which the investigation initiated by the 
public enforcer(s) of the AML 2007 aims to collect evidence of violation of the AML 2007 in 
order to make a decision upon whether the undertaking or association of undertakings 
concerned has violated the AML 2007.   
11
 Although the procedures between the merger assessment and the investigation of 
monopolistic agreements/abuse of dominant positions are quite distinctive and independent of 
each other, the rights of defence during merger assessment are similar to that during 
investigations of monopolistic agreements or abuse of dominant position.  For example, the 
right to be heard is protected both in the procedure of merger assessment and investigation on 
anticompetitive agreement or concerted practices between undertakings or association of 
undertakings in China. Article 7 of the Measures for the Undertaking Concentration 
Examination provides that during the investigation process(of merger assessment), the 
MOFCOM may initiate hearings  or hold them in response to the request of the relevant 
parties, making investigations, collecting evidence and listening to the opinions of the relevant 
parties. Article 43 of the AML confirms that the undertaking(s) concerned and being 
investigated shall have the right to be heard. Under EU competition law, the rights of defence 
during the merger assessment and investigation of anticompetitive agreements and concerted 
practices between undertakings or association of undertakings are generally the same. For 
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The institutional design created under the AML 2007 is unique: the MOFCOM, 
the NDRC and the SAIC share enforcement authority. The MOFCOM is mainly 
responsible for merger control review; the NDRC is mainly responsible for 
enforcement in respect of restrictive agreements and abuse of dominant 
positions that are price-related; and, the SAIC is mainly responsible for 
enforcement in respect of restrictive agreements and abuse of dominant 
positions that are non-price-related.12As revealed in the legislative history, 
such a tripartite system of enforcement flowed from a failure of the three 
bodies to disagree in relation to secession of powers which each believed 
should reside with them.13 Ambiguity can easily be generated by this parallel 
enforcement system, especially between the NDRC and the SAIC. A 
monopolistic activity can easily trigger both agencies‘ jurisdiction because it 
often contains both price and non-price matters.14 However, the MOFCOM, 
the NDRC and the SAIC concentrated the authority of investigation, decision 
making and (some of) legislation in their respective jurisdiction. In 
accordance with Article 53 of the AML 2007, Chinese courts are only 
responsible for conducting judicial review with regard to the Law‘s public 
enforcement. To this end, the rights of concerned parties during the 
administrative proceeding are mainly safeguarded by the administrative 
enforcers rather than Chinese courts. In this one respect the institutional 
                                                                                                                     
details, please refer to M. Kekelekis,EC Merger Control Regulation: Rights of Defence, supra 
note 9. 
12
See the official websites of the three agencies respectively.  
13
 See, Y. Huang, ‗Pursuing the Second Best: The History Momentum, and Remaining Issues 
of China‘s Anti-Monopoly Law‘, (2008)75 Antitrust Law Journal, 117-131, at 125-126. 
14
 There are plenty of criticises around this system both from foreign and domestic scholars. 
For example, G.H. Li, The Research on Enforcement of Antimonopoly Law [反垄断法实施机制
研究, fanlongduanfa shishijizhi yanjiu], (2006) Chinese Founder Press; A.H.Y. Zhang, ‗The 
enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law in China: An institutional design perspective‘, (2011) 
36(3)The Antitrust Bulletin, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1783037, last visited 
on 19/06/2013, 00:26; B.S. Zhang, ‗A Comment of the Institutional Design of Current 
Administrative Enforcers of the AML 2007 [论我国反垄断执法机构的设置, lun 
woguofanlongduanfa zhifajigoudeshezhi]‘, (2005) 2 Science of Law, 113-121. 
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design of the AML 2007 is similar to that which arises under EU competition 
law. The EU Commission (hereafter, the Commission) also has the authority 
of investigation, decision making and legislation while the Court of Justice of 
the European Union and the General Court only have the authority of judicial 
review. The situation in the US is different. The two major administrative 
enforcers of US federal antitrust laws, the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice, and the Federal Trade Commission (hereafter the FTC) 
only have the authority of investigation and preparing the consent decree. 
The federal court is the main decision maker, although in some circumstances 
the FTC may be reconstituted as an administrative court.15 Under such 
institutional design, as will be illustrated below by this chapter, the federal 
court is the main protector of the rights of concerned parties under US 
antitrust law.  
To this end, when comparing with the law of the EU and the US particular 
attention will be paid to the procedures applying to the public enforcement 
of Article 101 and 102 TFEU, which are constructed similarly to procedures 
under the AML 2007.16 The rights of concerned parties which exist in relation 
to investigation under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU may provide direct and 
relevant experience from which to analyse and suggest improvements to the 
rights of the defence during the administrative investigation under the AML 
2007. In US antitrust law the rights of the defence during the investigation 
process are largely defined and protected by the courts rather than the 
                                         
15
 See, J.M. Jacobson (editor in chief), Antitrust Law Developments, volume I, 6th edition, 
(2007) ABA Publishing, at 665-687. 
16
 The Commission, like the SAIC or the NDRC under the AML 2007, in a procedure relating 
to an infringement of the EU competition rules, performs both investigative and 
decision-making functions. See,K. Lenaerts& I. Maselis,‗Procedural Rights and Issues in the 
Enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty‘, (2000) 24(5) Fordham International Law 
Journal,1615-1654, at 1616.  
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administrative enforcers such as the Antitrust Division or the FTC.17 Although 
the procedure of US antitrust investigation is different from that under the 
AML 2007, the functions of such rights under US antitrust law are similar to 
that under the AML 2007 and Article 101 and 102 TFEU.  Legitimate 
comparison may be drawn between the rights of the defence under US 
antitrust investigation and under the EU‘s and China‘s procedures.18 
This chapter is divided into three parts. Firstly, a detailed examination is 
offered of the rights of concerned parties under the public enforcement of 
Article 101 and 102 TFEU in order to find useful experience for improving the 
protection of rights of the defence under the public enforcement of the AML 
2007.The second part will examine the rights of concerned parties protected 
during investigations undertaken by the DOJ and FTC under US antitrust law 
and to see is there any experience in US antitrust procedure that can be used 
by China. The third part of this chapter will set out the rights of concerned 
parties which are protected under the public enforcement of the AML 2007. It 
will then discuss whether the experience of EU and US is applicable and 
effective to address the problems raised above.  
2. Rights of the Defence during the 
Administrative Enforcement of Article 101 and 
102 TFEU 
2.1 Introductory remarks  
                                         
17
 For details of the antitrust investigation conducted by the Antitrust Division and the FTC, 
please refer to J.M. Jacobson (editor in chief),Antitrust Law Developments, supra note 15, at 
665-687; 695-716.  
18
 For further analysis on functional comparative law, please refer to K.Zweigert& H.Kötz,An 
Introduction to Comparative Law, 3
rd
 edition,(1998)Oxford University Press.   
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Rights of concerned parties in this section are those of the investigated 
parties and/or addressees of the statement of objection (hereafter, the SO) 
during the Commission‘s administrative enforcement process of Article 101 
and 102 TFEU, i.e. from the beginning of fact finding to the issuance of the 
first instance decision which may contain a sanction. The purpose of this 
section is to examine the rights of the concerned parties in the administrative 
proceeding as a means of identifying issues and relevant experience that may 
be applicable to the protection of rights of defence under Chinese AML 2007. 
The TFEU contains no express provisions on the protection of fundamental 
rights in the administrative proceeding of applying Article 101 and 102 
TFEU.19Rather these rights are guaranteed by the general principles of law 
recognised by the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereafter the 
CJEU), which devolve in part from the constitutional conditions common to  
Member States, and in part from international obligations accepted by  
Member States including, most importantly, the European Convention of 
Human Rights (hereafter the ECHR).20 Theoretically, the Commission‘s 
enforcement of Article 101 and 102 TFEU is not subject to the precedent case 
law of the ECHR because the EU is not yet a party to the Convention. Rather, 
the fundamental rights have been developed mainly by the 
CJEU.21Nevertheless, in the case of Stauder22 the CJEU referred for the first 
                                         
19
 See, M. Kekelekis,EC Merger Control Regulation: Rights of Defence, supra note 9; at 15. 
20
 See, Article 6(3) TEU; see also, Case C-5/88, Wachauf v Bundesamt fur Ernahrung und 
Fortwirtschaft, [1989] ECR 2609, para.19; Case 11/70, Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft,[1970] ECR 1125, para. 4.  
21
 See, C. Leskinen, ‗An Evaluation of the Right of Defence during Antitrust Inspections in the 
Light of the Case Law of the ECtHR: Would the Accession of the European Union to the 
ECtHR bring about a Significant Change?‘ (29 April, 2010)Working Paper IE Law School, 
available at 
http://globalcampus.ie.edu/webes/servicios/descarga_sgd_intranet/envia_doc.asp?id=9697&
nombre=AccesoDatosDocumentIE.Documento.pdf&clave=WPLS10-04, last visited on 
11/06/2012, 16:27.  
22
 Case 29/69, Stauder, [1969] ECR p.419 
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time to fundamental rights contained in the general principle of law and 
confirmed that the Court had to ensure the respect of these fundamental 
rights.23 
The CJEU acknowledged that the provisions and case law of the ECHR have 
a key role as a special source of inspiration in providing human rights 
protection24 and affirmed the particular position of the ECHR among the 
international instruments for the protection of fundamental rights.25 In 
practice the CJEU could not ignore the Luxembourg Court‘s engaging in an 
in-depth analysis of its right of defence protection provision as well as of the 
cases from the ECHR.26 In the light of above considerations, the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights (hereafter the Charter)27 had been made to protect 
the fundamental rights within the EU. The protection of the rights of the 
concerned parties in the EU would follow the case law of the CJEU and the 
Charter.28 
                                         
23
Ibid, at § 7. In later cases the CJEU developed the case law established on Stauder and held 
that ‗respect(ing) for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles of law 
protected by the Court of Justice. The protection of such rights, whilst inspired by the 
constitutional traditions common to Member States, must be ensured within the framework of 
the structure and objectives of the Community.‘ See, Case 11/70, Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfur und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, [1970] ECR 
1125, at § 4; see also, thefifth Recital of Regulation 1/2003 (hereafter, the Reg.1/2003).  
24
See, Case 4/73, Nold v Commission, [1974] ECR 491, para.13. 
25
 See, Opinion 2/94 on Accession of the Community to the ECHR, [1996] ECR p. I-1759.  
26
 See, A. Andreangeli, EU Competition Enforcement and Human Rights, (2008) Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited, at 8.  
27
 Part II, Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, [2003] OJ C 169.  
28
 Discussion on relationship between the protection of the rights of defence in the EU and the 
protection of fundamental rights under the ECHR is clearly beyond the scope of this thesis. For 
further analysis on this relationship, please refer to K. Lenaerts& D. Arts (edited by),Procedural 
Law of the European Union, second edition, (2006)Sweet & Maxwell; M. Kekelekis,EC Merger 
Control Regulation: Rights of Defence, supra note 9; A. Andreangeli,EU Competition 
Enforcement and Human Rights, supra note 26;K. Lenaerts& I. Maselis,‗Procedural Rights 
and Issues in the Enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty‘, supra note 16, at 
1615-1654; C. Leskinen,‗An Evaluation of the Right of Defence during Antitrust Inspections in 
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In order to examine the rights of the concerned parties under EU 
competition law, this section will first of all give an overview of this 
administrative proceeding.  Rights of the concerned parties in this 
proceeding will then be examined. They may include the right to be heard, 
the right of access to the Commission‘s files; the right to legal representation; 
the right against self-incrimination and the protection of legal professional 
privilege.29 
2.2 The Commission’s administrative proceeding in 
applying Articles 101 and 102 TFEU  
Under the powers granted by Reg.1/200330 the Commission has the power 
to obtain information from undertakings and may question natural persons; 
the Commission may make decisions and must afford those to whom decisions 
are to be addressed, and those with sufficient locus standi the right to be 
heard before any such decision is made. 
In the first stage the Commission investigates facts of the suspected 
violation based on complaints, leniency applications (and perhaps 
whistle-blowing) or on its own initiative. This fact-finding may proceed 
                                                                                                                     
the Light of the Case Law of the ECtHR: Would the Accession of the European Union to the 
ECtHR bring about a Significant Change?‘supra note 21. 
29
 These five are the main rights enjoyed by the investigated party and/or the addressee of the 
SO in the procedure of the Commission‘s administrative enforcement of Article 101 and 102 
TFEU which developed by case laws of the EU Courts and summarised from secondary 
literatures, although they may be grouped differently. See for example, C. Kerse& N. Khan,EC 
Antitrust Procedure, fifth edition, (2005)Sweet & Maxwell;T.K. Giannakopoulos, Safeguarding 
Companies' Rights in Competition and Anti-dumping/anti-subsidies Proceedings, 
(2004)Kluwer Law International;K. Lenaerts& D. Arts, ibid; M. Kekelekis,EC Merger Control 
Regulation: Rights of Defence, supra note 9; A. Andreangeli, EU Competition Enforcement 
and Human Rights, supra note 26;C. Leskinen,‗An Evaluation of the Right of Defence during 
Antitrust Inspections in the Light of the Case Law of the ECtHR: Would the Accession of the 
European Union to the ECtHR bring about a Significant Change?‘ supra note 21.  
30
Article 4 of the Reg.1/2003. 
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informally or formally.31 Where the investigation is conducted at a simple 
request from the Commission the addressees are free to decide whether or 
not they will reply to the questions put to them. A penalty may only be 
imposed when the investigated parties, having decided to reply, provide 
inaccurate or incomplete information.32 If the investigation is conducted by 
the exercise of formal powers, including by the making of relevant decisions, 
the investigated parties are obliged to cooperate actively with the 
Commission. In this case fines and/or periodic penalties may be imposed on 
the addressee of such decisions when they fail to provide the relevant 
information.33 The Commission has two major investigatory powers: of 
requesting information and inspecting on the spot.34 No matter whether the 
request for information is based on a simple written request or a formal 
decision, the Commission must state the legal basis and the purpose of the 
investigation, specify what information is required and fix the time-limit 
within which the information is to be provided, and the penalties provided for 
supplying incorrect or misleading information and/or failure to provide 
relevant information.35 In relation to on-site inspections the Commission has 
a power to enter an undertaking‘s premises and to inspect and take copies of 
and/or seal its business records in whatever form they are maintained,36 
and/or ask for oral explanations on the spot.37 Similarly, if an inspection is 
ordered upon a simply requested in writing, there is no legal obligation on the 
undertakings to submit to it; where the inspection is ordered by the 
                                         
31
Article 18(1) of the Reg.1/2003. 
32
Article 18(2), ibid. 
33
Article 23(1), ibid. 
34
 See, C. Kerse& N. Khan,EC Antitrust Procedure, supra note 29, at 39.  
35
Article 18(2) and Article 18(3), ibid. 
36
Article 20, ibid. It is noteworthy that the inspection is not limited to the premises of the 
undertaking under investigation. Other premises may include the homes, lands and means of 
transport of directors, managers and other members of staff of the undertakings and 
associations of undertakings concerned. See, Article 21(1) of Reg.1/2003. 
37
Article 20(2) (e), ibid. 
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Commission‘s decision, the investigated undertakings must cooperate 
actively during the inspection.38 When the inspection is conducted by a 
simple request, the official of the Commission should prepare a written 
authorisation specifying the subject matter and purpose of the inspection and 
the possibility of penalties under Article 23 in cases where production of the 
required books or other business records is incomplete or where answer to 
questions is incorrect or misleading.39 When the inspection is ordered by a 
formal decision Article 20(4) of Reg.1/2003 provides that the decision must: 1. 
specify the subject matter and purpose of the inspection; 2. appoint the date 
on which it is to begin; and, 3. indicate the penalties provided for in Articles 
23 and 24 and the right to have the decision reviewed by the Court of Justice. 
If the Commission considers that the evidence points to an infringement 
which should be the subject of a decision,40 it must inform the undertakings 
in writing of the objections raised against them, namely the SO, before the 
final decision is taken.41 The SO generally is composed of two distinct 
sections, one section headed ‗The Facts‘, containing a factual description of 
the contested practices and the other headed ‗legal assessment‘, containing 
the Commission's provisional legal qualification of the facts.42 The SO is only 
a procedural step preparatory to the final decision.43Its purpose is to give the 
                                         
38
 Article 23(1) (c) and Article 24(1) (e), ibid.  
39
Article 20(3), ibid. 
40
 In accordance with Article 10 of Reg.1/2003, if the Commission after the fact-finding stage 
can find no grounds for action to be taken under competition rules, it will issue a declaration of 
inapplicability. If the Commission finds the evidence points to an infringement of Article 101 
and/or 102 TFEU, it may either issue a Statement of objection or adopt interim measures. See, 
Article 10(1) of Regulation 773/2004(OJ L 123, 27.4.2004, p. 18) (hereafter, the Reg. 
773/2004) and Article 8 of Reg.1/2003. For the purpose of examining the rights of defence this 
section will only focus on the proceeding which leads the issuance of Statement of Objection.  
41
See, Article 10 of Reg. 773/2004. 
42
 See, K. Lenaerts& I. Maselis, Procedural Rights and Issues in the Enforcement of Articles 
81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, supra note 16, at 1626.  
43
 See, Case 60/81, IBM v. Commission, [1981] ECR 2639 (CJ.), at ¶¶ 20-21; see also, C. 
Kerse& N. Khan,EC Antitrust Procedure, supra note 29, at 210. 
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parties concerned all the information necessary to enable them to defend 
themselves before the Commission adopts a final decision.44 The addressees 
of the SO have no legal obligation to reply, though in practice a formal reply 
is made in almost all cases.45 The addressees‘ reply to the SO is first in 
written form and second, if necessary, oral.46 There is a time limit fixed by 
the SO within which the undertaking must deliver its written defence.47 In 
the time limit the undertaking has the right to be heard on the matters to 
which the Commission has taken objection.48 Prior to adopting a decision 
finding an infringement of EU competition rules the Commission must consult 
the Advisory Committee on restrictive practices and dominant positions.49 
After the hearing and consultation are completed the decision has to be 
drafted, taking account of everything in the fact-finding stage, hearings and 
the opinions of the Hearing Officer50 and Advisory Committee.  
2.3 Procedural rights of parties alleged to have 
infringed Article 101 and/or Article 102 TFEU 
2.3.1 Right to a fair hearing under EU competition law 
The right to a fair hearing has long been deeply entrenched in the EU legal 
system as a general principle of law common to Member States.51 This is 
                                         
44
Woodpulp Judgment, [1993] ECR 1-1307 at ¶¶ 52, 154. 
45
 C. Kerse& N. Khan,EC Antitrust Procedure, supra note 29, at 240.  
46
Ibid. 
47
Article 10(2) of Reg. 773/2004. 
48
Article 27(1) of Reg.1/2003. 
49
Article 14(1), ibid. 
50
 The role of Hearing Officer will be discussed in more detail in Section ‗2.3.1 Right to a fair 
hearing under EU competition law‘.  
51
See generally, T.K. Giannakopoulos,Safeguarding Companies' Rights in Competition and 
Anti-dumping/anti-subsidies Proceedings, supra note 29; H.P. Nehl, Principles of 
Administrative Procedure in EC Law, (1999) Hart Publishing; A. Andreangeli, EU Competition 
Enforcement and Human Rights, supra note 26.  
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reflected in the Charter.52 Article 41 of the Charter provides that every 
citizen has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and 
within a reasonable time by the institutions and bodies of the Union. It 
includes the right of every person to be heard, before any measure which 
would affect him or her adversely is taken.53 This principle was firstly 
confirmed in EU competition proceedings by the CJEU in Transocean Marine 
Paint: 
…there is a general rule that a person whose interests are perceptibly 
affected by a decision taken by a public authority, must be given the 
opportunity to make his point of view known.54 
The principle was reiterated in Hoffmann la Roche by the Court in a more 
restrictive way in referring to ‗the right to be heard before a sanction or 
penalty‘ is inflicted.55This approach was abandoned and the right to be heard 
has also been invoked by complainants and other interested parties in the 
infringement proceedings who have sufficient interest in the proceeding.56 
Based on the case law developed by the CJEU, Reg.1/2003 confirms that 
the right of the concerned parties to be heard should be guaranteed.57 
Reg.773/2004 further provides that the right to a hearing shall be exercised 
                                         
52
Protocol No 1 attaches the Charte, to the Treaty of Lisbon(TFEU) and accords it the same 
status as the Treaty, OJ 2000 C 364, p 1. Also Article 6(2) TFEU asserts thatthe Union 
protects fundamental rights as enshrined in the Charter, the ECHR and the constitutions of 
theMember States. 
53
 J. Flattery,‗Balancing Efficiency and Justice in EU Competition Law: Elements of Procedural 
Fairness and their Impact on the Right to a Fair Hearing‘, (2010) 7(1) Competition Law Review, 
53-81; at 54.  
54
 Case 17/74 Transocean Marine Paint [1974] ECR 1063.  
55
Case 85/76 Hoffman-La Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 461, para. 9.  
56
Case 43/85, ANCIDES v Commission, [1987] ECR 3131, para. 8.   
57
See, Recital 32 of Reg.1/2003; see also, Article 27 of Reg.1/2003, which provides that the 
undertakings concerned must be afforded the opportunity to be heard on the allegation of 
anticompetitive conduct raised by the Commission against them.  
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first and foremost in writing, whereas the oral hearing plays a supplementary 
role.58 Hence there are two main ways to safeguard the concerned parties‘ 
right to a hearing: the issuance of the SO and the oral hearing.59 
Right to be heard during period of request for information and before 
inspection 
There are two main instruments by which the Commission conducts its 
investigation: request for information and inspection.60 When requesting 
information, no matter whether by a simple request or by decision, the 
Commission is required to state the legal basis and the purpose of the request 
specify what information is required and fix the time-limit within which the 
information is to be provided, and the penalties provided for supplying 
incorrect or misleading information.61When conducting an inspection officials 
shall exercise their powers upon production of a written authorisation 
specifying the subject matter and purpose of the inspection and the penalties 
provided if the required books or other records related to the business are  
incomplete or where the answers to questions asked are incorrect or 
misleading.62In the case of a dawn raid officials are also obliged to present a 
document or a warrant setting out the scope of their investigatory powers 
and the subject of the investigation on the spot.63 These requirements 
provide essential procedural safeguards to the concerned parties‘ right to be 
heard. 
                                         
58
See, Article 10(3) of Reg. 773/2004. 
59
See, T.K. Giannakopoulos, ‘The Right to be Orally Heard by the Commission in Antitrust, 
Merger, Anti-dumping/Anti-subsidies and State Aid Community Procedures‘, (2004) 24(4) 
World Competition,541–569; at 569.     
60
See, Article 18 and Article 20 of Reg.1/2003.  
61
Article 18(2) and (3), ibid. 
62
Article 20(3), ibid. 
63
For a more detailed discussion about the right of the concerned parties under the 
Commission‘s dawn raids, please refer to I. Aslam& M. Ramsden,‗EC Dawn Raids: A Human 
Right Violation?‘(2008) 5(1)Competition Law Review, 61-87.  
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After the investigation: Statement of Objection and reply 
In order to safeguard the concerned undertakings‘ right to be heard it is 
the Commission‘s obligation to notify in a clear and exhaustive manner its 
allegations of anticompetitive conduct against the concerned parties.64 In 
fact the starting point from which the right to a hearing becomes operative is 
from receipt of the SO from the Commission. In Boehringer Mannhem65 the 
CJEU held that the SO must at least set out clearly, albeit succinctly, the 
essential facts on which the Commission relies.66 In later cases the Courts 
held that the Commission should not only be obliged to state clearly all the 
facts and legal arguments supporting its allegations,67 but would also have to 
explain the inference that it has drawn from the evidence collected and on 
which it relies against the investigated undertakings.68 In Corus UK69 it was 
stated that the Commission will be obliged to give a brief assessment of the 
proposed pecuniary sanction in terms of its severity and the duration of the 
infringement to allow the investigated parties to foresee the extent of the 
penalty that is likely to be inflicted on them and to challenge it in its 
submissions.70 
In addition the SO should be consistent with the grounds relied on by the 
Commission in its final decision since the undertaking must be fully informed 
so as to be able properly to prepare its defence to refute the evidence 
                                         
64
T.K. Giannakopoulos, ‗The Right to be Orally Heard by the Commission in Antitrust, Merger, 
Anti-dumping/Anti-subsidies and State Aid Community Procedures‘, supra note 59, at 569.  
65
Case 45/69, Boehringer Mannhem v Commission, [1970] ECR 769. 
66
Ibid, para.9. 
67
See, Case T-191/98, Atlantic Container Line AB and others v Commission, [2003] ECR II 
3275, para.113.   
68
Ibid, at para.162. 
69
Case T 48/00, Corus UK Ltd v the Commission, Judgment of the Court of First Instance 
(Second Chamber) of 8 July 2004, [2004] ECR II-2325.  
70
Ibid, para.144 and 146. See also, more recently, T-109/02 Bolloré[2007]ECR II-947, para 67; 
Case T-340/03, France Télécom v Commission, [2007] ECR II-107.  
Chapter 4  
Protection of Rights of Concerned Parties during the Administrative Procedure under the AML 2007 
192 
 
against it before a final decision is taken.71 However, it should be noted that 
not every divergence between the findings contained in the final decision and 
the allegations made in the SO will give rise to annulment of the decision.72 
The CJEU recognises that the Commission may, or rather should, modify the 
content of the SO as a result of new fact-finding measures or of the 
explanations given by the investigated parties in relation to the allegations or 
to the evidence.73 In this case a supplementary SO will be issued. The 
decision may be annulled only if the divergences with the SO concern new 
evidence or allegations on which the investigated parties have not had an 
opportunity to make their views known or to reply following the original SO.74 
Oral hearing and the role of Hearing Officer 
In accordance with Article 12 of Reg.773/2004 the addressees of the SO 
may request an oral hearing in their written submissions to the Commission. 
Reliance on this right has gained increasing importance as a means of 
clarifying and testing the arguments and evidence for and against the case 
made by the Commission in the SO.75 However, before the creation of the 
Hearing Officer in 198276 the investigated parties raised concerns as to the 
                                         
71
See, J. Flattery,‗Balancing Efficiency and Justice in EU Competition Law: Elements of 
Procedural Fairness and their Impact on the Right to a Fair Hearing‘,supranote 53, at 61.  
72
See, A. Andreangeli,EU Competition Enforcement and Human Rights, supra note 26, at37.  
73
Cases 142 & 156/84, BAT & Reynolds v Commission [1986] ECR 1899, para.27.  
74
See for examples, T 67/01, JCB Service v Commission, [2004] ECR II-49, paras. 50-51; 
Case T 109/02, Bollore SA and Others v Commission, Judgment of the General Court (Fifth 
Chamber) of 26 April 2007, paras.80-81. 
75
See, A. Andreangeli,EU Competition Enforcement and Human Rights, supra note 26, at 47.  
76
The intention to create the Hearing Officer was expressed first in the 
XIth Report on Competition Policy, 1982, Brussels, para.66. Hearing Officers now operate 
under terms ofreference set out in a Commission Decision of 23 May2001.(OJ L 162, 
19.6.2001) (hereafter the ‗Terms of Reference‘). For the history of the development of Hearing 
Officer, please refer to M. Albers & J. Jourdan,‗The Role of Hearing Officers in EU Competition 
Proceedings: A Historical and Practical Perspective‘, (2011) 2(3) Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice, available at 
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extent to which the oral hearing could actually fulfil its function. In 
particular they felt that the oral hearing should be conducted by an official 
who displayed some guarantee of independence.77 In response to the 
criticism78  the Commission appointed Hearing Officers to chair hearings,79  
vested with genuine autonomy and the right to direct access to the 
responsible member of the Commission to strengthen the objectivity of the 
procedure and any decision taken subsequently.80 
The Hearing Officer is responsible for the preparation of the oral hearing. 
The preparation stage might include the drawing up of a list of questions, the 
request for parties to submit a prior written notification containing the 
essential contents of their intended statements, the holding of preparatory 
meetings with the persons invited and the setting of time limits to provide a 
list of participants on their behalf.81The date, duration and place of the 
hearing are determined by the Hearing Officer. Every person shall be heard in 
the presence of all other persons invited to attend. The Hearing Officer will 
                                                                                                                     
http://jeclap.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2011/05/15/jeclap.lpr023.full.pdf+html,last visited 
on 06/07/2012, 11:03.  
77
 A. Andreangeli,EU Competition Enforcement and Human Rights, supra note 26, at 47. 
Formally, the oral hearing procedure was to appoint the Director responsible for the 
Directorate dealing with the case. See, C. Kerse& N. Khan,EC Antitrust Procedure, supra note 
29, at 199. 
78
See for example, House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union (8
th
 Report, 
1981-82, Competition Practice HL paper 91); B. Vesterdorf,‗The Court of Justice and Unlimited 
Jurisdiction: What Does it Mean in Practice?‘Antitrust (2009) 6 Chronicle, available at 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/the-court-of-justice-and-unlimited-jurisdiction-
what-does-it-mean-in-practice, last visited on 07/07/2012, 22:09.  
79
The Hearing Officer has other functions than chairing oral hearings. For example, the HO 
may take decisions on the extension of time limits for responding to a statement of objectives, 
on  access to additional documents and on the scope of disclosure. See Decision 
94/810/ECSC-EC on the terms of reference of Hearing Officers in competition procedures 
before the Commission [1994] OJ L330/67, arts 3-7. These functions will be discussed in the 
following sections.   
80
Commission of the European Union, XII Report on Competition Policy, 1983, Brussels, 31. 
81
Article11 of the Decision 2011/695 on the function and terms of reference of the Hearing 
Officer in certain competition proceedings [2011] OJ L 275/29(hereafter, Decision 2011/695). 
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preside over the hearing in full independence and will ensure that the oral 
hearing contributes to the objectivity of the decision taken subsequently.82 
The Hearing Officer allocates speaking time to parties, as well as time for 
question-and-answer sessions. Questions may be asked by all participants, 
notably the DG Competition (hereafter, the DG Comp.) and the parties.83 
The oral hearing constitutes a basis for an interim report to the competent 
member of the Commission, in which the Hearing Officer draws preliminary 
conclusions regarding the effective exercise of procedural rights.84 However, 
the interim report is unavailable for private parties to the proceedings.85 In 
addition, the Hearing Officer shall also provide a final report which shall be 
attached with the final decision and published.86 The final report primarily 
examines whether the right to be heard has been respected, and whether the 
final decision includes only objections on which parties have been given the 
opportunity of making known their views.87 
Problems relating to the right to be heard in the application of Article 101 
and 102 TFEU 
It is undeniable that the creation of the Hearing Officer has contributed to 
the objectivity, transparency and efficiency of the oral hearing proceeding. 
However, the objectivity and transparency of the oral hearing procedure is 
subject to constant scrutiny and question. 
                                         
82
See, P.V. Cleynenbreugel,‗The Hearing Officer's Extended Mandate: Whose Special Friend 
in the Conduct of EU Competition Proceedings?‘(2012) 33(6) European Competition Law 
Review,286-293; at 290. 
83
For a detailed description of the oral hearing procedure, please refer to C. Kerse& N. 
Khan,EC Antitrust Procedure, supra note 29.  
84
Decision 2011/695, art.14. 
85
See, J.T. Lang,‗Compensation for Unjustified Administrative Procedures in Community 
Law‘,(2002) 23(10) European Competition Law Review, 490-494; at 492. 
86
 See, M. Albers & J. Jourdan,‗The Role of Hearing Officers in EU Competition Proceedings: 
A Historical and Practical Perspective‘, supra note 76. 
87
Articles 15 and 16 of the Terms of Reference. 
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Firstly, although the Hearing Officer is declared to conduct the hearing in 
full independence88, it did not go as far as to allow the Hearing Officer to be 
appointed outside the number of the Commission officials.89  Commentators 
argue that the degree of independence that the Hearing Officer enjoys is not 
sufficient to comply with the concerns for the effectiveness of the 
guaranteed role during the proceedings.90 Secondly, the hearing is an 
entirely voluntary process, both as to attendance, which cannot be 
compelled by the Hearing Officer, and as to the participation of its attendees, 
who are neither under a duty to respond to every chief accusation nor have 
the right to receive specific answers from the Commission.91 As a result there 
is no power to summon witnesses, nor are the participants in the hearing 
under an obligation to answer questions or to tell the truth. This causes 
another consequent deficiency: lack of any possibility for the undertakings to 
question (cross-examine witnesses) the evidence submitted against them or 
to hold a public hearing.92 It is reported by the House of Lords that the oral 
hearings are ‗not an adversarial process like a trial‘ but ‗much more a 
presentation by the parties to the Commission‘.93 Finally, in the post-oral 
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Article 14(1) of the Reg.773/2004. 
89
See House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, XIX Report: Strengthening 
the Role of Hearing Officer, sess.1999-2000, para.31. Although in the 2001 reform of the 
Terms of Reference, the independence of the Hearing Officers was reinforced by removing the 
link to DG Competition, the HO is still an official of the Commission.  
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 M. Levitt, ‗Commission Hearings and the Role of the Hearing Officer: Suggestions for 
Reform‘, (1998) 19(6) European Competition Law Review, 404-409; at 404-405. J. Flattery 
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hearing phase, lack of transparency of the interim report is also a significant 
concern. The interim report, which addresses all procedural issues relating to 
the fairness of the procedure, may also contain observations on specific 
issues brought to the attention of the Hearing Officer by any part during the 
procedure, as well as on the substance of the case. Yet no right is vested in 
any party to the proceedings concerning such report.94 
2.3.2 Right of access to the Commission’s files 
Legal basis: equality of arms 
Once informed by the SO of the matters raised against them the 
undertakings concerned have an opportunity to submit their observations. To 
enable them to do so in full knowledge of the facts they are allowed access to 
the Commission‘s file.95 The legal basis can be referred to the ‗general 
principle of equality of arms, which presupposes that in a competition case 
the knowledge which the undertaking concerned has of the file used in the 
proceedings is the same as the Commission‘s.96 It is unacceptable, according 
to the Court, for the Commission alone to have documents available to it and 
to be able to decide whether or not to use them against the undertaking 
concerned.97 The Commission Notice on the rules for access to the 
Commission file in cases pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, 
                                         
94
N. Zingales,‗The Hearing Officer in EU Competition Law Proceedings: Ensuring Full Respect 
for the Right to Be Heard?‘supra note 91, at 149.  
95
T.K. Giannakopoulos,Safeguarding Companies' Rights in Competition and 
Anti-dumping/anti-subsidies Proceedings, supra note 29, at 123. In Cement the GC said that 
access to the file is ‗one of the procedural guarantees intended to protect the rights of the 
defence and to ensure, in particular, that right to be heard can be exercised effectively‘. See, 
Cases T10-12/92 and 15/92 Cimenteries CBR v Commission [1992] ECR II-1571, at para.38. 
96
See, Case T-30/91 Solvay v Commission [1995] ECR II-1175, at para.59;[1996] 5 CMLR 57; 
Case T-175/95 BASF Coatings AG v Commission, [1999] ECR II-1581, at para.46; [2000] 4 
CMLR 33.     
97
 See,C. Kerse& N. Khan,EC Antitrust Procedure, supra note 29, at 217.   
Chapter 4  
Protection of Rights of Concerned Parties during the Administrative Procedure under the AML 2007 
197 
 
Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement and Council Regulation (EC) No 
139/2004(hereafter the Notice on access to the file)98 confirms this principle 
in the opening sentence, one of the procedural guarantees intended to apply 
the principle of equality of arms and to protect the rights of defence.  
Accessible and non-accessible documents 
The Commission‘s files may be divided into those which are accessible and 
those which are not. In Consten&Grundig99 the CJEU acknowledged that the 
undertaking concerned must be put in a position to reply to the complaints 
made against them by the Commission. Nevertheless, the CJEU said that ‗it is 
not necessary that the entire contents of the file be communicated (to the 
undertaking concerned).‘100 In early judgments the EU Courts did not refer to 
the making available of the entire file or the other evidence and documents 
which the Commission might have but on which it did not seek or rely.101 In 
Hercules102 and later in Soda Ash103 the General Court104 (hereafter, the GC) 
required disclosure of all relevant documents and information in the 
Commission‘s possession other than the business secrets of other 
undertakings, internal Commission documents and other confidential 
information. The GC held that ‗it cannot be for the Commission alone to 
decide which documents are useful for the defence‘.105 Thus the 
undertakings concerned must be given the opportunity to examine documents 
which may be relevant for the defence. The Court‘s opinion has been 
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accepted by the Commission. Reg.1/2003 and the Notice on access to the file 
state that the undertaking concerned should be granted access to all 
documents making up the Commission file, with the exception of internal 
documents, business secrets of other undertakings, or other confidential 
information.106 
The Commission‘s internal documents are treated as non-accessible.107 
They mainly consist of ‗drafts, opinion or memos from the Commission‘s 
departments or other public authorities‘.108Non-disclosure is justified by the 
need to ensure secrecy of the Commission‘s deliberation and a ‗space of free 
thinking‘ for its officials.109 However, the protection of internal Commission 
documents is not absolute. In NHM Stahlwerke110 the GC held that although 
the sound functioning of the EU institutions could be put at risk by disclosure 
of internal documents, this risk should be assessed with regard to the 
protection of the rights of the concerned parties.111 The Court therefore 
suggested that, first of all, the Commission should identify the documents 
classified as internal in the file with detailed and specific reasons; secondly, 
internal documents which are relevant to issues upon which the Court must 
rule should be disclosed in their entirety to the undertakings concerned.112 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the GC‘s view is not entirely consistent 
with that of the Commission, which argues that undertakings concerned 
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should be precluded from access to internal documents because of the 
internal Commission files‘ lack of evidential value.113 
Based on case law of the EU Courts, the Notice on access to the file defines 
business secrets as information on an undertaking's business activity which 
could result in a serious harm to the same undertaking.114 It is the 
Commission‘s obligation to protect business secrets during the antitrust 
investigation.115 However, confidentiality is not a bar to disclosure.116 The 
Commission should try to find a way of communicating the substance of the 
secret or confidential material without breach of this obligation, or it should 
not use or rely on the material in the case if the material cannot be disclosed 
to the undertaking concerned.117 In practice it is the parties who have 
submitted information to the Commission, whether under compulsion or 
otherwise, to claim that the material is confidential and should not be 
disclosed.118 They are also asked to provide a non-confidential version of the 
documents, which would enable any parties with access to the file to 
determine whether the information deleted is likely to be relevant for their 
defence.119 If it is difficult to prepare a non-confidential version, the 
Commission should send to the undertaking concerned a sufficiently precise 
list of the problem documents in order to ensure the parties concerned are 
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able to assess whether the documents are relevant to their defence.120 If the 
party fails to comply with the requirements, the Commission may assume 
that the documents do not contain confidential information.121 
The Notice on access to the file defines other confidential information as 
information other than business secrets which may be considered 
confidential insofar as its disclosure would significantly harm a person or 
undertaking.122Information which does not qualify as a business secret may 
still be protected from disclosure.123 The Notice gives two examples. The 
first is the information that would enable parties to identify complainants or 
other third parties who wish or need to remain anonymous,124 which has been 
confirmed by the EU Courts.125 The legitimate interests of the secrecy of the 
complainants or other third parties‘ identity must be reconciled with the 
need to guarantee the effective protection of the rights of defence of the 
undertakings concerned and with the principle of equality of arms.126The 
other example is military secrets.127 
The role of the Hearing Officer 
The undertakings concerned may have a dispute with the Commission when 
the latter refuses the concerned undertaking‘s application of disclosure of 
the file. Or the undertakings which require the Commission to keep the 
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confidential information within the administrative proceeding may feel 
unhappy when the Commission still discloses it to the undertaking concerned. 
In these circumstances the undertaking has a right of recourse to the 
Commission and then to the Hearing Officer.128The Hearing Officer has 
authority to determine whether a document contains confidential or internal 
information and whether a document should be classified as non-accessible. 
His/her job is to investigate the matter and communicate a reasoned decision 
on any such request to the party making the request and any other parties 
standing to be affected by the procedure if the request is not agreed by the 
DG Comp.129 The procedural issues of access to the file and disclosure of 
documents must be attached to the decision, sent to the parties with the 
decision and published in the Official Journal.130 It is noteworthy that there 
is no legal recourse available immediately to challenge the Hearing Officer‘s 
decisions concerning access to file.131 In the recent Intel case the GC held 
that ‗the decisions refusing to grant access to those documents… even though 
they may constitute an infringement of the rights of the defence, are merely 
preparatory measures whose negative effects will be felt only in the event of 
any final decision finding that there has been an infringement‘.132 
2.3.3 Legal professional privilege under EU Competition law  
Legal basis and a brief history of legal professional privilege  
                                         
128
See, Article 9 of the Terms of Reference; see also, para.42 of the Notice on access to the 
file.  
129
C. Kerse& N. Khan,EC Antitrust Procedure, supra note 29, at 237.  
130
Article 15 of the Terms of Reference. 
131
 Such possibility was explicitly ruled out in Joined Cases T–10, 11, 12 & 15/92, Cimenteries 
CBR v Commission [1992] ECR II-2667. The approach was also endorsed by Advocate 
General Léger in his opinion in Case C-310/93P, BPB Industries and British Gypsum v. 
Commission,supranote 107, para.122.  
132
Case T-457/08 R, Intel v Commission, [2009] ECR II-12, para.56. 
Chapter 4  
Protection of Rights of Concerned Parties during the Administrative Procedure under the AML 2007 
202 
 
Legal professional privilege existed in Member States before recognition by 
the EU.133In common-law jurisdictions, legal professional privilege is derived 
initially from consideration of the ‘oath and honour’ of the lawyer.134 Under 
this approach this privilege opposes compelled disclosure of a client's secrets 
in violation of the gentleman's code of honour.135 Some scholars explain legal 
privilege on a utilitarian view. They argue that privilege is necessary for the 
maintenance of good client-lawyer relations and thus if people are able to 
consult lawyers without having to worry about the risks of subsequent 
disclosure of the information revealed and of the legal advice received, 
lawyers will be sought more frequently, advice received will be more 
accurate and the law will be better respected.136 Therefore the welfare of 
society in general is increased. On the other hand, civil law countries tend to 
recognise legal professional privilege as a fundamental right of the client 
rather than an obligation of lawyers. The privilege is regarded as a necessary 
requirement of the proper administration of justice.137 In the milestone case, 
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AM&S,138 the CJEU stated that protection of the confidentiality of 
lawyer-client communications was construed as a necessary requirement of 
the client's right to a fair trial,139 which is a fundamental right in accordance 
with Article 6 of ECHR. 
Since the 1982 judgment of AM&SEU law has imposed restrictions on the 
ability of the Commission to obtain and present documents constituting 
communications between a lawyer and his/her client as evidence in its 
competition investigations.140 As mentioned above, the CJEU tends to 
recognise legal professional privilege as a right of the undertaking concerned. 
In that case the CJEU stated that, first of all, protection of confidentiality of 
certain written communications between lawyers and client constitutes a 
general principle common to the law of the Member States and as such forms 
part of EU law; secondly, protection of confidentiality will be assured in EU 
competition law only when the following three conditions are met: (a) 
written communications between lawyer and client are made for the 
purposes and in the interests of the client's right of defence; (b) written 
communications emanate from independent lawyers, i.e. lawyers not bound 
to the client by a relationship of employment; and (c)written 
communications emanate from a lawyer who is entitled to practice his/her 
profession in a Member State.141 
While AM&S established the basic procedure and scope of the protection of 
legal professional privilege, Akzo142 has brought this area of law into the 
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spotlight again, reviving academic debate on whether the rules established in 
AM&S should be changed. In this case the President suggested in particular 
that the judgment in AM&S might be outdated and the Court considered the 
possibility of extending the privilege to in-house lawyers.143 
The conditions of legal professional privilege protection  
As one of the rights of the defence during administrative proceedings under 
EU competition law, generally speaking, protection of legal privilege is the 
result of a compromise between two competing interests: effective 
investigation of anticompetitive activities in order to enforce EU competition 
law efficiently, and the right of the individual to have unfettered recourse to 
proper legal advice and assistance with a view to safeguarding his/her 
rights.144 Accordingly the protection would not cover all communication 
between lawyer and client. 
As mentioned above, the first condition provided by AM&S is that written 
communications between lawyer and client should be made for the purpose 
and in the interest of the client‘s right of defence.145 This means, firstly, 
communications which are not for the purpose of protecting right of defence 
during the administrative proceeding of EU competition law‘s enforcement 
would not be privileged; secondly, a client may waive the privilege by 
disclosing the written communications if he considers it to be in his/her best 
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interests to do so.146 Once the privileged information has been disclosed by 
the client the basic justification for protection no longer applies.147 
The second condition brought more controversy. The privilege only applies 
to independent lawyers. It is worth noting that the Court defined 
―independence‖ negatively rather than positively: a lawyer who is not bound 
to the client by a relationship of employment.148By contrast, an in-house 
lawyer will be bound to his/her client by a relationship of employment. Much 
has been said about discrimination against in-house counsel in the AM&S by 
commentators.149 The core question on which the debate on in-house counsel 
privilege revolves is the requirement of ‗independence.‘150 The Court held 
that the primary role of the lawyer and the privilege is to contribute to the 
proper administration of justice rather than seeking to safeguard the 
interests of his client.151 And an in-house lawyer may be bound by the 
employment relationship. S/he has only one client: his/her employer. The 
in-house lawyer is not a ‗third party‘ to which communications may pass.152 
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In addition, s/he may have to consider practical issues such as salary and 
promotion in the undertaking and be sensitive to the interests and activities 
of his/her employer. These are considered to weaken in-house lawyers‘ 
independence and its contribution to a proper administration of justice. 
The opposite may, however, be argued with equal merit. Firstly, in-house 
lawyers are well placed to provide legal advice given their intimate 
knowledge of an undertaking‘s activities.153 This merit is particularly 
significant in the Reg.1/2003 era in which greater reliance was placed on 
undertakings to ensure that they comply with the law. In-house lawyers have 
a central role to play in this regard.154Affording in-house lawyers the same 
protection as independent lawyers will enhance legal compliance and 
predictability of EU competition law in a decentralised enforcement system. 
In addition, some commentators argued that in-house lawyers may, in fact, 
feel safer and more confident leaving one corporation and seeking 
employment with another if they disagree with the management.155 
Furthermore, in-house lawyers can always get the advice of an outside lawyer 
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in cases where they think they may disagree with the board of directors. Nor 
is there any evidence whatsoever to justify the implied accusation that 
in-house counsel act as stooges for management plotting to break the law.156 
The large number of such cases is said to confirm the high ethical standards 
of in-house counsel and their ability to resist pressure to violate their ethical 
responsibilities.157 
The third condition is that written communications emanate from a lawyer 
who is entitled to practice his/her profession in a Member State. The 
immediate and important result is that communications between a lawyer in 
a non-Member State and the client are excluded from legal professional 
privilege protection.158 For example, any written communication between a 
Member State firm and an American lawyer will not be protected by legal 
professional privilege. It is noteworthy that the protection of the privilege is 
not limited to the lawyer‘s geographic scope and/or nationality.159An 
independent (lawyer from a third country who is called to the bar) solicitor or 
barrister entitled to practice his/her profession just as a lawyer in a Member 
State, no matter where s/he comes from, will fall within the protection of 
the principle of confidentiality.160 
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In addition to the above three conditions, in AM&S the Court stated that 
the privilege covers ‗all written communications exchanged after the 
initiation of administrative procedure‘; earlier communications may also be 
protected if they concern the subject matter of the later administrative 
procedure.161 The GC in Hilti expanded the scope of legal professional 
privilege to include ‗internal notes confined to reporting the text or content‘ 
of communications between lawyer and client.162 As regards the question 
whether legal privilege also covers oral communication between a qualified 
lawyer and client, although the GC in AM&S specified that legal privilege 
covers written communications exchanged between lawyer and client, it did 
not limit the scope of privilege only to written communication. That in one 
case legal advice appears in writing or print in a business document while in 
the other only in oral conversation should not lead to different treatment in 
terms of protection of legal professional privilege.  
Proof dilemma when granting the privilege 
It is the Commission which determines whether the protection of privilege 
should be granted during the investigation.163A proof dilemma will be faced: 
often the only way to establish whether the privilege applies is to look into 
the content of the documents themselves. As the AM&S case itself clearly 
shows, privilege claims cannot be adjudicated on the exclusive basis of 
declarations of the party claiming privilege.164 However, the investigated 
party doubted that permitting the inspectors to examine the documents 
would violate the confidential status. The inspectors should be satisfied with 
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a description of the documents. In case of dispute the matter should be 
referred to an independent third party rather than the Commission.165 
However, the Court in AM&S confirmed the Commission‘s investigative power 
and rejected any suggestion that third parties should decide whether the 
protection of privilege should be granted. It held that is for the Commission 
itself and not the undertaking concerned or a third party (whether an expert 
or an arbitrator) to determine whether or not a given document must be 
produced.166 In competition investigations the Commission may require 
production of the business documents which it considers necessary, including 
written communications between lawyer and client by decision.167 The Court 
in AM&S has provided a practical way: put the claimed information in a 
sealed envelope168 and allow only the reporting judge and the 
Advocate-General to see the documents.169Since AM&S the Court has become 
the only body competent to give a definitive judgment on the protection of 
the legal professional privilege in dispute between the Commission and 
parties investigated.170 
2.3.4 Right against self-incrimination under EU competition 
law  
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The right against self-incrimination can be justified on three main 
grounds.171 Firstly, the right was explained as a means of protecting 
autonomy from improper coercion, known as privacy.172 The right against 
self-incrimination is thus related to the right of each individual to a sphere of 
privacy and centres on the existence of an individual's right to control the 
provision of information about ourselves.173An individual's self-knowledge and 
inner workings of mind are generally seen as areas in which the law should 
not intervene. However, it is also immediately clear that such a right cannot 
be absolute: a balance has to be drawn between the significance of the 
information to the individual and the societal needs that justify the demand 
to reveal it.174 Secondly, the right against self-incrimination is to avoid the 
'cruel trilemma' faced by the defendant.175To avoid the defendant‘s facing 
that cruel choice between three detrimental outcomes the right gives the 
guilty suspect a way out: silence.176 This argument requires that the state 
should act in a manner which is humane, and claims that it is intuitively 
inhumane to compel a person to harm himself, even when the same harm 
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would be justifiable when inflicted by others.177 Lastly, the right against 
self-incrimination may also be explained as a ‗functional necessity‘ within 
the criminal justice system.178 The purpose of the right is to protect against 
wrongful conviction of the innocent and to operate as part of the 
presumption of innocence. The right is related to the presumption of 
innocence and preventing the authorities from forcing the accused to 
produce inculpatory evidence which would be impossible to obtain if not for 
his/her cooperation.179 
The scope of the right against self-incrimination in investigation under EU 
competition law: divergence between the CJEU and the Strasbourg Court 
The right against self-incrimination was recognised by the CJEU to some 
extent as part of the general principle of EU law, although not explicitly 
provided by the relevant implementing legislation.180 However, the scope of 
this right under the Commission‘s investigation is limited. The Court has 
made it clear that where the right against self-incrimination existed in the 
laws of the Member States it applied only in relation to criminal 
proceedings.181 Furthermore, there was no such principle common to the law 
of the Member States that could be relied upon by legal persons in the 
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economic sphere, in particular, infringements of competition law.182 Thus 
the Court confirmed the power of the Commission to obtain ‗all necessary 
information‘183from the undertaking concerned even through compulsion, in 
order to guarantee the effectiveness of the Commission‘s investigation.184 
Nonetheless, the Court acknowledged that the Commission‘s powers are 
not unlimited.185It did accept that in order to protect the rights of the 
defence during the investigation a limited right against self-incrimination 
existed in EU law.186The CJEU thus held that the Commission may not ‗compel 
an undertaking to provide it with answers which might involve an admission 
on its part to an infringement which it is incumbent upon the Commission to 
prove‘.187 Hence the Commission may compel the undertaking concerned to 
answer questions of a purely factual nature but not questions that would 
involve an admission of violation.188 This restrictive interpretation of the 
right under competition investigation is maintained in later case law of the 
CJEU.189 The CJEU‘s approach has been criticised by commentators because 
even purely factual evidence may be damning.190 
 
                                         
182
Ibid, para.29. 
183
See, Article 18 of Reg.1/2003. 
184
Orkem [1989] ECR, paras.38-39. 
185
 See, A. Andreangeli,EU Competition Enforcement and Human Rights, supra note 26, at 
130.  
186
 See, Orkem [1989] ECR, para.35; see also, A. Riley,‗Saunders and the Power to Obtain 
Information in Community and United Kingdom competition law‘, (2000) 25(3) European Law 
Review, 264-281; at 267.  
187
Orkem [1989] ECR, para.35. 
188
 See, K.P.E. Lasok,‗The Privilege against Self-Incrimination in Competition Cases‘, (1990) 
11(2) European Competition Law Review, 90-91; at 91.  
189
 See for example,Mannesmannrhren-Werke AG v Commission, Case T-112/98 [2001] ECR 
11-729, [2001] 5 CMLR 1; LVM NV and Others v Commission, [2002] ECR I-8375.   
190
 A. Riley,‗Saunders and the Power to Obtain Information in Community and United 
Kingdom competition law‘, supra note 186, at 269.  
Chapter 4  
Protection of Rights of Concerned Parties during the Administrative Procedure under the AML 2007 
213 
 
3. Rights of the concerned parties during 
investigative procedures under US Antitrust Law  
3.1 Introductory remarks and an overview of US 
Antitrust law enforcement procedure 
This section seeks to examine the rights of concerned parties under the 
public enforcement of US antitrust laws, specifically § 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act, by the US Department of Justice. There is no specific procedure for the 
public enforcement of US antitrust laws. Enforcement is governed by general 
procedural rules such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure191 and the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.192 Hence there are no specific rights of 
the investigated or accused parties in the federal enforcement of antitrust 
law. Rights of concerned parties in US civil and/or criminal procedure are 
protected by general laws, including relevant provisions of the US 
Constitution. For example, the Fourth Amendment protects the individual 
or/and corporations from unreasonable search and seizure by means of 
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subpoenas193 and the Fifth Amendment provides protection against 
self-incrimination.194 
There are three main procedures to implement US antitrust law at the 
federal level: 1. the Antitrust Division‘s civil enforcement of the Sherman Act; 
2. the Antitrust Division‘s criminal enforcement of the Sherman Act and the 
Clayton Act; and, 3. the FTC‘s civil enforcement of Clayton Act and FTC 
Act.195 
The Antitrust Division‘s civil investigation usually begins with voluntary 
cooperation. Voluntary investigation would not involve rights of the 
concerned parties.196When conducting a civil investigation the Antitrust 
Division normally adopts a Civil Investigative Demand (hereafter the CID). 
Through the CID the Antitrust Division may require the recipient to produce 
documentary material, written interrogatory responses or/and oral 
testimony.197 The CID must generally state the nature of the conduct 
constituting the alleged antitrust violation and the provision of the law 
applicable thereto.198 During this compulsory investigation, the recipient of 
the CID may also claim right under the standards applicable to Grand Jury 
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subpoena.199The rights during the Antitrust Division‘s CID investigation 
include the right against unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment; the right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment; 
and attorney-client privilege. 
As the exclusive federal agency with the power to enforce antitrust law via 
the criminal law, the Antitrust Division‘s investigation may begin either with 
a complaint or on its own initiative.200Whatever the origin, the investigation 
is first assigned to an attorney or attorneys for preliminary investigation.201 If 
the preliminary investigation results in a recommendation to proceed further, 
the investigation takes on a different character, namely the seeking and 
obtaining of specific evidence of violation sufficient to warrant suit.202 There 
are two options: 1. seeking voluntary cooperation; 2. investigation by the use 
of compulsory powers. 
The Antitrust Division‘s voluntary based investigation is mainly conducted 
by interviews or by file searches. In such circumstance antitrust attorneys 
and Bureau agents have no power to subpoena or compel the production of 
documents from a businessman's files, or to compel persons to talk to them or 
give them written statements.203 The legal results of voluntary submissions 
can differ greatly from production of records under subpoena. Firstly, 
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voluntary submission is ipso facto a waiver of the right of privacy.204 
Secondly, voluntary submission is a waiver of the constitutional right against 
self-incrimination, and no immunity can be claimed since the immunity 
statute only applies where the documentary evidence has been produced 
under oath and in obedience to a subpoena.205 Thirdly, giving voluntary 
access to files waives the attorney-client privilege under the rule that 
disclosure of privileged communications without claiming the privilege is a 
waiver.206 Fourthly, a person who or corporation which voluntarily submits 
its records to the Government, and is not made a defendant may not be able 
to compel the Government to return or permit inspection of those 
documents.207 Fifthly, the Government has no obligation of secrecy with 
respect to documents produced voluntarily and not submitted to the Grand 
Jury. It should be noted that although a person may refuse to supply 
information or records as indicated above, if he voluntarily supplies the same, 
it would appear that under the ‗false statement‘ statute he must tell the 
truth and supply true records.208 
The Antitrust Division brings suit in the federal court challenging 
anticompetitive practices pursuant to the Sherman Act and Clayton Act, 
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civilly or criminally.209 There is no difference between antitrust litigation 
and any other litigation in the federal court, which should follow normal 
judicial procedure.210 Nevertheless, it is more likely after a civil 
investigation, that the Antitrust Division would offer a consent decree to the 
parties concerned to stop the illegal practices alleged in the complaint, 
prevent their renewal and restore competition to the state that would have 
existed had the violation not occurred.211 The Division must file a 
Competitive Impact Statement (hereafter the CIS) in the proposed consent 
final judgement to explain why the proposed decree is appropriate.212 In 
addition, the Antitrust Division is required to file materials and documents 
that are considered determinative in formulating the proposed consent 
judgement.213 These provisions guarantee the rights to be heard and access 
to the Antitrust Division‘s file of the recipients of the consent decree. 
In relation to compelling criminal investigation the Antitrust Division 
mainly relies on search warrant and Grand Jury subpoena ducestecum. It is 
not the purpose of this section to discuss the procedure of enforcing the 
searching warrant or the Grand Jury subpoena.It is enough to illustrate that 
the rights of the concerned parties are mainly related to the search warrant 
and Grand Jury subpoena ducestecum investigation. The Fourth Amendment 
governs search warrants and it extends to both individual and corporate 
bodies.214 The government must show a fair probability that the crime was 
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committed /perpetrated at the place specified in the warrant to the 
court.215The Fourth Amendment also requires that the warrant must 
‗particularly describe the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.‘216 The warrant should leave no discretion to the executing 
officer.217 The issuance of a search warrant is determined by different courts 
and thus the standard may be flexible. The Grand Jury subpoenas ducestecum 
are often more extensive than the searching warrant and require production 
in a short period of time.218 During a Grand Jury subpoena investigation, 
several privilege issues may be involved, for example, the attorney-client 
privilege (or the legal professional privilege).219 In addition, the Fifth 
Amendment which protects compelled self-incrimination may be involved. A 
sole proprietor may assert a Fifth Amendment privilege to resist producing 
business or personal records if the act of production involves compelled 
admissions that the documents exist, are authentic or are in the proprietor‘s 
possession.220 
The FTC‘s antitrust enforcement may take non-adjudicative and 
adjudicative form. In non-adjudicative procedure the FTC applies a CID or a 
subpoena to compel a concerned party to produce information. The FTC then 
brings the case before the federal court or prepares a consent order where 
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necessary. Similar to the Antitrust Division‘s civil enforcement, the right 
against unreasonable search and seizure, the right against self-incrimination, 
the attorney-client privilege and the rights to be heard and access to the file 
may be involved. In the FTC‘s adjudicative enforcement, which resembles 
administrative proceeding under EU competition law, similar rights of the 
concerned parties are guaranteed, although in a different way from that 
under the non-adjudicative procedure.221 The FTC may commence the 
investigation with a complaint issued to the concerned parties. The FTC may 
investigate the subject- matter in the complaint by compelling approaches, 
which bear a modest resemblance to the civil investigation conducted by the 
Antitrust Division.222 The Administrative Law Judge (hereafter the ALJ), who 
is a part of the FTC but has independent function of adjudication,223 is 
entitled to hold hearings and issue initial decision.224 
Of the three US antitrust law‘s enforcement procedures, only the FTC‘s 
adjudicative procedure may be classified as an ‗administrative proceeding‘ 
defined in the introduction of this chapter.225 However, the rights which may 
be claimed during the precomplaint investigation and the FTC‘s adjudicative 
proceeding, no matter whether criminally or civilly, have similar functions, 
i.e. protecting legitimate rights of the investigated individual and/or 
corporation during the compulsory investigation or the adjudicative 
proceeding conducted by the Antitrust Division and/or the FTC. From this 
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perspective the rights of defence under US antitrust laws are comparable 
with those under Article 101 and 102 TFEU and China‘s AML 2007.226 
In order to fulfil the functional equivalence the scope of rights of 
concerned parties under US antitrust laws discussed in this section are 
defined firstly as the rights of concerned parties under the compulsory 
pre-complaint investigation by the Antitrust Division and/or the FTC‘s 
non-adjudicative procedure. Secondly, the rights of concerned parties under 
the FTC‘s adjudicative procedure will also be considered; thirdly, the rights 
refer to those enjoyed by the undertaking concerned and investigated by the 
administrative enforcer(s) rather than the rights of complainants or third 
parties; fourthly, the right of concerned parties during merger assessment 
will be excluded; lastly, the US antitrust laws in this chapter only refer to 
federal antitrust laws. State antitrust statutes are excluded. The main rights 
of parties concerned under US antitrust law include the right to be heard and 
access to the file; the right against self-incrimination and attorney-client 
privilege; the right against unreasonable search and seizure.     
3.2 Procedural rights during the investigative 
procedures under US antitrust laws  
3.2.1 Rights to be heard under US antitrust law 
Civil investigation under US antitrust laws normally begins with the 
issuance of a CID.227 The recipient of the CID‘s right to be heard may be 
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protected by the following procedures. Firstly, a CID must state the nature of 
the conduct constituting the alleged antitrust violation and the provision of 
the law applicable thereto.228 If the CID is requesting documentary material, 
it must describe the class or classes of documentary material to be produced 
there under with such precision and certainty as to permit such material to 
be fairly identified.229 If the CID is requesting a written interrogatory 
response, the interrogatory should be propounded with clarity and 
certainty.230 As regards the CID for oral testimony, the CID must state the 
date, time and place where the testimony will be taken and identify an 
antitrust investigator who will conduct the examination.231 Secondly, a CID 
recipient may raise objection to the CID. S/he generally has three options: 
1.to negotiate a deferral or modification of compliance with the Division; 
2.to refuse to respond to the CID unless or until compelled by the court; 3. to 
file a petition to quash or modify the CID.232 If any of the three options is 
adopted, the recipient will have the opportunity to make his/her view known 
to the Antitrust Division or the courts by filing the petition. In fact the 
Antitrust Division encourages negotiation with the recipient about the 
content of the CID. It typically serves CIDs accompanied by a cover letter 
which invites the recipient to contact the Division promptly to discuss any 
modifications to the CID.233 
Most likely the Antitrust Division will provide a consent decree to the party 
concerned after its civil investigation. The consent decree is produced by 
negotiation between the Antitrust Division and the concerned parties. During 
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negotiation the Antitrust Division is required to produce a CIS234 in which the 
Division must describe the nature of the proceeding and explain the proposed 
consent decree, the remedies available and the procedures for modifying the 
proposed decree.235 Within ten days of the filing of the proposed consent 
decree a defendant must file with the court descriptions of all 
communications on its behalf concerning the consent decree.236 During the 
negotiation the parties concerned may make their view known to the 
Antitrust Division and/or to the court. If the Antitrust Division brings the case 
to litigation before the federal court, the defendant has the right to have his 
views heard before the court. This is beyond the scope of this discussion, 
defined in the introduction to this section.  
As with the civil investigation conducted by the Antitrust Division, during 
the criminal investigation under Grand Jury subpoena the respondent and 
counsel have the opportunity to negotiate the scope of the subpoena. The 
negotiation process often enables Antitrust Division attorneys to learn about 
the industry and the respondent, and it allows the respondent to learn about 
the focus and scope of the investigation.237 In addition, the respondent may 
challenge a subpoena by advancing a motion to quash or modify it before 
court.238 The respondent bears the burden of showing the abuse of the Grand 
Jury process. His/her view can be heard by the Antitrust Division and the 
court during this process.  Finally, during the final stages of a Grand Jury 
investigation the Antitrust Division will issue a target letter to any individual 
or corporation that it considers to be a putative defendant.239 At this stage 
the target is given the opportunity to testify before Grand Jury and the 
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target‘s counsel is given the opportunity to meet the Division‘s attorneys 
conducting the investigation.240 
The FTC‘s civil investigation, its non-adjudicative process, is similar to the 
Antitrust Division‘s civil enforcement; while under its adjudicative process 
the FTC initiates the investigation by sending a complaint to the concerned 
parties which states the concern of the FTC.241 The recipient is required to 
answer the questions raised in the complaint within 14 days of being 
served.242In the FTC‘s adjudicative process public hearing plays a very 
important part. Similar to practice under EU competition law, a hearing is 
organised and chaired by the Administrative Law Judge (the ALJ).243 
Compared with the role of the Hearing Officer under EU competition law, an 
ALJ plays a more important part and is the central figure.244 It is not only 
responsible for the organisation and the chairing of the hearing, but it is also 
responsible for making final administrative decisions.245  The independence 
of ALJs is guaranteed by the following mechanisms. First of all ALJs are 
selected by the US Office of Personnel Management (hereafter, the OPM) 
rather than the FTC itself; secondly, ALJs receive compensation from the 
OPM rather than the FTC;246 thirdly, the US Administrative Procedure Act 
(hereafter, the APA)247 requires that the ALJs' functions be conducted in an 
impartial manner and that if a disqualification petition is filed against an ALJ 
in any case, the agency must determine that issue on the record, and as part 
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of the decision in that case;248 finally, the APAalso stipulates that an ALJ may 
not be responsible to, or subject to supervision by anyone performing 
investigative or prosecutorial functions for an agency.249 
3.2.2 The right of access to the file under US antitrust laws 
Interested federal, state and private parties may seek to obtain access to 
Grand Jury information in certain circumstances regulated under Rule 6(e) 
(3).250As regards concerned parties‘ right of access to the file produced by 
Grand Jury investigation Rule 6(e) (3) (C) states that the disclosure may be 
made when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a 
judicial proceeding; or, when permitted by a court at the request of the 
defendant, upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the 
indictment because of matters occurring before the Grand Jury.251Thus the 
federal courts may decide whether to disclose Grand Jury information. 
Federal Criminal Rule 16(a) provides what the government must disclose 
during a criminal litigation.252One of its essential purposes is to give the 
defendant and counsel an adequate opportunity to prepare a defence. The 
information subject to disclosure by the Antitrust Division includes: 
1.thedefendant's oral statement made before the government; 2. the 
defendant's written or recorded statement within the government's 
possession, custody or control or before a Grand Jury; 3.organisational 
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defendant; 4.thedefendant's record; 5. documents and objects including any 
item material to preparing the defence, the government intends to use the 
item in its evidence-in-chief at trial or item was obtained from or belongs to 
the defendant; 6.the defendant‘s reports of examinations and tests; and, 7 
expert witnesses.253On the other hand, Rule 16stipulates two non-accessible 
documents. Firstly, internal governmental documents are not subject to 
disclosure. These include reports, memoranda and other internal 
governmental documents made by an attorney for the government or other 
government agent investigating or prosecuting the case.254 Secondly, 
statements made by government witnesses are not subject to disclosure 
except as provided by the 18 U.S.C. §3500.255Since such witnesses may 
include the complainants and third parties, the business secret and the 
information of the complainants and the third parties are protected from 
disclosure. 
Unlike a criminal defendant a defendant in a civil case has more discovery 
tools. For example, a civil practitioner may obtain disclosure of the 
opponent‘s legal theories, witnesses and evidence.256 As are the plaintiff and 
the defendant in civil litigation, both the Antitrust Division and the 
concerned parties are obliged to disclose the information that the disclosing 
party may use to support its claims or defences during the initial disclosure 
and the pre-trial disclosure process.257 Rule 26 (b) of the Federal Civil 
Procedure Rules provides that unless otherwise limited by court order, the 
scope of discovery is as follows: parties may obtain discovery regarding any 
non privileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defence. Thus 
there are two main limitations to accessible files: 1. privileged files are 
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treated as non-accessible; 2. by order, the court may alter the limits in these 
rules. Besides, there are limitations on the frequency and extent of such 
disclosure and electronically stored information with consideration of the 
cost and burden of disclosure.258 
Under the FTC‘s adjudicative procedure parties may obtain discovery to 
the extent that it may be reasonably expected to yield information relevant 
to the allegations of the complaint, to the proposed relief, or to the defences 
of any respondent.259 The ALJ may authorise for good cause additional 
discovery of materials in the possession, custody, or control of those Bureaux 
or Offices of the FTC. However, again, privileged materials are kept from 
disclosure.260 
Unlike in the EU, there is not much discussion on the right of access to the 
file in the US antitrust law enforcement context. Probably because of the 
existence of the federal court and the ALJ as the independent decision maker, 
the investigative power of the Antitrust Division or the FTC investigator is 
limited. Hence these rights can be sufficiently protected by the 
above-mentioned procedural instruments. The concerned parties‘ right to be 
heard and right of access to the file have not drawn as much attention as that 
under EU competition law.    
3.2.3 Attorney-client privilege under US antitrust law 
Justification of the attorney-client privilege 
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The rule of attorney-client privilege, which is known as legal professional 
privilege in the EU, has been recognised by the US courts since 1888.261 It is 
noteworthy that US courts later recognised the privilege between the 
in-house counsel and client in 1915.262 In Upjohn Co. v. United States263 the 
Supreme Court held that attorney-client privilege ‗is the oldest of the 
privileges for confidential communications known to the common 
law‘.264Although the rules differ somewhat according to jurisdiction, all 
attorneys have an obligation to maintain the confidences of their 
clients.265Justifications for attorney-client privilege are similar to those 
espoused by the EU and its Member States. In Upjohn the court said that the 
purpose of this privilege is to encourage the ‗communication of relevant 
information by employees of the client to attorneys seeking to render legal 
advice to the client corporation‘,266 because the best administration of 
justice can only occur when clients can have full and frank communication 
with their lawyers.267 Another justification is based on the notions of privacy 
and autonomy of the client in determining who should have access to his 
information.268 
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However, courts have recognised that the privilege hinders the discovery of 
the truth and therefore should not be broadly construed.269Criticism of 
attorney-client privilege is not uncommon, particularly of the underlying 
assumption that privilege increases communication.270 Unfortunately there is 
a paucity of available evidence that either supports or runs counter to the 
assumptions underlying the need to protect confidentiality.271 
On the above justifications both the EU and US have recognised the 
attorney-client privilege as one of the most fundamental protections 
afforded to clients. However, unlike the EU, the US extended this protection 
also to in-house counsel. Therefore the issue in the US is not whether 
in-house counsel should be allowed to exercise the attorney-client privilege, 
but rather who in a particular company should be included in that 
protection.272 
The scope of the attorney-client privilege in the US 
The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to protect the relation 
between the attorney and the client. Thus, first of all, the communication 
must be made with the intention of obtaining or providing legal advice. This 
is especially relevant in the corporate context where general counsel, those 
sitting on the board of directors, are often asked to or freely provide both 
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business and legal advice.273 Secondly, the privilege only applies to those 
who are deemed privileged persons. This includes the client, a prospective 
client, or ‗an agent of either who facilitates communication between them 
and agents of lawyers who facilitate representation.274If an officer discusses 
personal legal matters, the privilege may disappear.275 In addition, courts 
exclude from the privilege communication between clients and their 
attorneys that was made in furtherance of an ongoing or future criminal or 
fraudulent act.276 To invoke the crime/fraud exception, the party seeking 
discovery must establish a prima facie case of crime or fraud.277 
Although US has extended attorney-client privilege to in-house counsel, 
discussion on whether and to what extent this privilege should be thus 
applied still continues because the role of in-house counsel would complicate 
the first two standards. Unlike a lawyer from an independent law firm, an 
in-house counsel may have only one client.278 The economic fate of in-house 
attorneys is tied directly to a single employer.279 Secondly, the in-house 
counsel is not only responsible for giving legal advice, but also for providing 
business advice. As mentioned, only legal advice would be protected. In 
essence, this presents a conflict of interest for the attorney. While attorneys 
owe their own fiduciary duties to the client, as members of the board they 
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also owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders.280 Thirdly, while 
outside-counsel is usually presented with specific legal questions, in-house 
counsel has a grander picture of the issue at hand.281 Hence they may 
confuse the best legal answer with the best business strategy. These 
differences282 between independent lawyer and in-house counsel mean the 
latter cannot meet the standards of attorney-client privilege protection in 
certain circumstances.  
Attorney-client privilege in antitrust cases 
Attorney-client privilege applies in antitrust cases to the same extent as in 
other contexts.283 During compulsory investigation conducted by the 
Antitrust Division or the FTC communication between the concerned parties 
and the attorney should be protected from disclosure unless the 
communication falls outside the scope of the privilege. For example, the 
recipient of a CID may refuse to provide the communication between his/her 
attorney and log the privilege before the court. Meanwhile, a party seeking to 
withhold documents under this privilege must at a minimum, provide the 
essential elements necessary to sustain a claim of privilege.284 For example, 
to ensure that the essential elements are met, courts have required privilege 
claims to state the basis upon which it is claimed, subject matter, number of 
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pages, author, date created, and the identity of all persons to whom the 
original or any copies of the document where shown or provided.285 
3.2.4 Right against self-incrimination: the Fifth Amendment  
The right against self-incrimination under US antitrust law enforcement 
The right against self-incrimination is recognised as fundamental in the 
US.286This right applies to antitrust investigation and litigation as it applies 
elsewhere in the US. In the context of antitrust law this right may be asserted 
when the concerned parties face the CID287 or Grand Jury subpoena.288 Since 
the procedure of asserting this privilege is similar under the CID investigation 
and Grand Jury subpoena investigation, to avoid repetition, we only choose 
the right against self-incrimination under antitrust Grand Jury subpoena 
investigation as an example for examination. 
A witness subpoenaed to appear before a Grand Jury may assert the Fifth 
Amendment privilege and refuse to testify if he reasonably believes that the 
government in the form of the Antitrust Division could use that testimony 
against him in a prosecution or that the testimony could lead to other 
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evidence that the government might so use.289 A witness may invoke the 
privilege whether or not s/he is a target of the investigation.290 The Antitrust 
Division may challenge assertion of the privilege by moving to compel answer, 
and the court will then decide whether any hazard of self-incrimination is 
posed.291 To assert the right it need only be evident from the implications of 
the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to 
the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be 
dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.292 The witness may 
decline to answer any question that, if answered, ‗would furnish a link in the 
chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant.293 Where the possibility 
of self-incrimination is not apparent the court may require the witness to 
indicate where the danger lies.294 
A witness must assert the privilege to claim its protection.295 If the witness 
answers a question without invoking the privilege, the privilege is waived for 
that question.296 Moreover, once a witness voluntarily reveals incriminating 
facts, s/he may not refuse to disclose the details related to those facts.297 
When a witness has decided to assert the privilege against 
self-incrimination, his/her counsel shall inform the Antitrust Division of the 
client‘s intention. The Antitrust Division will commonly advise counsel 
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whether it will consider a grant of immunity.298 Immunity generally assures 
the recipient that if the Antitrust Division were to prosecute him or her for 
crimes about which testimony is given, then the Antitrust Division would have 
the substantial burden of affirmatively demonstrating that its evidence is not 
derived from the witness‘ testimony.299  Moreover, the Antitrust Division is 
required to seek the approval of the US Attorney General before prosecuting 
a witness who has previously received a grant of immunity.300 The decision to 
grant statutory immunity is made by the Antitrust Division, but only when the 
court enters an order directing the witness to testify. The decision then has 
force.301 
The scope of the right against self-incrimination 
Unlike that under the CJEU which only offers a fairly limited protection 
against self-incrimination,302 the right in US antitrust law covers both 
answers to questions of factual and non-factual nature. Even so, this right is 
not absolute.303 First of all, the right against self-incrimination can only 
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protect individuals, not corporations.304  If the Antitrust Division directs the 
subpoena to the corporation, then the corporation must find some means by 
which to comply because no Fifth Amendment defence is available to it.305 
Secondly, the right does not prohibit all forms of compulsory investigation; it 
applies only to testimonial communication, namely direct or implicit 
assertions involving the obligation to tell the truth.306 Therefore this right 
does not apply to handwriting samples,307 voice exemplars308 or any other 
form of compulsion not involving testimony. 
To sum up, only the individual witness rather than a corporation who faces 
testimony involving the obligation to tell the truth may invoke the right 
against self-incrimination.    
3.2.5 Right against unreasonable search and seizure: the 
Fourth Amendment  
A brief background and history 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that 
persons shall be secure from unreasonable search and seizure and that search 
warrants shall not issue but upon a showing of probable cause.309It consists of 
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two distinct clauses: the right of privacy clause and the warrant clause.310 
The first clause guarantees the individual‘s right to be secure from 
unreasonable search and seizure. The Supreme Court has held that the 
reasonableness of a search under the privacy clause may be determined by 
whether a searching warrant is issued before search or/and seizure.311  A 
warrantless non-consensual search is prima facie unreasonable.312 The 
second clause requires that that warrants may only be issued upon a showing 
of probable cause313 
The origin of this constitutional right can be traced back to the common 
law tradition of England.314 Although a full examination of the history and 
background lies outside the scope of this section,315 a brief review of the 
background and history of the Fourth Amendment may at least establish the 
following points. Firstly, one of the foundations of the principle against 
unreasonable search and seizure is that ‗(N) o free man shall be taken or 
imprisoned or outlawed or exiled or in any wise destroyed, save by the lawful 
                                         
310
See, Note,‗The Right of the People to be Secure: The Developing Role of the Search 
Warrant‘, (1967) 42 New York University Law Review, 1119-1138; at 1119-1120.  
311
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 US. 364, 370 n.5 (1976); United States v. Rabinowitz,339 
U.S. 56, 65-66 (1950). 
312
 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,429 U.S. 338 (1977),at 351-352.   
313
See, Note,‗The Right of the People to be Secure: The Developing Role of the Search 
Warrant‘, supra note 310, at 1119.  
314
See, J.J. Stengel,‗Background of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States- Part One‘, (1968-1969) 3 University of Richmond Law Review, 278-298; at 278.  
315
For  analysis of the background, history and principles of the Fourth Amendment, please 
refer to J.J. Stengel, ibid; see also,N.B. Lasson,The History and Development of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, (1937) Johns Hopkins Press; J.J. 
Stengel,‗Background of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States- Part 
Two‘,(1969-1970) 4University of Richmond Law Review, 60-76; A.R. Amar,‗Fourth 
Amendment First Principles‘, (1997)107(4) Harvard Law Review, 757-819; W. Cuddihy& B.C. 
Hardy,‗A Man's House Was Not His Castle: Origins of the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution‘, (1980) 37(3) William and Mary Quarterly, 371-400;K.H. Fox,‗The Right to 
Say ‗No‘: The Fourth Amendment and Administrative Inspections‘,(1979) 17 American 
Business Law Journal, 283-311.  
Chapter 4  
Protection of Rights of Concerned Parties during the Administrative Procedure under the AML 2007 
236 
 
judgment of his peers or the law of the land‘ declared in the Magna Carta in 
1215 in England.316 Secondly, the adoption of the Fourth Amendment was a 
reaction to a long history of executive abuse in England and the Colonies in 
the area of search and seizure.317 Thirdly, similar to the right against 
self-incrimination, the Fourth Amendment originally is used in criminal 
investigation and arrest (but not in administrative inspection).318However, in 
1967 the Supreme Court held in Camara and See that the Fourth Amendment 
should also be applied equally in administrative inspection.319 In relation to 
the administrative inspection procedure, the scope of Fourth Amendment is 
in essence determined by the problem of balancing competing societal 
interest in safeguarding the public health and safety against the privacy and 
security of the individual.320 Through the above cases the Supreme Court 
established that the individual‘s privacy has priority over to the public‘s 
interest in investigating administrative laws‘ violation and enunciated the 
guiding principle for administrative search and seizure: except in certain 
carefully defined classes of case a search of private property without proper 
consent is ‗unreasonable‘ unless it has been authorised by a valid search 
warrant.321 
The Fourth Amendment and US antitrust law enforcement 
The Fourth Amendment in the context of antitrust enforcement mainly 
covers investigation involving search and seizure and so for example a search 
                                         
316
 See, N.B. Lasson, at 20, ibid.  
317
See, J.J. Stengel,‗Background of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States- Part One‘, supra note 314, at 298.  
318
See, K.H. Fox,‗The Right to Say ‗No‘: The Fourth Amendment and Administrative 
Inspections‘,supra note 315, at 284.  
319
See, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967);See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 
(1967).  
320
See, K.H. Fox,‗The Right to Say ‗No‘: The Fourth Amendment and Administrative 
Inspections‘,supra note 315, at 287.  
321
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 528-529.  
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warrant. The Antitrust Division uses a search warrant as the first means by 
which to secure documents immediately, along with the issuance of a broader 
Grand Jury document subpoena.322 In accordance with the requirement of 
the Fourth Amendment, the Antitrust Division in practice usually uses a 
search warrant after it has already conducted an extensive covert 
investigation and has established reasonable cause to believe a crime has 
been committed.323 Indeed, the Antitrust Division has viewed search 
warrants as the most effective means of gathering incriminating evidence 
because the risk of document destruction and concealment is thereby 
reduced.324 
In order to obtain a search warrant the Antitrust Division must state 
information believed to establish necessary probable cause. The court must 
find probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and the 
evidence of that crime is at the place specified in the warrant. If the court 
decides to issue a search warrant, the Fourth Amendment provides that the 
warrant must particularly specify the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.325  However, due to the complexity of antitrust 
violation and investigation, it is often difficult to describe with particularity 
the business records and documents to be seized.326 Realising this, the court 
will consider the nature of the activity being investigated with a practical 
margin of flexibility, depending on the type of property to be seized.327 
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See, ABA Section of Antitrust Law,Handbook on Antitrust Grand Jury Investigations, supra 
note 218, at 30. 
323
See for example, R.D. Paul & J.M. Gidley, DOJ Unveils New Get-Tough Policy: Price Fixing 
Begins to Hit Bottom, Legal Times, (4, May 1998).   
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See, ABA Section of Antitrust Law,Handbook on Antitrust Grand Jury Investigations, supra 
note 218, at 31. 
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See, footnote 216. 
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See, ABA Section of Antitrust Law,Handbook on Antitrust Grand Jury Investigations, supra 
note 218, at 33.  
327
See, James v. United States, 416 F.2d 467, 473(5
th
 Cir. 1969).  
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Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (hereafter the FBI) typically 
execute search warrants in antitrust investigation.328 It is noteworthy that 
the FBI may use force to conduct the search if necessary, and the government 
can prosecute attempts to prevent or obstruct that search.329Yet neither a 
company nor an individual subject to a search warrant is required to give any 
statement to the investigator.330 
A company may challenge the use of evidence obtained by a search warrant. 
The Fourth Amendment provides the following grounds on which to challenge 
the validity of a search warrant: 1. that the Antitrust Division did not 
establish probable cause for the issuance of the warrant; 2. that the warrant 
failed to describe the items to be seized or the location to be searched with 
sufficient particularity; or, 3. that the affiant deliberately provided false 
information or exhibited a reckless disregard for the truth.331 The person 
challenging the search and/or seizure must have standing. The test is 
‗whether governmental officials violated any legitimate expectation of 
privacy held by the individual‘.332 
4 Procedural rights of concerned parties during 
the public enforcement under Chinese 
Antimonopoly Law 
4.1 Introductory remarks 
                                         
328
See for example, United States v. Andreas, 23 F. Supp. 2d 855, 857(N.D.III.1998).  
329
18 U.S.C. §§1501, 1509, 1512, 2231 (1991). 
330
See, ABA Section of Antitrust Law,Handbook on Antitrust Grand Jury Investigations, supra 
note 218, at 36.  
331
 See generally, J.W. Moore,Moore's Federal Practice, third edition,(1997)Matthew Bender.    
332
 See, Rowlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106(1980); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 
95 (1980); Raskas v. Illinois 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978).  
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The purpose of this section is to examine the problems of protection of 
procedural rights of concerned parties under the public enforcement of the 
AML 2007, with the aim of progressing to recommendations designed to 
improve the protection of rights of concerned parties available from the 
experience of the EU and US. There is little literature on the protection of 
rights of concerned parties specifically under the AML 2007‘s public 
enforcement.333 However, since the public enforcement of the AML 2007 
follows administrative procedure,334 discussion of the protection of rights of 
private parties under administrative law enforcement can provide a 
reference for the examination of the rights of concerned parties under the 
AML 2007.335 Sufficient literature has discussed the types of procedural right 
under administrative procedure that the parties concerned should have.336 
                                         
333
 In fact, the author only find one related article analysed the rights of private parties under 
the AML 2007‘s public enforcement. See, Y. You,‗On the Protection of the Benefits of the 
Parties in the Enforcement of Antimonopoly Law [论反垄断执法相对人的利益保护, 
lunfanlongduanzhifaxiangduiren de liyibaohu]‘, (2012) 2 Journal of Xiamen University (Arts & 
Social Sciences), 102-109. 
334
 An administrative procedure is initiated by the administrative authorities, aiming to collect 
evidence in order to realise the administrative purpose (see, suprafootnote 10), and to this end 
the public enforcement of the AML 2007 is a kind of administrative procedure. Since the AML 
2007 is enforced by the administrative enforcers, the procedure follows the administrative 
enforcers‘ procedural regulations. For example, NDRC issued the ‗Provisions on the 
Administrative Procedures for Law Enforcement against Price Fixing‘,while the SAIC issued 
the ‗Provisions on the Procedures for the Administrative Departments for Industry and 
Commerce to Investigate and Handle Cases of Monopolization Agreements and Abuse of 
Dominant Market Position‘. Both provisions have stipulated that procedural provisions under 
the AML 2007‘s enforcement should be referred to China‘s administrative laws. See, Article 24 
of the Provisions on the Administrative Procedures for Law Enforcement against Price Fixing 
and Article 26 of the Provisions on the Procedures for the Administrative Departments for 
Industry and Commerce to Investigate and Handle Cases of Monopolization Agreements and 
Abuse of Dominant Market Position, respectively.  
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For general examination of the rights of private parties under China‘s administrative laws, 
please refer to Y.S. Weng (edited by),Administrative Law [行政法, xingzhengfa], (2009) China 
Legal Publishing House; J.J. Liu,The Due Process of Administrative Investigation[行政调查正
当程序研究,xingzhengdiaochazhengdangchengxuyanjiu], (2010) Shandong University 
Press;M.J. Hu,‗The Procedural Right of the Private Parties in Administrative Process [论行政
Chapter 4  
Protection of Rights of Concerned Parties during the Administrative Procedure under the AML 2007 
240 
 
In order to answer the two questions raised in the introduction of this 
chapter, this section is divided into two parts: firstly, an examination of the 
current position on procedural rights of concerned parties under the public 
enforcement of the AML 2007 is provided; secondly, improving the protection 
of those rights under the AML 2007 with the experience from EU competition 
law and US antitrust law. 
 
4.2 The protection of procedural rights of concerned 
parties under AML 2007 
                                                                                                                     
相对人的程序性权利, lunxingzhengxiangduiren de chengxuxingquanli]‘,(2005) 1 Public Law 
Research, 201-233;X.X. Wang,‗An Analysis upon the Protection of Right of Private Parties in 
Administrative Process[行政过程中相对人程序性权利研究, 
xingzhengguochengzhongxiangduirenchengxuxingquanliyanjiu]‘, (2001) 4 China Legal 
Science,75-90;J.M. Xiao & W.H. Li,‗On the Administrative Procedural Rights [行政程序性权利
研究,xingzhengchengxuxingquanliyanjiu]‘, (2007) 6 Journal of Political Science and Law,5-12.   
336
For example, X.X. Wang argued that the rights of private parties under Chinese 
administrative procedure should include: 1. the right to an impartial decision-maker; 2. the right 
to be informed; 3. the right to be heard; 4. the right to equal treatment; 5. the right to 
reason-giving; 6. the right to disobedience; 7. the right of appeal. See, X.X. Wang, ibid, at 
80-85. J.M. Xiao & W.H. Li divided the rights of private parties into four categories: 1. the right 
to initiate an administrative procedure; 2. the right to be informed; 3. the right to participate in 
the administrative procedure; 4. the right to disobedience. See, J.M. Xiao & W.H. Li, ibid, at 
8-10. M.J. Hu summarised the rights as, 1.the right to participate in the administrative 
procedure; 2. the right to require the government to disclose the information; 3. the right of 
access to the government‘s file; 4. the right to reason-giving; 5. the right to apply for withdrawal. 
See, M.J. Hu, ibid, at 211-218; Y.T. Liu & H.W. Liu listed 12 kinds of right of private parties that 
can be listed under the heads mentioned above. See, Y.T. Liu & H.W. Liu,‗ Research on the 
Right of Private Parties under Administrative Law [行政相对人权利研究, 
xingzhengxiangduirenquanliyanjiu]‘, (2005) 49(4) Journal of Heilongjiang Administrative Cadre 
Institute of Politics and Law,29-32; at 31-32.To sum up, according to these scholars, private 
rights under China‘s administrative procedure should at least include (but not be limited to): 1. 
the right to an impartial decision-maker; 2. the right to be heard; 3. the right to be informed; 
4.the right of access to the file; 5. the right to disobedience; 6. the right to appeal; 7. the right to 
apply for withdrawal; and, 8. the right to equal treatment. 
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4.2.1 Statutory rights of concerned parties in legislation  
The AML 2007 does not provide any specific right of concerned parties 
under its public enforcement procedure.337 In the procedural provisions 
issued by the NDRC and the SAIC the situation is not further clarified. 
However, both procedural provisions suggest that the procedure should 
follow the Administrative Punishment Law of the People's Republic of China 
(hereafter, the Administrative Punishment Law).338The SAIC‘s procedural provision 
additionally provides that procedure should also follow the Provisions on the 
Procedures for Imposition of Administrative Punishments by the 
Administrative Authorities for Industry and Commerce (hereafter the SAIC 
Provision on Administrative Punishment); and the Provisions on the 
Procedures for Hearing before Imposition of Administrative Punishments by 
the Administrative Authorities for Industry and Commerce(hereafter the SAIC 
Provisions of Hearing).339 
                                         
337
The AML 2007 only generally provides that the concerned parties may express their opinion 
and that the enforcer should verify the fact, reason and evidence raised by the concerned 
parties; See, Article 43 of the AML 2007.  
338
See Article 24 of the Provisions on the Administrative Procedures for Law Enforcement 
against Price Fixing issued by the NDRC; see also, Article 26 of the Provisions on the 
Procedures for the Administrative Departments for Industry and Commerce to Investigate and 
Handle Cases of Monopolization Agreements and Abuse of Dominant Market Position issued 
by the SAIC. Administrative Punishment Law of the People's Republic of China was adopted 
at the fourth session of China‘s Eighth National People's Congress on March 17, 1996.  
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Article 26 of the Provisions on the Procedures for the Administrative Departments for 
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Abuse of Dominant Market Position issued by the SAIC stipulates that the procedure under 
AML 2007‘s public enforcement should subject to the Administrative Punishment Law;  
Provisions on the Procedures for Imposition of Administrative Punishments by the 
Administrative Authorities for Industry and Commerce (adopted on October, 1
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, 2007 by the 
SAIC), and, Provisions on the Procedures for Hearing before Imposition of Administrative 
Punishments by the Administrative Authorities for Industry and Commerce (adopted on 
October, 1st, 2007 by the SAIC).  
Chapter 4  
Protection of Rights of Concerned Parties during the Administrative Procedure under the AML 2007 
242 
 
The Administrative Punishment Law provides the following on rights of 
private parties. Firstly, the concerned parties have the right to be informed 
before the issuance of a decision containing sanction upon the party 
concerned.340 Secondly, Article 32 of the Administrative Punishment Law 
provides that concerned parties have the right to express their defend 
themselves before the administrative enforcer. Thirdly, the Law provides a 
relatively detailed procedure of hearing.341 However, the hearing can only be 
held before the issuance of the decisions involving order of suspension of 
production or business, rescission of business permit or licence and 
imposition of a comparatively large amount of fine.342 Fourthly, after the 
investigation, if the administrative enforcer decides to impose a sanction 
upon the investigated parties, the concerned parties must be informed in 
writing. The decision must contain the following information: 1. the name, 
title and address of the concerned parties; 2. the facts and evidence for the 
violation of law, regulations or rules; 3.type of and reasons for the proposed 
sanction; 4. the enforcement manner of the decision and time limits; 5. the 
procedure and time limits of applying administrative reconsideration or/and 
judicial review; 6. the name of the administrative agency that makes the 
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See, Article 31 of the Administrative Punishment Law. 
341
Article 42 of the Administrative Punishment Law provides that public hearings are to be 
organised according to the following procedure: 1. if a public hearing is requested by the 
parties concerned, the request shall be submitted within three days after the parties concerned 
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decision and the date on which the decision is made.343 Finally, the 
Administrative Punishment Law as well as the AML 2007 stipulate that the 
investigated parties are obliged to cooperate with the administrative 
enforcer and may not reject or hamper the investigation.344 
The main rights of the concerned parties under administrative procedure 
(and public enforcement under the AML 2007) regulated under legislation are 
the right to be informed and the right to be heard. The right to be informed 
means the parties concerned have the right to be informed about the 
proposed investigation and possible sanction which may have adverse effects 
on the parties concerned.345 The right to be heard means that before the 
administrative enforcer makes any decision on the parties concerned which 
may affect their interests; the concerned parties have the right to make their 
view known to the administrative enforcer and defend themselves.346 The 
two rights are closely linked: the right to be informed is the guarantee and a 
part of the right to be heard. 
It is noteworthy that there is neither legal professional privilege nor right 
against self-incrimination in Chinese administrative law and the AML 2007. 
4.2.2 Protection of rights of concerned parties in practice 
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Several antimonopoly cases tried by the NDRC and the SAIC give some clues 
about protection of the rights of concerned parties under the AML 2007‘s 
public enforcement.347 
In the first case handled by the SAIC, Lianyungang Concrete Association,348 
the ICJS investigated the price fixing agreement between the concrete 
companies in Lianyungang city in early January, 2011. The investigator had 
collected key evidence in pre-investigation because the concrete association 
‗did not recognise that their agreement might violate the law‘.349 A hearing 
was then held for the Concrete Association. It is noteworthy that the hearing 
was held by ICJS itself. After the hearing, the ICJS imposed a fine of RMB 
200,000 on the Concrete Association. In the written decision there is no clear 
and detailed description of the facts on which the decision is based, the 
reasoning behind the decision, nor how the fine is calculated.350 
This case at least revealed the following concerning the protection of rights 
of the concerned parties under the AML 2007‘s public enforcement.351 Firstly, 
the right to be informed was disregarded. The concerned parties in this case 
did not know the purpose nor subject matter of the investigation until key 
evidence had been collected by the ICJS. The concerned parties did not even 
realise that their agreement might violate the AML 2007 and was under 
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For all the following case information, please refer to A.Fels, X.Y. Wang & J. Su (edited 
by),China Competition Bulletin 2010-2012,China Competition Research Centre, available 
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The decision merely stated that ‗the members of the concrete association reached the 
agreement of price-fixing and market segmentation, which violated Article 16 of the AML 2007. 
In accordance with Article 46(3) of the AML 2007 the ICJS decided to order the concrete 
association to cease the illegal conduct and imposed a fine of 200,000 RMB.‘ See, ibid.     
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investigation. Secondly, the right to be heard– was ignored. Before the 
hearing the ICJS did not provide the concerned parties with a clear and 
exhaustive statement of its allegations of anticompetitive conduct. Thirdly, 
although a hearing was held for the concrete association, it was organised 
and chaired by the ICJS itself which conducted the investigation. It is thus 
hard to guarantee the impartiality and effectiveness of the hearing. The ICJS 
rejected the arguments presented by the concrete association at the hearing. 
In the case of Fuyang Paper Industry Association352which was dealt with at 
the same time as Lianyungang Concrete Association, the Zhejiang Price 
Bureau Branch of the NDRC fined the Paper Manufacturer Association of 
Fuyang City, 500,000 RMB for price fixing and output restriction. The author 
cannot find any published information on how the concerned parties were 
investigated in relation to this case. However, the announcement mentioned 
that the Paper Manufacturer Industry Association had organised five meetings 
at which more than 20 members discussed and agreed price increases, output 
restrictions and price discounts during 2010.353 The decision also provided the 
exact date of each meeting and the price agreed after each meeting.354The 
concerned parties‘ right to be informed seemed better observed than in the 
Lianyungang Concrete Association case. However, due to lack of disclosure of 
more detail, the author does not know further details of the investigation nor 
whether other rights of the concerned parties under e investigation were 
respected. 
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 See, ‗Paper Manufacturer Association of Fuyang City Fined for Price Monopoly Conduct‘ 
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More recently, in the case of Henan Second-hand Car Cartel,355 the 
Industry and Commerce Bureau of Henan Province (hereafter, ICHN) 
investigated and penalised a cartel in the second-hand car market in Anyang 
city, Henan Province. After receiving frequent customer complaints the ICHN 
began the investigation with the authorisation from the SAIC in January 2011. 
It found that three second-hand car dealers had set up the cartel in October 
2007 and gradually all the eleven second-hand car dealers in Anyang became 
involved in the cartel. The dealers had reached an agreement collectively to 
manage their businesses, divide the market, fix service fees and punish 
participants who deviated from the cartel agreement. The ICHN held that the 
dealers had infringed Article 13 of the AML 2007 and imposed penalties 
pursuant to Article 46(1) of the Law of 1.73 million RMB.356 It is noteworthy 
that the decision gave a simple explanation of how the final penalty was 
calculated: the illegal gains of the cartel from 2007 were RMB 1,468,202.08; 
the fine for anticompetitive conduct was RMB 264,920.37. Thus the fine was 
the sum of the two: 1.73 million RMB. In addition, according to the report in 
the China Consumer News, the investigators of ICHN collected relevant 
evidence from law firms.357However, it is unclear whether this ‗relevant 
evidence‘ included the communications between the lawyer and the 
concerned parties. If yes, a question would be raised: whether the 
communications between a lawyer and his/her client were protected from 
disclosure. 
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See, ‗Second-hand Car Cartel Investigated and Penalised in Henan Province‘, published by 
the official website of the Chinese Government, available at 
http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2012-08/03/content_2197559.htm, last visited on 20/09/2012, 20:18; 
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See, C.X. Li & J.A. Di, Henan Investigated and Punished the First Monopoly Case in the 
Second-hand Car Market,China Consumer News,13 August 2012, available at (in 
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The cases under AML 2007 raise the following concerns. First of all, the 
parties concerned were not properly informed of the procedure. Thus 
protection of the right to be heard is inadequate. Secondly, the hearing is not 
organised and chaired by a specified and independent officer. Thirdly, 
whether communications between a lawyer and client were protected from 
disclosure is unknown. The following section will discuss whether and how 
experience from EU competition law and US antitrust law can improve the 
rights of concerned parties under the AML 2007. 
4.3 Improving the protection of rights of concerned 
parties under AML 2007 
From the experience of EU competition law and US antitrust law, the 
following rights of concerned parties should be considered: 1. the right to be 
heard; 2. the right of access to the file; 3. legal professional privilege; 4. the 
right against self-incrimination; and, 5. the right against unreasonable search 
and seizure. Under China‘s AML 2007 and administrative law the concerned 
parties only have the rights to be informed and the right to be heard. Even 
these two rights are not fully protected in practice.  
4.3.1 Improving the right to be informed and the right to be 
heard: statement of objection and consent decree  
Comparison of the right to be heard under EU competition law and US 
antitrust law 
Both EU competition law and US antitrust laws respect the right of parties 
to be heard during and after investigation. Firstly, when requesting 
information, no matter in what form, both EU and US enforcers are required 
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to provide the legal basis and the purpose of the request as well as specify 
what information is required in the written request. In addition, before an 
inspection, both the officials of EU and US are required to produce a written 
authorisation specifying the subject matter and purpose of the inspection.358 
Finally, after the investigation the Commission will send a SO to inform the 
parties concerned of the Commission‘s objections after the investigation;359 
while the Antitrust Division will offer a consent decree after its investigation 
under US antitrust law. Or the FTC will send a complaint to the concerned 
parties which states the concern under its adjudicative procedure.360 No 
matter what forms they take, the Commission‘s SO, the Antitrust Division‘s 
consent decree and the FTC‘s complaint have the following similarities: 1. 
the time of issuing the SO, the consent decree and the FTC complaint are 
similar, i.e., after the investigation; 2. the SO, the consent decree and the 
FTC complaint all have a basic function: of informing the concerned parties 
of the allegation against them proposed by the administrative enforcers; 3. 
the SO, the consent decree and the FTC‘s complaint all require  
administrative enforcers to provide clear and definite facts and legal 
arguments on which the objection based, explanation of the relationship 
between the evidence and  allegation, and  assessment of the proposed 
remedy to the parties concerned.  
On the other hand, it should be noted that the purpose of the SO and the 
FTC‘s complaint may differ from the Antitrust Division‘s consent decree. The 
purpose of a SO/FTC‘s complaint is to inform the parties concerned of the 
objections raised against them so that the right to be heard can be protected, 
                                         
358
 The on-the-spot inspection in US antitrust law is conducted under a search warrant which 
states clearly the subject matter, scope and purpose of the inspection. Please refer to ‗3.2.4 
Right against unreasonable search and seizure: the Fourth Amendment‘ of this chapter.  
359
 For details, please refer to ‗2.3.1 Right to a fair hearing under EU competition law‘ of this 
chapter.  
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while the consent decree has an additional purpose which to provide a 
settlement proposed by the Antitrust Division to avoid expense and 
inconvenience of trial both for the Antitrust Division and the concerned 
parties.361 This difference lies in the different institutional design and 
enforcement mechanism between EU competition law and US antitrust law 
(especially the Sherman Act). The former emphasises the Commission‘s 
tripartite role in the enforcement while the GC and the CJEU are only 
responsible for judicial review.362 The latter only confers on the Antitrust 
Division the authority of investigation and prosecution; the Federal District 
Courts have the decision-making authority. However, the basic rationale and 
mechanism of protecting the concerned parties‘ right to be heard after the 
investigation is similar: the concerned parties shall reply to the SO or the 
consent decree in a way which enables them to make their view heard.  
What can be learned by China: improving the right to be heard during the 
AML 2007’s enforcement procedure   
Since the right to be heard has been recognised by the AML 2007 as well as 
Chinese administrative law,363 there is no need to discuss whether 
introducing the right to be heard will be good or bad for China‘s AML 2007‘s 
enforcement. Rather, this subsection suggests how protection of the right to 
be heard could be improved upon the deficiencies found above364and 
reference to the experience of the EU and US.  
    Firstly, before conducting an investigation  Chinese administrative 
enforcers might issue a written notice to inform the parties concerned of the 
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 See, J.M. Jacobson (editor in chief), Antitrust Law Developments, supra note 15, at 703.  
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See, P. Marsden,‗Checks and balances: EU Competition Law and the Rule of Law‘, (2009) 
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proposed investigation to guarantee the parties‘ right to be informed, which 
could be called a ‗pre-investigation notice‘. The notice should at least 
include the subject matter of the investigation and the related laws that the 
concerned parties might have violated. When investigators conduct a dawn 
raid without warning, they should at least inform the concerned parties on 
the spot of the subject matter and the law they might have violated. If so, 
the problem in Lianyungang Concrete Association case could be avoided. This 
is especially important when enforcement of the AML 2007 is at such an early 
stage and it is unfamiliar to domestic undertakings in China.  
    Secondly, after the investigation the administrative enforcer of the AML 
2007 should be obliged to send a written statement to the parties concerned 
when the investigation might lead to a decision having any adverse effect on 
the parties concerned and this should be stated clearly and exhaustively.365 
It should at least include: 1. all the facts, law and legal arguments supporting 
the administrative enforcers‘ allegations; 2. an explanation of the 
relationship between the evidence collected and the anticompetitive effects 
alleged; and, 3.a brief assessment of the proposed pecuniary sanction; and, 4. 
the time limit for reply. In addition, this statement should be consistent with 
the grounds relied on by the administrative enforcers of the AML 2007 in the 
final decisions. The parties concerned would be required to reply to the 
objection in order to safeguard their right to be heard, using all facts and 
evidence known to them which are relevant to their defence against the 
objections raised by the administrative enforcers. Besides, in the later oral 
hearing procedure, the parties concerned would be able to prepare their 
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 In fact Article 31 of Administrative Punishment Law requires administrative enforcers to 
inform the concerned parties of the facts, grounds and reasons before the issuance of the 
punishment decision. However, it did not provide any formal and detailed mechanisms on how 
to safeguard this right in practice. Under the enforcement of the AML 2007, at least the 
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defence more effectively because they have been informed about the facts 
and legal arguments against them. Thus through this mechanism the 
concerned parties‘ right to be heard can be improved. 
    It should also be noted that to add a pre-investigation notice and a 
statement of objection during the AML 2007‘s enforcement inevitably means 
an increase in administrative costs. More professional staff would also be 
required.  
4.3.2 Towards a more effective and impartial public hearing  
Comparison of public hearings under EU competition law and US antitrust 
law  
Public hearings play an important part in both EU competition and US 
antitrust enforcement procedure.366The two systems have many points in 
common. Firstly, the hearing is organised and chaired by specific officers or 
departments. Secondly, both the Hearing Officer and the ALJ have several 
procedural instruments to safeguard their independence.367 Thirdly, the 
purpose of the hearings under both regimes is to balance the position of the 
concerned parties and the administrative enforcers. Therefore the Hearing 
Officer in EU law requires both concerned parties and the investigator to 
submit a prior written notification containing the essential contents of their 
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 To be precise, ― hearings‖ under US antitrust law mentioned in this section means the 
hearing organised and chaired by the Administrative Law Judge under the FTC‘s adjudicative 
enforcement. 
367
For example, the Hearing Officer is attached, for administrative purposes, to the member of 
the Commission with special responsibility for competition and thus does not directly belong to 
the Directorate-General responsible for the investigation and prosecution of competition law 
infringements.  On the other hand, ALJs are selected and financially supported by the OPM 
rather than the FTC itself (5 U.S.C. § 5362 (1976)). 
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intended statements.368 The concerned parties are also given the 
opportunity to gain access to the Commission‘s file.369  A hearing under the 
FTC‘s antitrust enforcement goes further. It protects the concerned parties‘ 
right to ‗due notice, cross-examination, presentation of evidence, objection, 
motion, argument and all other rights essential to a fair hearing.‘370 These 
similarities may be recognised as essential features for an effective and 
impartial hearing at least in EU competition and US antitrust law.    
On the other hand, the hearing procedures in the two jurisdictions differ in 
certain respects. For example, the ALJ is externally independent of the 
investigators of the FTC, while the Hearing Officer provides merely an 
internal balance which belongs to the Commission. In addition the concerned 
parties may question the investigators‘ evidence and conduct 
cross-examination in the hearing held by the ALJ, while under the hearing 
held under EU competition law there is no cross-examination.   
What can be learned by China: A more effective and impartial public 
hearing under the AML 2007’s enforcement procedure 
Hearings under China‘s AML 2007 have the same basic function as those under 
EU and US systems: to give the concerned parties opportunities to defend 
themselves before an independent official or agency other than the 
administrative investigator(s).371 To this end, practice and experience in the 
latter systems might suggest how the hearing procedure under the AML 2007 
could be improved in its effectiveness and impartiality. 
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 See, Article11 of the Decision 2011/695 on the function and terms of reference of the 
Hearing Officer in certain competition proceedings [2011] OJ L 275/29.  
369
 For details, please refer to‘ 2.3.2 Right of access to the Commission‘s files‘ of this chapter.   
370
 See,§ 3.41(c) of the FTC Rules of Practice.   
371
See, H.K. Yang,‗A Research on Several Questions of Administrative Hearing System [关于
行政听证制度若干问题的研讨, guanyuxingzhengtingzhengzhiduruoganwentideyantao]‘, (1998) 
1 Jiangsu Social Science,74-81, at 77. 
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It may be concluded from Article 42 of the Administrative Punishment Law 
that the public hearing procedure under the AML 2007 has the following 
problems. Firstly, the (applicable) scope of the hearing procedure is unclear. 
Article 42 of the Administrative Punishment Law provides that the 
administrative enforcer should inform the concerned parties of their right to 
request a public hearing only when the proposed decision involves suspending 
production and business operations, revoking certificates or business licences, 
or imposing relatively large fines or other administrative punishments. There 
is no further explanation of the general words ‗relatively large fine‘. Such 
vagueness leaves the administrative enforcers of the AML 2007 excessive 
discretion in whether to inform the parties concerned of this right and thus 
may harm the right to be heard and decrease legal certainty.372 Secondly, 
the hearing is chaired by a person appointed by the administrative enforcer. 
Although the concerned parties may submit a request for withdrawal if they 
think the person chairing the hearing has a direct connection to the case, it is 
the administrative enforcer(s) who decides who is to chair the hearing. There 
is no designated official or agency responsible for conducting the hearing. 
Thirdly, there is no (procedural) guarantee for an independent hearing. 
Article 42(4) of the Administrative Punishment Law merely states that the 
organiser of the hearing should be different from the investigator(s) in the 
case. Accordingly, given that there is no designated hearing staff(s) or 
department under the AML 2007, a hearing would be chaired by just another 
official in the same administrative agency which conducted the investigation. 
Fourthly, although the concerned parties may defend themselves during the 
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 For example, in Lianyungang Concrete Association the concerned parties did not submit 
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hearing, they have no opportunity to question the evidence held by the 
administrative enforcer, nor can they cross examination the investigators.373 
Given the experience of the EU and US systems, China should be able to 
improve its hearing procedure under the AML 2007 in the following ways. 
Firstly, the applicable scope of a hearing procedure should be determined. 
Setting the limit of fines as a condition of whether to grant the parties 
concerned the opportunity of a hearing seems unreasonable and unfair. On 
the one hand, it is impossible to determine what exactly a ‗large fine‘ means. 
On the other, the right to a hearing of parties who risk a relatively small fine 
would be jeopardised, for they may not be able to request a public hearing. 
All concerned parties under the AML 2007, regardless of the amount of 
proposed fine, should be given the right to request a public hearing due to its 
importance to the parties‘ right to be heard under the AML 2007.374 
Secondly, administrative enforcers of the AML 2007 should establish a 
specific department to organise and chair the hearing. Take the NDRC for 
example. All the hearings under the NDRC‘s Antimonopoly law enforcement 
shall be organised and chaired by this hearing department. Under current 
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 It is not the task of this thesis to evaluate China‘s administrative hearing system. For a 
more detailed examination on China‘s hearing system, please refer to Z.C. Peng, L. Xue& K. 
Kan,Public Hearing Systems in China[听证制度,tingzhengzhidu], (2004)Tsinghua University 
Press;J.S. Zhang,Research on Administrative Hearing System [行政听证制度研究, 
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Research,59-61.   
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 For the importance of the public hearing to the AML 2007‘s administrative enforcement 
procedure, please refer to S.W. Hu,‗The Deployment of Hearing System in the Enforcement of 
Antimonopoly Law[反垄断法中听证制度之引入, 
fanlongduanfazhongtingzhengzhiduzhiyinru]‘,(2009) 28(4) Journal of Anqing Teachers 
College(Social Science Edition), 21-25.  
 
Chapter 4  
Protection of Rights of Concerned Parties during the Administrative Procedure under the AML 2007 
255 
 
practice the organiser and chairman of a hearing is appointed by the 
administrative enforcer dealing with the case. The establishment of a 
specific hearing department may limit the administrative enforcer‘s 
discretion in appointing the organiser and chairman of the hearing and thus 
improve the objectivity, independence and predictability of the hearing. 
Thirdly, this specialised department should conduct the hearing 
independently at least of anyone performing investigative or/and 
prosecutorial functions. This is an essential requirement for an impartial and 
effective hearing. Here are two options. Firstly, as EU experience shows, the 
administrative enforcer of the AML 2007 may achieve internal independence 
within the administrative enforcer by certain procedural guarantees. Take 
the NDRC for example. China‘s State Council or/and the NDRC might rule in 
law or regulation that it is the responsibility of the hearing department to 
guarantee the fairness of the hearing. Secondly, the hearing department 
might be authorised to organise and chair hearings independently of anyone 
performing investigative functions in the NDRC in antimonopoly cases. Thirdly, 
the hearing department might be made directly responsible to the Director 
General of the NDRC and required to prepare an interim report after each 
hearing exclusively for the Director General375 of the case. Fourthly, the 
hearing department should also be made responsible for issuing and 
publishing an independent final report to evaluate the fairness and 
effectiveness of the hearing. Secondly, administrative enforcers of the AML 
2007 might establish an external hearing department as under the ALJs in US 
antitrust law. This is unrealistic, if not impossible, under the current AML 
2007‘s administrative enforcement. China currently does not have a role the 
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function of which can be compared with that of the ALJs in the US;376in 
addition, it is unrealistic to expect the allocation of the budget of the hearing 
department under the administrative enforcers of the AML 2007 to be 
independent of that agency. To this end, it seems that the experience of the 
hearing procedure under EU competition law is more feasible.  
Fourthly, the concerned parties in the hearing should have the opportunity 
not only to defend themselves, but also to question and challenge the 
evidence and legal case advanced by the investigators. During the 
preparatory stage of the hearing, the concerned parties should be able to 
access the investigators‘ file on the basis of which the administrative 
enforcer made the allegation.377 The hearing department should also have 
the power to require both parties, especially the investigators, to attend the 
hearing. Moreover, the investigators should be obliged to answer the 
questions raised by the concerned parties. 
However, it should be noted that the establishment of the hearing 
department may cause several concerns. Firstly, its creation under the NDRC, 
the SAIC and the MOFCOM would inevitably increase the administrative 
burden and cost. Secondly, an independent hearing department might 
provide the concerned parties a mechanism by which to slow down the 
proceedings, submitting to the hearing department a variety of requests that 
are of dubious purpose, which might be revealed to be simply 
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well-engineered dilatory tactics.378Thirdly, if EU practice is adopted, the 
hearing procedure under the AML 2007 will face similar problems to those 
met by the EU Hearing Officer: the position of the hearing department under 
the administrative enforcers of the AML 2007 may not be independent enough; 
and lack the opportunity for the concerned parties under the AML 2007 to 
cross-examine witnesses and challenge the evidence submitted against them.  
4.3.3 Right of access to the file under the AML 2007  
Comparison of the right of access to the file under EU competition and US 
antitrust law 
Both EU competition and US antitrust law recognise the right of access to 
the file as a necessary component of the concerned parties‘ right to be 
heard.379 However, their ways of granting this right may differ. In EU 
competition law the right of access to the Commission‘s file is granted after 
the issuance of the SO if requested by the parties concerned. However, the 
Commission regards its internal file, the business secrets and other 
confidential information as non-accessible files.380 In case of dispute 
between the concerned parties and the Commission, the former have a right 
of recourse to the Commission and then to the Hearing Office. In US antitrust 
law this right is safeguarded by federal criminal or civil procedural rules and 
the ALJ‘s adjudicative procedure. The main difference between the two 
regimes lies in the right‘s being protected under EU competition law by an 
administrative proceeding and by the investigator and the decision maker: 
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 Similar concern is also raised in the context of EU competition law. See, N. Zingales,‗The 
Hearing Officer in EU Competition Law Proceedings: Ensuring Full Respect for the Right to Be 
Heard?‘supra note 91, at 138.  
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 See, ‗2.3.2 Right of access to the Commission‘s files‘ and ‗3.2.1 Rights to be heard and 
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the Commission; under  US antitrust law this right is safeguarded by its 
judicial or quasi-judicial procedural requirement and the judiciary. The files 
accessible under US criminal procedure are quite limited, even more limited 
than under EU competition law.381In US civil litigation and FTC adjudicative 
procedure, however, the limitations on the accessible files are fewer. Firstly, 
privileged information is generally non-accessible; secondly, the courts or 
ALJs may impose a limitation on the frequency and extent of such disclosure. 
Unlike EU competition law which defines the scope of accessible and 
non-accessible files clearly during its administrative enforcement procedure, 
US antitrust law enforcers leave considerable discretion to the federal courts 
and ALJs to decide the scope of accessible and non-accessible files.       
What can be learned by China: introducing the right of access to the file in 
the AML 2007’s enforcement procedure      
Unlike the right to be heard, right of access to the file does not exist in 
Chinese Antimonopoly and Administrative law. In the period of AML 2007‘s 
enforcement the published cases shows that the concerned parties did not 
have the right of access to the administrative enforcers‘ file.382 Hence the 
very first question to be answered is: is there any need to give the parties 
concerned the right of access to the file under the AML 2007 enforcement? As 
illustrated both by EU and US experience, the right of access to the file is a 
necessary part of protection of the right to be heard. If China recognises the 
right to be heard under its AML 2007 regime (in which case it is recognised), it 
should also recognise the right of access to the file because it is a necessary 
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 Please refer to ‗Right of access to the file under US antitrust laws‘ in ‗3.2.1 Rights to be 
heard and access to the file under US antitrust laws‘ 
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 However, in China‘s criminal procedure counsel (rather than the defendant) have the right 
to consult, extract and duplicate judicial documents pertaining to the current case and the 
technical verification material from the procuratorates and courts. See, Article 36 of Criminal 
Procedural Law of People‘s Republic of China, adopted on January 1, 1997.  
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part of it. If the concerned parties under the AML 2007 are given the right of 
access to the administrative enforcer‘s file, their right to be heard can be 
better protected, the public hearing may be more effective and the 
procedure would thus be fairer and more balanced. 
With regard to establishing this right under the AML 2007 regime, the 
experience of EU competition law may be more valuable. Enforcement of the 
AML 2007 follows an administrative proceeding similar to that of EU 
competition law. Requiring the administrative enforcers of the AML 2007 to 
grant the concerned parties the right of access to their files would not need 
any radical structural changes in the enforcement regime. If US practice were 
adopted, this right would be granted by Chinese courts rather than 
administrative enforcers. The difficulty lies in Chinese courts‘ exclusion 
under current AML 2007 from public enforcement except in conducting 
judicial review.383Nor are administrative enforcers and concerned parties 
plaintiffs and defendants. Thus there is no legal ground on which the court 
might grant this right under the AML 2007.However, it should be noted that 
the US approach may be more transparent, objective and effective than that 
of the EU at least with regard to civil enforcement. Firstly, the Antitrust 
Division and concerned parties are in an equal position before federal courts; 
secondly, the scope of accessible files is not determined by the plaintiff but 
by federal procedural rules and the court.  
Both the EU and US may provide useful experience on the question of 
accessibility of files. Firstly, an accessible file must be relevant to the case in 
respect of which objection is made, a file based on which the administrative 
enforcer made the allegation and decision. Files which are irrelevant to the 
case should not be disclosed to the concerned parties.  Secondly, as in EU 
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competition law, a file containing business secrets should not be disclosed.384 
Keeping business secrets is also a legal obligation on the administrative 
enforcer under the AML 2007.385 Thus it has  legal ground to treat business 
secrets as non-accessible. Similarly, the category of non-accessible ‗other 
confidential information‘ under the AML 2007 may contain state secrets, the 
complainants‘ information and matters within the individual‘s privacy which 
have been regulated in the Administrative Punishment Law.386Thirdly, as 
regards the administrative enforcers‘ internal file, its non-accessibility is 
justified by the EU competition regime and US antitrust criminal procedure. 
However, the EU Courts‘ view is not entirely consistent with the view of the 
Commission with regard to whether to disclosure of the Commission‘s 
internal files. The General Court requires the Commission to balance the risk 
of disclosing internal files and protection of the right of concerned parties.387 
It thus held that the Commission should identify the documents classified as 
internal in the file and justify their non-disclosure with detailed and specific 
reasons. Such internal files may nevertheless be disclosed to the parties 
concerned by the Courts‘ order. The requirement under US antitrust criminal 
procedure may be incomparable with that under the AML 2007 because the 
latter includes no criminal procedure. It is still arguable whether the 
administrative enforcers‘ internal files should be disclosed under the AML 
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 For details, please refer to ‗Accessible and non-accessible documents‘ in ‗2.3.2 Right of 
access to the Commission‘s files‘ of this chapter.  
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See, Article 41 of the AML 2007. 
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 According to Article 42(3) of Administrative Punishment Law, the hearing shall be in 
camera if it contains state or, business secrets or matters of an individual‘s privacy.  Article 3 
of the Law of the People‘s Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets (Adopted at the Third 
Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People's Congress on September 
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obligation to guard state secrets.‘ The category of ‗other confidential information‘ needs more 
detailed and careful analysis. However, it is the task of Administrative law, not of this thesis.  
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Joint Cases T-134, 136-138, 141, 145,147-148, 151, 156-157, NHM Stahlwerke and Others 
v Commission, [1996] ECR II-537, at paras. 73-74.  
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2007. The author held that at least the protection of the internal files cannot 
be absolute. The administrative enforcers of the AML 2007 should assess the 
risk of disclosure and the protection of the concerned parties‘ right to be 
heard and provide sufficient reason to explain why the specific internal 
documents are non-accessible. This requirement could be fairly important 
given that the AML 2007‘s enforcement system lacks transparency and 
external balance.388On the other hand, it should be noted that because of this 
lack of transparency and external balance it is still hard to limit the 
administrative enforcers‘ discretion in determining the scope of their 
internal files under the AML 2007.Finally, as regards privileged files which are 
protected from disclosure under US antitrust law, since there is no such 
privilege in current Chinese civil and administrative procedure,389 it would 
be too early to treat the privileged files as non-accessible under the AML 
2007‘s enforcement. 
To sum up, in order to improve the rights of concerned parties and the 
impartiality of the AML 2007‘s enforcement procedure, the MOFCOM,  NDRC 
and  SAIC may consider giving concerned parties the right to access its file 
upon application. The concerned parties may gain access after they have 
received the statement of objection and before the issuance of the 
administrative enforcers‘ final decision. In order to maintain the efficiency of 
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 As regards lack of transparency, see, A.H.Y. Zhang,‗Problems in Following E.U. 
Competition Law: A Case Study of Coca-Cola/Huiyuan‘, (2011) 3 Peking University 
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the enforcement, the MOFCOM, NDRC and SAIC may set a time limit on this 
right. After the concerned parties have submitted the request for access to 
the file the administrative enforcer may decide whether to grant the request. 
Where the parties concerned dispute the administrative enforcers‘ refusal of 
their application, the hearing department of the administrative enforcer may 
be entitled to determine whether the file should be disclosed or not, as does 
the Hearing Officer in the EU.390In relation to the scope of accessible files, 
business secrets and other confidential information should not be disclosed; 
in relation to the administrative enforcer‘s internal files, the administrative 
enforcer must justify refusal of access to such files before denying the 
concerned parties‘ request.     
4.3.4 Legal professional privilege: a restrictive scope  
Comparison of legal professional privilege under the EU Competition and 
US Antitrust law 
Professional privilege (or the attorney-client privilege) is recognised both 
by EUand US regimes. Its justifications are similar in the two regimes: 
communication of relevant information by employees of the client to 
attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client corporation must 
remain confidential because the best administration of justice can only be 
secured when clients can have full and frank communication with their 
lawyers.391 Another similarity lies in the regimes‘ restriction of the scope of 
this privilege. Both the EU and US grant this privilege only when the 
communication is made with the intention of obtaining or providing legal 
advice. In addition, both the EU and US grant this privilege only when the 
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communication emanates from a lawyer who is entitled to practise in their 
respective jurisdictions.392 
On the other hand, the differences in the protection of the legal 
professional privilege between the two regimes are equally significant. Firstly, 
the way in which this privilege is protected differs. Under EU competition law 
it is for the Commission to determine whether the protection of privilege 
should be granted during the investigation,393 while in US antitrust law this 
privilege is granted and supervised by courts.394Secondly, under the EU 
system the privilege only applies to independent lawyers: communications 
between in-house lawyers in a relationship of employment with the 
concerned parties would not be protected, while US has extended this 
privilege to in-house counsel.  
What can be learned by China: whether the concerned parties under the 
AML 2007 should be granted legal professional privilege?  
Although legal professional privilege is not regulated in Chinese legislation, 
lawyers in China are obliged to keep secrets for their clients. Article 33 of the 
Law on Lawyers of the People's Republic of China (hereafter, the Lawyers‘ 
Law)395 states: 
A lawyer shall keep confidential secrets of the State and 
commercial secrets of the parties concerned that he comes to 
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know during his practice activities and shall not divulge the 
private affairs of the parties concerned. 
In addition, Article 8 of the ‗Standard of Professional Ethics and Practice 
Discipline of Chinese Lawyers‘ (hereafter, the Professional Ethics Standard) 
issued by Chinese Lawyers‘ Association requires lawyers to keep state secrets, 
business secrets and individual privacy of the client. However, Chinese 
lawyers‘ professional confidentiality is read as an obligation rather than a 
privilege that can be used as a defence in the criminal and/or administrative 
procedure.396 In AML 2007 enforcement there is seldom discussion of legal 
professional privilege. However, in practice this issue has been met in the 
Henan Second-hand Car Cartel case.397 Since legal professional privilege has 
not been introduced in the AML 2007 and the administrative laws of China, 
this subsection seeks to answer the three questions: 1. is it necessary to 
introduce this privilege to the AML 2007‘s enforcement procedure? 2. If 
necessary, how can this privilege be granted to the concerned parties under 
the AML 2007? 3. If necessary, what is the scope of this privilege under the 
AML 2007? 
In relation to the first question, from the experience of EU competition law 
and US antitrust law it is necessary to give antitrust lawyers in China the legal 
professional privilege. Firstly, as EU and US systems show, legal professional 
privilege may increase the welfare of the whole of society.398 For example, if 
the communication between the undertaking concerned and the antitrust 
lawyer is protected by legal professional privilege, it may be expected that 
the undertaking concerned will be encouraged to consult the professional 
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lawyers more often without having to worry about the risks of subsequent 
disclosure of the information revealed and of the legal advice received. The 
AML 2007 would be respected more often because antitrust lawyers are more 
familiar with antitrust law than the parties concerned. This is especially 
important for undertakings in China given that the AML 2007 is new law and 
its enforcement is at such an early stage. Secondly, the privilege is regarded 
as a necessary requirement for the proper administration of justice by the 
CJEU399 and the US courts.400 Although Chinese legislators have not 
recognised this privilege as a necessary requirement, it can nevertheless 
improve protection of the parties concerned under the AML 2007 and make 
the procedure fairer and more balanced.401 In fact Chinese scholars have 
argued that legal professional privilege is based on fundamental procedural 
principles such as presumption of innocence, the right against 
self-incrimination and individual‘s privacy,402 which have been found in 
Chinese Criminal Procedural law. 
The second question is that of how to grant professional privilege to the 
concerned parties in the practice of the AML 2007‘s enforcement. As there is 
no external balance as in US antitrust law procedure in China,403 the privilege 
may only be given by Chinese administrative enforcers. The proof dilemma404 
met by the EU Commission would thus similarly be faced by China. Legal 
                                         
399
T. Christoforou: Protection of Legal Privilege in EEC Competition Law: The Imperfections of 
a Case, supra note 134, at 4.  
400
 See, Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888). 
401
 In AM&Sthe CJEU stated that protection of the confidentiality of lawyer-client 
communications was construed as a necessary requirement of the client's right to a fair trial.  
402
 See, T. Cheng, ‗Deciphering the Professional Secrets of the Legal Profession [论律师的职
业秘密, lunlvshidezhiyemimi]‘, (2005) 4 Justice of China,37-41, at 38.  
403
 For example, under US antitrust laws‘ enforcement, the concerned parties‘ privilege claim 
is booked before courts. See, Alexander v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 186 F.R.D. 102, 107 
(D.D.C. 1998). 
404
See, ‗Proof dilemma when granting the privilege‘ in ‗2.3.3 Legal professional privilege‘ of this 
chapter. 
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professional privilege in China might be guided by the EU‘s ‗sealed envelope‘ 
method.405 Firstly, it is for administrative enforcers of the AML 2007 to 
determine whether the protection of privilege should be granted during 
investigation. Secondly, it is the concerned parties‘ obligation to persuade 
investigators that the claimed document should be privileged. For example, 
they might state the basis upon which the privilege is claimed, subject 
matter, number of pages, author, date created and the identity of all persons 
to whom the original or any copies of the document were shown or provided. 
Thirdly, the administrative enforcer should not disclose the document and/or 
use it as evidence in the decision if the claimed document fulfils the 
conditions of granting legal professional privilege. Fourthly, in the case of 
dispute the investigator should put the claimed document in a sealed 
envelope and take it directly to the Director General of the administrative 
enforcer of the AML 2007. Only the Director General can open the envelope 
and decide whether the document inside should be privileged. Finally, the 
concerned parties may waive the privilege by disclosing the written 
communication if he considers it to be in his/her best interests to do so. For 
once the privileged information has been disclosed by the client, the basic 
justification for protection no longer applies.406 
As regards the last question, it should be firstly noted that protection of 
legal professional privilege illustrates the conflicts between protection of the 
concerned parties‘ right and effective enforcement: the existence of this 
privilege would unavoidably harm the effectiveness of enforcement, the aim 
of which is to disclose facts and truth.407 Moreover, in AML 2007 enforcement 
                                         
405
Ibid. 
406
See, T. Christoforou,‗Protection of Legal Privilege in EEC Competition Law: The 
Imperfections of a Case‘, supra note 134, at 44.  
407
 See, J.X. Wang,‗An Analyse on Lawyers‘ Professional Confidentiality [律师职业秘密问题研
究, lvshizhiyemimiwentiyanjiu]‘, supra note 347, at 320.  
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practice the NDRC and the SAIC have met difficulties in investigation.408 In 
addition, the NDRC and the SAIC are not active with regard to enforcing the 
AML 2007and have not accumulated adequate experience.409Affording the 
protection of communications between concerned parties and their lawyers 
from disclosure would increase the barrier to investigation as well as 
discourage NDRC and SAIC enforcement.410 Hence the scope of the legal 
professional privilege under the enforcement of the AML 2007 should be 
strictly limited. 
As EU competition law and US antitrust law provide, the following 
restrictions can be applied. Firstly, the privileged communication should be 
made for the purpose of protecting the right of concerned parties and the 
legal advice should be made by lawyers who are entitled to practise in China. 
This condition is derived directly from the purpose and essential meaning of 
legal professional privilege itself. Secondly, on the question whether legal 
professional privilege should be applied to in-house lawyers under the AML 
2007 investigation, the author believes that it is too early. First of all, there 
is no legal professional privilege under current AML 2007 enforcement, which 
means even communication between an independent lawyer and the client 
cannot be protected from disclosure. Thus the first consideration should be 
establishing this privilege in the China‘s antimonopoly investigation 
procedure for independent lawyers rather than extending this privilege to 
in-house lawyers. In addition, as shown by EU and US experience, extending 
                                         
408
 For example, in TravelSky, the NDRC was reported to meet obstacles during the 
investigation and thus the investigation is pending. See, B.Q. Wang & W.X. Liu, NDRC 
investigated Travelsky for manipulating ticket price, The Economic Observer, 15th, May, 2009.     
409
 For details, please refer to ‗2.1 Thecurrent position of the administrative enforcers under 
the AML 2007‘s public enforcement‘ in Chapter 1 of this thesis.  
410
 For example, in the Henan Second-hand Car Cartel case, if the communications between 
the concerned parties and the lawyers had been covered by legal professional privilege, the 
investigator (ICHN) would not have been able to collect the evidence of the communications 
between lawyers and the concerned parties.   
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this privilege to in-house lawyers may cause various problems. For example, 
it is hard to distinguish whether an in-house lawyer‘s opinion is business 
advice or a legal advice; also because in essence the in-house lawyer is an 
employee of the concerned company. The relationship between an in-house 
lawyer and his/her employer differs from that between an independent 
lawyer and his/her client. Besides, the privilege should be excluded when the 
concerned parties are conducting or planning an on-going or future 
crime.411Finally, the privileged communication under the AML 2007 should be 
in the form of written and should be made after the initiation of investigation. 
These restrictions are provided to prevent this privilege being abused as a 
delaying tactic by the concerned parties.    
4.3.5 Right against self-incrimination: too early to extend to 
the AML 2007 
Comparison of the right against self-incrimination under EU Competition 
and US Antitrust law  
The right against self-incrimination is recognised as a basic principle in EU 
and US law to protect individual‘s human right. However, the scope of this 
right in the two regimes differs. The CJEU reluctantly recognises this right to 
a limited extent: the Commission may compel the undertaking concerned to 
answer questions of a purely factual nature even if answer to this factual 
question may incriminate the concerned party.412 Only questions which may 
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 See, See, J.X. Wang,‗An Analyse on Lawyers‘ Professional Confidentiality [律师职业秘密
问题研究, lvshizhiyemimiwentiyanjiu]‘, supra note 347, at 325. J.X. Wang further explained the 
scope of ‗criminal act‘, it include: 1. crimes of endangering national security; 2. crimes of 
endangering public security; 3. Other crimes that should be disclosed by the lawyers.  
412
 The CJEU only prevents the European Commission from ‗compelling an undertaking to 
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include admission on its part of the existence of an infringement which it is 
incumbent upon the Commission to prove are prevented. Under US antitrust 
law the right against self-incrimination, as one of the Constitutional rights, 
covers both answers to questions of factual and non-factual nature. However, 
only the individual witness (rather than any legal person such as a company) 
who testifies on oath may invoke the right against self-incrimination.413 
What can be learned by China: whether the right against 
self-incrimination should be introduced in the AML 2007’s public 
enforcement procedure 
The right against self-incrimination is regulated in Chinese Criminal 
Procedural Law‘s latest modification.414 However, there is no further 
procedural rule or mechanism to guarantee this right during criminal 
procedures. Moreover, discussion of this right in China is limited to the scope 
of criminal procedure.415The most important question is: is it necessary to 
                                                                                                                     
self-incrimination in investigation under EU competition law: divergence between the CJEU 
and the Strasbourg Court‘ in ‗2.3.4 Right against self-incrimination‘ of this chapter.  
413
 See, ‗The scope of the right against self-incrimination under US antitrust laws‘ in ‗3.2.3 
Right against self-incrimination: the Fifth Amendment‘ of this chapter.  
414
 See, Article 50 of Chinese Criminal Procedural Law, last modified on March 14, 2012. 
However, in the same statute, Article 118 stipulates that the suspected parties are obliged to 
answer the investigators‘ questions truthfully.   
415
 It is not the task of this thesis to give a comprehensive and detailed discussion of the right 
against self-incrimination in a general sense under Chinese law. For more detailed research 
on this topic, please refer to L. Peng,The Privilege against Self-Incrimination [不得强迫自证其
罪原则研究, budeqiangpozizhengqizuiyanjiu], (2009)Chinese Procuratorial Press;C.Y. 
Fan,‗From the Obligation of ‗Answer truthfully‘ to the right ‗against self-incrimination‘ [从‗应当如
实回答‘到‗不得自证其罪‘, cong ‗yingdangrushihuida‘ dao ‗budeqiangpozizhengqizui‘]‘, (2008) 2 
Chinese Journal of Law,111-121; G.J. Liu,‗Several Problems on the Establishment of the Right 
to Silence in China-Part One [在我国确定沉默权原则几个问题的探讨-上, 
zaiwoguoquedingchengmoquanyuanzejigewentizhitantao-shang]‘, (2000) 2 China Legal 
Science,43-54; G.J. Liu,‗Several Problems on the Establishment of the Right to Silence in 
China-Part Two [在我国确定沉默权原则几个问题的探讨-下, 
zaiwoguoquedingchengmoquanyuanzejigewentizhitantao-xia]‘,(2000) 3 China Legal Science, 
37-47; Y.H. Song & H.Y. Wu, ‗The Principle of the Privilege against Self-Incrimination and its 
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extend the right against self-incrimination to the AML 2007?416 The main 
justification is that the concerned parties‘ rights during AML 2007 
enforcement would be improved. If this right were given, during the 
investigation the investigated parties would be able to refuse to answer 
question raised by the investigator if the witness thinks answer would 
incriminate herself/himself. 
If this right were extended to AML 2007 enforcement procedure, the 
following concerns would be raised. Firstly, it might discourage 
administrative enforcers from enforcing the law actively and harm the 
effectiveness of enforcement of the AML 2007. Administrative enforcers‘ 
effective investigation is important to disclose anticompetitive activities. 
Compelling a company to provide all necessary information is a guarantee to 
the effectiveness of the investigation,417 while the right against 
self-incrimination would protect the concerned parties from disclosure. As 
mentioned above,418 given that public enforcement of monopolistic 
agreements and abuse of dominant position under the AML 2007 is inactive 
since 2008,419 it would be inadvisable further reduce the effectiveness of the 
                                                                                                                     
Procedural Protection [任何人不受强迫自证其罪原则及其程序保障, 
renherenbushouqiangpozizhengqizuiyuanzejiqichengxubaozhang]‘, (1999) 2 China Legal 
Science, 117-128;Y.G. Yang,‗An Analyse on the Principle of against Self-Incrimination [论不强
迫自证其罪原则, lunbuqiangpozizhengqizuiyuanze]‘, (2003) 1 China Legal Science,130-137.       
416
 The AML 2007 does not impose criminal responsibilities upon the individuals or companies 
violating the substantial part of the Law. However, the concerned parties may face (individual 
and company)  prosecution if they break the procedural rules provided by the AML 2007 
and/or other administrative laws. See, Article 52 of the AML 2007. 
417
See, Case 27/88, Orkem v Commission, [1989] ECR 3355, at paras. 38-39.  
418
 See, ‗Legal professional privilege‘ in ‗4.3.3 Improving the protection of procedural rights of 
the concerned parties under AML 2007: from a comparative perspective‘ of this chapter.  
419
 See, N. Petit,‗Chinese Antitrust Law – The Year of the Rabbit in Review (1) & (2)‘, Chillin' 
Competition, (23 January, 2012), available at 
http://chillingcompetition.com/2012/01/23/chinese-antitrust-law-the-year-of-the-rabbit-in-revie
w-1/, last visited on 04/10/2012, 16:06. For a more detailed record of monopolistic agreement 
and abuse of dominant position cases under the AML 2007, please refer to A. Fels, X.Y. Wang 
& J. Su (edited by),China Competition Bulletin 2010-2012, supra note 347.  
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enforcement. Secondly, it is problematic to apply this right to a legal person, 
who is, in most situations the subject of AML 2007 investigation.  EU 
competition law and US antitrust law both provide that this right can only be 
enjoyed by natural persons. China‘s Criminal Procedural Law also only offers 
protection to natural persons rather than any legal persons.420 Hence there is 
no legal ground for extending this right to legal persons such as companies or 
undertakings. Thirdly, the enforcement procedure of the AML 2007 is an 
administrative rather than criminal. One of the reasons for which the CJEU 
offers limited protection of the right against self-incrimination under EU 
competition law is that the Commission‘s enforcement is not of a criminal 
nature.421Concerned parties under the AML 2007 cannot incriminate 
themselves because there is no criminal responsibility for anticompetitive 
conduct. Fourthly, even under China‘s criminal procedure the right against 
self-incrimination is too immature to have any applicable procedure and 
mechanism to safeguard this right, not to mention extending it to AML 2007 
enforcement. It may be too early to give the concerned parties the right 
against self-incrimination under the AML 2007. Extension of this right to the 
AML 2007 enforcement should not be earlier than the establishment of 
certain mutual and practical procedures and mechanisms to exercise this 
right under China‘s criminal procedure.       
4.3.6 Right against unreasonable search and seizure: no legal 
ground 
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is provided by US 
Constitution. In US antitrust law this right is specifically raised when the 
investigation is conducted under search warrant. Accordingly, the Antitrust 
                                         
420
 Article 50 of the Criminal Procedural Law provides that the judge, theprocurator and the 
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Division must demonstrate reasonableness before the court to obtain a search 
warrant when a crime is reasonably believed to have been committed. In 
addition, the search warrant must particularly describe the place to be 
searched, and persons or things to be seized.422 
China also has a search warrant system in its criminal law.423 However, 
there is no legal ground for the right against unreasonable search or seizure 
which can be applied in criminal investigation.424 Since under the AML 2007 
administrative enforcers cannot even invoke criminal procedure, there is no 
obvious reason and legal ground for establishing this right under the AML 
2007.   
                                         
422
 See, ‗Fourth Amendment and US antitrust law enforcement‘ of ‗3.2.4 Right against 
unreasonable searches and seizures: the Fourth Amendment‘ in this chapter.  
423
 See, Article 128 of China‘s Criminal Procedural Law; see also, Article 206 of the 
Procedural Rules of Chinese Public Security Bureau when Dealing with Criminal Cases(No. 35 
Order of Ministry of Public Security of the People's Republic of China, last amended on 25
th
. 
October, 2007).     
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 For  discussion of  search warrants in Chinese criminal  law, please refer to L.P. Pan, 
Research on China’s Criminal Search System [刑事搜查制度研究, xingshisouchazhiduyanjiu], 
PhD Thesis, (2006)Sichuan University;L.P. Pan,‗ Research on the Reform of China‘s Criminal 
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4Academic Forum,111-115; F.Q. Liu,‗From Authorization to Restraint- Research on the 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
China‘s Antimonopoly Law (the AML 2007) was adopted on 1st August, 2008, 
after its entering into the WTO. In about four and a half years‘ enforcement 
the administrative enforcers of the AML 2007 have met various problems (in 
practice). This thesis has attempted to find solutions to some of these 
problems. This thesis has compared the public enforcement regimes of EU 
competition and US antitrust law. There are two reasons for choosing these 
two regimes for comparison. Firstly, they are two mainstream enforcement 
regimes;1 secondly, the public enforcement mechanism of the AML 2007 is 
significantly influenced by the two regimes.2 
The thesis first examined the public enforcement of the AML 2007 in the 
four and a half years and identifies the following problems: 1. lack of 
independent judiciary and effective judicial review; 2. the administrative 
enforcers of the AML 2007 are not independent of sector regulators and the 
SOEs in China; 3. lack of transparency in Chinese merger enforcement; 4. the 
vagueness of the Law‘s public enforcement authority‘s allocation between 
the central and local government; 5. rights of the concerned parties are 
insufficiently protected. The first two problems are classified as structural 
and the rest as technical problems. Structural problems (of the AML 2007‘s 
public enforcement) are rooted in the current Chinese political and economic 
structure such as lacking judicial independence. They are caused by the fact 
of Chinese transitional period from planned to market economy.3 The 
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 The EU competition law public enforcement regime is known as administrative-orientated 
while the US antitrust law enforcement regime is known as judicial-orientated. See, Y.J. Jung 
& Q. Hao, ‗The New Economic Constitution in China: A Third way for Competition Regime?‘ 
(2003) 24 Northwestern journal of International law and Business, 107-171, at 123. 
2
 See, ‗1. Comparative perspectives of competition law‘s public enforcement‘ of Chapter 1.  
3
 See, B. Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth, (2007) Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Press; see also, J.L. Wu, ‗China's Economic Reform: Past, Present 
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experience of EU competition and US antitrust law may offer little 
contribution to their solution because neither regime went through a 
transitional period. 
On the other hand, the technical problems met by the AML 2007‘s 
administrative enforcers are not caused by Chinese political and economic 
structure; they are solely related to the procedure of the AML 2007‘s public 
enforcement and they may also be faced by the public enforcement regimes 
of EU competition law as well as US antitrust law. For example, the case 
allocation between different enforcement authorities and protection of right 
of concerned parties are commonly concerned issues under an antitrust 
enforcement regime regardless of what political and economic structure it 
belongs to. Technical problems can be solved under the current Chinese 
political and economic structure. Experience of the EU and US may provide 
effective solutions to the technical problems of the AML 2007. 
This thesis does not aim to solve all the problems within the public 
enforcement of the AML 2007; rather it only focuses on providing solutions to 
the three significant technical problems by examining public enforcement 
regimes under EU competition law and US antitrust law. Namely, how to 
improve transparency of the merger control under the AML 2007; how to 
allocate the enforcement authority of the AML 2007 between the 
administrative enforcers at the central governmental level and at the 
provincial governmental level; and, how to improve the rights of concerned 
parties under the AML 2007‘s public enforcement. 
Chapter 2 seeks to show how transparency of merger enforcement under 
the AML 2007 might be secured by referring to EU and US experiences. 
                                                                                                                     
and Future‘, (2000) 1(5) Perspectives, available at 
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Transparency may contribute to an open, fair and responsive procedure. It is 
especially important to Chinese merger for this regime is still young and often 
suspected to be influenced by political factors.4 Examination focuses on two 
issues: firstly, transparency during the merger investigation process; secondly, 
the transparency in merger decisions. The first section of this chapter 
examined the two issues mentioned above under EU merger enforcement 
regime. During the merger investigation process, the Commission promptly 
discloses information on notifications, declarations of lack of jurisdiction, 
decisions of clearance after phase I investigation and decisions to conduct a 
second phase investigation. In relation to the decisions made after the 
second phase investigation, the Commission will offer detailed explanation in 
the decisions, regardless of whether the case is cleared unconditionally, 
cleared with remedies or blocked. On the other hand, it should be noted that 
the main concern of transparency under the EU merger regime lies in the 
Commission‘s tripartite role under the regime. 
The second part of this chapter examined transparency under the US 
merger regime. Similar to the EU‘s, US merger assessment also contains two 
phases of investigation. However, the Antitrust Division and the FTC did not 
pay as much attention to transparency as the EU Commission does. Firstly, in 
relation to the merger investigation process, the Antitrust Division and the 
FTC only disclose the statistics of certain cases in the annual reports. The 
notifications based on the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act 
(hereafter, the HSR Act) are not be made public for the considerations of 
confidentiality.5 Nor would there be disclosure of the procedure when an 
investigation is dropped by the agencies; a proposed merger is dropped by 
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 See, R. Evans, ‗Transparency is in Mofcom's Interests‘, (2008-2010) 28 International 
Financial Law Review, 19-20.  
5
 See, I.K. Gotts (edited by), The Merger Review Process, second edition, (2001) ABA 
Publishing, at 100. 
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the merging parties; or, the Antitrust Division resolves competition issues 
through a fix-it-first settlement. In relation to the decisions made under US 
merger control regime, there are three possibilities. Firstly, the case may be 
cleared after the Antitrust Division or the FTC‘s investigation because of its 
insignificant competitive impact, in which case there would be little 
disclosure of the decision. Secondly, the merger may be cleared with consent 
decree settlement, in which case the agencies are required to disclose the 
remedies and explain the competitive impact. However, it is argued that the 
agencies fail to provide analysis of the competitive impact which has not 
been addressed by the remedies.6 Thirdly, the merger may be filed in a 
Federal court if the Antitrust Division or the FTC may want to block it.7 Thus 
the decision is subject to the requirement of judicial disclosure, which lies 
out of the scope of Chapter 2. It can be concluded that there are two 
significant concerns under US merger enforcement‘s transparency: 1. when 
the investigation or the proposed merger is dropped or the merger is cleared, 
there is little disclosure of information on the case; 2. when the case is 
settled by consent decree, disclosure of information is incomplete. On the 
other hand, there are arguments advanced that improving US merger control 
regime‘s transparency would bring significant cost to the agencies.8 
The third part of this chapter aims to solve the problem of how to improve 
the transparency of merger control procedure under the AML 2007. Firstly, it 
compared the transparency of EU and US merger control procedures and 
found the following results: 1. In relation to the investigative procedure, both 
regimes provide statistics on their enforcement activities during the 
                                         
6
 See for example, W.S. Grimes, ‗Transparency in Federal Antitrust Enforcement‘, (2003) 51(4) 
Buffalo Law Review, 937-993. 
7
The FTC may also issue a preliminary injunction to block a merger which is authorised by 
federal court.   
8
 See, J.M. Nannes, ‗Transparency in Federal Antitrust Enforcement Decisions: A Reaction to 
Professor Grimes‘, (2003) 51 Buffalo Law Review, 1017-1027 
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investigation process; 2. both the EU and US disclose the prohibition decisions 
and decisions with remedies, although in different ways and to different 
extent; 3. the EU merger control regime offers more transparency than the 
US Antitrust Division and the FTC did in both the investigative procedure and 
final decisions.9 Comparison of EU and US merger enforcement regimes and 
as the current practices of the MOFCOM‘s merger enforcement illustrates 
that the MOFCOM should provide a more transparent investigative procedure 
by publishing the statistics and summary information on the notifications, the 
cases challenged by the MOFCOM and the case proceeds to the second phase 
investigation. In order to address the problem of lack of information on the 
MOFCOM‘s final decision, this section compared the content of decision in 
Panasonic/Sanyo merger between EU, US and China. Comparison disclosed a 
series of deficiencies in the MOFCOM‘s decision such as lacking analysis on the 
relevant market and explanation on remedies. This section also examined 
whether the concerns of transparency met by the EU and US would apply to 
the Chinese merger control regime. It found that the institutional design 
concern of the EU merger control regime would also be met by China, while 
the concern of cost of transparency met by the US merger regime is 
insignificant due to the MOFCOM‘s relatively low caseload. 
Chapter 3 aims to find an effective way to allocate the enforcement 
authority of the AML 2007 between the central government administrative 
enforcers (the CAEs) and the provincial government administrative enforcers 
(the PAEs). This chapter firstly examined decentralisation and multi-level 
governance under EU competition law‘s public enforcement. It is noteworthy 
that the modernisation of EU competition law provides us a chance to 
evaluate both centralised and decentralised enforcement mechanism under 
EU competition law. After providing an overview of the modernisation 
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 See, ‗3.3.1 A comparative study between the transparency of merger enforcement 
procedure between the EU and US‘ of Chapter 2.  
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process from a centralised enforcement mechanism to a decentralised 
mechanism under EU competition law, the thesis analysed the advantages 
and concerns of the EU centralised and decentralised enforcement 
mechanisms, respectively. Discussion is established on economic and 
theoretical analysis. The advantages of the centralised enforcement 
approach under Regulation 17/62 include: 1.that it can prevent trade 
protectionism between Member States; 2. it may guarantee the consistent 
implementation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in Member States. The main 
concern of this approach is that the European Commission (the Commission) 
cannot afford the immense administrative overload.10 The reasons for 
applying the decentralised approach under Reg.1/2003 include: 1. that it can 
overcome the administrative burden caused by the centralised mechanism 
especially in an enlarged EU; 2. national competition authorities and national 
courts in Member States may be in a better position to collect information on 
local conduct than the Commission in Brussels. The main concern brought by 
the decentralised approach is that it may reduce the consistency and legal 
certainty of Articles‘ 101 and 102 TFEU enforcement. Although EU 
competition law‘s enforcement regime has abandoned the centralised 
approach, it is nevertheless difficult to conclude simply that the 
decentralised mechanism is better. This thesis further analysed the 
experience of the European Competition Network, which aims to guarantee 
the legal certainty in EU competition law‘s decentralisation era. 
The second part of this chapter examined the relationship between Federal 
and State antitrust enforcers under US federal antitrust law public 
enforcement. Although there is no such classification as ‗centralised 
approach‘ and ‗decentralised approach‘ under the US antitrust enforcement 
regime, debate on whether states should be empowered to enforce federal 
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See the Third Recital of Regulation 1/2003; see also, para. 24 of the White Paper.  
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antitrust law are also heated, especially after the Microsoft case.11 The 
states‘ comparative advantages when enforcing federal antitrust law may be 
summarised as: 1. familiarity with local markets; 2. familiarity with and 
representation of state and local institutions; 3. ability to provide monetary 
relief to injured individuals. The concerns of state enforcement of federal 
antitrust laws are equally significant. Firstly, the conflict between federal 
enforcers and State Attorneys General reduces the legal certainty of 
enforcement and brings additional costs to businesses. Secondly, it may 
cause state protectionism. Thirdly, state enforcers do not have the resources 
to enforce federal antitrust laws. Similar to EU experience, the US also 
developed a series of mechanisms to encourage cooperation and coordination 
between federal and state antitrust enforcers to reduce legal uncertainty. 
Before applying the above criteria to China‘s AML 2007‘s public 
enforcement regime, the thesis found two features in China that need to be 
considered during the discussion: 1. Chinese PAEs generally lack resources 
and capacity to enforce the AML 2007; and, 2. protectionism is a serious 
matter in China. In the light of  EU and US experience the thesis then 
discussed whether a centralised or  decentralised enforcement approach 
would be more suitable for Chinese AML 2007‘s public enforcement, given the 
considerations of the above two features. This chapter further analysed the 
case allocation mechanism, cooperation and coordination of PAEs and CAEs 
under the AML 2007. 
Chapter 4 seeks ways in which to improve the protection of rights of 
concerned parties under AML 2007 public enforcement. It firstly examined 
the rights of concerned parties during the administrative enforcement of 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The procedural rights of concerned parties under 
EU competition law include: 1. rights to be heard; 2. right of access to the 
                                         
11
 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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Commission‘s file; 3. legal professional privilege; and, 4. right against 
self-incrimination. Protection of the right to be heard is recognised as one of 
the basic principles of EU law.12 In EU competition law this right is protected 
by two mechanisms: the reply to the Statement of Objection and oral hearing. 
The oral hearing procedure has been criticised for lack of independence of 
the Hearing Officer and the lack of cross examination during the hearing. The 
right of access to the Commission‘s file is based on the concept of ‗equality of 
arms‘13 at common law. It is noteworthy that not all Commission files are 
accessible. The Commission‘s internal files, the file which contains business 
secrets and other confidential information should be kept from disclosure. 
Legal professional privilege also stems from common law tradition.14 Notably 
in EU competition law, this privilege cannot be applied to in-house lawyers. 
As regards the right against self-incrimination, the Court of Justice (the CJEU) 
adopts a rather narrow  interpretation and confirms that the Commission has 
the power to obtain ‗all necessary information‘15 from the parties concerned 
but cannot compel the parties to provide answers involving an admission of 
the infringement which it is incumbent upon the Commission to prove. 
The next part of this chapter examined the rights of concerned parties 
under US antitrust law. There are three kinds of procedure under US antitrust 
law‘s public enforcement: the Antitrust Division‘s criminal enforcement 
procedure, the Antitrust Division‘s civil enforcement procedure and the 
Federal Trade Commission (the FTC)‘s civil enforcement procedure. The 
                                         
12
 See, Protocol No 1 attaches the Charter, to the Treaty of Lisbon (TFEU) and accords it the 
same status as the Treaty, OJ 2000 C 364, p 1; see also, Article 6(2) TFEU.  
13
 See, E. Toma, ‗The Principle of Equality of Arms: Part of the Right to a Fair Trial‘, (2011) 
1(3) Law Review, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1931999, last visited on 
22/11/2012, 17:06.  
14
 I.e., the ‘oath and honour’ of the lawyer. See, T. Christoforou, ‗Protection of Legal Privilege 
in EEC Competition Law: The Imperfections of a Case‘ (1985) 9(1) Fordham International Law 
Journal, 1-62; at 3.   
15
 See, Article 18 of Reg.1/2003. 
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thesis analysed the rights of concerned parties under the three procedures 
and summed up five kinds of right of concerned parties: 1. the right to be 
heard; 2. the right of access to the file; 3. attorney-client privilege; 4. the 
right against self-incrimination; and, 5. the right against unreasonable search 
and seizure. Although the procedures of public enforcement of EU 
competition and US antitrust law are quite distinctive, the types of the right 
of concerned parties are generally the same, except the right against 
unreasonable search and seizure under US antitrust law. However, the scope 
and the way to safeguard these rights differ in the EU and US systems. Firstly, 
the oral hearing under the FTC‘s adjudicative procedure is conducted by an 
independent Administrative Law Judge (the ALJ); while under EU law the 
Hearing Officer is not as independent as the ALJ. Secondly, in US antitrust 
law the right of access to the file is safeguarded by its judicial or 
quasi-judicial procedural requirement and the judiciary; while the right of 
access to the file under EU competition law is protected by the Commission. 
Thirdly, attorney-client privilege under US antitrust law applies equally to 
in-house lawyers16 while under EU competition law such privilege only holds 
between client and independent lawyer. Finally, the scope of the right 
against self-incrimination under US antitrust law is wider than that under EU 
competition law. 
This chapter then turns to China and examines the current position of 
protection of right of concerned parties under the AML 2007 based on 
legislation and cases. The concerned parties under the AML 2007 only have 
two rights: the right to be heard and the right to be informed. In practice 
even these two rights are not protected. This thesis deems it is necessary to 
learn from the experience from both the EU and US to give sufficient 
                                         
16
Although such extension of this privilege is subject to criticisms, see for example, S.R. 
Weaver, ‗Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel: A Structural and Contextual Analysis‘, 
(1997) 46 Emory Law Journal, 1023-1052; at 1026-1027.   
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protection of the rights of concerned parties under the AML 2007. However, 
several facts related to China should be considered. For example, the AML 
2007 has just been enacted and the administrative enforcers (especially the 
SAIC and the NDRC) have not gained sufficient experience and thus a rigid 
enforcement policy may be preferable. In addition, the NDRC and the SAIC 
have met difficulties in investigation in practice with regard to collecting 
evidence in a secret cartel case.17 Finally, some rights enshrined in EU and US 
law are not recognised in China. In the light of above facts, the thesis 
discussed each right of concerned parties examined above in order to 
determine what can be learned by the AML 2007‘s public enforcement 
regime. 
Following the above discussion, it became necessary to propose some 
recommendations on how to allocate the enforcement authority of the AML 
2007 between CAEs and PAEs as well as how to provide sufficient protection 
of rights of concerned parties under the AML 2007.   
1. How to provide transparency of merger control enforcement under the 
AML 2007  
Transparency during the investigative procedure 
In order to provide transparency of the merger investigative procedure 
under the AML 2007, the author argued, the MOFCOM should publish the 
statistics on investigation as an initial step towards a transparent procedure. 
The statistics include: the number of notifications received; the number of 
phase I investigations conducted; and, 3. the number of cases accessed to the 
second phase investigation.18 However, mere disclosure of statistics is not 
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 See, the TravelSky case, in The Economic Observer, 15th, May, 2009. 
18
 See, ‗3.3.2 What can be learned to improve the transparency of Chinese merger 
enforcement procedure‘ of Chapter 2.  
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enough. The MOFCOM should disclose promptly and regularly a summary of 
information on the notification and the explanation of its decisions on 
whether to clear a merger or investigate it in the second phase. In this way 
the public, the potential merging parties and other practitioners could see 
and evaluate the MOFCOM‘s enforcement and be given legal certainty and 
predictability of the MOFCOM‘s merger enforcement, and thus the merger 
policy would be better respected.        
Transparency of the MOFCOM’s decision 
In relation to cleared mergers, the MOFCOM should not only disclose the 
name of the merging parties, but also, as in EU practice, provide more 
information on the nature of the transaction, a statement of the 
transaction‘s competitive impact, and the main reason for offering clearance. 
Such disclosure is especially important when the MOFCOM clears a merger 
after the second phase investigation. 
Where the decision blocks a merger or clears it with conditions, although 
the MOFCOM is obliged to publish them timely, the decision itself lacks 
necessary information especially with regard to the explanation of the 
definition of relevant market, competitive impact and the remedies. In order 
to improve the situation, after comparison of Panasonic/Sanyo, the author 
made the following suggestions. Firstly, the MOFCOM should provide the 
definition of relevant product market and relevant geographic market. 
Secondly, the MOFCOM should give a sound analysis on the competitive 
impact of the proposed transaction. Such analysis might include: 1. the 
market shares and ability of other major competitors; 2. whether the 
merging parties are close competitors and the reasons; 3. whether the 
market is growing and the evidence; 4. whether the relevant market is highly 
concentrated and the reasons; 5. whether new competitors will enter the 
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market and the reasons. Thirdly, if the decision contains remedies, the 
MOFCOM should disclose the original remedies proposed by the merging 
parties and its assessment and an explanation of how the remedies will 
effectively eliminate the anticompetitive effects brought by the transaction. 
This chapter has provided solutions to the two problems of transparency 
under Chinese merger control procedure: lack of transparency during the 
MOFCOM‘s investigation and lack of disclosure of information in the 
MOFCOM‘s decisions. The public and practitioners in the market would 
benefit from a more transparent merger control regime for the increasing of 
legal certainty and predictability; on the other hand, the improvement of 
transparency of the procedure would equally help the MOFCOM to establish 
its creditability when enforcing the AML 2007, especially when it is young and 
its decisions of which are often suspected of being influenced by the 
government.   
2. How to allocate the enforcement authority of the AML 2007 between 
the administrative enforcers at central and provincial governmental 
levels. 
A centralised enforcement approach is more appropriate for the AML 2007 
at current stage 
When considering the advantages and disadvantages of the centralised and 
the decentralised enforcement approaches summarised from the experience 
of EU competition law and US antitrust law for the Chinese AML 2007, the 
thesis concluded that a centralised enforcement mechanism may be more 
appropriate than the decentralised approach. Firstly, the concerns raised by 
the centralised enforcement approach faced by the previous EU competition 
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law regime under Regulation 17/6219 seem to be less significant in AML 
2007‘s public enforcement since the administrative workload is not so high in 
China. Secondly, the advantages that a centralised enforcement approach 
brought are valuable for the enforcement of the AML 2007. For example, it 
may prevent provincial protectionism in China and guarantee a consistent 
and unified enforcement of the AML 2007 and thus provide necessary legal 
certainty. Thirdly, the main concern of a decentralised approach, i.e. 
reduction of legal certainty and consistency of enforcement, seems to be 
fatal especially for a new and unfledged competition law regime such as 
China‘s AML 2007. Finally, the advantages such as regulatory competition and 
experimentation that are brought by a decentralised approach to EU and US 
seem to be less significant to China because of the incapability of the PAEs to 
enforce the AML 2007.  
A specific design of a centralised enforcement approach for China’s AML 
2007 
Given that the above conclusion reached, this thesis provided a specific 
institutional design of a centralised enforcement approach for the AML 2007. 
Under this approach the CAEs are the main enforcers of the AML 2007. They 
may enforce the Law by themselves or authorise the PAEs to enforce it. The 
AML 2007 is not directly enforceable by the PAEs. Firstly, the PAEs‘ 
enforcement actions are supervised by the CAEs. For example, the PAEs 
should obtain the authorisation from the CAEs before its first formal antitrust 
investigation; the PAEs should inform the CAEs before taking a decision on 
enforcement; the PAEs should respect and follow the precedent made by the 
CAEs. In addition, if the CAEs think that a PAE is not enforcing the AML 2007 
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Since a centralised enforcement approach never existed in US federal antitrust law, the 
advantages of this approach are mainly based on the examination on the public enforcement 
of EU competition law under Regulation 17/62.   
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properly, they may issue a guidance letter to the PAE to help it enforce the 
Law. Secondly, during PAE enforcement a CAE should have the power to 
withdraw the authorisation and therefore relieve the PAE(s) of its duty to 
enforce the Law. However, the CAEs should initiate such proceeding 
cautiously. 
This thesis also argued that China should adopt an ex ante notification 
system is similar to the previous EU notification system under Regulation 
17/62. There are four reasons. Firstly, anticompetitive agreements, decisions 
or concerted practice can be examined before they come into practice; 
secondly, undertakings or associations of undertakings would be relieved of 
self-examination of their possible anticompetitive conduct; thirdly, this 
notification process might spread the sense? of antitrust and make the AML 
2007 known to undertakings or associations of undertakings and lawyers in 
China; fourthly, the heavy administrative burden faced by EU competition 
law‘s notification system does not exist under AML 2007 enforcement.   
Case allocation mechanism and cooperation of PAEs and the CAEs 
This thesis further discussed the case allocation mechanism and the 
cooperation and coordination of CAEs and the PAEs.  EU and US systems 
show that the general principles are: 1. that CAEs should authorise PAEs 
which stands closest to the centre of gravity of the violation in question to 
enforce the Law when the suspected violation only has an effect within its 
territory; 2. if a violation of the Law has a nationwide effect, the CAEs should 
investigate the case and/or cooperate with the PAEs; 3. If the violation in 
question is between two or several provinces but do not have a national 
effect, the PAEs in these provinces should be authorised to enforce the Law 
in a cooperative and coordinative manner. The thesis also suggested that a 
Chinese Antimonopoly Network (the CAN) should be established to encourage 
Chapter 5 Conclusion 
287 
 
cooperation and coordination of CAEs and PAEs. The CAN should have three 
purposes: 1. to allocate antitrust cases within the network; 2.to exchange 
information between CAEs and PAEs efficiently; 3. to help the PAEs to 
enforce the AML 2007 effectively. 
To this end this chapter has provided a set of solutions to the second 
technical problem met by the AML 2007‘s public enforcement: how to 
allocate the enforcement authority of the AML 2007 between CAEs and PAEs.  
3. How to establish the rights of concerned parties under the AML 2007’s 
public enforcement  
Chapter 4 made a series of suggestions to establish the protection of rights 
of concerned parties under the AML 2007 enforcement regime with reference 
to EU and US experience. Firstly, in order to provide the protection of the 
concerned parties‘ right to be heard, Chinese administrative enforcers should 
inform the parties of the concerned matters after the investigation by a 
statement of objection if the investigation may lead to any decision 
containing sanction. The concerned parties should also be obliged to reply to 
this statement in order to guarantee this right. In addition, the oral hearing 
needs to be more impartial. To this end AML 2007 enforcers might consider 
establishing a designated hearing department which is sufficiently 
independent of the investigators of the case. The parties concerned in the 
hearing should also have the right to question the investigators and the 
evidence against them instead of merely defending themselves. The 
investigators must answer the questions raised by the parties concerned. 
Thirdly, the right of access to the file should be given to the concerned 
parties under the AML 2007, given its importance to the protection of right to 
be heard. However, business secrets, the administrative enforcers‘ internal 
documents and other confidential information should be protected from 
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disclosure.20 Fourthly, AML 2007 enforcers should permit the protection of 
legal professional privilege to a limited extent. Such limitations might 
stipulate: 1. that privileged communication be made for the purpose of 
protecting the right of concerned parties; 2. legal advice should be given by 
lawyers who are entitled to practise in China; 3. Chinese in-house lawyers 
might not claim this privilege; 4. privileged communication should be written 
and be made after the initiation of investigation. Fifthly, it is too early for 
the AML 2007 public enforcement regime to adopt the privilege against 
self-incrimination and the privilege against unreasonable search and seizure. 
It is recommended that these two privileges should not be applied to the AML 
2007‘s public enforcement until they have been firmly established in Chinese 
Criminal Procedure Law. Chapter 4 has addressed the technical problem 
raised in the introduction of the thesis, i.e. how to establish the rights of 
concerned parties under the AML 2007‘s public enforcement. 
As the three technical problems have been dealt with, the transparency of 
the merger enforcement has been established; more legal certainty and 
predictability will be provided to the public and potential merging parties 
accordingly. In addition, the relationship between central and provincial 
governmental enforcers has become clearer; case allocation between the 
CAEs and PAEs has been clearer and more consistent; cooperation and 
coordination of CAEs and PAEs has been encouraged in a consistent and 
effective way. Moreover, protection of rights of concerned parties under the 
AML 2007 has been secured. The thesis has contributed to a more effective, 
transparent and fair public enforcement procedure under the AML 2007. 
Chinese legislators and administrative enforcers of the AML 2007 might 
                                         
20
As indicated in Chapter 3 the protection of the administrative enforcers‘ internal files is 
conditional. Administrative enforcers of the AML 2007 should assess the risk of disclosure and 
protection of the concerned parties‘ right to be heard and provide sufficient reason for denial of 
access to internal documents. See, ‗4.3.3 Right of access to the file under the AML 2007‘, 
Chapter 3.  
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consider formulating a specific procedural regulation for the AML 2007‘s 
public enforcement to address these problems based on the examinations in 
this thesis. 
The solutions suggested in this thesis may need further analysis. For 
example, in relation to case allocation between the CAEs and the PAEs, the 
thesis did not provide a comprehensive discussion of the definition of 
‗nationwide effect‘ which is an important factor in case allocation.21 In 
relation to  discussion of the rights of concerned parties under the AML 
2007‘s , although it has been argued that it is too early to grant the right 
against self-incrimination to  parties concerned, it has not been suggested 
when would be appropriate to grant this right. 
Although the purpose of this thesis is to examine the technical problems 
raised by the AML 2007‘s public enforcement, it has to be accepted that for 
reasons of space and time this thesis has only focused on three most obvious 
technical problems. There are other technical problems which may also be 
comparable to EU competition and the US antitrust law, such as lack of 
professionalism. The author also believes that with the continuous 
development of the AML 2007 enforcement, more technical problems will 
emerge. 
Nor does this thesis address the structural problems of the AML 2007. 
Therefore, in a more general sense, (public enforcement of) the AML 2007 
still faces serious challenges. For example, lack of independent and effective 
judicial review will weaken the effectiveness of the public enforcement 
regime of the AML 2007 since it is the only external balance within an 
administrative orientated enforcement mechanism. Moreover the close 
relationship between AML 2007 public enforcers, sector regulators and SOEs 
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 See, ‗4.4 Case allocation between CAEs and PAEs: a basic principle‘ in Chapter 3.  
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may weaken public enforcers‘ incentive to enforce the AML 2007.22 It seems 
that the structural problems may have a more significant influence on the 
effectiveness of the AML 2007‘s public enforcement. However, EU 
competition law and US antitrust law regimes will not have comparability 
with regard to such structural problems. To address them, the author 
considers that it would be appropriate for China to choose competition law 
regimes which have experienced the transitional period from planned 
economy to market economy, for example, the competition law regime of 
Poland23 or Russia, which would be a totally different topic from that of this 
thesis. All these show that there is a need for more research on the public 
enforcement of the AML 2007, to improve it further.  
                                         
22
 For a more detailed discussion on this issue, please see, J.F. Li, ‗Sector regulation and 
Chinese Antimonopoly Law‘s enforcement structure [产业规制视角下的中国反垄断执法架构, 
chanyegunzhi shijiaoxiade zhongguo fanlongduafa zhifajiagou]‘, (2010) 2 Studies in Law and 
Business, 32-43.   
23
 For a comparative study of competition laws between China and Poland, please refer to B. 
Song, ‗Competition Policy in a Transitional Economy: the Case of China‘, (1995) 31 Stanford 
Journal of International Law, 387-422. 
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APPENDIX: KEY SUBSTATIVE LEGISLATIONS (EXCERPTS) 
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA  
Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China 
(Adopted at the 29th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 10th National 
People''s Congress of the People's Republic of China on August 30, 2007) 
Translated by China.org.cn, available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/government/laws/2009-02/10/content_17254169.
htm,  last visited on 7th March, 2013.   
Chapter I General Provisions 
Article 1 This Law is enacted for the purpose of preventing and restraining 
monopolistic conducts, protecting fair competition in the market, enhancing 
economic efficiency, safeguarding the interests of consumers and social 
public interest, promoting the healthy development of the socialist market 
economy. 
Article 2 This Law shall be applicable to monopolistic conducts in economic 
activities within the People's Republic of China. 
This Law shall apply to the conducts outside the territory of the People's 
Republic of China if they eliminate or have restrictive effect on competition 
on the domestic market of the PRC. 
Article 3 For the purposes of this Law, "monopolistic conducts" are defined as 
the following: 
(1) monopolistic agreements among business operators; 
Appendix and Bibliography 
292 
 
(2) abuse of dominant market positions by business operators; and, 
(3) concentration of business operators that eliminates or restricts 
competition or might be eliminating or restricting competition. 
Article 4 The State constitutes and carries out competition rules which accord 
with the socialist market economy, perfects macro-control, and advances a 
unified, open, competitive and orderly market system. 
Article 5 Business operators may, through fair competition, voluntary alliance，
concentrate themselves according to law, expand the scope of business 
operations, and enhance competitiveness. 
Article 6 Any business with a dominant position may not abuse that dominant 
position to eliminate, or restrict competition. 
Article 7 With respect to the industries controlled by the State-owned 
economy and concerning the lifeline of national economy and national 
security or the industries implementing exclusive operation and sales 
according to law, the state protects the lawful business operations conducted 
by the business operators therein. The state also lawfully regulates and 
controls their business operations and the prices of their commodities and 
services so as to safeguard the interests of consumers and promote technical 
progresses. 
The business operators as mentioned above shall lawfully operate, be honest 
and faithful, be strictly self-disciplined, accept social supervision, shall not 
damage the interests of consumers by virtue of their dominant or exclusive 
positions. 
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Article 8 No administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or 
administrative regulation to administer public affairs may abuse its 
administrative powers to eliminate or restrict competition. 
Article 9 The State Council shall establish the Anti-monopoly Commission, 
which is in charge of organizing, coordinating, guiding anti-monopoly work, 
performs the following functions: 
(1) studying and drafting related competition policies; 
(2) organizing the investigation and assessment of overall competition 
situations in the market, and issuing assessment reports; 
(3) constituting and issuing anti-monopoly guidelines; 
(4) coordinating anti-monopoly administrative law enforcement; and 
(5) other functions as assigned by the State Council. 
The State Council shall stipulate composition and working rules of the 
Anti-monopoly Commission. 
Article 10 The anti-monopoly authority designated by the State Council 
(hereinafter referred to as the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State 
Council) shall be in charge of anti-monopoly law enforcement in accordance 
with this Law. 
The Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council) may, when needed, 
authorize the corresponding authorities in the people''s governments of the 
provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central 
Government to take charge of anti-monopoly law enforcement in accordance 
with this Law. 
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Article 11 A trade association shall intensify industrial self-discipline, guide 
business operators to lawfully compete, safeguard the competition order in 
the market. 
Article 12 For the purposes of this Law, ‗business operator‘ refers to a natural 
person, legal person, or any other organization that is in the engagement of 
commodities production or operation or service provision, and ‗relevant 
market‘ refers to the commodity scope or territorial scope within which the 
business operators compete against each other during a certain period of 
time for specific commodities or services (hereinafter generally referred to 
as "commodities"). 
Chapter II Monopoly Agreement 
Article 13 Any of the following monopoly agreements among the competing 
business operators shall be prohibited: 
(1) fixing or changing prices of commodities; 
(2) limiting the output or sales of commodities; 
(3) dividing the sales market or the raw material procurement market; 
(4) restricting the purchase of new technology or new facilities or the 
development of new technology or new products; 
(5) making boycott transactions; or 
(6) other monopoly agreements as determined by the Anti-monopoly 
Authority under the State Council. 
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For the purposes of this Law, ‗monopoly agreements‘ refer to agreements, 
decisions or other concerted actions which eliminate or restrict competition. 
Article 14 Any of the following agreements among business operators and 
their trading parties are prohibited: 
(1) fixing the price of commodities for resale to a third party; 
(2) restricting the minimum price of commodities for resale to a third party; 
or 
(3) other monopoly agreements as determined by the Anti-monopoly 
Authority under the State Council. 
Article 15 An agreement among business operators shall be exempted from 
application of articles 13 and 14 if it can be proven to be in any of the 
following circumstances: 
(1) for the purpose of improving technologies, researching and developing 
new products; 
(2) for the purpose of upgrading product quality, reducing cost, improving 
efficiency, unifying product specifications or standards, or carrying out 
professional labor division; 
(3) for the purpose of enhancing operational efficiency and reinforcing the 
competitiveness of small and medium-sized business operators; 
(4) for the purpose of achieving public interests such as conserving energy, 
protecting the environment and relieving the victims of a disaster and so on; 
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(5) for the purpose of mitigating serious decrease in sales volume or obviously 
excessive production during economic recessions; 
(6) for the purpose of safeguarding the justifiable interests in the foreign 
trade or foreign economic cooperation; or 
(7) other circumstances as stipulated by laws and the State Council. 
Where a monopoly agreement is in any of the circumstances stipulated in 
Items 1 through 5 and is exempt from Articles 13 and 14 of this Law, the 
business operators must additionally prove that the agreement can enable 
consumers to share the interests derived from the agreement, and will not 
severely restrict the competition in relevant market. 
Article 16 Any trade association may not organize the business operators in its 
own industry to implement the monopolistic conduct as prohibited by this 
Chapter. 
Chapter III Abuse of Market Dominance 
Article 17 A business operator with a dominant market position shall not 
abuse its dominant market position to conduct following acts: 
(1) selling commodities at unfairly high prices or buying commodities at 
unfairly low prices; 
(2) selling products at prices below cost without any justifiable cause; 
(3) refusing to trade with a trading party without any justifiable cause; 
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(4) requiring a trading party to trade exclusively with itself or trade 
exclusively with a designated business operator(s) without any justifiable 
cause; 
(5) tying products or imposing unreasonable trading conditions at the time of 
trading without any justifiable cause; 
(6) applying dissimilar prices or other transaction terms to counterparties 
with equal standing; 
(7) other conducts determined as abuse of a dominant position by the 
Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council. 
For the purposes of this Law, "dominant market position" refers to a market 
position held by a business operator having the capacity to control the price, 
quantity or other trading conditions of commodities in relevant market, or to 
hinder or affect any other business operator to enter the relevant market. 
Article 18 The dominant market status shall be determined according to the 
following factors: 
(1) the market share of a business operator in relevant market, and the 
competition situation of the relevant market; 
(2) the capacity of a business operator to control the sales markets or the raw 
material procurement market; 
(3) the financial and technical conditions of the business operator; 
(4) the degree of dependence of other business operators upon of the 
business operator in transactions; 
Appendix and Bibliography 
298 
 
(5) the degree of difficulty for other business operators to enter the relevant 
market; and 
(6) other factors related to determine a dominant market position of the said 
business operator. 
Article 19 Where a business operator is under any of the following 
circumstances, it may be assumed to be have a dominant market position: 
(1) the relevant market share of a business operator accounts for1/2 or above 
in the relevant market; 
(2) the joint relevant market share of two business operators accounts for 2/3 
or above; or 
(3) the joint relevant market share of three business operators accounts for 
3/4 or above. 
A business operator with a market share of less than 1/10 shall not be 
presumed as having a dominant market position even if they fall within the 
scope of second or third item. 
Where a business operator who has been presumed to have a dominant 
market position can otherwise prove that they do not have a dominant 
market, it shall not be determined as having a dominant market position. 
Chapter IV Concentration of Business operators 
Article 20 A concentration refers to the following circumstances: 
(1) the merger of business operators; 
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(2) acquiring control over other business operators by virtue of acquiring their 
equities or assets; or, 
(3) acquiring control over other business operators or possibility of exercising 
decisive influence on other business operators by virtue of contact or any 
other means. 
Article 21 Where a concentration reaches the threshold of declaration 
stipulated by the State Council, a declaration must be lodged in advance with 
the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council, or otherwise the 
concentration shall not be implemented. 
Article 22 Where a concentration is under any of the following circumstances, 
it may not be declared to the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State 
Council: 
(1) one business operator who is a party to the concentration has the power 
to exercise more than half the voting rights of every other business operator, 
whether of the equity or the assets; or, 
(2) one business operator who is not a party to the concentration has the 
power to exercise more than half the voting rights of every business operator 
concerned, whether of the equity or the assets. 
Article 23 A business operator shall, when lodge a concentration declaration 
with the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council, submit the 
following documents and materials: 
(1) a declaration paper; 
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(2) explanations on the effect of the concentration on the relevant market 
competition; 
(3) the agreement of concentration; 
(4) the financial reports and accounting reports of the proceeding accounting 
year of the business operator; and 
(5) other documents and materials as stipulated by the Anti-monopoly 
Authority under the State Council. 
Such items shall be embodied in the declaration paper as the name, domicile 
and business scopes of the business operators involved in the concentration 
as well as the date of the scheduled concentration and other items as 
stipulated by the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council. 
Article 24 Where the documents or materials submitted by a business 
operator are incomplete, it shall submit the rest of the documents and 
materials within the time limit stipulated by the Anti-monopoly Authority 
under the State Council; otherwise, the declaration shall be deemed as not 
filed. 
Article 25 The Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council shall conduct 
a preliminary review of the declared concentration of business operators, 
make a decision whether to conduct further review and notify the business 
operators in written form within 30 days upon receipt of the documents and 
materials submitted by the business operators pursuant to Article 23 of this 
Law. Before such a decision made by the Anti-monopoly Authority under the 
State Council, the concentration may be not implemented. 
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Where the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council decides not to 
conduct further review or fails to make a decision at expiry of the stipulated 
period, the concentration may be implemented. 
Article 26 Where the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council 
decides to conduct further review, they shall, within 90 days from the date of 
decision, complete the review, make a decision on whether to prohibit the 
concentration, and notify the business operators concerned of the decision in 
written form. A decision of prohibition shall be attached with reasons 
therefor. Within the review period the concentration may not be 
implemented. 
Under any of the following circumstances, the Anti-monopoly Authority under 
the State Council may notify the business operators in written form that the 
time limit as stipulated in the preceding paragraph may be extended to no 
more than 60 days: 
(1) the business operators concerned agree to extend the time limit; 
(2) the documents or materials submitted are inaccurate and need further 
verification; 
(3) things have significantly changed after declaration. 
If the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council fails to make a 
decision at expiry of the period, the concentration may be implemented. 
Article 27 In the case of the examination on the concentration of business 
operators, it shall consider the relevant elements as follows: 
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(1) the market share of the business operators involved in the relevant 
market and the controlling power thereof over that market, 
(2) the degree of market concentration in the relevant market, 
(3) the influence of the concentration of business operators on the market 
access and technological progress, 
(4) the influence of the concentration of business operators on the consumers 
and other business operators, 
(5) the influence of the concentration of business operators on the national 
economic development, and 
(6) other elements that may have an effect on the market competition and 
shall be taken into account as regarded by the Anti-monopoly Authority under 
the State Council. 
Article 28 Where a concentration has or may have effect of eliminating or 
restricting competition, the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council 
shall make a decision to prohibit the concentration. However, if the business 
operators concerned can prove that the concentration will bring more 
positive impact than negative impact on competition, or the concentration is 
pursuant to public interests, the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State 
Council may decide not to prohibit the concentration. 
Article 29 Where the concentration is not prohibited, the Anti-monopoly 
Authority under the State Council may decide to attach restrictive conditions 
for reducing the negative impact of such concentration on competition. 
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Article 30 Where the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council 
decides to prohibit a concentration or attaches restrictive conditions on 
concentration, it shall publicize such decisions to the general public in a 
timely manner. 
Article 31 Where a foreign investor merges and acquires a domestic 
enterprise or participate in concentration by other means, if state security is 
involved, besides the examination on the concentration in accordance with 
this Law, the examination on national security shall also be conducted in 
accordance with the relevant State provisions. 
Chapter V Abuse of Administrative Power to Eliminate or Restrict Competition 
Article 32 Any administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or 
administrative regulation to administer public affairs may not abuse its 
administrative power, restrict or restrict in a disguised form entities and 
individuals to operate, purchase or use the commodities provided by business 
operators designated by it. 
Article 33 Any administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or an 
administrative regulation to administer public affairs may not have any of the 
following conducts by abusing its administrative power to block free 
circulation of commodities between regions: 
(1) imposing discriminative charge items, discriminative charge standards or 
discriminative prices upon commodities from outside the locality, 
(2) imposing such technical requirements and inspection standards upon 
commodities from outside the locality as different from those upon local 
commodities of the same classification, or taking such discriminative 
technical measures as repeated inspections or repeated certifications to 
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commodities from outside the locality, so as to restrict them to enter local 
market, 
(3) exerting administrative licensing specially on commodities from outside 
the locality so as to restrict them to enter local market, 
(4) setting barriers or taking other measures so as to hamper commodities 
from outside the locality from entering the local market or local commodities 
from moving outside the local region, or 
(5) other conducts for the purpose of hampering commodities from free 
circulation between regions. 
Article 34 Any administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or 
administrative regulation to administer public affairs may not abuse its 
administrative power to reject or restrict business operators from outside the 
locality to participate in local tendering and bidding activities by such means 
as imposing discriminative qualification requirements or assessment 
standards or releasing information in an unlawful manner. 
Article 35 Any administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or 
administrative regulation to administer public affairs may not abuse its 
administrative power to reject or restrict business operators from outside the 
locality to invest or set up branches in the locality by imposing unequal 
treatment thereupon compared to that upon local business operators. 
Article 36 Any administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or 
administrative regulation to administer public affairs may not abuse its 
administrative power to force business operators to engage in the 
monopolistic conducts as prescribed in this Law. 
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Article 37 Any administrative organ may not abuse its administrative power to 
set down such provisions in respect of eliminating or restricting competition. 
Chapter VI Investigation into the Suspicious Monopolistic Conducts 
Article 38 The anti-monopoly authority shall make investigations into 
suspicious monopolistic conducts in accordance with law. 
Any entity or individual may report suspicious monopolistic conducts to the 
anti-monopoly authority. The anti-monopoly authority shall keep the 
informer confidential. 
Where an informer makes the reporting in written form and provides relevant 
facts and evidences, the anti-monopoly authority shall make necessary 
investigation. 
Article 39 The anti-monopoly authority may take any of the following 
measures in investigating suspicious monopolistic conducts: 
(1) conducting the inspection by getting into the business premises of 
business operators under investigation or by getting into any other relevant 
place, 
(2) inquiring of the business operators under investigation, interested parties, 
or other relevant entities or individuals, and requiring them to explain the 
relevant conditions, 
(3) consulting and duplicating the relevant documents, agreements, account 
books, business correspondences and electronic data, etc. of the business 
operators under investigation, interested parties and other relevant entities 
or individuals, 
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(4) seizing and detaining relevant evidence, and 
(5) inquiring about the business operators'' bank accounts under investigation. 
Before the measures as prescribed in the preceding paragraph are approved, 
a written report shall be submitted to the chief person(s)-in-charge of the 
anti-monopoly authority. 
Article 40 When inspecting suspicious monopolistic conducts, there shall be 
at least two law enforcers, and they shall show their law enforcement 
certificates. 
When inquiring about and investigating suspicious monopolistic conducts, law 
enforcers shall make notes thereon, which shall bear the signatures of the 
persons under inquiry or investigation. 
Article 41 The anti-monopoly authority and functionaries thereof shall be 
obliged to keep confidential the trade secrets they have access to during the 
course of the law enforcement. 
Article 42 Business operators, interested parties and other relevant entities 
and individuals under investigation shall show cooperation with the 
anti-monopoly authority in performing its functions, and may not reject or 
hamper the investigation by the anti-monopoly authority. 
Article 43 Business operators, interested parties under investigation have the 
right to voice their opinions. The anti-monopoly authority shall verify the 
facts, reasons and evidences provided by the business operators, interested 
parties under investigation. 
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Article 44 Where the anti-monopoly authority deems that a monopolistic 
conduct is constituted after investigating and verifying a suspicious 
monopolistic conduct, it shall make a decision on how to deal with the 
monopolistic conduct, and publicize it. 
Article 45 As regards a suspicious monopolistic conduct that the 
anti-monopoly authority is investigating, if the business operators under 
investigation promise to eliminate the impact of the conduct by taking 
specific measures within the time limit prescribed by the anti-monopoly 
authority, the anti-monopoly authority may decide to suspend the 
investigation. The decision on suspending the investigation shall specify the 
specific measures as promised by the business operators under investigation. 
Where the anti-monopoly authority decides to suspend the investigation, it 
shall supervise the implementation of the promise by the relevant business 
operators. If the business operators keep their promise, the anti-monopoly 
authority may decide to terminate the investigation. 
However, the anti-monopoly authority shall resume the investigation, where 
(1) the business operators fail to implement the promise, 
(2) significant changes have taken place to the facts based on which the 
decision on suspending the investigation was made; or 
(3) the decision on suspending the investigation was made based on 
incomplete or inaccurate information provided by the business operators. 
Chapter VII Legal Liabilities 
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Article 46 Where business operators reach an monopoly agreement and 
perform it in violation of this Law, the anti-monopoly authority shall order 
them to cease doing so, and shall confiscate the illegal gains and impose a 
fine of 1% up to 10% of the sales revenue in the previous year. Where the 
reached monopoly agreement has not been performed, a fine of less than 
500,000 yuan shall be imposed. 
Where any business operator voluntarily reports the conditions on reaching 
the monopoly agreement and provides important evidences to the 
anti-monopoly authority, it may be imposed a mitigated punishment or 
exemption from punishment as the case may be. 
Where a guild help the achievement of a monopoly agreement by business 
operators in its own industry in violation of this Law, a fine of less than 
500,000 yuan shall be imposed thereupon by the anti-monopoly authority; in 
case of serious circumstances, the social group registration authority may 
deregister the guild. 
Article 47 Where any business operator abuses its dominant market status in 
violation of this Law, it shall be ordered to cease doing so. The anti-monopoly 
authority shall confiscate its illegal gains and impose thereupon a fine of 1% 
up to 10% of the sales revenue in the previous year. 
Article 48 Where any business operator implements concentration in violation 
of this Law, the anti-monopoly authority shall order it to cease doing so, to 
dispose of shares or assets, transfer the business or take other necessary 
measures to restore the market situation before the concentration within a 
time limit, and may impose a fine of less than 500,000 yuan. 
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Article 49 The specific amount of the fines as prescribed in Articles 46 
through 48 shall be determined in consideration of such factors as the nature, 
extent and duration of the violations. 
Article 50 Where any loss was caused by a business operator's monopolistic 
conducts to other entities and individuals, the business operator shall assume 
the civil liabilities. 
Article 51 Where any administrative organ or an organization empowered by a 
law or administrative regulation to administer public affairs abuses its 
administrative power to eliminate or restrict competition, the superior 
authority thereof shall order it to make correction and impose punishments 
on the directly liable person(s)-in-charge and other directly liable persons. 
The anti-monopoly authority may put forward suggestions on handling 
according to law to the relevant superior authority. 
Where it is otherwise provided in a law or administrative regulation for the 
handling the organization empowered by a law or administrative regulation 
to administer public affairs who abuses its administrative power to eliminate 
or restrict competition, such provisions shall prevail. 
Article 52 As regards the inspection and investigation by the anti-monopoly 
authority, if business operators refuse to provide related materials and 
information, provide fraudulent materials or information, conceal, destroy or 
remove evidence, or refuse or obstruct investigation in other ways, the 
anti-monopoly authority shall order them to make rectification, impose a fine 
of less than 20,000 yuan on individuals, and a fine of less than 200,000 yuan 
on entities; and in case of serious circumstances, the anti-monopoly authority 
may impose a fine of 20,000 yuan up to 100,000 yuan on individuals, and a 
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fine of 200,000 yuan up to one million yuan on entities; where a crime is 
constituted, the relevant business operators shall assume criminal liabilities. 
Article 53 Where any party concerned objects to the decision made by the 
anti-monopoly authority in accordance with Articles 28 and 29 of this Law, it 
may first apply for an administrative reconsideration; if it objects to the 
reconsideration decision, it may lodge an administrative lawsuit in 
accordance with law. 
Where any party concerned is dissatisfied with any decision made by the 
anti-monopoly authority other than the decisions prescribed in the preceding 
paragraph, it may lodge an application for administrative reconsideration or 
initiate an administrative lawsuit in accordance with law. 
Article 54 Where any functionary of the anti-monopoly authority abuses 
his/her power, neglects his/her duty, seeks private benefits, or discloses 
trade secrets he/she has access to during the process of law enforcement, 
and a crime is constituted, he/she shall be subject to the criminal liability; 
where no crime is constituted, he/she shall be imposed upon a disciplinary 
sanction. 
Chapter VIII Supplementary Provisions 
Article 55 This Law does not govern the conduct of business operators to 
exercise their intellectual property rights under laws and relevant 
administrative regulations on intellectual property rights; however, business 
operators'' conduct to eliminate or restrict market competition by abusing 
their intellectual property rights shall be governed by this Law. 
Article 56 This Law does not govern the ally or concerted actions of 
agricultural producers and rural economic organizations in the economic 
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activities such as production, processing, sales, transportation and storage of 
agricultural products. 
Article 57 This Law shall enter into force as of August 1, 2008. 
 
THE EUROPEAN UNION  
Article 101(ex Article 81 TEC) 
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: 
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between 
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market, and in 
particular those which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading 
conditions; 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or 
investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
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2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be 
automatically void. 
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in 
the case of: 
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings, 
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings, 
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to 
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair 
share of the resulting benefit, and which does not: 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not 
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in 
respect of a substantial part of the products in question. 
Article 102 (ex Article 82 TEC) 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade 
between Member States. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
Appendix and Bibliography 
313 
 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other 
unfair trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other 
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
THE UNITED STATES  
The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7  
Section 1 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or 
engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall 
be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished 
by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, 
$1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said 
punishments, in the discretion of the court.   
Section 2 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire with any other person or persons,  to  monopolize  any  part  of  
Appendix and Bibliography 
314 
 
the  trade  or  commerce  among  the  several  States,  or  with  
foreign  nations, shall  be  deemed  guilty  of  a  felony,  and,  on  
conviction  thereof,  shall  be  punished  by  fine  not  exceeding 
$100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by 
imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the 
discretion of the court.   
The Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 
Section 3 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of 
such commerce, to lease or make a sale  or  contract  for  sale  of  
goods,  wares,  merchandise,  machinery,  supplies,  or  other  
commodities,  whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption, or 
resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of 
Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the 
United States, or fix a price  charged  therefor,  or  discount  from,  or  
rebate  upon,  such  price,  on  the  condition,  agreement,  or 
understanding  that  the  lessee  or  purchaser  thereof  shall  not  
use  or  deal  in  the  goods,  wares,  merchandise, machinery, 
supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or 
seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such 
condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce. 
Section 7 
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall 
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other 
share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade 
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Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another 
person engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, 
where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any 
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to 
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly. 
No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the 
stock or other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of 
one or more persons engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting 
commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting 
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition, of 
such stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock by the voting or granting of 
proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend 
to create a monopoly. 
This section shall not apply to persons purchasing such stock solely for 
investment and not using the same by voting or otherwise to bring about, or 
in attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition. Nor 
shall anything contained in this section prevent a corporation engaged in 
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce from causing the formation 
of subsidiary corporations for the actual carrying on of their immediate 
lawful business, or the natural and legitimate branches or extensions thereof, 
or from owning and holding all or a part of the stock of such subsidiary 
corporations, when the effect of such formation is not to substantially lessen 
competition. 
Nor shall anything herein contained be construed to prohibit any common 
carrier subject to the laws to regulate commerce from aiding in the 
construction of branches or short lines so located as to become feeders to the 
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main line of the company so aiding in such construction or from acquiring or 
owning all or any part of the stock of such branch lines, nor to prevent any 
such common carrier from acquiring and owning all or any part of the stock of 
a branch or short line constructed by an independent company where there is 
no substantial competition between the company owning the branch line so 
constructed and the company owning the main line acquiring the property or 
an interest therein, nor to prevent such common carrier from extending any 
of its lines through the medium of the acquisition of stock or otherwise of any 
other common carrier where there is no substantial competition between the 
company extending its lines and the company whose stock, property, or an 
interest therein is so acquired. 
Nothing contained in this section shall be held to affect or impair any right 
heretofore legally acquired: Provided, That nothing in this section shall be 
held or construed to authorize or make lawful anything heretofore prohibited 
or made illegal by the antitrust laws, nor to exempt any person from the 
penal provisions thereof or the civil remedies therein provided. 
Nothing contained in this section shall apply to transactions duly 
consummated pursuant to authority given by the Secretary of Transportation, 
Federal Power Commission, Surface Transportation Board, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission in the exercise of its jurisdiction under section 79j of 
this title, the United States Maritime Commission, or the Secretary of 
Agriculture under any statutory provision vesting such power in such 
Commission, Board, or Secretary. 
The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58  
 Section 5 
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(a) Declaration of unlawfulness; power to prohibit unfair practices; 
inapplicability to foreign trade   
(1)  Unfair  methods  of  competition  in  or  affecting  commerce,  
and  unfair  or  deceptive  acts  or  practices  in  or affecting 
commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.   
(2) The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, 
partnerships, or corporations, except banks, savings and loan institutions 
described in section 57a (f)(3) of this title, Federal credit unions described in 
section 57a (f)(4) of this title, common carriers subject to the Acts to 
regulate commerce, air carriers and foreign air carriers subject to part A of 
subtitle VII of title 49, and persons, partnerships, or corporations insofar as 
they are subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, as amended [7 
U.S.C. 181 et seq.], except as provided in section  406(b)  of  said  Act  
[7  U.S.C.  227  (b)],  from  using  unfair  methods  of  competition  
in  or  affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce.   
(3) This subsection shall not apply to unfair methods of competition involving 
commerce with foreign nations (other than import commerce) unless—  
(A) such methods of competition have a direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable effect—   
(i) on commerce which is not commerce with foreign nations, or on import 
commerce with foreign nations; or   
(ii) on export commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in such 
commerce in the United States; and   
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(B) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of this subsection, 
other than this paragraph.   
If this subsection applies to such methods of competition only because of the 
operation of subparagraph (A) (ii), this subsection shall apply to such conduct 
only for injury to export business in the United States.   
(4)  (A)  For  purposes  of  subsection  (a),  the  term  ―unfair  or  
deceptive  acts  or  practices‖  includes  such  acts  or practices 
involving foreign commerce that—   
(i) cause or are likely to cause reasonably foreseeable injury within the 
United States; or   
(ii) involve material conduct occurring within the United States.   
(B)  All  remedies  available  to  the  Commission  with  respect  to  
unfair  and  deceptive  acts  or  practices  shall  be available for acts 
and practices described in this paragraph, including restitution to domestic or 
foreign victims.   
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